GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. v. O CENTRO ESPIRITA BENEFICENTE UNIAO DO VEGETAL et al.

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GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. v. O
CENTRO ESPIRITA BENEFICENTE UNIAO
DO VEGETAL et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the tenth circuit
No. 04–1084. Argued November 1, 2005—Decided February 21, 2006
Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)
in response to Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v.
Smith, 494 U. S. 872, where, in upholding a generally applicable law that
burdened the sacramental use of peyote, this Court held that the First
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause does not require judges to engage
in a case-by-case assessment of the religious burdens imposed by facially
constitutional laws, id., at 883–890. Among other things, RFRA pro
hibits the Federal Government from substantially burdening a person’s
exercise of religion, “even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability,” 42 U. S. C. § 2000bb–1(a), except when the Government
can “demonstrat[e] that application of the burden to the person—
(1) [furthers] a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that . . . interest,” § 2000bb–1(b).
Members of respondent church (UDV) receive communion by drink
ing hoasca, a tea brewed from plants unique to the Amazon Rainforest
that contains DMT, a hallucinogen regulated under Schedule I of the
Controlled Substances Act, see 21 U. S. C. § 812(c), Schedule I(c). After
U. S. Customs inspectors seized a hoasca shipment to the American
UDV and threatened prosecution, the UDV filed this suit for declara
tory and injunctive relief, alleging, inter alia, that applying the Con
trolled Substances Act to the UDV’s sacramental hoasca use violates
RFRA. At a hearing on the UDV’s preliminary injunction motion, the
Government conceded that the challenged application would substan
tially burden a sincere exercise of religion, but argued that this burden
did not violate RFRA because applying the Controlled Substances Act
was the least restrictive means of advancing three compelling govern
mental interests: protecting UDV members’ health and safety, prevent
ing the diversion of hoasca from the church to recreational users, and
complying with the 1971 United Nations Convention on Psychotropic
Substances. The District Court granted relief, concluding that, be
cause the parties’ evidence on health risks and diversion was equally
balanced, the Government had failed to demonstrate a compelling inter
est justifying the substantial burden on the UDV. The court also held

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that the 1971 Convention does not apply to hoasca. The Tenth Circuit
affirmed.
Held: The courts below did not err in determining that the Government
failed to demonstrate, at the preliminary injunction stage, a compelling
interest in barring the UDV’s sacramental use of hoasca. Pp. 427–439.
1. This Court rejects the Government’s argument that evidentiary
equipoise as to potential harm and diversion is an insufficient basis for
a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Controlled Sub
stances Act. Given that the Government conceded the UDV’s prima
facie RFRA case in the District Court and that the evidence found to
be in equipoise related to an affirmative defense as to which the Govern
ment bore the burden of proof, the UDV effectively demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits. The Government’s argument that,
although it would bear the burden of demonstrating a compelling inter
est at trial on the merits, the UDV should have borne the burden of
disproving such interests at the preliminary injunction hearing is fore
closed by Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U. S. 656,
666. There, in affirming the grant of a preliminary injunction against
the Government, this Court reasoned that the burdens with respect to
the compelling interest test at the preliminary injunction stage track
the burdens at trial. The Government’s attempt to limit the Ashcroft
rule to content-based restrictions on speech is unavailing. The fact
that Ashcroft involved such a restriction in no way affected the Court’s
assessment of the consequences of having the burden at trial for prelimi
nary injunction purposes. Congress’ express decision to legislate the
compelling interest test indicates that RFRA challenges should be adju
dicated in the same way as the test’s constitutionally mandated applica
tions, including at the preliminary injunction stage. Pp. 427–430.
2. Also rejected is the Government’s central submission that, because
it has a compelling interest in the uniform application of the Controlled
Substances Act, no exception to the DMT ban can be made to accommo
date the UDV. The Government argues, inter alia, that the Act’s de
scription of Schedule I substances as having “a high potential for
abuse,” “no currently accepted medical use,” and “a lack of accepted
safety for use . . . under medical supervision,” 21 U. S. C. § 812(b)(1), by
itself precludes any consideration of individualized exceptions, and that
the Act’s “closed” regulatory system, which prohibits all use of con
trolled substances except as the Act itself authorizes, see Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U. S. 1, 13, cannot function properly if subjected to judicial
exemptions. Pp. 430–437.
(a) RFRA and its strict scrutiny test contemplate an inquiry more
focused than the Government’s categorical approach. RFRA requires

