STEWART v. DUTRA CONSTRUCTION CO.

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STEWART v. DUTRA CONSTRUCTION CO.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the first circuit
No. 03–814. Argued November 1, 2004—Decided February 22, 2005
As part of a project to extend the Massachusetts Turnpike, respondent
Dutra Construction Company dug a trench beneath Boston Harbor
using its dredge, the Super Scoop, a floating platform with a bucket that
removes silt from the ocean floor and dumps it onto adjacent scows.
The Super Scoop has limited means of self-propulsion, but can navigate
short distances by manipulating its anchors and cables. When dredg-
ing the trench here, it typically moved once every couple of hours.
Petitioner, a marine engineer hired by Dutra to maintain the Super
Scoop’s mechanical systems, was seriously injured while repairing a
scow’s engine when the Super Scoop and the scow collided. He sued
Dutra under the Jones Act, alleging that he was a seaman injured by
Dutra’s negligence, and under § 5(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Work-
ers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U. S. C. § 905(b), which authorizes
covered employees to sue a “vessel” owner as a third party for an injury
caused by the owner’s negligence. The District Court granted Dutra
summary judgment on the Jones Act claim, and the First Circuit af-
firmed. On remand, the District Court granted Dutra summary judg-
ment on the LHWCA claim. In affirming, the First Circuit noted that
Dutra had conceded that the Super Scoop was a “vessel” under § 905(b),
but found that Dutra’s alleged negligence had been committed in its
capacity as an employer and not as the vessel’s owner.
Held: A dredge is a “vessel” under the LHWCA. Pp. 487–497.
(a) Congress enacted the Jones Act in 1920 to remove the bar to negli-
gence suits by seamen. Although that Act does not define “seaman,”
the maritime law backdrop at the time it was passed shows that “sea-
man” is a term of art with an established meaning under general mari-
time law. The LHWCA, enacted in 1927 to provide scheduled compen-
sation to land-based maritime workers but not to “a master or member
of a crew of any vessel,” 33 U. S. C. § 902(3)(G), works in tandem with
the Jones Act: The Jones Act provides tort remedies to sea-based mari-
time workers and the LHWCA provides workers’ compensation to
land-based maritime employees. In McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander,
498 U. S. 337, and Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U. S. 347, this Court
addressed the relationship a worker must have to a vessel in order to
be a “master or member” of its crew. Now the Court turns to the other

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half of the LHWCA’s equation: determining whether a watercraft is a
vessel. Pp. 487–488.
(b) The LHWCA did not define “vessel” when enacted, but §§ 1 and
3 of the Revised Statutes of 1873 specified that, in any Act passed after
February 25, 1871, “ ‘vessel’ includes every description of water-craft or
other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of
transportation on water.” The LHWCA is such an Act. Section 3’s
definition has remained virtually unchanged to the present and contin-
ues to supply the default definition of “vessel” throughout the U. S.
Code. Section 3 merely codified the meaning “vessel” had acquired in
general maritime law. In fact, prior to the passage of the Jones Act
and the LHWCA, this Court and lower courts had treated dredges as
vessels. By the time those Acts became law in the 1920’s, it was settled
that § 3 defined “vessel” for their purposes, and that a structure’s status
as a vessel under § 3 depended on whether the structure was an instru-
ment of naval transportation. See Ellis v. United States, 206 U. S. 246,
259. Then as now, dredges served a waterborne transportation func-
tion: In performing their work they carried machinery, equipment, and
a crew over water. This Court has continued to treat § 3 as defining
“vessel” in the LHWCA and to construe § 3 consistently with general
maritime law. Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U. S. 565. Pp. 488–492.
(c) Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., 119 U. S. 625, and Evansville &
Bowling Green Packet Co. v. Chero Cola Bottling Co., 271 U. S. 19, did
not adopt a definition of vesselhood narrower than § 3. Rather, they
made a sensible distinction between watercraft temporarily stationed in
a particular location and those permanently anchored to shore or the
ocean floor. A watercraft is not capable of being used for maritime
transport in any meaningful sense if it has been permanently moored or
otherwise rendered practically incapable of transportation or move-
ment. By including special-purpose vessels like dredges, § 3 sweeps
broadly, but other prerequisites to qualifying for seaman status under
the Jones Act provide some limits. A worker seeking such status must
prove that his duties contributed to the vessel’s function or mission and
that his connection to the vessel was substantial in nature and duration.
Chandris, supra, at 376. Pp. 493–495.
(d) The First Circuit held that the Super Scoop is not a “vessel” be-
cause its primary purpose is not navigation or commerce and because it
was not in actual transit at the time of Stewart’s injury. Neither prong
of that test is consistent with § 3’s text or general maritime law’s estab-
lished meaning of “vessel.” Section 3 requires only that a watercraft
be “used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on
water,” not that it be used primarily for that purpose. The Super
Scoop was not only “capable of being used” to transport equipment and

