JACKSON v. BIRMINGHAM BOARD OF EDUCATION

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167 OCTOBER TERM, 2004
Syllabus
JACKSON v. BIRMINGHAM BOARD OF EDUCATION
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 02–1672. Argued November 30, 2004—Decided March 29, 2005
After petitioner, the girls’ basketball coach at a public high school, discov-
ered that his team was not receiving equal funding and equal access to
athletic equipment and facilities, he complained unsuccessfully to his
supervisors. He then received negative work evaluations and ulti-
mately was removed as the girls’ coach. He brought this suit alleging
that respondent school board (Board) had retaliated against him because
he had complained about sex discrimination in the high school’s athletic
program, and that such retaliation violated Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a), which provides that “[n]o per-
son . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be . . . subjected to discrimination
under any education program . . . receiving Federal financial assistance.”
The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Title
IX’s private cause of action does not include claims of retaliation, and
the Eleventh Circuit agreed and affirmed. The appeals court also con-
cluded that, under Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, the Depart-
ment of Education’s Title IX regulation expressly prohibiting retaliation
does not create a private cause of action, and that, even if Title IX
prohibits retaliation, petitioner is not within the class of persons the
statute protects.
Held: Title IX’s private right of action encompasses claims of retaliation
against an individual because he has complained about sex discrimina-
tion. Pp. 173–184.
(a) When a funding recipient retaliates against a person because he
complains of sex discrimination, this constitutes intentional “discrimina-
tion” “on the basis of sex,” in violation of Title IX. This Court has held
that Title IX implies a private right of action to enforce its prohibition
on intentional sex discrimination, Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U. S. 677, 690–693, and that that right includes actions for monetary
damages by private persons, Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools, 503 U. S. 60, and encompasses intentional sex discrimination in
the form of a recipient’s deliberate indifference to sexual harassment of
a student by a teacher, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist.,
524 U. S. 274, 290–291, or by another student, Davis v. Monroe County
Bd. of Ed., 526 U. S. 629, 642. In all of these cases, the Court relied on

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168 JACKSON v. BIRMINGHAM BD. OF ED.
Syllabus
Title IX’s broad language prohibiting a funding recipient from intention-
ally subjecting any person to “discrimination” “on the basis of sex.”
Retaliation is, by definition, an intentional act. It is a form of “discrimi-
nation” because the complainant is subjected to differential treatment.
Moreover, it is discrimination “on the basis of sex” because it is an inten-
tional response to the nature of the complaint: an allegation of sex dis-
crimination. The Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that Title IX does not
prohibit retaliation because it is silent on the subject ignores the import
of this Court’s repeated holdings construing “discrimination” under
Title IX broadly to include conduct, such as sexual harassment, which
the statute does not expressly mention. The fact that Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 expressly prohibits retaliation is of limited use
with respect to Title IX. Title VII is a vastly different statute, which
details the conduct that constitutes prohibited discrimination. Because
Congress did not list any specific discriminatory practices in Title IX,
its failure to mention one such practice says nothing about whether it
intended that practice to be covered. Moreover, Congress’ enactment
of Title IX just three years after Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,
396 U. S. 229—in which this Court interpreted 42 U. S. C. § 1982’s gen-
eral prohibition of racial discrimination to include retaliation against a
white man for advocating the rights of blacks—provides a realistic basis
for presuming that Congress expected Title IX to be interpreted in
conformity with Sullivan. Pp. 173–177.
(b) The Board cannot rely on this Court’s holding in Sandoval, supra,
at 285, that, because Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 itself pro-
hibits only intentional discrimination, private parties could not obtain
redress for disparate-impact discrimination based on the Justice Depart-
ment’s Title VI regulations prohibiting federal funding recipients from
adopting policies with such an impact. Citing the Education Depart-
ment’s Title IX retaliation regulation, the Board contends that Jackson,
like the Sandoval petitioners, seeks an impermissible extension of the
statute when he argues that Title IX’s private right of action encom-
passes retaliation. This argument, however, entirely misses the point.
The Court does not here rely on the Education Department regulation
at all, because Title IX’s text itself contains the necessary prohibition:
Retaliation against a person who speaks out against sex discrimination
is intentional “discrimination” “on the basis of sex” within the statute’s
meaning. Pp. 177–178.
(c) Nor is the Court convinced by the Board’s argument that, even if
Title IX’s private right of action encompasses discrimination, Jackson
is not entitled to invoke it because he is an “indirect victi[m]” of sex
discrimination. The statute is broadly worded; it does not require that
the victim of the retaliation also be the victim of the discrimination that

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Syllabus
is the subject of the original complaint. Where the retaliation occurs
because the complainant speaks out about sex discrimination, the stat-
ute’s “on the basis of sex” requirement is satisfied. The complainant is
himself a victim of discriminatory retaliation, regardless of whether he
was the subject of the original complaint. Cf. Sullivan, supra, at 237.
Congress enacted Title IX not only to prevent the use of federal dollars
to support discriminatory practices, but also “to provide individual citi-
zens effective protection against those practices.” Cannon, supra, at
704. This objective would be difficult to achieve if persons complaining
about sex discrimination did not have effective protection against retali-
ation. Pp. 179–181.
(d) Nor can the Board rely on the principle that, because Title IX was
enacted as an exercise of Congress’ Spending Clause powers, a private
damages action is available only if the federal funding recipient had
adequate notice that it could be held liable for the conduct at issue, see,
e. g., Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1,
17. Pennhurst does not preclude such an action where, as here, the
funding recipient engages in intentional acts that clearly violate Title
IX. See, e. g., Davis, supra, at 642. Moreover, the Board should have
been put on notice that it could be held liable for retaliation by the fact
that this Court’s cases since Cannon have consistently interpreted Title
IX’s private cause of action broadly to encompass diverse forms of inten-
tional sex discrimination; by Title IX itself, which expressly prohibits
intentional conduct that violates clear statutory terms, Davis, 526 U. S.,
at 642; by the regulations implementing Title IX, which clearly prohibit
retaliation and have been on the books for nearly 30 years; and by the
holdings of all of the Courts of Appeals that had considered the question
at the time of the conduct at issue that Title IX covers retaliation. The
Board could not have realistically supposed that, given this context, it
remained free to retaliate against those who reported sex discrimina-
tion. Cf. id., at 644. Pp. 181–184.
(e) To prevail on the merits, Jackson will have to prove that the Board
retaliated against him because he complained of sex discrimination. At
the present stage, the issue is not whether he will ultimately prevail, but
whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claims. P. 184.
309 F. 3d 1333, reversed and remanded.
O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissent-
ing opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia and Kennedy, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 184.