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the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is sat
isfied through application of the challenged law “to the person”—the
particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substan
tially burdened. 42 U. S. C. § 2000bb–1(b). Section 2000bb(b)(1) ex
pressly adopted the compelling interest test of Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U. S. 398, and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205. There, the Court
looked beyond broadly formulated interests justifying the general appli
cability of government mandates, scrutinized the asserted harms, and
granted specific exemptions to particular religious claimants. Id., at
213, 221, 236; Sherbert, supra, at 410. Outside the Free Exercise area
as well, the Court has noted that “[c]ontext matters” in applying the
compelling interest test, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 327, and
has emphasized that strict scrutiny’s fundamental purpose is to take
“relevant differences” into account, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜ a,
515 U. S. 200, 228. Pp. 430–432.
(b) Under RFRA’s more focused inquiry, the Government’s mere
invocation of the general characteristics of Schedule I substances cannot
carry the day. Although Schedule I substances such as DMT are excep
tionally dangerous, see, e. g., Touby v. United States, 500 U. S. 160, 162,
there is no indication that Congress, in classifying DMT, considered the
harms posed by the particular use at issue. That question was litigated
below. Before the District Court found that the Government had not
carried its burden of showing a compelling interest in preventing such
harm, the court noted that it could not ignore the congressional classifi
cation and findings. But Congress’ determination that DMT should be
listed under Schedule I simply does not provide a categorical answer
that relieves the Government of the obligation to shoulder its RFRA
burden. The Controlled Substances Act’s authorization to the Attorney
General to “waive the requirement for registration of certain manufac
turers, distributors, or dispensers if he finds it consistent with the public
health and safety,” 21 U. S. C. § 822(d), reinforces that Congress’ findings
with respect to Schedule I substances should not carry the determina
tive weight, for RFRA purposes, that the Government would ascribe to
them. Indeed, despite the fact that everything the Government says
about the DMT in hoasca applies in equal measure to the mescaline in
peyote, another Schedule I substance, both the Executive and Congress
have decreed an exception from the Controlled Substances Act for Na
tive American religious use of peyote, see 21 CFR § 1307.31; 42 U. S. C.
§ 1996a(b)(1). If such use is permitted in the face of the general con
gressional findings for hundreds of thousands of Native Americans prac
ticing their faith, those same findings alone cannot preclude consider
ation of a similar exception for the 130 or so American members of the
UDV who want to practice theirs. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye,

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Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 547. The Government’s argument that
the existence of a congressional exemption for peyote does not indicate
that the Controlled Substances Act is amenable to judicially crafted
exceptions fails because RFRA plainly contemplates court-recognized
exceptions, see § 2000bb–1(c). Pp. 432–434.
(c) The peyote exception also fatally undermines the Government’s
broader contention that the Controlled Substances Act establishes a
closed regulatory system that admits of no exceptions under RFRA.
The peyote exception has been in place since the Controlled Substances
Act’s outset, and there is no evidence that it has undercut the Govern
ment’s ability to enforce the ban on peyote use by non-Indians. The
Government’s reliance on pre-Smith cases asserting a need for uniform
ity in rejecting claims for religious exemptions under the Free Exercise
Clause is unavailing. Those cases did not embrace the notion that a
general interest in uniformity justified a substantial burden on religious
exercise, but instead scrutinized the asserted need and explained why
the denied exemptions could not be accommodated. See, e. g., United
States v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252, 258, 260. They show that the Government
can demonstrate a compelling interest in uniform application of a partic
ular program by offering evidence that granting the requested religious
accommodations would seriously compromise its ability to administer
the program. Here the Government’s uniformity argument rests not
so much on the particular statutory program at issue as on slippery
slope concerns that could be invoked in response to any RFRA claim
for an exception to a generally applicable law, i. e., “if I make an excep
tion for you, I’ll have to make one for everybody, so no exceptions.”
But RFRA operates by mandating consideration, under the compel
ling interest test, of exceptions to “rule[s] of general applicability.”
§ 2000bb–1(a). Congress’ determination that the legislated test is
“workable . . . for striking sensible balances between religious liberty
and competing prior governmental interests,” § 2000bb(a)(5), finds sup
port in Sherbert, supra, at 407, and Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709,
722. While there may be instances where a need for uniformity pre
cludes the recognition of exceptions to generally applicable laws under
RFRA, it would be surprising to find that this was such a case, given
the longstanding peyote exemption and the fact that the very reason
Congress enacted RFRA was to respond to a decision denying a claimed
right to sacramental use of a controlled substance. The Government
has not shown that granting the UDV an exemption would cause the
kind of administrative harm recognized as a compelling interest in, e. g.,
Lee. It cannot now compensate for its failure to convince the District
Court as to its health or diversion concerns with the bold argument that