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Syllabus
passengers over water—it was so used. Similarly, requiring a water-
craft to be in motion to qualify as a vessel under § 3 is the sort of “snap-
shot” test rejected in Chandris. That a vessel must be “in navigation,”
Chandris, supra, at 373–374, means not that a structure’s locomotion at
any given moment matters, but that structures may lose their character
as vessels if withdrawn from the water for an extended period. The
“in navigation” requirement is thus relevant to whether a craft is “used,
or capable of being used,” for naval transportation. The inquiry
whether a craft is “used, or capable of being used,” for maritime trans-
portation may involve factual issues for a jury, but here no relevant
facts were in dispute. Dutra conceded that the Super Scoop was only
temporarily stationary while the scow was being repaired; it had not
been taken out of service, permanently anchored, or otherwise rendered
practically incapable of maritime transport. Finally, Dutra conceded
that the Super Scoop is a “vessel” under § 905(b), which imposes
LHWCA liability on vessel owners for negligence to longshoremen.
However, the LHWCA does not meaningfully define the term “vessel”
in either § 902(3)(G) or § 905(b), and 1 U. S. C. § 3 defines the term “ves-
sel” throughout the LHWCA. Pp. 495–497.
343 F. 3d 10, reversed and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Mem-
bers joined, except Rehnquist, C. J., who took no part in the decision of
the case.
David B. Kaplan argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Thomas M. Bond, David W. Robert-
son, and Michael F. Sturley.
Lisa S. Blatt argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief were
former Solicitor General Olson, Deputy Solicitor General
Hungar, Howard M. Radzely, Allen H. Feldman, and Mark
S. Flynn.
Frederick E. Connelly, Jr., argued the cause for respond-
ent. With him on the brief were Harvey Weiner and John
J. O’Connor.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Association
of Trial Lawyers of America by John W. deGravelles and David S. Casey,
Jr.; for Diamond Offshore Drilling, Inc., et al. by James Patr ick

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Opinion of the Court
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is whether a dredge is a “vessel”
under § 2(3)(G) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Com-
pensation Act (LHWCA), 44 Stat., pt. 2, p. 1425, as added
by § 2(a) of Pub. L. 98–426, 33 U. S. C. § 902(3)(G). We hold
that it is.
I
As part of Boston’s Central Artery/Tunnel Project, or “Big
Dig,” the Commonwealth of Massachusetts undertook to ex-
tend the Massachusetts Turnpike through a tunnel running
beneath South Boston and Boston Harbor to Logan Airport.
The Commonwealth employed respondent Dutra Construc-
tion Company to assist in that undertaking. At the time,
Dutra owned the world’s largest dredge, the Super Scoop,
which was capable of digging the 50-foot-deep, 100-foot-wide,
three-quarter-mile-long trench beneath Boston Harbor that
is now the Ted Williams Tunnel.
The Super Scoop is a massive floating platform from which
a clamshell bucket is suspended beneath the water. The
bucket removes silt from the ocean floor and dumps the sedi-
ment onto one of two scows that float alongside the dredge.
The Super Scoop has certain characteristics common to sea-
going vessels, such as a captain and crew, navigational lights,
ballast tanks, and a crew dining area. But it lacks others.
Most conspicuously, the Super Scoop has only limited means
of self-propulsion. It is moved long distances by tugboat.
(To work on the Big Dig, it was towed from its home base
in California through the Panama Canal and up the eastern
seaboard to Boston Harbor.) It navigates short distances
by manipulating its anchors and cables. When dredging the
Cooney; and for the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America by John R. Hillsman and John T. DeCarlo.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Signal Mu-
tual Indemnity Association by John J. Walsh; and for T. W. LaQuay Dredg-
ing, Inc., by Gus David Oppermann V.