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170 JACKSON v. BIRMINGHAM BD. OF ED.
Counsel
Walter Dellinger argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Marcia D. Greenberger, Jocelyn Sam-
uels, Dina R. Lassow, Matthew D. Roberts, and Pamela A.
Harris.
Irving L. Gornstein argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the
brief were Acting Solicitor General Clement, Assistant At-
torney General Acosta, Dennis J. Dimsey, and Linda F.
Thome.
Kenneth L. Thomas argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief was Valerie L. Acoff.
Kevin C. Newsom, Solicitor General of Alabama, argued
the cause for the State of Alabama et al. as amici curiae
urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Troy King,
Attorney General, and the Attorneys General for their re-
spective States as follows: M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Mark
J. Bennett of Hawaii, Brian Sandoval of Nevada, Hardy
Myers of Oregon, Lawrence E. Long of South Dakota, Paul
G. Summers of Tennessee, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, and
Jerry W. Kilgore of Virginia.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Bar
Association by Robert J. Grey, Jr., Nancy L. Perkins, and Kristen Galles;
for the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights by Virginia A. Seitz, Ste-
ven Shapiro, and Lenora M. Lapidus; for the National Education Associa-
tion et al. by Jeremiah A. Collins, Alice O’Brien, David M. Rabban,
Donna R. Euben, and Ann D. Springer; for the National Partnership for
Women & Families et al. by Caroline M. Brown; for New York Lawyers
for the Public Interest et al. by Jeffrey A. Lamken, Macey Reasoner
Stokes, J. Richard Cohen, and Rhonda Brownstein; and for Birch Bayh by
John F. Cooney, Margaret N. Strand, and Kevin O. Faley.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Eagle Forum
Education & Legal Defense Fund by Andrew L. Schlafly; for the National
School Boards Association et al. by Julie Underwood and Naomi Gittins;
for the National Wrestling Coaches Association by Lawrence J. Joseph;
and for the Pacific Legal Foundation by John H. Findley.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the College Sports Council by
Mr. Joseph; and for the Women’s Sports Foundation et al. by Nancy
Hogshead-Makar and Howard R. Rubin.

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Opinion of the Court
Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.
Roderick Jackson, a teacher in the Birmingham, Alabama,
public schools, brought suit against the Birmingham Board
of Education (Board) alleging that the Board retaliated
against him because he had complained about sex discrimina-
tion in the high school’s athletic program. Jackson claimed
that the Board’s retaliation violated Title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92–318, 86 Stat. 373, as
amended, 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq. The District Court dis-
missed Jackson’s complaint on the ground that Title IX does
not prohibit retaliation, and the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 309 F. 3d 1333 (2002). We con-
sider here whether the private right of action implied by
Title IX encompasses claims of retaliation. We hold that it
does where the funding recipient retaliates against an indi-
vidual because he has complained about sex discrimination.
I
Because Jackson’s Title IX claim was dismissed under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, “we must assume
the truth of the material facts as alleged in the complaint.”
Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U. S. 322, 325 (1991).
According to the complaint, Jackson has been an employee
of the Birmingham school district for over 10 years. In
1993, the Board hired Jackson to serve as a physical educa-
tion teacher and girls’ basketball coach. Jackson was trans-
ferred to Ensley High School in August 1999. At Ensley, he
discovered that the girls’ team was not receiving equal fund-
ing and equal access to athletic equipment and facilities.
The lack of adequate funding, equipment, and facilities made
it difficult for Jackson to do his job as the team’s coach.
In December 2000, Jackson began complaining to his
supervisors about the unequal treatment of the girls’ basket-
ball team, but to no avail. Jackson’s complaints went unan-
swered, and the school failed to remedy the situation. In-

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Opinion of the Court
stead, Jackson began to receive negative work evaluations
and ultimately was removed as the girls’ coach in May 2001.
Jackson is still employed by the Board as a teacher, but he
no longer receives supplemental pay for coaching.
After the Board terminated Jackson’s coaching duties, he
filed suit in the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Alabama. He alleged, among other things,
that the Board violated Title IX by retaliating against him
for protesting the discrimination against the girls’ basketball
team. Amended Complaint 2–3, App. 10–11. The Board
moved to dismiss on the ground that Title IX’s private cause
of action does not include claims of retaliation. The District
Court granted the motion to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
309 F. 3d 1333 (2002). It assumed, for purposes of the ap-
peal, that the Board retaliated against Jackson for complain-
ing about Title IX violations. It then held that Jackson’s
suit failed to state a claim because Title IX does not provide
a private right of action for retaliation, reasoning that
“[n]othing in the text indicates any congressional concern
with retaliation that might be visited on those who complain
of Title IX violations.” Id., at 1344. Relying on our deci-
sion in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275 (2001), the
Court of Appeals also concluded that a Department of Educa-
tion regulation expressly prohibiting retaliation does not
create a private cause of action for retaliation: “Because Con-
gress has not created a right through Title IX to redress
harms resulting from retaliation, [the regulation] may not be
read to create one either.” 309 F. 3d, at 1346. Finally, the
court held that, even if Title IX prohibits retaliation, Jackson
would not be entitled to relief because he is not within the
class of persons protected by the statute.
We granted certiorari, 542 U. S. 903 (2004), to resolve a
conflict in the Circuits over whether Title IX’s private right
of action encompasses claims of retaliation for complaints
about sex discrimination. Compare Lowrey v. Texas A & M

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Univ. System, 117 F. 3d 242, 252 (CA5 1997) (“[T]itle IX af-
fords an implied cause of action for retaliation”); Preston v.
Virginia ex rel. New River Community College, 31 F. 3d 203,
206 (CA4 1994) (same), with the case below, supra.
II
A
Title IX prohibits sex discrimination by recipients of fed-
eral education funding. The statute provides that “[n]o per-
son in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any education program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. ” 20
U. S. C. § 1681(a). More than 25 years ago, in Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 690–693 (1979), we held
that Title IX implies a private right of action to enforce
its prohibition on intentional sex discrimination. In subse-
quent cases, we have defined the contours of that right of
action. In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,
503 U. S. 60 (1992), we held that it authorizes private parties
to seek monetary damages for intentional violations of Title
IX. We have also held that the private right of action en-
compasses intentional sex discrimination in the form of a
recipient’s deliberate indifference to a teacher’s sexual har-
assment of a student, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent
School Dist., 524 U. S. 274, 290–291 (1998), or to sexual har-
assment of a student by another student, Davis v. Monroe
County Bd. of Ed., 526 U. S. 629, 642 (1999).
In all of these cases, we relied on the text of Title IX,
which, subject to a list of narrow exceptions not at issue
here, broadly prohibits a funding recipient from subjecting
any person to “discrimination” “on the basis of sex.” 20
U. S. C. § 1681. Retaliation against a person because that
person has complained of sex discrimination is another form
of intentional sex discrimination encompassed by Title IX’s
private cause of action. Retaliation is, by definition, an in-