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there can be no RFRA exceptions at all to the Controlled Substances
Act. Pp. 434–437.
3. The Government argues unpersuasively that it has a compelling
interest in complying with the 1971 U. N. Convention. While this
Court does not agree with the District Court that the Convention does
not cover hoasca, that does not automatically mean that the Govern
ment has demonstrated a compelling interest in applying the Controlled
Substances Act, which implements the Convention, to the UDV’s sacra
mental use. At this stage, it suffices that the Government did not sub
mit any evidence addressing the international consequences of granting
the UDV an exemption, but simply relied on two affidavits by State
Department officials attesting to the general (and undoubted) impor
tance of honoring international obligations and maintaining the United
States’ leadership in the international war on drugs. Under RFRA,
invocation of such general interests, standing alone, is not enough.
Pp. 437–438.
389 F. 3d 973, affirmed and remanded.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other
Members joined, except Alito, J., who took no part in the consideration
or decision of the case.
Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for
petitioners. With him on the brief were Solicitor General
Clement, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Deputy As
sistant Attorney General Katsas, Patricia A. Millett, Mi
chael Jay Singer, and Matthew M. Collette.
Nancy Hollander argued the cause for respondents.
With her on the brief were John W. Boyd and Zachary A.
Ives.*
*Marci A. Hamilton filed a brief for the Tort Claimants’ Committee
et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Baptist Joint
Committee et al. by Gene C. Schaerr, Linda T. Coberly, Thomas C. Berg,
and Gregory S. Baylor; for the Council on Spiritual Practices et al. by
David T. Goldberg; for the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops
by Mark E. Chopko and Jeffrey Hunter Moon; for Dr. John H. Halpern
et al. by Roy S. Haber; and for Douglas Laycock by Mr. Laycock, pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the International Academy for
Freedom of Religion and Belief et al. by Lee Boothby, Derek Davis, Robert

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Opinion of the Court
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the
Court.
A religious sect with origins in the Amazon Rainforest
receives communion by drinking a sacramental tea, brewed
from plants unique to the region, that contains a hallucinogen
regulated under the Controlled Substances Act by the Fed
eral Government. The Government concedes that this prac
tice is a sincere exercise of religion, but nonetheless sought
to prohibit the small American branch of the sect from en
gaging in the practice, on the ground that the Controlled
Substances Act bars all use of the hallucinogen. The sect
sued to block enforcement against it of the ban on the sacra
mental tea, and moved for a preliminary injunction.
It relied on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993, which prohibits the Federal Government from substan
tially burdening a person’s exercise of religion, unless the
Government “demonstrates that application of the burden to
the person” represents the least restrictive means of advanc
ing a compelling interest. 42 U. S. C. § 2000bb–1(b). The
District Court granted the preliminary injunction, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted the Government’s
petition for certiorari. Before this Court, the Government’s
central submission is that it has a compelling interest in the
uniform application of the Controlled Substances Act, such
that no exception to the ban on use of the hallucinogen can
be made to accommodate the sect’s sincere religious practice.
We conclude that the Government has not carried the burden
expressly placed on it by Congress in the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, and affirm the grant of the preliminary
injunction.
A. Destro, and W. Cole Durham, Jr.; for the Liberty Legal Institute by
Kelly Shackelford; for Various Religious and Civil Rights Organizations
by Anthony R. Picarello, Jr.; and for Robert Gable et al. by Peter D.
Kennedy.

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I
In Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore.
v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990), this Court held that the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment does not prohibit
governments from burdening religious practices through
generally applicable laws. In Smith, we rejected a chal
lenge to an Oregon statute that denied unemployment bene
fits to drug users, including Native Americans engaged in
the sacramental use of peyote. Id., at 890. In so doing, we
rejected the interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause an
nounced in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), and, in
accord with earlier cases, see Smith, 494 U. S., at 879–
880, 884–885, held that the Constitution does not require
judges to engage in a case-by-case assessment of the reli
gious burdens imposed by facially constitutional laws. Id.,
at 883–890.
Congress responded by enacting the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 107 Stat. 1488, as amended,
42 U. S. C. § 2000bb et seq., which adopts a statutory rule
comparable to the constitutional rule rejected in Smith.
Under RFRA, the Federal Government may not, as a statu
tory matter, substantially burden a person’s exercise of reli
gion, “even if the burden results from a rule of general ap
plicability.” § 2000bb–1(a). The only exception recognized
by the statute requires the Government to satisfy the com
pelling interest test—to “demonstrat[e] that application of
the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compel
ling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”
§ 2000bb–1(b). A person whose religious practices are bur
dened in violation of RFRA “may assert that violation as a
claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appro
priate relief.” § 2000bb–1(c).1
1 As originally enacted, RFRA applied to States as well as the Federal
Government. In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507 (1997), we held
the application to States to be beyond Congress’ legislative authority
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

