ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION v. MURPHY et vir

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Syllabus
ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD
OF EDUCATION v. MURPHY et vir
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the second circuit
No. 05–18. Argued April 19, 2006—Decided June 26, 2006
After respondents prevailed in their Individuals with Disabilities Educa
tion Act (IDEA) action to require petitioner school board to pay for
their son’s private school tuition, they sought fees for services rendered
by an educational consultant during the proceedings, relying on an
IDEA provision that permits a court to “award reasonable attorneys’
fees as part of the costs” to prevailing parents, 20 U. S. C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).
The District Court granted their motion in part. Affirming, the Second
Circuit noted that, under Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482
U. S. 437, and West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U. S.
83, a cost- or fee-shifting provision will not be read to permit recovery
of expert fees without explicit statutory authority, but concluded that a
congressional Conference Committee Report relating to § 1415(i)(3)(B)
and a footnote in Casey referencing that Report showed that the IDEA
authorized such reimbursement.
Held: Section 1415(i)(3)(B) does not authorize prevailing parents to re
cover expert fees. Pp. 295–304.
(a) The resolution of this question is guided by the fact that Congress
enacted the IDEA pursuant to the Spending Clause. While Congress
has broad power to set the terms on which it disburses federal money
to the States, any conditions it attaches to a State’s acceptance of such
funds must be set out “unambiguously.” Pennhurst State School and
Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17. Fund recipients are bound only
by those conditions that they accept “voluntarily and knowingly,” ibid.,
and States cannot knowingly accept conditions of which they are “un
aware” or which they are “unable to ascertain,” ibid. Thus, the ques
tion here is whether the IDEA furnishes clear notice regarding expert
fees. Pp. 295–296.
(b) The Court begins with the IDEA’s text, for if its “language is
plain,” the courts’ function “ ‘ “is to enforce it according to its terms.” ’ ”
Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N. A., 530
U. S. 1, 6. While § 1415(i)(3)(B) provides for an award of “reasonable
attorneys’ fees,” it does not even hint that acceptance of IDEA funds
makes a State responsible for reimbursing prevailing parents for the
services of experts. “Costs” is a term of art that does not generally

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Syllabus
include expert fees. The use of “costs” rather than “expenses” strongly
suggests that § 1415(i)(3)(B) was not meant to be an open-ended provi
sion making States liable for all expenses. Moreover, § 1415(i)(3)(B)
says not that a court may award “costs” but that it may award attorney’s
fees “as part of the costs.” This language simply adds reasonable attor
ney’s fees to the list of recoverable costs set out in 28 U. S. C. § 1920,
the general statute covering taxation of costs, which is strictly limited
by § 1821. Thus, § 1415(i)(3)(B)’s text does not authorize an award of
additional expert fees, and it certainly fails to present the clear no
tice required by the Spending Clause. Other IDEA provisions point
strongly in the same direction. Of little significance here is a provision
in the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986 requiring the Gen
eral Accounting Office to collect data on awards to prevailing parties in
IDEA cases, but making no mention of consultants or experts or their
fees. And the fact that the provision directed the GAO to compile data
on the hours spent by consultants in IDEA cases does not mean that
Congress intended that States compensate prevailing parties for fees
billed by these consultants. Pp. 296–300.
(c) Crawford Fitting Co. and Casey strongly reinforce the conclusion
that the IDEA does not unambiguously authorize prevailing parents
to recover expert fees. Crawford Fitting Co.’s reasoning supports the
conclusion that the term “costs” in § 1415(i)(3)(B), like “costs” in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), the provision at issue there, is defined
by the categories of expenses enumerated in 28 U. S. C. § 1920. This
conclusion is buttressed by the principle, recognized in Crawford Fitting
Co., that no statute will be construed to authorize taxing witness fees
as costs unless the statute “refer[s] explicitly to witness fees.” 482
U. S., at 445. The conclusion that the IDEA does not authorize expert
fee awards is confirmed even more dramatically by Casey, where the
Court held that 42 U. S. C. § 1988, a fee-shifting provision with wording
virtually identical to that of 20 U. S. C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), did not empower
a district court to award expert fees to a prevailing party. 499 U. S.,
at 102. The Second Circuit misunderstood the meaning of the Casey
footnote on which it relied. That footnote did not state that the Con
ference Committee Report set out the correct interpretation of
§ 1415(i)(3)(B) or provided the clear notice required under the Spending
Clause. Its thrust was simply that “attorneys’ fees,” standing alone, is
generally not understood as encompassing expert fees. Pp. 300–303.
(d) Respondents’ additional arguments are unpersuasive. The
IDEA’s goals of “ensur[ing] that all children with disabilities have avail
able to them a free appropriate public education,” § 1400(d)(1)(A), and of
safeguarding parents’ right to challenge adverse school decisions are too
general to provide much support for their reading of the IDEA. And

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the IDEA’s legislative history is insufficient help, where everything
other than that history overwhelmingly suggests that expert fees may
not be recovered. Pp. 303–304.
402 F. 3d 332, reversed and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed an
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 304.
Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 308. Breyer, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Stevens and Souter, JJ., joined, post, p. 308.
Raymond G. Kuntz argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Jeffrey J. Schiro and Mario L.
Spagnuolo.
David B. Salmons argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief
were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney Gen
eral Kim, Deputy Solicitor General Garre, David K. Flynn,
Dennis J. Dimsey, and Kent D. Talbert.
David C. Vladeck argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief were Peter L. Strauss, Brian Wolf
man, and Scott L. Nelson.*
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA or
Act) provides that a court “may award reasonable attorneys’
fees as part of the costs” to parents who prevail in an ac
tion brought under the Act. 111 Stat. 92, 20 U. S. C.
§ 1415(i)(3)(B). We granted certiorari to decide whether
this fee-shifting provision authorizes prevailing parents to
*A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for the National
School Boards Association et al. by Darcy L. Kriha, Julie Heuberger Yura,
Patricia Whitten, Francisco M. Negro´ n, Jr., Naomi Gittins, Thomas Hut
ton, and Lisa Soronen.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Council of
Parent Attorneys and Advocates by Susan Jaffe Roberts; and for the
National Disability Rights Network et al. by Drew S. Days III, Seth M.
Galanter, and Linda A. Arnsbarger.