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tentional act. It is a form of “discrimination” because the
complainant is being subjected to differential treatment.
See generally Olmstead v. L. C., 527 U. S. 581, 614 (1999)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (the “normal defini-
tion of discrimination” is “differential treatment”); see also
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462
U. S. 669, 682, n. 22 (1983) (discrimination means “less favor-
able” treatment). Moreover, retaliation is discrimination
“on the basis of sex” because it is an intentional response to
the nature of the complaint: an allegation of sex discrimina-
tion. We conclude that when a funding recipient retaliates
against a person because he complains of sex discrimination,
this constitutes intentional “discrimination” “on the basis of
sex,” in violation of Title IX.
The Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Title IX does not
prohibit retaliation because the “statute makes no mention
of retaliation,” 309 F. 3d, at 1344, ignores the import of our
repeated holdings construing “discrimination” under Title IX
broadly. Though the statute does not mention sexual har-
assment, we have held that sexual harassment is intentional
discrimination encompassed by Title IX’s private right of ac-
tion. Franklin, 503 U. S., at 74–75; see also id., at 75 (noting
that, under Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U. S.
57, 64 (1986), “ ‘when a supervisor sexually harasses a subor-
dinate because of the subordinate’s sex, that supervisor “dis-
criminate[s]” on the basis of sex,’ ” and holding that “the
same rule should apply when a teacher sexually harasses . . .
a student”). Thus, a recipient’s deliberate indifference to a
teacher’s sexual harassment of a student also “violate[s] Title
IX’s plain terms.” Davis, supra, at 643 (citing Gebser,
supra, at 290–291). Likewise, a recipient’s deliberate indif-
ference to sexual harassment of a student by another student
also squarely constitutes “discrimination” “on the basis of
sex.” Davis, 526 U. S., at 643; see also id., at 650 (“Having
previously determined that ‘sexual harassment’ is ‘discrimi-
nation’ . . . under Title IX, we are constrained to conclude

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that student-on-student sexual harassment, if sufficiently
severe, can likewise rise to the level of discrimination action-
able under the statute”). “Discrimination” is a term that
covers a wide range of intentional unequal treatment; by
using such a broad term, Congress gave the statute a broad
reach. See North Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Bell, 456 U. S. 512,
521 (1982) (Courts “ ‘must accord’ ” Title IX “ ‘a sweep as
broad as its language’ ”).
Congress certainly could have mentioned retaliation in
Title IX expressly, as it did in § 704 of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 257, as amended, 86 Stat. 109, 42
U. S. C. § 2000e–3(a) (providing that it is an “unlawful em-
ployment practice” for an employer to retaliate against an
employee because he has “opposed any practice made an un-
lawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
[Title VII]”). Title VII, however, is a vastly different
statute from Title IX, see Gebser, 524 U. S., at 283–284,
286–287, and the comparison the Board urges us to draw is
therefore of limited use. Title IX’s cause of action is im-
plied, while Title VII’s is express. See id., at 283–284.
Title IX is a broadly written general prohibition on discrimi-
nation, followed by specific, narrow exceptions to that broad
prohibition. See 20 U. S. C. § 1681. By contrast, Title VII
spells out in greater detail the conduct that constitutes dis-
crimination in violation of that statute. See 42 U. S. C.
§§ 2000e–2 (giving examples of unlawful employment prac-
tices), 2000e–3 (prohibiting “[o]ther unlawful employment
practices,” including (a) “[d]iscrimination” in the form of re-
taliation; and (b) the discriminatory practice of “[p]rinting or
publication of notices or advertisements indicating prohib-
ited preference . . . ”). Because Congress did not list any
specific discriminatory practices when it wrote Title IX, its
failure to mention one such practice does not tell us anything
about whether it intended that practice to be covered.

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Opinion of the Court
Title IX was enacted in 1972, three years after our deci-
sion in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229
(1969). In Sullivan, we held that Rev. Stat. § 1978, 42
U. S. C. § 1982, which provides that “[a]ll citizens of the
United States shall have the same right . . . as is enjoyed by
white citizens . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property,” protected a white man
who spoke out against discrimination toward one of his ten-
ants and who suffered retaliation as a result. Sullivan had
rented a house to a black man and assigned him a member-
ship share and use rights in a private park. The corporation
that owned the park would not approve the assignment to
the black lessee. Sullivan protested, and the corporation re-
taliated against him by expelling him and taking his shares.
Sullivan sued the corporation, and we upheld Sullivan’s cause
of action under 42 U. S. C. § 1982 for “[retaliation] for the
advocacy of [the black person’s] cause.” 396 U. S., at 237.
Thus, in Sullivan we interpreted a general prohibition on
racial discrimination to cover retaliation against those who
advocate the rights of groups protected by that prohibition.1
Congress enacted Title IX just three years after Sullivan
was decided, and accordingly that decision provides a valu-
able context for understanding the statute. As we recog-
nized in Cannon, “it is not only appropriate but also realistic
to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar with [Sul-
livan] and that it expected its enactment [of Title IX] to be
interpreted in conformity with [it].” 441 U. S., at 699; see
also id., at 698, n. 22. Retaliation for Jackson’s advocacy of
the rights of the girls’ basketball team in this case is “dis-
1 Justice Thomas contends that Sullivan merely decided that the white
owner had standing to assert the rights of the black lessee. Post, at 194
(dissenting opinion). But Sullivan’s holding was not so limited. It
plainly held that the white owner could maintain his own private cause of
action under § 1982 if he could show that he was “punished for trying to
vindicate the rights of minorities.” 396 U. S., at 237.

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crimination” “on the basis of sex,” just as retaliation for ad-
vocacy on behalf of a black lessee in Sullivan was discrimina-
tion on the basis of race.
B
The Board contends that our decision in Alexander v. San-
doval, 532 U. S. 275 (2001), compels a holding that Title IX’s
private right of action does not encompass retaliation. San-
doval involved an interpretation of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, as amended, 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000d et seq., which provides in § 601 that no person shall,
“on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity” cov-
ered by Title VI. 42 U. S. C. § 2000d. Section 602 of Title
VI authorizes federal agencies to effectuate the provisions
in § 601 by enacting regulations. Pursuant to that authority,
the Department of Justice promulgated regulations prohibit-
ing funding recipients from adopting policies that had “the
effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of
their race, color, or national origin.” 28 CFR § 42.104(b)(2)
(1999). The Sandoval petitioners brought suit to enjoin an
English-only policy of the Alabama Department of Public
Safety on grounds that it disparately impacted non-English
speakers in violation of the regulations. Though we as-
sumed that the regulations themselves were valid, see 532
U. S., at 281, we rejected the contention that the private
right of action to enforce intentional violations of Title VI
encompassed suits to enforce the disparate-impact regula-
tions. We did so because “[i]t is clear . . . that the
disparate-impact regulations do not simply apply § 601—
since they indeed forbid conduct that § 601 permits—and
therefore clear that the private right of action to enforce
§ 601 does not include a private right to enforce these regula-
tions.” Id., at 285. See also Central Bank of Denver, N. A.
v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164, 173