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Opinion of the Court
The Controlled Substances Act, 84 Stat. 1242, as amended,
21 U. S. C. § 801 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. I), regulates the
importation, manufacture, distribution, and use of psycho
tropic substances. The Act classifies substances into five
schedules based on their potential for abuse, the extent to
which they have an accepted medical use, and their safety.
See § 812(b) (2000 ed.). Substances listed in Schedule I of
the Act are subject to the most comprehensive restrictions,
including an outright ban on all importation and use, except
pursuant to strictly regulated research projects. See §§ 823,
960(a)(1). The Act authorizes the imposition of a criminal
sentence for simple possession of Schedule I substances, see
§ 844(a), and mandates the imposition of a criminal sentence
for possession “with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dis
pense” such substances, see §§ 841(a), (b).
O Centro Espı´rita Beneficente Unia˜ o do Vegetal (UDV) is
a Christian Spiritist sect based in Brazil, with an American
branch of approximately 130 individuals. Central to the
UDV’s faith is receiving communion through hoasca (pro
nounced “wass-ca”), a sacramental tea made from two plants
unique to the Amazon region. One of the plants, psychotria
viridis, contains dimethyltryptamine (DMT), a hallucinogen
whose effects are enhanced by alkaloids from the other plant,
banisteriopsis caapi. DMT, as well as “any material, com
pound, mixture, or preparation, which contains any quantity
of [DMT],” is listed in Schedule I of the Controlled Sub
stances Act. § 812(c), Schedule I(c).
In 1999, United States Customs inspectors intercepted a
shipment to the American UDV containing three drums of
hoasca. A subsequent investigation revealed that the UDV
had received 14 prior shipments of hoasca. The inspectors
seized the intercepted shipment and threatened the UDV
with prosecution.
The UDV filed suit against the Attorney General and
other federal law enforcement officials, seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that
applying the Controlled Substances Act to the UDV’s sacra

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mental use of hoasca violates RFRA. Prior to trial, the
UDV moved for a preliminary injunction, so that it could
continue to practice its faith pending trial on the merits.
At a hearing on the preliminary injunction, the Govern
ment conceded that the challenged application of the Con
trolled Substances Act would substantially burden a sincere
exercise of religion by the UDV. See O Centro Espirita Be
neficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1236,
1252 (NM 2002). The Government argued, however, that
this burden did not violate RFRA, because applying the
Controlled Substances Act in this case was the least restric
tive means of advancing three compelling governmental in
terests: protecting the health and safety of UDV members,
preventing the diversion of hoasca from the church to recre
ational users, and complying with the 1971 United Nations
Convention on Psychotropic Substances, a treaty signed by
the United States and implemented by the Act. Feb. 21,
1971, [1979–1980] 32 U. S. T. 543, T. I. A. S. No. 9725. See
282 F. Supp. 2d, at 1252–1253.
The District Court heard evidence from both parties on
the health risks of hoasca and the potential for diversion
from the church. The Government presented evidence to
the effect that use of hoasca, or DMT more generally, can
cause psychotic reactions, cardiac irregularities, and adverse
drug interactions. The UDV countered by citing studies
documenting the safety of its sacramental use of hoasca and
presenting evidence that minimized the likelihood of the
health risks raised by the Government. With respect to di
version, the Government pointed to a general rise in the
illicit use of hallucinogens, and cited interest in the illegal
use of DMT and hoasca in particular; the UDV emphasized
the thinness of any market for hoasca, the relatively small
amounts of the substance imported by the church, and the
absence of any diversion problem in the past.
The District Court concluded that the evidence on health
risks was “in equipoise,” and similarly that the evidence on
diversion was “virtually balanced.” Id., at 1262, 1266. In

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the face of such an even showing, the court reasoned that the
Government had failed to demonstrate a compelling interest
justifying what it acknowledged was a substantial burden on
the UDV’s sincere religious exercise. Id., at 1255. The
court also rejected the asserted interest in complying with
the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, hold
ing that the Convention does not apply to hoasca. Id., at
1266–1269.
The court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting the
Government from enforcing the Controlled Substances Act
with respect to the UDV’s importation and use of hoasca.
The injunction requires the church to import the tea pursu
ant to federal permits, to restrict control over the tea to
persons of church authority, and to warn particularly suscep
tible UDV members of the dangers of hoasca. See Prelimi
nary Injunction ¶¶ 2, 5–12, 32–33, App. F to App. to Pet.
for Cert. 249a, 250a–252a, 258a–259a. The injunction also
provides that “if [the Government] believe[s] that evidence
exists that hoasca has negatively affected the health of UDV
members,” or “that a shipment of hoasca contain[s] particu
larly dangerous levels of DMT, [the Government] may apply
to the Court for an expedite[d] determination of whether the
evidence warrants suspension or revocation of [the UDV’s
authority to use hoasca].” Id., at 257a, ¶ 29.
The Government appealed the preliminary injunction and
a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit af
firmed, O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal
v. Ashcroft, 342 F. 3d 1170 (2003), as did a majority of the
Circuit sitting en banc, 389 F. 3d 973 (2004). We granted
certiorari. 544 U. S. 973 (2005).
II
Although its briefs contain some discussion of the potential
for harm and diversion from the UDV’s use of hoasca, the
Government does not challenge the District Court’s factual
findings or its conclusion that the evidence submitted on