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recover fees for services rendered by experts in IDEA ac
tions. We hold that it does not.
I
Respondents Pearl and Theodore Murphy filed an action
under the IDEA on behalf of their son, Joseph Murphy, seek
ing to require petitioner Arlington Central School District
Board of Education to pay for their son’s private school tu
ition for specified school years. Respondents prevailed in
the District Court, 86 F. Supp. 2d 354 (SDNY 2000), and the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, 297 F. 3d
195 (2002).
As prevailing parents, respondents then sought $29,350 in
fees for the services of an educational consultant, Marilyn
Arons, who assisted respondents throughout the IDEA pro
ceedings. The District Court granted respondents’ request
in part. It held that only the value of Arons’ time spent
between the hearing request and the ruling in respondents’
favor could properly be considered charges incurred in an
“action or proceeding brought” under the Act, see 20 U. S. C.
§ 1415(i)(3)(B). 2003 WL 21694398, *9 (SDNY, July 22,
2003). This reduced the maximum recovery to $8,650. The
District Court also held that Arons, a nonlawyer, could be
compensated only for time spent on expert consulting serv
ices, not for time spent on legal representation, id., at *4, but
it concluded that all the relevant time could be characterized
as falling within the compensable category, and thus allowed
compensation for the full $8,650, id., at *10.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
402 F. 3d 332 (2005). Acknowledging that other Circuits had
taken the opposite view, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that “Congress intended to and did authorize
the reimbursement of expert fees in IDEA actions.” Id., at
336. The court began by discussing two decisions of this
Court holding that expert fees could not be recovered as
taxed costs under particular cost- or fee-shifting provisions.

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See Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U. S. 437
(1987) (interpreting Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54(d) and 28 U. S. C.
§ 1920); West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499
U. S. 83 (1991) (interpreting 42 U. S. C. § 1988 (1988 ed.)).
According to these decisions, the court noted, a cost- or fee
shifting provision will not be read to permit a prevailing
party to recover expert fees without “ ‘explicit statutory au
thority’ indicating that Congress intended for that sort of
fee-shifting.” 402 F. 3d, at 336.
Ultimately, though, the court was persuaded by a state
ment in the Conference Committee Report relating to 20
U. S. C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) and by a footnote in Casey that made
reference to that Report. 402 F. 3d, at 336–337 (citing H. R.
Conf. Rep. No. 99–687, p. 5 (1986)). Based on these authori
ties, the court concluded that it was required to interpret the
IDEA to authorize the award of the costs that prevailing
parents incur in hiring experts. 402 F. 3d, at 336.
We granted certiorari, 546 U. S. 1085 (2006), to resolve the
conflict among the Circuits with respect to whether Con
gress authorized the compensation of expert fees to prevail
ing parents in IDEA actions. Compare Goldring v. District
of Columbia, 416 F. 3d 70, 73–77 (CADC 2005); Neosho R–V
School Dist. v. Clark ex rel. Clark, 315 F. 3d 1022, 1031–1033
(CA8 2003); T. D. v. LaGrange School Dist. No. 102, 349 F. 3d
469, 480–482 (CA7 2003), with 402 F. 3d 332 (CA2 2005). We
now reverse.
II
Our resolution of the question presented in this case is
guided by the fact that Congress enacted the IDEA pursuant
to the Spending Clause. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see
Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U. S. 49 (2005). Like its statutory
predecessor, the IDEA provides federal funds to assist state
and local agencies in educating children with disabilities “and
conditions such funding upon a State’s compliance with ex
tensive goals and procedures.” Board of Ed. of Hendrick

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Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley,
458 U. S. 176, 179 (1982).
Congress has broad power to set the terms on which it
disburses federal money to the States, see, e. g., South Da
kota v. Dole, 483 U. S. 203, 206–207 (1987), but when Con
gress attaches conditions to a State’s acceptance of federal
funds, the conditions must be set out “unambiguously,” see
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451
U. S. 1, 17 (1981); Rowley, supra, at 204, n. 26. “[L]egisla
tion enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the
nature of a contract,” and therefore, to be bound by “feder
ally imposed conditions,” recipients of federal funds must ac
cept them “voluntarily and knowingly.” Pennhurst, 451
U. S., at 17. States cannot knowingly accept conditions of
which they are “unaware” or which they are “unable to as
certain.” Ibid. Thus, in the present case, we must view
the IDEA from the perspective of a state official who is en
gaged in the process of deciding whether the State should
accept IDEA funds and the obligations that go with those
funds. We must ask whether such a state official would
clearly understand that one of the obligations of the Act is
the obligation to compensate prevailing parents for expert
fees. In other words, we must ask whether the IDEA fur
nishes clear notice regarding the liability at issue in this case.
III
A
In considering whether the IDEA provides clear notice,
we begin with the text. We have “stated time and again
that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute
what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”
Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253–254
(1992). When the statutory “language is plain, the sole
function of the courts—at least where the disposition re
quired by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according
to its terms.” Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union

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Planters Bank, N. A., 530 U. S. 1, 6 (2000) (quoting United
States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 241
(1989), in turn quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S.
470, 485 (1917); internal quotation marks omitted).
The gover ni ng prov isi on of the IDEA, 20 U. S. C.
§ 1415(i)(3)(B), provides that “[i]n any action or proceeding
brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may
award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs” to the
parents of “a child with a disability” who is the “prevailing
party.” While this provision provides for an award of “rea
sonable attorneys’ fees,” this provision does not even hint
that acceptance of IDEA funds makes a State responsible for
reimbursing prevailing parents for services rendered by
experts.
Respondents contend that we should interpret the term
“costs” in accordance with its meaning in ordinary usage and
that § 1415(i)(3)(B) should therefore be read to “authorize re
imbursement of all costs parents incur in IDEA proceedings,
including expert costs.” Brief for Respondents 17.
This argument has multiple flaws. For one thing, as the
Court of Appeals in this case acknowledged, “ ‘costs’ is a
term of art that generally does not include expert fees.”
402 F. 3d, at 336. The use of this term of art, rather than
a ter m such as “expenses, ” strong ly suggests that
§ 1415(i)(3)(B) was not meant to be an open-ended provision
that makes participating States liable for all expenses in
curred by prevailing parents in connection with an IDEA
case—for example, travel and lodging expenses or lost wages
due to time taken off from work. Moreover, contrary to re
spondents’ suggestion, § 1415(i)(3)(B) does not say that a
court may award “costs” to prevailing parents; rather, it says
that a court may award reasonable attorney’s fees “as part
of the costs” to prevailing parents. This language simply
adds reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by prevailing par
ents to the list of costs that prevailing parents are otherwise
entitled to recover. This list of otherwise recoverable costs