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(1994) (A “private plaintiff may not bring a [suit based on a
regulation] against a defendant for acts not prohibited by
the text of [the statute]”). Thus, Sandoval held that private
parties may not invoke Title VI regulations to obtain redress
for disparate-impact discrimination because Title VI itself
prohibits only intentional discrimination.
The Board cites a Department of Education regulation
prohibiting retaliation “against any individual for the pur-
pose of interfering with any right or privilege secured by
[Title IX],” 34 CFR § 100.7(e) (2004) (incorporated by refer-
ence by § 106.71), and contends that Jackson, like the peti-
tioners in Sandoval, seeks an “impermissible extension of
the statute” when he argues that Title IX’s private right
of action encompasses retaliation. Brief for Respondent 45.
This argument, however, entirely misses the point. We do
not rely on regulations extending Title IX’s protection be-
yond its statutory limits; indeed, we do not rely on the De-
partment of Education’s regulation at all, because the statute
itself contains the necessary prohibition. As we explain
above, see supra, at 174–175, the text of Title IX prohibits a
funding recipient from retaliating against a person who
speaks out against sex discrimination, because such retalia-
tion is intentional “discrimination” “on the basis of sex.”
We reach this result based on the statute’s text. In step
with Sandoval, we hold that Title IX’s private right of action
encompasses suits for retaliation, because retaliation falls
within the statute’s prohibition of intentional discrimination
on the basis of sex.2
2 We agree with Justice Thomas that plaintiffs may not assert claims
under Title IX for conduct not prohibited by that statute. Post, at 193
(dissenting opinion). See also Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164, 173 (1994) (“[T]he private
plaintiff may not bring a 10b–5 suit against a defendant for acts not pro-
hibited by the text of § 10(b)”). But we part ways with regard to our
reading of the statute. We interpret Title IX’s text to clearly prohibit
retaliation for complaints about sex discrimination.

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Opinion of the Court
C
Nor are we convinced by the Board’s argument that, even
if Title IX’s private right of action encompasses discrimina-
tion, Jackson is not entitled to invoke it because he is an
“indirect victi[m]” of sex discrimination. Brief for Respond-
ent 33. The statute is broadly worded; it does not require
that the victim of the retaliation must also be the victim of
the discrimination that is the subject of the original com-
plaint. If the statute provided instead that “no person shall
be subjected to discrimination on the basis of such individu-
al’s sex,” then we would agree with the Board. Cf. 42
U. S. C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (“It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any indi-
vidual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin” (emphasis added)). However, Title
IX contains no such limitation. Where the retaliation oc-
curs because the complainant speaks out about sex discrimi-
nation, the “on the basis of sex” requirement is satisfied.
The complainant is himself a victim of discriminatory retalia-
tion, regardless of whether he was the subject of the original
complaint.3 As we explain above, see supra, at 176–177, this
is consistent with Sullivan, which formed an important part
3 Justice Thomas contends that “extending the implied cause of action
under Title IX to claims of retaliation expands the class of people the
statute protects beyond the specified beneficiaries.” Post, at 194 (dissent-
ing opinion). But Title IX’s beneficiaries plainly include all those who are
subjected to “discrimination” “on the basis of sex.” 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a).
Because, as we explain above, see supra, at 174–175, retaliation in re-
sponse to a complaint about sex discrimination is “discrimination” “on the
basis of sex,” the statute clearly protects those who suffer such retaliation.
The following hypothetical, offered by petitioner at oral argument, illus-
trates this point: If the male captain of the boys’ basketball team and the
female captain of the girls’ basketball team together approach the school
principal to complain about discrimination against the girls’ team, and the
principal retaliates by expelling them both from the honor society, then
both the female and the male captains have been “discriminated” against
“on the basis of sex.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 53–54.

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180 JACKSON v. BIRMINGHAM BD. OF ED.
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of the backdrop against which Congress enacted Title IX.
Sullivan made clear that retaliation claims extend to those
who oppose discrimination against others. See 396 U. S., at
237 (holding that a person may bring suit under 42 U. S. C.
§ 1982 if he can show that he was “punished for trying to
vindicate the rights of minorities”).
Congress enacted Title IX not only to prevent the use of
federal dollars to support discriminatory practices, but also
“to provide individual citizens effective protection against
those practices.” Cannon, 441 U. S., at 704. We agree with
the United States that this objective “would be difficult, if
not impossible, to achieve if persons who complain about sex
discrimination did not have effective protection against re-
taliation.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13.
If recipients were permitted to retaliate freely, individuals
who witness discrimination would be loath to report it, and
all manner of Title IX violations might go unremedied as
a result. See Sullivan, supra, at 237 (noting that without
protection against retaliation, the underlying discrimination
is perpetuated).
Reporting incidents of discrimination is integral to Title
IX enforcement and would be discouraged if retaliation
against those who report went unpunished. Indeed, if retal-
iation were not prohibited, Title IX’s enforcement scheme
would unravel. Recall that Congress intended Title IX’s
private right of action to encompass claims of a recipient’s
deliberate indifference to sexual harassment. See generally
Davis, 526 U. S. 629. Accordingly, if a principal sexually
harasses a student, and a teacher complains to the school
board but the school board is indifferent, the board would
likely be liable for a Title IX violation. See generally
Gebser, 524 U. S. 274. But if Title IX’s private right of ac-
tion does not encompass retaliation claims, the teacher would
have no recourse if he were subsequently fired for speaking
out. Without protection from retaliation, individuals who
witness discrimination would likely not report it, indiffer-