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these issues was evenly balanced. Instead, the Government
maintains that such evidentiary equipoise is an insufficient
basis for issuing a preliminary injunction against enforce
ment of the Controlled Substances Act. We review the Dis
trict Court’s legal rulings de novo and its ultimate decision
to issue the preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion.
See McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of
Ky., 545 U. S. 844, 867 (2005).
The Government begins by invoking the well-established
principle that the party seeking pretrial relief bears the bur
den of demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits.
See, e. g., Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U. S. 968, 972 (1997)
(per curiam); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922, 931
(1975). The Government argues that the District Court lost
sight of this principle in issuing the injunction based on a
mere tie in the evidentiary record.
A majority of the en banc Court of Appeals rejected this
argument, and so do we. Before the District Court, the
Government conceded the UDV’s prima facie case under
RFRA. See 282 F. Supp. 2d, at 1252 (application of the Con
trolled Substances Act would (1) substantially burden (2) a
sincere (3) religious exercise). The evidence the District
Court found to be in equipoise related to two of the compel
ling interests asserted by the Government, which formed
part of the Government’s affirmative defense. See 42
U. S. C. § 2000bb–1(b) (“Government may substantially bur
den a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates
that application of the burden to the person—(1) is in fur
therance of a compelling governmental interest . . . ” (empha
sis added)); § 2000bb–2(3) (“[T]he term ‘demonstrates’ means
meets the burdens of going forward with the evidence and
of persuasion”). Accordingly, the UDV effectively demon
strated that its sincere exercise of religion was substantially
burdened, and the Government failed to demonstrate that
the application of the burden to the UDV would, more likely
than not, be justified by the asserted compelling interests.

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Opinion of the Court
See 389 F. 3d, at 1009 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“[T]he balance is between actual irrep
arable harm to [the] plaintiff and potential harm to the
government which does not even rise to the level of a pre
ponderance of the evidence”).
The Government argues that, although it would bear the
burden of demonstrating a compelling interest as part of its
affirmative defense at trial on the merits, the UDV should
have borne the burden of disproving the asserted compelling
interests at the hearing on the preliminary injunction. This
argument is foreclosed by our recent decision in Ashcroft v.
American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U. S. 656 (2004). In
Ashcroft, we affirmed the grant of a preliminary injunction
in a case where the Government had failed to show a likeli
hood of success under the compelling interest test. We rea
soned that “[a]s the Government bears the burden of proof
on the ultimate question of [the challenged Act’s] constitu
tionality, respondents [the movants] must be deemed likely
to prevail unless the Government has shown that respond
ents’ proposed less restrictive alternatives are less effective
than [enforcing the Act].” Id., at 666. That logic extends
to this case; here the Government failed on the first prong
of the compelling interest test, and did not reach the least
restrictive means prong, but that can make no difference.
The point remains that the burdens at the preliminary in
junction stage track the burdens at trial.
The Government attempts to limit the rule announced in
Ashcroft to content-based restrictions on speech, but the dis
tinction is unavailing. The fact that Ashcroft involved such
a restriction was the reason the Government had the burden
of proof at trial under the First Amendment, see id., at 665,
but in no way affected the Court’s assessment of the conse
quences of having that burden for purposes of the prelimi
nary injunction. Here the burden is placed squarely on the
Government by RFRA rather than the First Amendment,
see 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000bb–1(b), 2000bb–2(3), but the conse

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Opinion of the Court
quences are the same. Congress’s express decision to leg
islate the compelling interest test indicates that RFRA
challenges should be adjudicated in the same manner as
constitutionally mandated applications of the test, including
at the preliminary injunction stage.
III
The Government’s second line of argument rests on the
Controlled Substances Act itself. The Government con
tends that the Act’s description of Schedule I substances as
having “a high potential for abuse,” “no currently accepted
medical use in treatment in the United States,” and “a lack
of accepted safety for use . . . under medical supervision,” 21
U. S. C. § 812(b)(1), by itself precludes any consideration of
individualized exceptions such as that sought by the UDV.
The Government goes on to argue that the regulatory re
gime established by the Act—a “closed” system that prohib
its all use of controlled substances except as authorized by
the Act itself, see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U. S. 1, 13 (2005)—
“cannot function with its necessary rigor and comprehensive
ness if subjected to judicial exemptions.” Brief for Petition
ers 18. According to the Government, there would be no
way to cabin religious exceptions once recognized, and “the
public will misread” such exceptions as signaling that the
substance at issue is not harmful after all. Id., at 23.
Under the Government’s view, there is no need to assess the
particulars of the UDV’s use or weigh the impact of an ex
emption for that specific use, because the Controlled Sub
stances Act serves a compelling purpose and simply admits
of no exceptions.
A
RFRA, and the strict scrutiny test it adopted, contemplate
an inquiry more focused than the Government’s categorical
approach. RFRA requires the Government to demonstrate
that the compelling interest test is satisfied through applica
tion of the challenged law “to the person”—the particular