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is obviously the list set out in 28 U. S. C. § 1920, the general
statute governing the taxation of costs in federal court, and
the recovery of witness fees under § 1920 is strictly limited
by § 1821, which authorizes travel reimbursement and a $40
per diem. Thus, the text of 20 U. S. C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) does
not authorize an award of any additional expert fees, and it
certainly fails to provide the clear notice that is required
under the Spending Clause.
Other provisions of the IDEA point strongly in the same
direction. While authorizing the award of reasonable attor
ney’s fees, the Act contains detailed provisions that are de
signed to ensure that such awards are indeed reasonable.
See §§ 1415(i)(3)(C)–(G). The absence of any comparable
provisions relating to expert fees strongly suggests that re
covery of expert fees is not authorized. Moreover, the lack
of any reference to expert fees in § 1415(d)(2) gives rise to a
similar inference. This provision, which generally requires
that parents receive “a full explanation of the procedural
safeguards” available under § 1415 and refers expressly to
“attorneys’ fees,” makes no mention of expert fees.
B
Respondents contend that their interpretation of § 1415(i)
(3)(B) is supported by a provision of the Handicapped
Children’s Protection Act of 1986 that required the General
Accounting Office (GAO) to collect certain data, § 4(b)(3), 100
Stat. 797 (hereinafter GAO study provision), but this provi
sion is of little significance for present purposes. The GAO
study provision directed the Comptroller General, acting
through the GAO, to compile data on, among other things:
“(A) the specific amount of attorneys’ fees, costs, and ex
penses awarded to the prevailing party” in IDEA cases for
a particular period of time, and (B) “the number of hours
spent by personnel, including attorneys and consultants, in
volved in the action or proceeding, and expenses incurred

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by the parents and the State educational agency and local
educational agency.” Id., at 797–798.
Subparagraph (A) would provide some support for re
spondents’ position if it directed the GAO to compile data on
awards to prevailing parties of the expense of hiring consult
ants, but that is not what subparagraph (A) says. Subpara
graph (A) makes no mention of consultants or experts or
their fees.1
Subparagraph (B) similarly does not help respondents.
Subparagraph (B), which directs the GAO to study “the num
ber of hours spent [in IDEA cases] by personnel, in
cluding . . . consultants,” says nothing about the award of
fees to such consultants. Just because Congress directed
the GAO to compile statistics on the hours spent by consult
ants in IDEA cases, it does not follow that Congress meant
for States to compensate prevailing parties for the fees billed
by these consultants.
Respondents maintain that “Congress’ direction to the
GAO would be inexplicable if Congress did not anticipate
that the expenses for ‘consultants’ would be recoverable,”
1 Because subparagraph (A) refers to both “costs” and “expenses”
awarded to prevailing parties and because it is generally presumed that
statutory language is not superfluous, it could be argued that this provi
sion manifests the expectation that prevailing parties would be awarded
certain “expenses” not included in the list of “costs” set out in 28 U. S. C.
§ 1920 and that expert fees were intended to be among these unenumer
ated “expenses.” This argument fails because, whatever expectation this
language might seem to evidence, the fact remains that neither 20 U. S. C.
§ 1415 nor any other provision of the IDEA authorizes the award of any
“expenses” other than “costs.” Recognizing this, respondents argue not
that they are entitled to recover “expenses” that are not “costs,” but that
expert fees are recoverable “costs.” As a result, the reference to awards
of both “expenses” and “costs” does not support respondents’ position.
The reference to “expenses” may relate to IDEA actions brought in state
court, § 1415(i)(2)(A), where “expenses” other than “costs” might be receiv
able. Or the reference may be surplusage. While it is generally pre
sumed that statutes do not contain surplusage, instances of surplusage are
not unknown.

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Brief for Respondents 19, but this is incorrect. There are
many reasons why Congress might have wanted the GAO to
gather data on expenses that were not to be taxed as costs.
Knowing the costs incurred by IDEA litigants might be use
ful in considering future procedural amendments (which
might affect these costs) or a future amendment regarding
fee shifting. And, in fact, it is apparent that the GAO study
provision covered expenses that could not be taxed as costs.
For example, the GAO was instructed to compile statistics
on the hours spent by all attorneys involved in an IDEA
action or proceeding, even though the Act did not provide
for the recovery of attorney’s fees by a prevailing state or
local educational agency.2 Similarly, the GAO was directed
to compile data on “expenses incurred by the parents,” not
just those parents who prevail and are thus eligible to re
cover taxed costs.
In sum, the terms of the IDEA overwhelmingly support
the conclusion that prevailing parents may not recover the
costs of experts or consultants. Certainly the terms of the
IDEA fail to provide the clear notice that would be needed
to attach such a condition to a State’s receipt of IDEA funds.
IV
Thus far, we have considered only the text of the IDEA,
but perhaps the strongest support for our interpretation of
the IDEA is supplied by our decisions and reasoning in
Crawford Fitting, 482 U. S. 437, and Casey, 499 U. S. 83. In
light of those decisions, we do not see how it can be said
2 In 2000, the attorney’s fees provision provided only an award to pre
vailing parents. See 20 U. S. C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). In 2004, Congress
amended § 1415(i)(3)(B) to include two additional awards. See § 101, 118
Stat. 2724. The amendments provided awards “to a prevailing party who
is a State educational agency or local educational agency” where the com
plaint filed is frivolous or presented for an improper purpose, such as
to harass, delay, or increase the cost of litigation. See 20 U. S. C.
§§ 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II)–(III) (2000 ed., Supp. V).