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181 Cite as: 544 U. S. 167 (2005)
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ence claims would be short circuited, and the underlying dis-
crimination would go unremedied.
Title IX’s enforcement scheme also depends on individual
reporting because individuals and agencies may not bring
suit under the statute unless the recipient has received “ac-
tual notice” of the discrimination. Id., at 288, 289–290 (hold-
ing that an appropriate official of the funding recipient must
have actual knowledge of discrimination and respond with
deliberate indifference before a private party may bring
suit); 20 U. S. C. § 1682 (providing that a federal agency may
terminate funding only after it “has advised the appropriate
person or persons of the failure to comply with the require-
ment and has determined that compliance cannot be secured
by voluntary means”). If recipients were able to avoid such
notice by retaliating against all those who dare complain,
the statute’s enforcement scheme would be subverted. We
should not assume that Congress left such a gap in its
scheme.
Moreover, teachers and coaches such as Jackson are
often in the best position to vindicate the rights of their
students because they are better able to identify discrimina-
tion and bring it to the attention of administrators. Indeed,
sometimes adult employees are “ ‘the only effective adver-
sar[ies]’ ” of discrimination in schools. See Sullivan, supra,
at 237 (“[A] white owner is at times ‘the only effective adver-
sary’ of the unlawful restrictive covenant” (citing Barrows v.
Jackson, 346 U. S. 249, 259 (1953))).
D
The Board is correct in pointing out that, because Title IX
was enacted as an exercise of Congress’ powers under the
Spending Clause, see, e. g., Davis, supra, at 640; Gebser,
supra, at 287; Franklin, 503 U. S., at 74–75, and n. 8, “private
damages actions are available only where recipients of fed-
eral funding had adequate notice that they could be liable for
the conduct at issue,” Davis, supra, at 640. When Congress

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182 JACKSON v. BIRMINGHAM BD. OF ED.
Opinion of the Court
enacts legislation under its spending power, that legislation
is “in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the
States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.”
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451
U. S. 1, 17 (1981). As we have recognized, “[t]here can . . .
be no knowing acceptance [of the terms of the contract] if a
State is unaware of the conditions [imposed by the legislation
on its receipt of funds].” Ibid.
The Board insists that we should not interpret Title IX to
prohibit retaliation because it was not on notice that it could
be held liable for retaliating against those who complain of
Title IX violations. We disagree. Funding recipients have
been on notice that they could be subjected to private suits
for intentional sex discrimination under Title IX since 1979,
when we decided Cannon. Pennhurst does not preclude
private suits for intentional acts that clearly violate Title IX.
Davis, supra, at 642.
Indeed, in Davis, we held that Pennhurst did not pose an
obstacle to private suits for damages in cases of a recipient’s
deliberate indifference to one student’s sexual harassment of
another, because the deliberate indifference constituted in-
tentional discrimination on the basis of sex. Davis, supra,
at 650. See also Franklin, supra, at 75 (“Congress surely
did not intend for federal moneys to be expended to support
the intentional actions it sought by statute to proscribe”).
Similarly, we held in Gebser that a recipient of federal fund-
ing could be held liable for damages under Title IX for delib-
erate indifference to a teacher’s harassment of a student.
524 U. S., at 287–288. In Gebser, as in Davis, we acknowl-
edged that federal funding recipients must have notice that
they will be held liable for damages. See Davis, supra, at
642; Gebser, supra, at 287. But we emphasized that “this
limitation on private damages actions is not a bar to liability
where a funding recipient intentionally violates the statute.”
Davis, supra, at 642 (citing Franklin, 503 U. S., at 74–75).
See also ibid. (“[T]he [Pennhurst] notice problem does not

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183 Cite as: 544 U. S. 167 (2005)
Opinion of the Court
arise in a case such as this, in which intentional discrimina-
tion is alleged”); Bennett v. Kentucky Dept. of Ed., 470 U. S.
656, 665–666 (1985) (holding that there was sufficient no-
tice under Pennhurst where a statute made clear that some
conditions were placed on the receipt of federal funds, and
stating that Congress need not “specifically identif[y] and
proscrib[e]” each condition in the legislation). Simply put,
“Pennhurst does not bar a private damages action under
Title IX where the funding recipient engages in intentional
conduct that violates the clear terms of the statute.” Davis,
supra, at 642.
Thus, the Board should have been put on notice by the fact
that our cases since Cannon, such as Gebser and Davis, have
consistently interpreted Title IX’s private cause of action
broadly to encompass diverse forms of intentional sex dis-
crimination. Indeed, retaliation presents an even easier
case than deliberate indifference. It is easily attributable
to the funding recipient, and it is always—by definition—
intentional. We therefore conclude that retaliation against
individuals because they complain of sex discrimination is
“intentional conduct that violates the clear terms of the stat-
ute,” Davis, 526 U. S., at 642, and that Title IX itself there-
fore supplied sufficient notice to the Board that it could not
retaliate against Jackson after he complained of discrimina-
tion against the girls’ basketball team.
The regulations implementing Title IX clearly prohibit re-
taliation and have been on the books for nearly 30 years.
Cf., e. g., id., at 643 (holding that Title IX’s regulatory
scheme “has long provided funding recipients with notice
that they may be liable for their failure to respond to the
discriminatory acts of certain nonagents”). More impor-
tantly, the Courts of Appeals that had considered the ques-
tion at the time of the conduct at issue in this case all had
already interpreted Title IX to cover retaliation. See, e. g.,
Lowrey, 117 F. 3d, at 252; Preston, 31 F. 3d, at 206. The
Board could not have realistically supposed that, given this

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184 JACKSON v. BIRMINGHAM BD. OF ED.
Thomas, J., dissenting
context, it remained free to retaliate against those who re-
ported sex discrimination. Cf. Davis, supra, at 644 (stating
that the common law of torts “has put schools on notice that
they may be held responsible under state law for their failure
to protect students from the tortious acts of third parties”).
A reasonable school board would realize that institutions
covered by Title IX cannot cover up violations of that law
by means of discriminatory retaliation.
To prevail on the merits, Jackson will have to prove that
the Board retaliated against him because he complained of
sex discrimination. The amended complaint alleges that the
Board retaliated against Jackson for complaining to his su-
pervisor, Ms. Evelyn Baugh, about sex discrimination at Ens-
ley High School. At this stage of the proceedings, “[t]he
issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but
whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support
the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 236 (1974).
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, with whom The Chief Justice,
Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy join, dissenting.
The Court holds that the private right of action under
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, for sex dis-
crimination that it implied in Cannon v. University of Chi-
cago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979), extends to claims of retaliation.
Its holding is contrary to the plain terms of Title IX, because
retaliatory conduct is not discrimination on the basis of sex.
Moreover, we require Congress to speak unambiguously in
imposing conditions on funding recipients through its spend-
ing power. And, in cases in which a party asserts that a
cause of action should be implied, we require that the statute
itself evince a plain intent to provide such a cause of action.