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claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being sub
stantially burdened. 42 U. S. C. § 2000bb–1(b). RFRA ex
pressly adopted the compelling interest test “as set forth in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972).” § 2000bb(b)(1). In each of
those cases, this Court looked beyond broadly formulated in
terests justifying the general applicability of government
mandates and scrutinized the asserted harm of granting spe
cific exemptions to particular religious claimants. In Yoder,
for example, we permitted an exemption for Amish children
from a compulsory school attendance law. We recognized
that the State had a “paramount” interest in education, but
held that “despite its admitted validity in the generality of
cases, we must searchingly examine the interests that the
State seeks to promote . . . and the impediment to those
objectives that would flow from recognizing the claimed
Amish exemption.” 406 U. S., at 213, 221 (emphasis added).
The Court explained that the State needed “to show with
more particularity how its admittedly strong interest . . .
would be adversely affected by granting an exemption to the
Amish.” Id., at 236 (emphasis added).
In Sherbert, the Court upheld a particular claim to a reli
gious exemption from a state law denying unemployment
benefits to those who would not work on Saturdays, but ex
plained that it was not announcing a constitutional right to
unemployment benefits for “all persons whose religious con
victions are the cause of their unemployment.” 374 U. S., at
410 (emphasis added). The Court distinguished the case “in
which an employee’s religious convictions serve to make him
a nonproductive member of society.” Ibid.; see also Smith,
494 U. S., at 899 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (strict
scrutiny “at least requires a case-by-case determination of
the question, sensitive to the facts of each particular claim”).
Outside the Free Exercise area as well, the Court has noted
that “[c]ontext matters” in applying the compelling interest
test, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 327 (2003), and has

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emphasized that “strict scrutiny does take ‘relevant differ
ences’ into account—indeed, that is its fundamental pur
pose,” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜ a, 515 U. S. 200,
228 (1995).
B
Under the more focused inquiry required by RFRA and
the compelling interest test, the Government’s mere invoca
tion of the general characteristics of Schedule I substances,
as set forth in the Controlled Substances Act, cannot carry
the day. It is true, of course, that Schedule I substances
such as DMT are exceptionally dangerous. See, e. g., Touby
v. United States, 500 U. S. 160, 162 (1991). Nevertheless,
there is no indication that Congress, in classifying DMT, con
sidered the harms posed by the particular use at issue here—
the circumscribed, sacramental use of hoasca by the UDV.
The question of the harms from the sacramental use of
hoasca by the UDV was litigated below. Before the Dis
trict Court found that the Government had not carried its
burden of showing a compelling interest in preventing such
harms, the court noted that it could not “ignore that the
legislative branch of the government elected to place materi
als containing DMT in Schedule I of the [Act], reflecting
findings that substances containing DMT have ‘a high poten
tial for abuse,’ and ‘no currently accepted medical use in
treatment in the United States,’ and that ‘[t]here is a lack of
accepted safety for use of [DMT] under medical supervi
sion.’ ” 282 F. Supp. 2d, at 1254. But Congress’ determina
tion that DMT should be listed under Schedule I simply does
not provide a categorical answer that relieves the Govern
ment of the obligation to shoulder its burden under RFRA.
This conclusion is reinforced by the Controlled Substances
Act itself. The Act contains a provision authorizing the At
torney General to “waive the requirement for registration of
certain manufacturers, distributors, or dispensers if he finds
it consistent with the public health and safety.” 21 U. S. C.
§ 822(d). The fact that the Act itself contemplates that ex

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empting certain people from its requirements would be “con
sistent with the public health and safety” indicates that con
gressional findings with respect to Schedule I substances
should not carry the determinative weight, for RFRA pur
poses, that the Government would ascribe to them.
And in fact an exception has been made to the Schedule I
ban for religious use. For the past 35 years, there has been
a regulatory exemption for use of peyote—a Schedule I sub
stance—by the Native American Church. See 21 CFR
§ 1307.31 (2005). In 1994, Congress extended that exemp
tion to all members of every recognized Indian Tribe. See
42 U. S. C. § 1996a(b)(1). Everything the Government says
about the DMT in hoasca—that, as a Schedule I substance,
Congress has determined that it “has a high potential for
abuse,” “has no currently accepted medical use,” and has
“a lack of accepted safety for use . . . under medical supervi
sion,” 21 U. S. C. § 812(b)(1)—applies in equal measure to the
mescaline in peyote, yet both the Executive and Congress
itself have decreed an exception from the Controlled Sub
stances Act for Native American religious use of peyote. If
such use is permitted in the face of the congressional findings
in § 812(b)(1) for hundreds of thousands of Native Americans
practicing their faith, it is difficult to see how those same
findings alone can preclude any consideration of a similar ex
ception for the 130 or so American members of the UDV who
want to practice theirs. See Church of Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 547 (1993) (“It is estab
lished in our strict scrutiny jurisprudence that ‘a law cannot
be regarded as protecting an interest ‘of the highest
order’ . . . when it leaves appreciable damage to that suppos
edly vital interest unprohibited’ ” (quoting Florida Star v.
B. J. F., 491 U. S. 524, 541–542 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment))).
The Government responds that there is a “unique relation
ship” between the United States and the Tribes, Brief for
Petitioners 27; see Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535 (1974),