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that the IDEA gives a State unambiguous notice regarding
liability for expert fees.
In Crawford Fitting, the Court rejected an argument very
similar to respondents’ argument that the term “costs” in
§ 1415(i)(3)(B) should be construed as an open-ended refer
ence to prevailing parents’ expenses. It was argued in
Crawford Fitting that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d),
which provides for the award of “costs” to a prevailing party,
authorizes the award of costs not listed in 28 U. S. C. § 1821.
482 U. S., at 439. The Court held, however, that Rule 54(d)
does not give a district judge “discretion to tax whatever
costs may seem appropriate”; rather, the term “costs” in
Rule 54(d) is defined by the list set out in § 1920. Id., at 441.
Because the recovery of witness fees, see § 1920(3), is strictly
limited by § 1821, the Court observed, a broader interpreta
tion of Rule 54(d) would mean that the Rule implicitly ef
fected a partial repeal of those provisions. Id., at 442. But,
the Court warned, “[w]e will not lightly infer that Congress
has repealed §§ 1920 and 1821, either through Rule 54(d) or
any other provision not referring explicitly to witness fees.”
Id., at 445.
The reasoning of Crawford Fitting strongly supports the
conclusion that the term “costs” in 20 U. S. C. § 1415(i)(3)(B),
like the same term in Rule 54(d), is defined by the categories
of expenses enumerated in 28 U. S. C. § 1920. This conclu
sion is buttressed by the principle, recognized in Crawford
Fitting, that no statute will be construed as authorizing the
taxation of witness fees as costs unless the statute “refer[s]
explicitly to witness fees.” 482 U. S., at 445; see also ibid.
(“[A]bsent explicit statutory or contractual authorization for
the taxation of the expenses of a litigant’s witness as costs,
federal courts are bound by the limitations set out in 28
U. S. C. § 1821 and § 1920”).
Our decision in Casey confirms even more dramatically
that the IDEA does not authorize an award of expert fees.
In Casey, as noted above, we interpreted a fee-shifting pro

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vision, 42 U. S. C. § 1988, the relevant wording of which
was virtually identical to the wording of 20 U. S. C.
§ 1415(i)(3)(B). Compare ibid. (authorizing the award of
“reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs” to prevailing
parents) with 42 U. S. C. § 1988 (1988 ed.) (permitting pre
vailing parties in certain civil rights actions to be awarded
“a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs”). We held
that § 1988 did not empower a district court to award expert
fees to a prevailing party. Casey, supra, at 102. To decide
in favor of respondents here, we would have to interpret the
virtually identical language in 20 U. S. C. § 1415 as having
exactly the opposite meaning. Indeed, we would have to go
further and hold that the relevant language in the IDEA
unambiguously means exactly the opposite of what the
nearly identical language in 42 U. S. C. § 1988 was held to
mean in Casey.
The Court of Appeals, as noted above, was heavily influ
enced by a Casey footnote, see 402 F. 3d, at 336–337 (quoting
499 U. S., at 91–92, n. 5), but the court misunderstood the
footnote’s meaning. The text accompanying the footnote ar
gued, based on an analysis of several fee-shifting statutes,
that the term “attorney’s fees” does not include expert fees.
Id., at 88–91. In the footnote, we commented on petitioners’
invocation of the Conference Committee Report relating to
20 U. S. C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), which stated: “ ‘The conferees in
tend[ed] that the term “attorneys’ fees as part of the costs”
include reasonable expenses and fees of expert witnesses and
the reasonable costs of any test or evaluation which is found
to be necessary for the preparation of the . . . case.’ ” 499
U. S., at 91–92, n. 5 (quoting H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 99–687, at
5; ellipsis in original). This statement, the footnote com
mented, was “an apparent effort to depart from ordinary
meaning and to define a term of art.” 499 U. S., at 92, n. 5.
The footnote did not state that the Conference Committee
Report set out the correct interpretation of § 1415(i)(3)(B),
much less that the Report was sufficient, despite the lan

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guage of the statute, to provide the clear notice required
under the Spending Clause. The thrust of the footnote was
simply that the term “attorneys’ fees,” standing alone, is
generally not understood as encompassing expert fees.
Thus, Crawford Fitting and Casey strongly reinforce the
conclusion that the IDEA does not unambiguously authorize
prevailing parents to recover expert fees.
V
Respondents make several arguments that are not based
on the text of the IDEA, but these arguments do not show
that the IDEA provides clear notice regarding the award of
expert fees.
Respondents argue that their interpretation of the IDEA
furthers the Act’s overarching goal of “ensur[ing] that all
children with disabilities have available to them a free appro
priate public education,” 20 U. S. C. § 1400(d)(1)(A), as well
as the goal of “safeguard[ing] the rights of parents to chal
lenge school decisions that adversely affect their child.”
Brief for Respondents 20. These goals, however, are too
general to provide much support for respondents’ reading of
the terms of the IDEA. The IDEA obviously does not seek
to promote these goals at the expense of all other considera
tions, including fiscal considerations. Because the IDEA is
not intended in all instances to further the broad goals iden
tified by respondents at the expense of fiscal considerations,
the goals cited by respondents do little to bolster their argu
ment on the narrow question presented here.3
3 Respondents note that a GAO report stated that expert witness fees
are reimbursable expenses. See Brief for Respondents 19 (citing GAO,
Briefing Report to Congressional Requesters, Special Education: The At
torney Fees Provision of Public Law 99–372 (GAO/HRD–90–22BR), p. 13
(Nov. 1989)). But this passing reference in a report issued by an agency
not responsible for implementing the IDEA is plainly insufficient to pro
vide clear notice regarding the scope of the conditions attached to the
receipt of IDEA funds.

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Finally, respondents vigorously argue that Congress
clearly intended for prevailing parents to be compensated for
expert fees. They rely on the legislative history of § 1415
and in particular on the following statement in the Confer
ence Committee Report, discussed above: “The conferees in
tend that the term ‘attorneys’ fees as part of the costs’ in
clude reasonable expenses and fees of expert witnesses and
the reasonable costs of any test or evaluation which is found
to be necessary for the preparation of the . . . case.” H. R.
Conf. Rep. No. 99–687, at 5.
Whatever weight this legislative history would merit in
another context, it is not sufficient here. Putting the legisla
tive history aside, we see virtually no support for respond
ents’ position. Under these circumstances, where every
thing other than the legislative history overwhelmingly
suggests that expert fees may not be recovered, the legisla
tive history is simply not enough. In a Spending Clause
case, the key is not what a majority of the Members of both
Houses intend but what the States are clearly told regarding
the conditions that go along with the acceptance of those
funds. Here, in the face of the unambiguous text of the
IDEA and the reasoning in Crawford Fitting and Casey, we
cannot say that the legislative history on which respondents
rely is sufficient to provide the requisite fair notice.
* * *
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Ginsburg, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
I agree, in the main, with the Court’s resolution of this
case, but part ways with the Court’s opinion in one respect.
The Court extracts from Pennhurst State School and Hospi