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Boston Harbor trench, it typically moved in this way once
every couple of hours, covering a distance of 30-to-50 feet
each time.
Dutra hired petitioner Willard Stewart, a marine engi-
neer, to maintain the mechanical systems on the Super Scoop
during its dredging of the harbor. At the time of Stewart’s
accident, the Super Scoop lay idle because one of its scows,
Scow No. 4, had suffered an engine malfunction and the other
was at sea. Stewart was on board Scow No. 4, feeding wires
through an open hatch located about 10 feet above the engine
area. While Stewart was perched beside the hatch, the
Super Scoop used its bucket to move the scow. In the proc-
ess, the scow collided with the Super Scoop, causing a jolt
that plunged Stewart headfirst through the hatch to the deck
below. He was seriously injured.
Stewart sued Dutra in the United States District Court
for the District of Massachusetts under the Jones Act, 38
Stat. 1185, as amended, 41 Stat. 1007 and 96 Stat. 1955, 46
U. S. C. App. § 688(a), alleging that he was a seaman injured
by Dutra’s negligence. He also filed an alternative claim
under § 5(b) of the LHWCA, 33 U. S. C. § 905(b), which au-
thorizes covered employees to sue a “vessel” owner as a
third party for an injury caused by the owner’s negligence.
Dutra moved for summary judgment on the Jones Act
claim, arguing that Stewart was not a seaman. The com-
pany acknowledged that Stewart was “a member of the
[Super Scoop’s] crew,” 230 F. 3d 461, 466 (CA1 2000); that he
spent “[n]inety-nine percent of his time while on the job”
aboard the Super Scoop, App. 20 (Defendant’s Memorandum
in Support of Summary Judgment); and that his “duties con-
tributed to the function” of the Super Scoop, id., at 32.
Dutra argued only that the Super Scoop was not a vessel for
purposes of the Jones Act. Dutra pointed to the Court of
Appeals’ en banc decision in DiGiovanni v. Traylor Broth-
ers, Inc., 959 F. 2d 1119 (CA1 1992), which held that “if a

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barge . . . or other float’s purpose or primary business is not
navigation or commerce, then workers assigned thereto for
its shore enterprise are to be considered seamen only when
it is in actual navigation or transit” at the time of the plain-
tiff ’s injury. Id., at 1123 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The District Court granted summary judgment to Dutra,
because the Super Scoop’s primary purpose was dredging
rather than transportation and because it was stationary at
the time of Stewart’s injury.
On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed,
concluding that it too was bound by DiGiovanni. 230 F. 3d,
at 467–468. The court reasoned that the Super Scoop’s pri-
mary function was construction and that “[a]ny navigation
or transportation that may be required is incidental to this
primary function.” Id., at 468. The court also concluded
that the scow’s movement at the time of the accident did not
help Stewart, because his status as a seaman depended on
the movement of the Super Scoop (which was stationary)
rather than the scow. Id., at 469.
On remand, the District Court granted summary judgment
in favor of Dutra on Stewart’s alternative claim that Dutra
was liable for negligence as an owner of a “vessel” under the
LHWCA, 33 U. S. C. § 905(b). The Court of Appeals again
affirmed. It noted that Dutra had conceded that the Super
Scoop was a “vessel” for purposes of § 905(b), explaining that
“the LHWCA’s definition of ‘vessel’ is ‘significantly more in-
clusive than that used for evaluating seaman status under
the Jones Act.’ ” 343 F. 3d 10, 13 (CA1 2003) (quoting More-
head v. Atkinson-Kiewit, J/V, 97 F. 3d 603, 607 (CA1 1996)
(en banc)). The Court of Appeals nonetheless agreed with
the District Court’s conclusion that Dutra’s alleged negli-
gence was committed in its capacity as an employer rather
than as owner of the vessel under § 905(b).
We granted certiorari to resolve confusion over how to de-
termine whether a watercraft is a “vessel” for purposes of
the LHWCA. 540 U. S. 1177 (2004).