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but never explains what about that “unique” relationship jus
tifies overriding the same congressional findings on which
the Government relies in resisting any exception for the
UDV’s religious use of hoasca. In other words, if any
Schedule I substance is in fact always highly dangerous in
any amount no matter how used, what about the unique rela
tionship with the Tribes justifies allowing their use of pey
ote? Nothing about the unique political status of the Tribes
makes their members immune from the health risks the
Government asserts accompany any use of a Schedule I
substance, nor insulates the Schedule I substance the Tribes
use in religious exercise from the alleged risk of diversion.
The Government argues that the existence of a congres
sional exemption for peyote does not indicate that the Con
trolled Substances Act is amenable to judicially crafted ex
ceptions. RFRA, however, plainly contemplates that courts
would recognize exceptions—that is how the law works.
See 42 U. S. C. § 2000bb–1(c) (“A person whose religious
exercise has been burdened in violation of this section
may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial
proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a govern
ment”). Congress’ role in the peyote exemption—and the
Executive’s, see 21 CFR § 1307.31 (2005)—confirms that the
findings in the Controlled Substances Act do not preclude
exceptions altogether; RFRA makes clear that it is the ob
ligation of the courts to consider whether exceptions are
required under the test set forth by Congress.
C
The well-established peyote exception also fatally under
mines the Government’s broader contention that the Con
trolled Substances Act establishes a closed regulatory
system that admits of no exceptions under RFRA. The
Government argues that the effectiveness of the Controlled
Substances Act will be “necessarily . . . undercut” if the Act
is not uniformly applied, without regard to burdens on reli
gious exercise. Brief for Petitioners 18. The peyote excep

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tion, however, has been in place since the outset of the Con
trolled Substances Act, and there is no evidence that it has
“undercut” the Government’s ability to enforce the ban on
peyote use by non-Indians.
The Government points to some pre-Smith cases relying
on a need for uniformity in rejecting claims for religious ex
emptions under the Free Exercise Clause, see Brief for Peti
tioners 16, but those cases strike us as quite different from
the present one. Those cases did not embrace the notion
that a general interest in uniformity justified a substantial
burden on religious exercise; they instead scrutinized the as
serted need and explained why the denied exemptions could
not be accommodated. In United States v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252
(1982), for example, the Court rejected a claimed exception
to the obligation to pay Social Security taxes, noting that
“mandatory participation is indispensable to the fiscal vital
ity of the social security system” and that the “tax system
could not function if denominations were allowed to chal
lenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a
manner that violates their religious belief.” Id., at 258, 260.
See also Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U. S. 680, 700
(1989) (same). In Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599 (1961)
(plurality opinion), the Court denied a claimed exception to
Sunday closing laws, in part because allowing such excep
tions “might well provide [the claimants] with an economic
advantage over their competitors who must remain closed on
that day.” Id., at 608–609. The whole point of a “uniform
day of rest for all workers” would have been defeated by
exceptions. See Sherbert, 374 U. S., at 408 (discussing
Braunfeld). These cases show that the Government can
demonstrate a compelling interest in uniform application of
a particular program by offering evidence that granting the
requested religious accommodations would seriously com
promise its ability to administer the program.
Here the Government’s argument for uniformity is differ
ent; it rests not so much on the particular statutory program
at issue as on slippery-slope concerns that could be invoked

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in response to any RFRA claim for an exception to a gener
ally applicable law. The Government’s argument echoes the
classic rejoinder of bureaucrats throughout history: If I
make an exception for you, I’ll have to make one for every
body, so no exceptions. But RFRA operates by mandating
consideration, under the compelling interest test, of ex
ceptions to “rule[s] of general applicability.” 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000bb–1(a). Congress determined that the legislated test
“is a workable test for striking sensible balances between
religious liberty and competing prior governmental inter
ests.” § 2000bb(a)(5). This determination finds support in
our cases; in Sherbert, for example, we rejected a slippery
slope argument similar to the one offered in this case, dis
missing as “no more than a possibility” the State’s specula
tion “that the filing of fraudulent claims by unscrupulous
claimants feigning religious objections to Saturday work”
would drain the unemployment benefits fund. 374 U. S.,
at 407.
We reaffirmed just last Term the feasibility of case-by-case
consideration of religious exemptions to generally applicable
rules. In Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709 (2005), we held
that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000, which allows federal and state prisoners to seek
religious accommodations pursuant to the same standard
as set forth in RFRA, does not violate the Establishment
Clause. We had “no cause to believe” that the compelling
interest test “would not be applied in an appropriately bal
anced way” to specific claims for exemptions as they arose.
Id., at 722. Nothing in our opinion suggested that courts
were not up to the task.
We do not doubt that there may be instances in which a
need for uniformity precludes the recognition of exceptions
to generally applicable laws under RFRA. But it would
have been surprising to find that this was such a case, given
the longstanding exemption from the Controlled Substances
Act for religious use of peyote, and the fact that the very
reason Congress enacted RFRA was to respond to a decision