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tal v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981), a “clear notice” re
quirement, and deems it applicable in this case because Con
gress enacted the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA), as it did the legislation at issue in Pennhurst,
pursuant to the Spending Clause. Ante, at 296. That ex
traction, in my judgment, is unwarranted. Pennhurst’s
“clear notice” requirement should not be unmoored from its
context. The Court there confronted a plea to impose “an
unexpected condition for compliance—a new [programmatic]
obligation for participating States.” Bell v. New Jersey, 461
U. S. 773, 790, n. 17 (1983). The controversy here is lower
key: It concerns not the educational programs IDEA directs
school districts to provide, but “the remedies available
against a noncomplying [district].” Ibid.; see post, at 316–
318 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
The Court’s repeated references to a Spending Clause de
rived “clear notice” requirement, see ante, at 295–296, 298,
300, 303, and n. 3, are questionable on other grounds as well.
For one thing, IDEA was enacted not only pursuant to Con
gress’ Spending Clause authority, but also pursuant to § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Smith v. Robinson, 468
U. S. 992, 1009 (1984) (IDEA’s predecessor, the Education of
the Handicapped Act, was “set up by Congress to aid the
States in complying with their constitutional obligations to
provide public education for handicapped children.”). Fur
thermore, no “clear notice” prop is needed in this case given
the twin pillars on which the Court’s judgment securely
rests. First, as the Court explains, ante, at 297–298, the
specific, attorneys’-fees-oriented, provisions of IDEA, i. e., 20
U. S. C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)–(G); § 1415(d)(2)(L) (2000 ed., Supp. V),
“overwhelmingly support the conclusion that prevailing par
ents may not recover the costs of experts or consultants,”
ante, at 300. Those provisions place controls on fees recov
erable for attorneys’ services, without mentioning costs par
ents might incur for other professional services and controls
geared to those costs. Second, as the Court develops, prior

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decisions closely in point “strongly suppor[t],” even “confir[m]
. . . dramatically,” today’s holding that IDEA trains on attor
neys’ fees and does not authorize an award covering amounts
paid or payable for the services of an educational consultant.
Ante, at 301 (citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons,
Inc., 482 U. S. 437 (1987), and West Virginia Univ. Hospitals,
Inc. v. Casey, 499 U. S. 83 (1991)).
For the contrary conclusion, Justice Breyer’s dissent re
lies dominantly on a Conference Report stating the confer
ees’ view that the term “attorneys’ fees as part of the costs”
includes “expenses and fees of expert witnesses” and pay
ments for tests necessary for the preparation of a case.
H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 99–687, p. 5 (1986) (internal quotation
marks omitted).1 Including costs of consultants and tests
in § 1415(i)(3)(B) would make good sense in light of IDEA’s
overarching goal, i. e., to provide a “free appropriate public
education” to children with disabilities, § 1400(d)(1)(A). See
post, at 313–316 (Breyer, J., dissenting). But Congress did
not compose § 1415(i)(3)(B)’s text,2 as it did the texts of other
1 The relevant statement from the Conference Report reads in its
entirety:
“The conferees intend that the term ‘attorneys’ fees as part of the costs’
include reasonable expenses and fees of expert witnesses and the reason
able costs of any test or evaluation which is found to be necessary for the
preparation of the parent or guardian’s case in the action or proceeding,
as well as traditional costs incurred in the course of litigating a case.”
H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 99–687, at 5.
Although the Conference Report goes on to consider other matters, in
cluding controls on attorneys’ fees, nothing further is said on expert wit
ness fees or test costs.
2 At the time the Conference Report was submitted to the Senate and
House, sponsors of the legislation did not mention anything on the floor
about expert or consultant fees. They were altogether clear, however,
that the purpose of the legislation was to “reverse” this Court’s decision
in Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992 (1984). In Smith, the Court held that,
under the statute as then designed, prevailing parents were not entitled
to attorneys’ fees. See 132 Cong. Rec. 16823 (1986) (remarks of Sen.
Weicker) (“In adopting this legislation, we are rejecting the reasoning of

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statutes too numerous and varied to ignore, to alter the com
mon import of the terms “attorneys’ fees” and “costs” in
the context of expense-allocation legislation. See, e. g., 42
U. S. C. § 1988(c) (added in 1991 specifically to “include ex
pert fees as part of the attorney’s fee”); Casey, 499 U. S.,
at 88–92, and n. 4 (citing variously composed statutes that
“explicitly shift expert . . . fees as well as attorney’s fees”).
Given the constant meaning of the formulation “attorneys’
fees as part of the costs” in federal legislation, we are not at
liberty to rewrite “the statutory text adopted by both
Houses of Congress and submitted to the President,” id., at
98, to add several words Congress wisely might have in
cluded. The ball, I conclude, is properly left in Congress’
court to provide, if it so elects, for consultant fees and testing
expenses beyond those IDEA and its implementing reg
ulations already authorize,3 along with any specifications,
conditions, or limitations geared to those fees and expenses
Congress may deem appropriate. Cf. § 1415(i)(3)(B)–(G);
§ 1415(d)(2)(L) (listing only attorneys’ fees, not expert or con
sulting fees, among the procedural safeguards about which
school districts must inform parents).
In sum, although I disagree with the Court’s rationale to
the extent that it invokes a “clear notice” requirement tied
the Supreme Court in Smith versus Robinson.”); id., at 16824 (remarks of
Sen. Kerry) (“This vital legislation reverses a U. S. Supreme Court deci
sion Smith versus Robinson[.]”); id., at 17608–17609 (remarks of Rep.
Bartlett) (“I support those provisions in the conference agreement that,
in response to the Supreme Court decision in . . . Smith versus Robinson,
authoriz[e] the awarding of reasonable attorneys’ fees to parents who pre
vail in special education court cases.”); id., at 17609 (remarks of Rep.
Biaggi) (“This legislation clearly supports the intent of Congress back in
1975 and corrects what I believe was a gross misinterpretation of the law.
Attorneys’ fees should be provided to those individuals who are being
denied access to the educational system.”).
3 Under 34 CFR § 300.502(b)(1) (2005), a “parent has the right to an inde
pendent educational evaluation at public expense if the parent disagrees
with an evaluation obtained by the public agency.”