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II
Prior to the passage of the Jones Act, general maritime
law usually entitled a seaman who fell sick or was injured
both to maintenance and cure (or the right to be cared for
and paid wages during the voyage, see, e. g., Harden v.
Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 482–483 (No. 6,047) (CC Me. 1823)
(Story, J.)), and to damages for any “injuries received . . . in
consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship,” The Osce-
ola, 189 U. S. 158, 175 (1903). Suits against shipowners for
negligence, however, were barred. Courts presumed that
the seaman, in signing articles of employment for the voyage,
had assumed the risks of his occupation; thus a seaman was
“not allowed to recover an indemnity for the negligence of
the master, or any member of the crew.” Ibid.
Congress enacted the Jones Act in 1920 to remove this
bar to negligence suits by seamen. See Chandris, Inc. v.
Latsis, 515 U. S. 347, 354 (1995). Specifically, the Jones Act
provides:
“Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the
course of his employment may, at his election, maintain
an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by
jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States
modifying or extending the common-law right or rem-
edy in cases of personal injury to railway employees
shall apply.” 46 U. S. C. App. § 688(a).
Although the statute is silent on who is a “seaman,” both the
maritime law backdrop against which Congress enacted the
Jones Act and Congress’ subsequent enactments provide
some guidance.
First, “seaman” is a term of art that had an established
meaning under general maritime law. We have thus pre-
sumed that when the Jones Act made available negligence
remedies to “[a]ny seaman who shall suffer personal injury
in the course of his employment,” Congress took the term
“seaman” as the general maritime law found it. Chandris,

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supra, at 355 (citing Warner v. Goltra, 293 U. S. 155, 159
(1934)); G. Gilmore & C. Black, Law of Admiralty § 6–21,
pp. 328–329 (2d ed. 1975).
Second, Congress provided further guidance in 1927 when
it enacted the LHWCA, which provides scheduled compensa-
tion to land-based maritime workers but which also excepts
from its coverage “a master or member of a crew of any
vessel.” 33 U. S. C. § 902(3)(G). This exception is simply
“a refinement of the term ‘seaman’ in the Jones Act.” Mc-
Dermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U. S. 337, 347 (1991).
Thus, the Jones Act and the LHWCA are complementary
regimes that work in tandem: The Jones Act provides tort
remedies to sea-based maritime workers, while the LHWCA
provides workers’ compensation to land-based maritime em-
ployees. Ibid.; Swanson v. Marra Brothers, Inc., 328 U. S.
1, 6–7 (1946).
Still, discerning the contours of “seaman” status, even with
the general maritime law and the LHWCA’s language as
aids to interpretation, has not been easy. See Chandris,
supra, at 356. We began clarifying the definition of “sea-
man” in a pair of cases, McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander,
supra, and Chandris, supra, that addressed the relationship
a worker must have to a vessel in order to be a “master or
member” of its crew. We now turn to the other half of the
LHWCA’s equation: how to determine whether a watercraft
is a “vessel.”
A
Just as Congress did not define the term “seaman” in the
Jones Act,1 it did not define the term “vessel” in the LHWCA
1 The Shipping Act, 1916, defines the term “vessel” for purposes of the
Jones Act. See 46 U. S. C. App. § 801. However, the provision of the
Jones Act at issue here, § 688(a), speaks not of “vessels,” but of “seamen.”
In any event, because we have identified a Jones Act “seaman” with refer-
ence to the LHWCA’s exclusion, see 33 U. S. C. § 902(3)(G) (“a master or
member of a crew of any vessel”), it is the LHWCA’s use of the term
“vessel” that matters. And, as we explain, the context surrounding Con-