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denying a claimed right to sacramental use of a controlled
substance. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000bb(a)(4). And in fact the
Government has not offered evidence demonstrating that
granting the UDV an exemption would cause the kind of
administrative harm recognized as a compelling interest in
Lee, Hernandez, and Braunfeld. The Government failed to
convince the District Court at the preliminary injunction
hearing that health or diversion concerns provide a com
pelling interest in banning the UDV’s sacramental use of
hoasca. It cannot compensate for that failure now with the
bold argument that there can be no RFRA exceptions at all
to the Controlled Substances Act. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 17
(Deputy Solicitor General statement that exception could not
be made even for “rigorously policed” use of “one drop” of
substance “once a year”).
IV
Before the District Court, the Government also asserted
an interest in compliance with the 1971 United Nations Con
vention on Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 21, 1971, [1979–
1980] 32 U. S. T. 543, T. I. A. S. No. 9725. The Convention,
signed by the United States and implemented by the Con
trolled Substances Act, calls on signatories to prohibit the
use of hallucinogens, including DMT. The Government ar
gues that it has a compelling interest in meeting its interna
tional obligations by complying with the Convention.
The District Court rejected this interest because it found
that the Convention does not cover hoasca. The court re
lied on the official commentary to the Convention, which
notes that “Schedule I [of the Convention] does not list . . .
natural hallucinogenic materials,” and that “[p]lants as such
are not, and—it is submitted—are also not likely to be, listed
in Schedule I, but only some products obtained from plants.”
U. N. Commentary on the Convention on Psychotropic Sub
stances 387, 385 (1976). The court reasoned that hoasca,
like the plants from which the tea is made, is sufficiently
distinct from DMT itself to fall outside the treaty. See 282
F. Supp. 2d, at 1266–1269.

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We do not agree. The Convention provides that “a prepa
ration is subject to the same measures of control as the psy
chotropic substance which it contains,” and defines “prepara
tion” as “any solution or mixture, in whatever physical state,
containing one or more psychotropic substances.” See 32
U. S. T., at 546, Art. 1(f)(i); id., at 551, Art. 3. Hoasca is a
“solution or mixture” containing DMT; the fact that it is
made by the simple process of brewing plants in water, as
opposed to some more advanced method, does not change
that. To the extent the commentary suggests plants them
selves are not covered by the Convention, that is of no mo
ment—the UDV seeks to import and use a tea brewed from
plants, not the plants themselves, and the tea plainly quali
fies as a “preparation” under the Convention.
The fact that hoasca is covered by the Convention, how
ever, does not automatically mean that the Government has
demonstrated a compelling interest in applying the Con
trolled Substances Act, which implements the Convention, to
the UDV’s sacramental use of the tea. At the present stage,
it suffices to observe that the Government did not even sub
mit evidence addressing the international consequences of
granting an exemption for the UDV. The Government sim
ply submitted two affidavits by State Department officials
attesting to the general importance of honoring international
obligations and of maintaining the leadership position of the
United States in the international war on drugs. See Decla
ration of Gary T. Sheridan (Jan. 24, 2001), App. G to App. to
Pet. for Cert. 261a; Declaration of Robert E. Dalton (Jan. 24,
2001), App. H, id., at 265a. We do not doubt the validity of
these interests, any more than we doubt the general interest
in promoting public health and safety by enforcing the Con
trolled Substances Act, but under RFRA invocation of such
general interests, standing alone, is not enough.2
2 In light of the foregoing, we do not reach the UDV’s argument that
Art. 22, ¶ 5, of the Convention should be read to accommodate exceptions
under domestic laws such as RFRA.

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* * *
The Government repeatedly invokes Congress’ findings
and purposes underlying the Controlled Substances Act, but
Congress had a reason for enacting RFRA, too. Congress
recognized that “laws ‘neutral’ toward religion may burden
religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere
with religious exercise,” and legislated “the compelling in
terest test” as the means for the courts to “strik[e] sensible
balances between religious liberty and competing prior gov
ernmental interests.” 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000bb(a)(2), (5).
We have no cause to pretend that the task assigned by
Congress to the courts under RFRA is an easy one. Indeed,
the very sort of difficulties highlighted by the Government
here were cited by this Court in deciding that the approach
later mandated by Congress under RFRA was not required
as a matter of constitutional law under the Free Exercise
Clause. See Smith, 494 U. S., at 885–890. But Congress
has determined that courts should strike sensible balances,
pursuant to a compelling interest test that requires the Gov
ernment to address the particular practice at issue. Apply
ing that test, we conclude that the courts below did not err
in determining that the Government failed to demonstrate,
at the preliminary injunction stage, a compelling interest in
barring the UDV’s sacramental use of hoasca.
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit is affirmed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or deci
sion of this case.