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to the Spending Clause, I agree with the Court’s discussion
of IDEA’s terms, ante, at 296–298, and of our decisions
in Crawford and Casey, ante, at 300–303. Accordingly, I
concur in part in the Court’s opinion, and join the Court’s
judgment.
Justice Souter, dissenting.
I join Justice Breyer’s dissent and add this word only
to say outright what would otherwise be implicit, that I
agree with the distinction he draws between this case and
Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U. S. 181 (2002). See post, at 318
(citing Barnes, supra, at 191 (Souter, J., concurring)). Be
yond that, I emphasize the importance for me of § 4 of the
Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 797,
note following 20 U. S. C. § 1415 (1988 ed.), which mandated
the study by what is now known as the Government Account
ability Office. That section, of equal dignity with the fee
shifting provision enacted by the same statute, makes Jus
tice Breyer’s resort to the related Conference Report the
reasonable course.
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens and Jus
tice Souter join, dissenting.
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA or
Act), 20 U. S. C. § 1400 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. V), says
that a court may “award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part
of the costs to the parents” who are prevailing parties.
§ 1415(i)(3)(B). Unlike the Court, I believe that the word
“costs” includes, and authorizes payment of, the costs of ex
perts. The word “costs” does not define its own scope.
Neither does the phrase “attorneys’ fees as part of costs.”
But Members of Congress did make clear their intent by,
among other things, approving a Conference Report that
specified that “the term ‘attorneys’ fees as part of the costs’
include[s] reasonable expenses and fees of expert witnesses
and the reasonable costs of any test or evaluation which is
found to be necessary for the preparation of the parent or

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guardian’s case in the action or proceeding.” H. R. Conf.
Rep. No. 99–687, p. 5 (1986), Appendix A, infra, at 326. No
Senator or Representative voiced any opposition to this
statement in the discussion preceding the vote on the Con
ference Report—the last vote on the bill before it was sent
to the President. I can find no good reason for this Court to
interpret the language of this statute as meaning the precise
opposite of what Congress told us it intended.
I
There are two strong reasons for interpreting the statu
tory phrase to include the award of expert fees. First, that
is what Congress said it intended by the phrase. Second,
that interpretation furthers the IDEA’s statutorily defined
purposes.
A
Congress added the IDEA’s cost-shifting provision when
it enacted the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986
(HCPA), 100 Stat. 796. Senator Lowell Weicker introduced
the relevant bill in 1985. 131 Cong. Rec. 1979–1980 (1985).
As introduced, it sought to overturn this Court’s determina
tion that the then-current version of the IDEA (and other
civil rights statutes) did not authorize courts to award attor
ney’s fees to prevailing parents in IDEA cases. See Smith
v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992 (1984). The bill provided that
“ ‘[i]n any action or proceeding brought under this subsec
tion, the court, in its discretion, may award a reasonable
attorney’s fee as part of the costs to a parent or legal
representative of a handicapped child or youth who is
the prevailing party.’ ” 131 Cong. Rec. 1980; see S. Rep.
No. 99–112, p. 2 (1985).
After hearings and debate, several Senators introduced a
new bill in the Senate that would have put a cap on attor
ney’s fees for legal services lawyers, but at the same time
would have explicitly authorized the award of “a reasonable
attorney’s fee, reasonable witness fees, and other reasonable

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expenses of the civil action, in addition to the costs to a
parent . . . who is the prevailing party.” Id., at 7 (some
emphasis deleted). While no Senator objected to the latter
provision, some objected to the cap. See, e. g., id., at 17–18
(additional views of Sens. Kerry, Kennedy, Pell, Dodd, Simon,
Metzenbaum, and Matsunaga) (accepting cost-shifting provi
sion, but objecting to cap and other aspects of the bill). A
bipartisan group of Senators, led by Senators Hatch and
Weicker, proposed an alternative bill that authorized courts
to award “ ‘a reasonable attorney’s fee in addition to the costs
to a parent’ ” who prevailed. Id., at 15–16 (additional views
of Sens. Hatch, Weicker, Stafford, Dole, Pell, Matsunaga,
Simon, Kerry, Kennedy, Metzenbaum, Dodd, and Grassley);
131 Cong. Rec. 21389.
Senator Weicker explained that the bill
“will enable courts to compensate parents for whatever
reasonable costs they had to incur to fully secure what
was guaranteed to them by the [Education of the Hand
icapped Act]. As in other fee shifting statutes, it is our
intent that such awards will include, at the discretion of
the court, reasonable attorney’s fees, necessary expert
witness fees, and other reasonable expenses which were
necessary for parents to vindicate their claim to a free
appropriate public education for their handicapped
child.” Id., at 21390 (emphasis added).
Not a word of opposition to this statement (or the provision)
was voiced on the Senate floor, and S. 415 passed without a
recorded vote. Id., at 21393.
The House version of the bill also reflected an intention
to authorize recovery of expert costs. Following the House
hearings, the Committee on Education and Labor produced
a substitute bill that authorized courts to “ ‘award reasonable
attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs’ ” to prevailing parents.
H. R. Rep. No. 99–296, pp. 1, 5 (1985) (emphasis added). The
House Report stated:

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“The phrase ‘expenses and costs’ includes expenses of
expert witnesses; the reasonable costs of any study, re
port, test, or project which is found to be necessary for
the preparation of the parents’ or guardian’s due proc
ess hearing, state administrative review or civil action;
as well as traditional costs and expenses incurred in the
course of litigating a case (e. g., depositions and interrog
atories).” Id., at 6 (emphasis added).
No one objected to this statement. By the time H. R. 1523
reached the floor, another substitute bill was introduced.
131 Cong. Rec. 31369 (1985). This new bill did not change
in any respect the text of the authorization of expenses and
costs. It did add a provision, however, that directed the
General Accounting Office (GAO)—now known as the Gov
ernment Accountability Office, see note following 31 U. S. C.
§ 731 (2000 ed., Supp. IV)—to study and report to Congress
on the fiscal impact of the cost-shifting provision. See 131
Cong. Rec. 31369–31370. The newly substituted bill passed
the House without a recorded vote. Id., at 31377.
Members of the House and Senate (including all of the pri
mary sponsors of the HCPA) then met in conference to work
out certain differences. At the conclusion of those negotia
tions, they produced a Conference Report, which contained
the text of the agreed-upon bill and a “Joint Explanatory
Statement of the Committee of Conference.” See H. R.
Conf. Rep. No. 99–687, at 5, Appendix A, infra, at 325. The
Conference accepted the House bill’s GAO provision with “an
amendment expanding the data collection requirements of
the GAO study to include information regarding the amount
of funds expended by local educational agencies and state
educational agencies on civil actions and administrative pro
ceedings.” Id., at 7, Appendix A, infra, at 327–328. And it
accepted (with minor changes) the cost-shifting provisions
provided in both the Senate and House versions. The con
ferees explained:

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“With slightly different wording, both the Senate bill
and the House amendment provide for the awarding of
attorneys’ fees in addition to costs.
“The Senate recedes to the House and the House re
cedes to the Senate with an amendment clarifying that
‘the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable at
torneys’ fees as part of the costs . . . ’ This change in
wording incorporates the Supreme Court[’s] Marek v.
Chesny[, 473 U. S. 1 (1985),] decision.
“The conferees intend that the term ‘attorneys’ fees
as part of the costs’ include reasonable expenses and
fees of expert witnesses and the reasonable costs of any
test or evaluation which is found to be necessary for the
preparation of the parent or guardian’s case in the ac
tion or proceeding, as well as traditional costs incurred
in the course of litigating a case.” Id., at 5, Appendix
A, infra, at 326 (emphasis added; citation omitted).
The Conference Report was returned to the Senate and
the House. A motion was put to each to adopt the Confer
ence Report, and both the Senate and the House agreed to
the Conference Report by voice votes. See Appendix B,
infra, at 329 (Senate); Appendix C, infra, at 330 (House).
No objection was raised to the Conference Report’s state
ment that the cost-shifting provision was intended to author
ize expert costs. I concede that “sponsors of the legislation
did not mention anything on the floor about expert or con
sultant fees” at the time the Conference Report was submit
ted. Ante, at 306, n. 2 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment). But I do not believe that silence
is significant in light of the fact that every Senator and three
of the five Representatives who spoke on the floor had pre
viously signed his name to the Conference Report—a Re
port that made Congress’ intent clear on the first page of
its explanation. See Appendix A, infra, at 325. And every
Senator and Representative who took the floor preceding the
votes voiced his strong support for the Conference Report.

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132 Cong. Rec. 16823–16825 (1986) (Senate); id., at 17607–
17612 (House). The upshot is that Members of both Houses
of Congress voted to adopt both the statutory text before us
and the Conference Report that made clear that the statute’s
words include the expert costs here in question.
B
The Act’s basic purpose further supports interpreting the
provision’s language to include expert costs. The IDEA
guarantees a “free” and “appropriate” public education for
“all” children with disabilities. 20 U. S. C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)
(2000 ed., Supp. V); see also § 1401(9)(A) (defining “free
appropriate public education” as one “provided at public
expense,” “without charge”); § 1401(29) (defining “special
education” as “specially designed instruction, at no cost to
parents, to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability”
(emphasis added)).
Parents have every right to become involved in the Act’s
efforts to provide that education; indeed, the Act encourages
their participation. § 1400(c)(5)(B) (IDEA “ensur[es] that
families of [disabled] children have meaningful opportunities
to participate in the education of their children at school”).
It assures parents that they may question a school district’s
decisions about what is “appropriate” for their child. And in
doing so, they may secure the help of experts. § 1415(h)(1)
(parents have “the right to be accompanied and advised by
counsel and by individuals with special knowledge or train
ing with respect to the problems of children with disabili
ties”); see generally Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U. S. 49, 53–54
(2005) (detailing Act’s procedures); Board of Ed. of Hendrick
Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley,
458 U. S. 176, 205–206 (1982) (emphasizing importance of
Act’s procedural guarantees).
The practical significance of the Act’s participatory rights
and procedural protections may be seriously diminished if
parents are unable to obtain reimbursement for the costs of

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their experts. In IDEA cases, experts are necessary. See
Kuriloff & Goldberg, Is Mediation a Fair Way to Resolve
Special Education Disputes? First Empirical Findings, 2
Harv. Negotiation L. Rev. 35, 40 (1997) (detailing findings of
study showing high correlation between use of experts and
success of parents in challenging school district’s plan); Kuri
loff, Is Justice Served by Due Process?: Affecting the Out
come of Special Education Hearings in Pennsylvania, 48
Law & Contemp. Prob. 89, 100–101, 109 (1985) (same); see
also Brief for National Disability Rights Network et al. as
Amici Curiae 6–15 (collecting sources); cf. Schaffer, supra,
at 66–67 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he vast majority of
parents whose children require the benefits and protections
provided in the IDEA lack knowledge about the educational
resources available to their child and the sophistication to
mount an effective case against a district-proposed” individu
alized education program (IEP) (internal quotation marks
and brackets omitted)).
Experts are also expensive. See Brief for Respondents
28, n. 17 (collecting District Court decisions awarding expert
costs ranging from $200 to $7,600, and noting three reported
cases in which expert awards exceeded $10,000). The costs
of experts may not make much of a dent in a school district’s
budget, as many of the experts they use in IDEA proceed
ings are already on the staff. Cf. Oberti v. Board of Ed.
Clementon School Dist., 995 F. 2d 1204, 1219 (CA3 1993).
But to parents, the award of costs may matter enormously.
Without potential reimbursement, parents may well lack the
services of experts entirely. See Dept. of Education,
M. Wagner et al., The Individual and Household Characteris
tics of Youth With Disabilities: A Report from the National
Longitudinal Transition Study–2 (NLTS2), p. 3–10 (Aug.
2003) (prepared by SRI International), online at http://www.
nlts2.org/reports/2003_08/nlts2_report_2003_08_complete.pdf
(all Internet materials as visited June 23, 2006, and available
in Clerk of Court’s case file) (finding that 25% of disabled