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itself.2 However, Congress provided a definition elsewhere.
At the time of the LHWCA’s enactment, §§ 1 and 3 of the
Revised Statutes of 1873 specified:
“In determining the meaning of the revised statutes,
or of any act or resolution of Congress passed subse-
quent to February twenty-fifth, eighteen hundred and
seventy-one, . . . [t]he word ‘vessel’ includes every de-
scription of water-craft or other artificial contrivance
used, or capable of being used, as a means of transporta-
tion on water.” 3 18 Stat., pt. 1, p. 1.
Sections 1 and 3 show that, because the LHWCA is an Act
of Congress passed after February 25, 1871, the LHWCA’s
use of the term “vessel” “includes every description of
water-craft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of
being used, as a means of transportation on water.” Ibid.
Section 3’s definition, repealed and recodified in 1947 as
part of the Rules of Construction Act, 1 U. S. C. § 3, has
gress’ enactment of the LHWCA suggests that Rev. Stat. § 3, now 1
U. S. C. § 3, provides the controlling definition of the term “vessel” in the
LHWCA.
2 As part of its 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA, Congress amended
the Act with what appears at first blush to be a definition of the term
“vessel”: “Unless the context requires otherwise, the term ‘vessel’ means
any vessel upon which or in connection with which any person entitled to
benefits under this chapter suffers injury or death arising out of or in the
course of his employment, and said vessel’s owner, owner pro hac vice,
agent, operator, charter or bare boat charterer, master, officer, or crew
member.” 33 U. S. C. § 902(21). However, Congress enacted this defini-
tion in conjunction with the third-party vessel owner provision of § 905(b).
Rather than specifying the characteristics of a vessel, § 902(21) instead
lists the parties liable for the negligent operation of a vessel. See McCar-
thy v. The Bark Peking, 716 F. 2d 130, 133 (CA2 1983) (§ 902(21) is “circu-
lar” and “does not provide precise guidance as to what is included within
the term ‘vessel’ ”).
3 Congress had used substantially the same definition before, first in an
1866 antismuggling statute, see § 1, 14 Stat. 178, and then in an 1870 stat-
ute “provid[ing] for the Relief of sick and disabled Seamen,” ch. clxix, 16
Stat. 169 (italics deleted); see id., § 7, at 170.

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remained virtually unchanged from 1873 to the present.4
Even now, § 3 continues to supply the default definition of
“vessel” throughout the U. S. Code, “unless the context indi-
cates otherwise.” 1 U. S. C. § 1. The context surrounding
the LHWCA’s enactment indicates that § 3 defines the term
“vessel” for purposes of the LHWCA.
Section 3 merely codified the meaning that the term “ves-
sel” had acquired in general maritime law. See 1 S. Friedell,
Benedict on Admiralty § 165 (rev. 7th ed. 2004). In the dec-
ades following its enactment, § 3 was regularly used to define
the term “vessel” in maritime jurisprudence. Taking only
the issue presented here—whether a dredge is a vessel—
prior to passage of the Jones Act and the LHWCA, courts
often used § 3’s definition to conclude that dredges were
vessels.5
From the very beginning, these courts understood the dif-
ferences between dredges and more traditional seagoing ves-
sels. Though smaller, the dredges at issue in the earliest
cases were essentially the same as the Super Scoop here.
For instance, the court could have been speaking equally of
the Super Scoop as of The Alabama when it declared:
“The dredge and scows have no means of propulsion of
their own except that the dredge, by the use of anchors,
windlass, and rope, is moved for short distances, as re-
quired in carrying on the business of dredging. Both
4 During the 1947 codification, the hyphen was removed from the word
“watercraft.” § 3, 61 Stat. 633.
5 See, e. g., The Alabama, 19 F. 544, 546 (SD Ala. 1884) (dredge was a
vessel and subject to maritime liens); Huismann v. The Pioneer, 30 F. 206,
207 (EDNY 1886) (dredge was a vessel under § 3); Saylor v. Taylor, 77 F.
476, 477 (CA4 1896) (dredge was a vessel under § 3, and its workers were
seamen); The International, 89 F. 484, 484–485 (CA3 1898) (dredge was a
vessel under § 3); Eastern S. S. Corp. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.,
256 F. 497, 500–501 (CA1 1919) (type of dredge called a “drillboat” was a
vessel under § 3); Los Angeles v. United Dredging Co., 14 F. 2d 364, 365–
366 (CA9 1926) (dredge was a vessel under § 3 and its engineers were
seamen).