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185 Cite as: 544 U. S. 167 (2005)
Thomas, J., dissenting
Section 901 of Title IX meets none of these requirements.
I therefore respectfully dissent.
I
Title IX provides education funding to States, subject to
§ 901’s condition that “[n]o person in the United States shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.” 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a). Section 901
does not refer to retaliation. Consequently, the statute pro-
hibits such conduct only if it falls within § 901’s prohibition
against discrimination “on the basis of sex.” It does not.
A claim of retaliation is not a claim of discrimination on the
basis of sex. In the context of § 901, the natural meaning of
the phrase “on the basis of sex” is on the basis of the plain-
tiff ’s sex, not the sex of some other person. See Leocal v.
Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1, 9 (2004) (“When interpreting a statute,
we must give words their ordinary or natural meaning” (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)). For example, suppose a
sexist air traffic controller withheld landing permission for a
plane because the pilot was a woman. While the sex dis-
crimination against the female pilot no doubt adversely im-
pacted male passengers aboard that plane, one would never
say that they were discriminated against “on the basis of
sex” by the controller’s action.
Congress’ usage of the phrase “on the basis of sex” con-
firms this commonsense conclusion. Even within Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 itself, Congress used the
phrase “on the basis of sex” as a shorthand for discrimination
“on the basis of such individual’s sex.” Specifically, in ensur-
ing that Title VII reached discrimination because of preg-
nancy, Congress provided that “[t]he terms ‘because of sex’
or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because
of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medi-
cal conditions.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(k); cf. California Fed.

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186 JACKSON v. BIRMINGHAM BD. OF ED.
Thomas, J., dissenting
Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Guerra, 479 U. S. 272, 277 (1987) (de-
scribing how Congress amended Title VII to specify that sex
discrimination included discrimination on the basis of preg-
nancy). The reference to “on the basis of sex” in this provi-
sion must refer to Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination
“because of such individual’s . . . sex,” suggesting that Con-
gress used the phrases interchangeably. § 2000e–2(a)(1).
After all, Title VII’s general prohibition against discrimina-
tory employer practices does not use “[t]he terms ‘because
of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex.’ ” It uses only the phrase
“because of such individual’s . . . sex.” Ibid.
This Court has also consistently used the phrase “on the
basis of sex” as a shorthand for on the basis of the claimant’s
sex. See, e. g., United States v. Burke, 504 U. S. 229, 239
(1992); Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U. S. 57,
64 (1986). Thus, for a disparate-treatment claim to be a
claim of discrimination on the basis of sex, the claimant’s sex
must have “actually played a role in [the decisionmaking]
process and had a determinative influence on the outcome,”
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U. S. 604, 610 (1993). Cf.
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 335, n. 15 (1977)
(“ ‘Disparate treatment’ . . . is the most easily understood
type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some
people less favorably than others because of their race, color,
religion, sex, or [other protected trait]”).
Jackson’s assertion that the Birmingham Board of Educa-
tion (Board) retaliated against him fails to allege sex discrim-
ination in this sense. Jackson does not claim that his own
sex played any role, let alone a decisive or predominant one,
in the decision to relieve him of his position. Instead, he
avers that he complained to his supervisor about sex discrim-
ination against the girls’ basketball team and that, sometime
subsequent to his complaints, he lost his coaching position.
App. 10–11. At best, then, he alleges discrimination “on the
basis of sex” founded on the attenuated connection between
the supposed adverse treatment and the sex of others. Be-

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187 Cite as: 544 U. S. 167 (2005)
Thomas, J., dissenting
cause Jackson’s claim for retaliation is not a claim that his
sex played a role in his adverse treatment, the statute’s plain
terms do not encompass it.
Jackson’s lawsuit therefore differs fundamentally from
other examples of sex discrimination, like sexual harassment.
Ante, at 174–175. A victim of sexual harassment suffers
discrimination because of her own sex, not someone else’s.
Cases in which this Court has held that § 901 reaches claims
of vicarious liability for sexual harassment are therefore in-
apposite here. See, e. g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of
Ed., 526 U. S. 629, 641–649 (1999); Gebser v. Lago Vista Inde-
pendent School Dist., 524 U. S. 274, 277 (1998); Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U. S. 60, 75 (1992). In
fact, virtually every case in which this Court has addressed
Title IX concerned a claimant who sought to recover for dis-
crimination because of her own sex. Davis, supra, at 633–
635; National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Smith, 525 U. S.
459, 462 (1999); Gebser, supra, at 277–279; Franklin, supra,
at 63–64; Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S.
718, 721 (1982); North Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Bell, 456 U. S. 512,
517–518 (1982); Cannon, 441 U. S., at 680. Again, Jackson
makes no such claim.
Moreover, Jackson’s retaliation claim lacks the connection
to actual sex discrimination that the statute requires. Jack-
son claims that he suffered reprisal because he complained
about sex discrimination, not that the sex discrimination un-
derlying his complaint occurred. This feature of Jackson’s
complaint is not surprising, since a retaliation claimant need
not prove that the complained-of sex discrimination hap-
pened. Although this Court has never addressed the ques-
tion, no Court of Appeals requires a complainant to show
more than that he had a reasonable, good-faith belief that
discrimination occurred to prevail on a retaliation claim.1
1 See, e. g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F. 3d 252,
262 (CA1 1999); Gregory v. Daly, 243 F. 3d 687, 701 (CA2 2001); Aman
v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F. 3d 1074, 1085 (CA3 1996); Byers

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188 JACKSON v. BIRMINGHAM BD. OF ED.
Thomas, J., dissenting
Retaliation therefore cannot be said to be discrimination on
the basis of anyone’s sex, because a retaliation claim may
succeed where no sex discrimination ever took place.
The majority ignores these fundamental characteristics of
retaliation claims. Its sole justification for holding that
Jackson has suffered sex discrimination is its statement that
“retaliation is discrimination ‘on the basis of sex’ because it
is an intentional response to the nature of the complaint: an
allegation of sex discrimination.” Ante, at 174.2 But the
sex-based topic of the complaint cannot overcome the fact
that the retaliation is not based on anyone’s sex, much less
the complainer’s sex. For example, if a coach complains to
school officials about the dismantling of the men’s swimming
team, which he honestly and reasonably, but incorrectly, be-
lieves is occurring because of the sex of the team, and he is
fired, he may prevail. Yet, he would not have been discrimi-
v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F. 3d 419, 428 (CA5 2000); Johnson v.
University of Cincinnati, 215 F. 3d 561, 579–580 (CA6 2000); Talanda v.
KFC Nat. Management Co., 140 F. 3d 1090, 1096 (CA7 1998); EEOC v.
HBE Corp., 135 F. 3d 543, 554 (CA8 1998); Moore v. California Inst. of
Technology Jet Propulsion Lab., 275 F. 3d 838, 845, n. 1 (CA9 2002); Crum-
packer v. Kansas Dept. of Human Resources, 338 F. 3d 1163, 1171 (CA10
2003); Meeks v. Computer Assoc. Int’l, 15 F. 3d 1013, 1021 (CA11 1994);
Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 652 F. 2d 1012, 1019–1020 (CADC
1981); cf. Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U. S. 268, 271–272
(2001) (per curiam) (where no reasonable person could have believed that
the incident constituted sex harassment violating Title VII, employee
could not prevail on her retaliation claim).
2 Tellingly, the Court does not adopt the rationale offered by petitioner
at oral argument. According to petitioner, “[b]ut for the discrimination
on the basis of sex, he would not have complained, and . . . had he not
made a complaint about sex discrimination, he would [not] have lost his
[coaching] position.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. This “but for” chain exposes
the faulty premise in the position that retaliation is on the basis of sex.
The first and necessary step in this chain of causation is that “discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex” occurred. Yet, retaliation claims require proving
no such thing. Thus, the “but for” link articulated by counsel between
“discrimination on the basis of sex” and the adverse employment action
does not exist.