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the dredge and the scows are moved from place to place
where they may be employed by being towed, and some
of the tows have been for long distances and upon the
high seas. The dredge and scows are not made for or
adapted to the carriage of freight or passengers, and the
evidence does not show that, in point of fact, this dredge
and scows had ever been so used and employed.” The
Alabama, 19 F. 544, 545 (SD Ala. 1884).
See also Huismann v. The Pioneer, 30 F. 206 (EDNY 1886).
None of this prevented the court from recognizing that
dredges are vessels because they are watercraft with “the
capacity to be navigated in and upon the waters.” The Ala-
bama, supra, at 546; see also The Pioneer, supra, at 207; The
International, 89 F. 484, 485 (CA3 1898).
This Court also treated dredges as vessels prior to the
passage of the Jones Act and the LHWCA. It did so in a
pair of cases, first implicitly in The “Virginia Ehrman” and
the “Agnese,” 97 U. S. 309 (1878), and then explicitly in Ellis
v. United States, 206 U. S. 246 (1907). In Ellis, this Court
considered, inter alia, whether workers aboard various
dredges and scows were covered by a federal labor law.
Just as in the present case, one of the Ellis appellants argued
that the dredges at issue were “vessels” within the meaning
of Rev. Stat. § 3, now 1 U. S. C. § 3. 206 U. S., at 249. The
United States responded that dredges were only vessels, if
at all, when in actual navigation as they were “towed from
port to port.” Id., at 253. Citing § 3, Justice Holmes re-
jected the Government’s argument, stating that “[t]he scows
and floating dredges were vessels” that “were within the ad-
miralty jurisdiction of the United States.” Id., at 259.
These early cases show that at the time Congress enacted
the Jones Act and the LHWCA in the 1920’s, it was settled
that § 3 defined the term “vessel” for purposes of those stat-
utes. It was also settled that a structure’s status as a vessel
under § 3 depended on whether the structure was a means
of maritime transportation. See R. Hughes, Handbook of

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Admiralty Law § 5, p. 14 (2d ed. 1920). For then, as now,
dredges served a waterborne transportation function, since
in performing their work they carried machinery, equipment,
and crew over water. See, e. g., Butler v. Ellis, 45 F. 2d 951,
955 (CA4 1930) (finding the vessel status of dredges “sus-
tained by the overwhelming weight of authority”); The Hur-
ricane, 2 F. 2d 70, 72 (ED Pa. 1924) (expressing “no doubt”
that dredges are vessels), aff ’d, 9 F. 2d 396 (CA3 1925).
This Court’s cases have continued to treat § 3 as defining
the term “vessel” in the LHWCA, and they have continued
to construe § 3’s definition in light of the term’s established
meaning in general maritime law. For instance, in Norton
v. Warner Co., 321 U. S. 565 (1944), the Court considered
whether a worker on a harbor barge was “a master or mem-
ber of a crew of any vessel” under the LHWCA, 33 U. S. C.
§ 902(3)(G). In finding that the “barge [was] a vessel within
the meaning of the Act,” the Court not only quoted § 3’s
definition of the term “vessel,” but it also cited in support of
its holding several earlier cases that had held dredges to be
vessels based on the general maritime law. 321 U. S., at 571,
and n. 4. This Court therefore confirmed in Norton that § 3
defines the term “vessel” in the LHWCA and that § 3 should
be construed consistently with the general maritime law.
Since Norton, this Court has often said that dredges and
comparable watercraft qualify as vessels under the Jones Act
and the LHWCA.6
6 See, e. g., Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.,
513 U. S. 527, 535, and n. 1 (1995) (indicating that a stationary crane barge
was a “vessel” under the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act); South-
west Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 502 U. S. 81, 92 (1991) (holding that a jury
could reasonably find that floating platforms were “vessels in navigation”
under the Jones Act); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U. S.
523, 528–530 (1983) (treating coal barge as a “vessel” under the LHWCA,
33 U. S. C. § 905(b)); cf. Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U. S. 370,
372 (1957) (assuming that a dredge was a Jones Act vessel); id., at 375,
n. 1 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (same).

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B
Despite this Court’s reliance on § 3 in cases like Ellis and
Norton, Dutra argues that the Court has implicitly narrowed
§ 3’s definition. Section 3 says that a “vessel” must be “used,
or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on
water.” 18 Stat., pt. 1, p. 1. In a pair of cases, the Court
held that a drydock, Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., 119 U. S.
625, 630 (1887), and a wharfboat attached to the mainland,
Evansville & Bowling Green Packet Co. v. Chero Cola Bot-
tling Co., 271 U. S. 19, 22 (1926), were not vessels under § 3,
because they were not practically capable of being used to
transport people, freight, or cargo from place to place. Ac-
cording to Dutra, Cope and Evansville adopted a definition
of “vessel” narrower than § 3’s text.
Dutra misreads Cope and Evansville. In Cope, the plain-
tiff sought a salvage award for having prevented a drydock
from sinking after a steamship collided with it. 119 U. S.,
at 625–626. At the time of the accident, the drydock, a
floating dock used for repairing vessels, was “moored and
lying at [the] usual place” it had occupied for the past
20 years. Id., at 626. In those circumstances, the dry-
dock was a “fixed structure” that had been “permanently
moored,” rather than a vessel that had been temporarily
anchored. Id., at 627. Evansville involved a wharfboat
secured by cables to the mainland. Local water, electric-
ity, and telephone lines all ran from shore to the wharfboat,
evincing a “permanent location.” 271 U. S., at 22. And
the wharfboat, like the drydock in Cope, was neither “taken
from place to place” nor “used to carry freight from one
place to another.” 271 U. S., at 22. As in Cope, the Court
concluded that the wharfboat “was not practically capable of
being used as a means of transportation.” 271 U. S., at 22.
Cope and Evansville did no more than construe § 3 in light
of the distinction drawn by the general maritime law be-
tween watercraft temporarily stationed in a particular loca-
tion and those permanently affixed to shore or resting on the

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494 STEWART v. DUTRA CONSTR. CO.
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ocean floor. See, e. g., The Alabama, 19 F., at 546 (noting
that vessels possess “mobility and [the] capacity to navi-
gate,” as distinct from fixed structures like wharves, dry-
docks, and bridges). Simply put, a watercraft is not “capa-
ble of being used” for maritime transport in any meaningful
sense if it has been permanently moored or otherwise ren-
dered practically incapable of transportation or movement.
This distinction is sensible: A ship and its crew do not
move in and out of Jones Act coverage depending on whether
the ship is at anchor, docked for loading or unloading, or
berthed for minor repairs, in the same way that ships taken
permanently out of the water as a practical matter do not
remain vessels merely because of the remote possibility that
they may one day sail again. See Pavone v. Mississippi
Riverboat Amusement Corp., 52 F. 3d 560, 570 (CA5 1995)
(floating casino was no longer a vessel where it “was moored
to the shore in a semi-permanent or indefinite manner”);
Kathriner v. Unisea, Inc., 975 F. 2d 657, 660 (CA9 1992)
(floating processing plant was no longer a vessel where a
“large opening [had been] cut into her hull,” rendering her
incapable of moving over the water). Even if the general
maritime law had not informed the meaning of § 3, its defini-
tion would not sweep within its reach an array of fixed struc-
tures not commonly thought of as capable of being used for
water transport. See, e. g., Leocal v. Ashcroft, ante, at 9
(“When interpreting a statute, we must give words their ‘or-
dinary or natural’ meaning” (quoting Smith v. United States,
508 U. S. 223, 228 (1993))).
Applying § 3 brings within the purview of the Jones Act
the sorts of watercraft considered vessels at the time Con-
gress passed the Act. By including special-purpose vessels
like dredges, § 3 sweeps broadly, but the other prerequisites
to qualifying for seaman status under the Jones Act provide
some limits, notwithstanding § 3’s breadth. A maritime
worker seeking Jones Act seaman status must also prove
that his duties contributed to the vessel’s function or mission,

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and that his connection to the vessel was substantial both in
nature and duration. Chandris, 515 U. S., at 376. Thus,
even though the Super Scoop is a “vessel,” workers injured
aboard the Super Scoop are eligible for seaman status only
if they are “master[s] or member[s]” of its crew.
C
The Court of Appeals, relying on its previous en banc deci-
sion in DiGiovanni v. Traylor Brothers, Inc., 959 F. 2d 1119
(CA1 1992), held that the Super Scoop is not a “vessel” be-
cause its primary purpose is not navigation or commerce and
because it was not in actual transit at the time of Stewart’s
injury. 230 F. 3d, at 468–469. Neither prong of the Court
of Appeals’ test is consistent with the text of § 3 or the estab-
lished meaning of the term “vessel” in general maritime law.
Section 3 requires only that a watercraft be “used, or capa-
ble of being used, as a means of transportation on water” to
qualify as a vessel. It does not require that a watercraft be
used primarily for that purpose. See The Alabama, supra,
at 546; The International, 89 F., at 485. As the Court of
Appeals recognized, the Super Scoop’s “function was to move
through Boston Harbor, . . . digging the ocean bottom as it
moved.” 343 F. 3d, at 12. In other words, the Super Scoop
was not only “capable of being used” to transport equipment
and workers over water—it was used to transport those
things. Indeed, it could not have dug the Ted Williams Tun-
nel had it been unable to traverse the Boston Harbor, carry-
ing with it workers like Stewart.
Also, a watercraft need not be in motion to qualify as a
vessel under § 3. Looking to whether a watercraft is mo-
tionless or moving is the sort of “snapshot” test that we re-
jected in Chandris. Just as a worker does not “oscillate
back and forth between Jones Act coverage and other reme-
dies depending on the activity in which the worker was en-
gaged while injured,” Chandris, 515 U. S., at 363, neither
does a watercraft pass in and out of Jones Act coverage