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Thomas, J., dissenting
nated against on the basis of his sex, for his own sex played
no role, and the men’s swimming team over which he ex-
pressed concern also suffered no discrimination on the basis
of sex. In short, no discrimination on the basis of sex has
occurred.
At bottom, and petitioner as much as concedes, retaliation
is a claim that aids in enforcing another separate and distinct
right. Brief for Petitioner 13 (noting the relationship retali-
ation bears to “primary discrimination”). In other contexts,
this Court has recognized that protection from retaliation is
separate from direct protection of the primary right and
serves as a prophylactic measure to guard the primary right.
See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U. S. 574, 588, n. 10 (1998)
(“The reason why such retaliation offends the Constitution
is that it threatens to inhibit [the] exercise of the protected
right”).3 As we explained with regard to Title VII’s retalia-
tion prohibition, “a primary purpose of antiretaliation provi-
sions” is “[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory reme-
dial mechanisms.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337,
346 (1997). To describe retaliation as discrimination on the
basis of sex is to conflate the enforcement mechanism with
the right itself, something for which the statute’s text pro-
vides no warrant.
Moreover, that the text of Title IX does not mention re-
taliation is significant. By contrast to Title IX, Congress
enacted a separate provision in Title VII to address retalia-
tion, in addition to its general prohibition on discrimination.
§ 2000e–3(a). Congress’ failure to include similar text in
Title IX shows that it did not authorize private retaliation
actions. This difference cannot be dismissed, as the major-
3 See also Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Novotny, 442 U. S.
366, 387 (1979) (White, J., dissenting) (“Clearly, respondent’s right under
§ 704(a)—to be free from retaliation for efforts to aid others asserting Title
VII rights—is distinct from the Title VII right implicated in [this] claim
under § 1985(3), which is the right of women employees not to be discrimi-
nated against on the basis of their sex”).

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190 JACKSON v. BIRMINGHAM BD. OF ED.
Thomas, J., dissenting
ity suggests, on the ground that Title VII is a more specific
statute in which Congress proscribed particular practices, as
opposed to the general prohibition here. Ante, at 175. The
fact that Congress created those specific prohibitions in Title
VII is evidence that it intended to preclude courts from im-
plying similar specific prohibitions in Title IX.
Even apart from Title VII, Congress expressly prohibited
retaliation in other discrimination statutes. See, e. g., 42
U. S. C. § 12203(a) (Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990);
29 U. S. C. § 623(d) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967). If a prohibition on “discrimination” plainly encom-
passes retaliation, the explicit reference to it in these stat-
utes, as well as in Title VII, would be superfluous—a result
we eschew in statutory interpretation. The better explana-
tion is that when Congress intends to include a prohibition
against retaliation in a statute, it does so. See Central
Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N. A., 511 U. S. 164, 176–177 (1994). Its failure to do so in
§ 901 is therefore telling.
II
The Court’s holding is also inconsistent with two lines of
this Court’s precedent: Our rule that Congress must speak
with a clear voice when it imposes liability on the States
through its spending power and our refusal to imply a cause
of action when Congress’ intent to create a right or a remedy
is not evident.
A
As the majority acknowledges, Congress enacted Title IX
pursuant to its spending power. Ante, at 181 (citing Davis,
526 U. S., at 640; Gebser, 524 U. S., at 287; Franklin, 503
U. S., at 74–75, and n. 8); U. S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. This
Court has repeatedly held that the obligations Congress im-
poses on States in spending power legislation must be clear.
Such legislation is “in the nature of a contract” and funding
recipients’ acceptance of the terms of that contract must be
“voluntar[y] and knowin[g].” Pennhurst State School and

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191 Cite as: 544 U. S. 167 (2005)
Thomas, J., dissenting
Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981); see also
Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U. S. 181, 186 (2002). For their ac-
ceptance to be voluntary and knowing, funding recipients
must “have notice of their potential liability.” Davis, 526
U. S., at 641. Thus, “[i]n interpreting language in spending
legislation, we . . . ‘insis[t] that Congress speak with a clear
voice,’ ” id., at 640 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U. S., at 17), and a
condition must be imposed “unambiguously,” ibid.; Gonzaga
Univ. v. Doe, 536 U. S. 273, 280 (2002); Barnes, supra, at 186.
The Court’s holding casts aside this principle. As I have
explained, supra, at 185–190, the statute’s plain terms do not
authorize claims of retaliation. The same analysis shows
that, at the least, the statute does not clearly authorize retal-
iation claims. The majority points out that the statute does
not say: “ ‘[N]o person shall be subjected to discrimination
on the basis of such individual’s sex.’ ” Ante, at 179 (em-
phasis in original). But this reasoning puts the analysis
backwards. The question is not whether Congress clearly
excluded retaliation claims under Title IX, but whether it
clearly included them. The majority’s statement at best
points to ambiguity in the statute; yet ambiguity is resolved
in favor of the States, which must be aware when they ac-
cept federal funds of the obligations they thereby agree to
assume.
The majority asserts that “the Board should have been
put on notice by the fact that our cases since Cannon, such
as Gebser and Davis, have consistently interpreted Title IX’s
private cause of action broadly to encompass diverse forms
of intentional sex discrimination.” Ante, at 183. Gebser
and Davis did not hold or imply that Title IX prohibited
“diverse forms of intentional sex discrimination”; they held
that schools could be held vicariously liable for sexual har-
assment committed by students or teachers. See Gebser,
supra, at 277; Davis, supra, at 633. There was no question
that the sexual harassment in those cases was sex discrimi-
nation. See Meritor Savings, 477 U. S., at 64 (“Without
question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate