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496 STEWART v. DUTRA CONSTR. CO.
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depending on whether it was moving at the time of the
accident.
Granted, the Court has sometimes spoken of the require-
ment that a vessel be “in navigation,” id., at 373–374, but
never to indicate that a structure’s locomotion at any given
moment mattered. Rather, the point was that structures
may lose their character as vessels if they have been with-
drawn from the water for extended periods of time. Ibid.;
Roper v. United States, 368 U. S. 20, 21, 23 (1961); West v.
United States, 361 U. S. 118, 122 (1959). The Court did not
mean that the “in navigation” requirement stood apart from
§ 3, such that a “vessel” for purposes of § 3 might neverthe-
less not be a “vessel in navigation” for purposes of the Jones
Act or the LHWCA. See, e. g., United States v. Templeton,
378 F. 3d 845, 851 (CA8 2004) (“[T]he definition of ‘vessel in
navigation’ under the Jones Act is not as expansive as the
general definition of ‘vessel’ ”).
Instead, the “in navigation” requirement is an element of
the vessel status of a watercraft. It is relevant to whether
the craft is “used, or capable of being used” for maritime
transportation. A ship long lodged in a drydock or shipyard
can again be put to sea, no less than one permanently moored
to shore or the ocean floor can be cut loose and made to sail.
The question remains in all cases whether the watercraft’s
use “as a means of transportation on water” is a practical
possibility or merely a theoretical one. Supra, at 493. In
some cases that inquiry may involve factual issues for the
jury, Chandris, supra, at 373, but here no relevant facts were
in dispute. Dutra conceded that the Super Scoop was only
temporarily stationary while Stewart and others were re-
pairing the scow; the Super Scoop had not been taken out of
service, permanently anchored, or otherwise rendered prac-
tically incapable of maritime transport.
Finally, although Dutra argues that the Super Scoop is not
a “vessel” under § 902(3)(G), which is the LHWCA provision
that excludes seamen from the Act’s coverage, Dutra con-

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ceded below that the Super Scoop is a “vessel” under
§ 905(b), which is the LHWCA provision that imposes liabil-
ity on vessel owners for negligence to longshoremen. The
concession was necessary because the Court of Appeals had
previously held that § 905(b)’s use of the term “vessel” is
“ ‘significantly more inclusive than that used for evaluating
seaman status under the Jones Act.’ ” 343 F. 3d, at 13 (quot-
ing Morehead v. Atkinson-Kiewit, 97 F. 3d, at 607). The
Court of Appeals’ approach is no longer tenable. The
LHWCA does not meaningfully define the term “vessel” as
it appears in either § 902(3)(G) or § 905(b), see n. 2, supra,
and 1 U. S. C. § 3 defines the term “vessel” throughout the
LHWCA.
III
At the time that Congress enacted the LHWCA and since,
Rev. Stat. § 3, now 1 U. S. C. § 3, has defined the term “ves-
sel” in the LHWCA. Under § 3, a “vessel” is any watercraft
practically capable of maritime transportation, regardless of
its primary purpose or state of transit at a particular mo-
ment. Because the Super Scoop was engaged in maritime
transportation at the time of Stewart’s injury, it was a vessel
within the meaning of 1 U. S. C. § 3. Despite the seeming
incongruity of grouping dredges alongside more traditional
seafaring vessels under the maritime statutes, Congress and
the courts have long done precisely that:
“[I]t seems a stretch of the imagination to class the deck
hands of a mud dredge in the quiet waters of a Potomac
creek with the bold and skillful mariners who breast
the angry waves of the Atlantic; but such and so far-
reaching are the principles which underlie the jurisdic-
tion of the courts of admiralty that they adapt them-
selves to all the new kinds of property and new sets of
operatives and new conditions which are brought into
existence in the progress of the world.” Saylor v. Tay-
lor, 77 F. 476, 479 (CA4 1896).

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498 STEWART v. DUTRA CONSTR. CO.
Opinion of the Court
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The Chief Justice took no part in the decision of this
case.