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192 JACKSON v. BIRMINGHAM BD. OF ED.
Thomas, J., dissenting
because of the subordinate’s sex, that supervisor ‘discrimi-
nate[s]’ on the basis of sex”). These cases hardly gave notice
to the Board here that retaliation liability loomed.
More important, the Court’s rationale untethers notice
from the statute. The Board, and other Title IX recipients,
must now assume that if conduct can be linked to sex
discrimination—no matter how attenuated that link—this
Court will impose liability under Title IX. That there is a
regulation proscribing retaliation in Title IX administrative
enforcement proceedings is no answer, ante, at 183, for it
says nothing about whether retaliation is discrimination on
the basis of sex, much less whether there is a private cause
of action for such conduct. Rather than requiring clarity
from Congress, the majority requires clairvoyance from
funding recipients.
B
Even apart from the clarity we consistently require of obli-
gations imposed by spending power legislation, extending
the cause of action implied in Cannon to Jackson’s claim con-
tradicts the standard we have set for implying causes of ac-
tion to enforce federal statutes. Whether a statute supplies
a cause of action is a matter of statutory interpretation.
See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 568
(1979). We must examine whether the statute creates a
right. That right “must be phrased in terms of the per-
son benefited.” Gonzaga, supra, at 284 (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sand-
berg, 501 U. S. 1083, 1102, 1103 (1991). And our inquiry is
not merely whether the statute benefits some class of people,
but whether that class includes the plaintiff in the case be-
fore us. Our role, then, is not “ ‘to provide such remedies as
are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose’
expressed by a statute,” but to examine the text of what
Congress enacted into law. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U. S. 275, 287 (2001) (quoting J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S.

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193 Cite as: 544 U. S. 167 (2005)
Thomas, J., dissenting
426, 433 (1964)); Virginia Bankshares, supra, at 1102; Touche
Ross & Co., supra, at 578. If the statute evinces no intent
to create a right for the plaintiff in the case before us, we
should not imply a cause of action.
This Court has held that these principles apply equally
when the Court has previously found that the statute in
question provides an implied right of action and a party at-
tempts to expand the class of persons or the conduct to which
the recognized action applies. Virginia Bankshares, supra,
at 1102. More specifically, this Court has rejected the cre-
ation of implied causes of action for ancillary claims like re-
taliation. In Central Bank, we concluded that § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, as amended,
15 U. S. C. § 78j, provided no civil action against those who
aid and abet individuals engaging in manipulative or decep-
tive practices, though the respondents urged that such a
claim was necessary to fulfill the statute’s protection against
deceit in the securities marketplace. 511 U. S., at 177, 188.
We declined to do so even though this Court had implied a
cause of action for § 10(b). See Borak, supra. In our view,
while the statute’s language potentially reached the conduct
of some aiders and abettors, the full scope of liability for
aiding and abetting would have extended liability beyond the
conduct prohibited by the statute. Central Bank, 511 U. S.,
at 176. We surveyed other statutes and found that “Con-
gress knew how to impose aiding and abetting liability when
it chose to do so.” Id., at 176–177. Our view that the stat-
ute did not reach aiding and abetting was also confirmed by
the fact that an “element critical for recovery” in actions
against those engaging in fraudulent and manipulative acts
was not required in proving that someone had aided and
abetted such persons. Id., at 180.
The same reasons militate equally against extending the
implied cause of action under Title IX to retaliation claims.
As in Central Bank, imposing retaliation liability expands
the statute beyond discrimination “on the basis of sex” to

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194 JACKSON v. BIRMINGHAM BD. OF ED.
Thomas, J., dissenting
instances in which no discrimination on the basis of sex has
occurred. Again, § 901 protects individuals only from dis-
crimination on the basis of their own sex. Supra, at 185–
187. Thus, extending the implied cause of action under Title
IX to claims of retaliation expands the class of people the
statute protects beyond the specified beneficiaries. As with
the absence of aiding and abetting from the statute at issue
in Central Bank, I find it instructive that § 901 does not ex-
pressly prohibit retaliation, while other discrimination stat-
utes do so explicitly. And like the aiding and abetting liabil-
ity in Central Bank, prevailing on a claim of retaliation lacks
elements necessary to prevailing on a claim of discrimination
on the basis of sex, for no sex discrimination need have
occurred.
The majority’s reliance on Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229 (1969), is wholly misplaced. Ante,
at 176–177. Rather than holding that a general prohibition
against discrimination permitted a claim of retaliation, Sulli-
van held that a white lessor had standing to assert the right
of a black lessee to be free from racial discrimination pursu-
ant to Rev. Stat. § 1978, 42 U. S. C. § 1982. 396 U. S., at 237
(“[T]here can be no question but that Sullivan has standing
to maintain this action” (citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S.
249 (1953), a standing case)).4 To make out his third-party
claim on behalf of the black lessee, the white lessor would
necessarily be required to demonstrate that the defendant
had discriminated against the black lessee on the basis of
race. Jackson, by contrast, need not show that the sex dis-
crimination forming the basis of his complaints actually oc-
curred. Thus, by recognizing Jackson’s claim, the majority
creates an entirely new cause of action for a secondary rights
holder, beyond the claim of the original rights holder, and
4 Title 42 U. S. C. § 1982 provides: “All citizens of the United States shall
have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white
citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property.”

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195 Cite as: 544 U. S. 167 (2005)
Thomas, J., dissenting
well beyond Sullivan. In any event, Sullivan involved
§ 1982, a statute enacted pursuant to Congress’ Thirteenth
Amendment enforcement power, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U. S. 409, 437–438 (1968), not its spending power.
Sullivan therefore says nothing about whether Title IX
clearly conditions States’ receipt of federal funds on retalia-
tion liability.
III
The Court establishes a prophylactic enforcement mecha-
nism designed to encourage whistle-blowing about sex dis-
crimination. The language of Title IX does not support this
holding. The majority also offers nothing to demonstrate
that its prophylactic rule is necessary to effectuate the stat-
utory scheme. Nothing prevents students—or their par-
ents—from complaining about inequality in facilities or
treatment. See, e. g., Franklin, 503 U. S., at 63 (student
brought suit); Davis, 526 U. S., at 633 (suit brought by mi-
nor’s parent). Under the majority’s reasoning, courts may
expand liability as they, rather than Congress, see fit. This
is no idle worry. The next step is to say that someone
closely associated with the complainer, who claims he suf-
fered retaliation for those complaints, likewise has a retalia-
tion claim under Title IX. See 2 Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission, Compliance Manual § 8–II, p. 8–10 (1998)
(“[I]t would be unlawful for a respondent to retaliate against
an employee because his or her spouse, who is also an em-
ployee, filed an EEOC charge”).
By crafting its own additional enforcement mechanism, the
majority returns this Court to the days in which it created
remedies out of whole cloth to effectuate its vision of con-
gressional purpose. In doing so, the majority substitutes its
policy judgments for the bargains struck by Congress, as
reflected in the statute’s text. The question before us is
only whether Title IX prohibits retaliation, not whether pro-
hibiting it is good policy. Central Bank, supra, at 177. For

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196 JACKSON v. BIRMINGHAM BD. OF ED.
Thomas, J., dissenting
the reasons addressed above, I would hold that § 901 does
not encompass private actions for retaliation. I respect-
fully dissent.