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children live in poverty and 65% live in households with in
comes less than $50,000); see Dept. of Education, M. Wagner,
C. Marder, J. Blackorby, & D. Cardoso, The Children We
Serve: The Demographic Characteristics of Elementary and
Middle School Students with Disabilities and Their House
holds 28 (Sept. 2002) (prepared by SRI International), online
at http://www.seels.net/designdocs/SEELS_Children_We_
Serve_Report.pdf (finding that 36% of disabled children live
in households with incomes of $25,000 or less).
In a word, the Act’s statutory right to a “free” and “appro
priate” education may mean little to those who must pay
hundreds of dollars to obtain it. That is why this Court has
previously avoided interpretations that would bring about
this kind of result. See School Comm. of Burlington v. De
partment of Ed. of Mass., 471 U. S. 359 (1985) (construing
IDEA provision granting equitable authority to courts to in
clude the power to order reimbursement for parents who
switch their child to private schools if that decision later
proves correct); id., at 370 (without cost reimbursement for
prevailing parents, “the child’s right to a free appropriate
public education, the parents’ right to participate fully in de
veloping a proper IEP, and all of the procedural safeguards
would be less than complete”); Florence County School Dist.
Four v. Carter, 510 U. S. 7, 13 (1993) (holding that prevailing
parents are not barred from reimbursement for switching
their child to a private school that does not meet the IDEA’s
definition of a free and appropriate education). In Carter,
we explained: “IDEA was intended to ensure that children
with disabilities receive an education that is both appropriate
and free. To read the provisions of § 1401(a)(18) to bar reim
bursement in the circumstances of this case would defeat this
statutory purpose.” Id., at 13–14 (citation omitted).
To read the word “costs” as requiring successful parents
to bear their own expenses for experts suffers from the same
problem. Today’s result will leave many parents and guard
ians “without an expert with the firepower to match the op

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position,” Schaffer, 546 U. S., at 61, a far cry from the level
playing field that Congress envisioned.
II
The majority makes essentially three arguments against
this interpretation. It says that the statute’s purpose and
“legislative history is simply not enough” to overcome:
(1) the fact that this is a Spending Clause case; (2) the text
of the statute; and (3) our prior cases which hold that the
term “costs” does not include expert costs. Ante, at 304. I
do not find these arguments convincing.
A
At the outset the majority says that it “is guided by the
fact that Congress enacted the IDEA pursuant to the Spend
ing Clause.” Ante, at 295. “In a Spending Clause case,”
the majority adds, “the key is not what a majority of the
Members of both Houses intend but what the States are
clearly told regarding the conditions that go along with the
acceptance of those funds.” Ante, at 304. Thus, the stat
ute’s “conditions must be set out ‘unambiguously.’ ” Ante,
at 296 (citing Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Hal
derman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981), and Rowley, 458 U. S., at 204,
n. 26). And “we must ask” whether the statute “furnishes
clear notice regarding the liability at issue in this case.”
Ante, at 296.
I agree that the statute on its face does not clearly tell the
States that they must pay expert fees to prevailing parents.
But I do not agree that the majority has posed the right
question. For one thing, we have repeatedly examined the
nature and extent of the financial burdens that the IDEA
imposes without reference to the Spending Clause or any
“clear-statement rule.” See, e. g., Burlington, supra, at 369
(private school fees); Carter, supra, at 13 (same); Smith, 468
U. S., at 1010–1011 (attorney’s fees); Cedar Rapids Com
munity School Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U. S. 66, 76–79 (1999)
(continuous nursing service); but see id., at 83 (Thomas, J.,

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joined by Kennedy, J., dissenting). Those cases did not ask
whether the statute “furnishes clear notice” to the affirma
tive obligation or liability at issue.
For another thing, neither Pennhurst nor any other case
suggests that every spending detail of a Spending Clause
statute must be spelled out with unusual clarity. To the
contrary, we have held that Pennhurst’s requirement that
Congress “unambiguously” set out “a condition on the grant
of federal money” does not necessarily apply to legislation
setting forth “the remedies available against a noncomply
ing State.” Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U. S. 773, 790, n. 17
(1983) (emphasis added) (rejecting Pennhurst-based argu
ment that Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
did not unambiguously provide that the Secretary could re
cover federal funds that are misused by a State). We have
added that Pennhurst does not require Congress “specifi
cally” to “identify” and “proscribe each condition in [Spend
ing Clause] legislation.” Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of
Ed., 544 U. S. 167, 183 (2005) (emphasis added; internal quo
tation marks and brackets omitted) (rejecting argument that
Pennhurst precluded interpreting Title IX’s private cause of
action to encompass retaliation); see also Bennett v. Ken
tucky Dept. of Ed., 470 U. S. 656, 665–666 (1985). And we
have denied any implication that “suits under Spending
Clause legislation are suits in contract, or that contract-law
principles apply to all issues that they raise.” Barnes v.
Gorman, 536 U. S. 181, 188–189, n. 2 (2002) (emphasis added).
These statements and holdings are not surprising. After
all, the basic objective of Pennhurst’s clear-statement re
quirement does not demand textual clarity in respect to
every detail. That is because ambiguity about the precise
nature of a statutory program’s details—particularly where
they are of a kind that States might have anticipated—is
rarely relevant to the basic question: Would the States have
accepted the Federal Government’s funds had they only
known the nature of the accompanying conditions? Often,

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the later filling-in of details through judicial interpretation
will not lead one to wonder whether funding recipients would
have agreed to enter the basic program at all. Given the
nature of such details, it is clear that the States would have
entered the program regardless. At the same time, to view
each statutory detail of a highly complex federal/state pro
gram (involving, say, transportation, schools, the environ
ment) simply through the lens of linguistic clarity, rather
than to assess its meanings in terms of basic legislative
purpose, is to risk a set of judicial interpretations that can
prevent the program, overall, from achieving its basic objec
tives or that might well reduce a program in its details to
incoherence.
This case is about just such a detail. Permitting parents
to recover expert fees will not lead to awards of “indetermi
nate magnitude, untethered to compensable harm” and con
sequently will not “pose a concern that recipients of federal
funding could not reasonably have anticipated.” Barnes,
536 U. S., at 190–191 (Souter, J., joined by O’Connor, J., con
curring) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Unlike, say, punitive damages, an award of costs to expert
parties is neither “unorthodox” nor “indeterminate,” and
thus does not throw into doubt whether the States would
have entered into the program. Id., at 188. If determina
tions as to whether the IDEA requires States to provide
continuing nursing services, Cedar Rapids, supra, or reim
bursement for private school tuition, Burlington, 471 U. S.
359, do not call for linguistic clarity, then the precise content
of recoverable “costs” does not call for such clarity here
a fortiori.
B
If the Court believes that the statute’s language is unam
biguous, I must disagree. The provision at issue says that
a court “may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the
costs” to parents who prevail in an action brought under the
Act. 20 U. S. C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). The statute neither defines

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the word “costs” nor points to any other source of law for a
definition. And the word “costs,” alone, says nothing at all
about which costs fall within its scope.
Neither does the statutory phrase—“as part of the costs to
the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing
party”—taken in its entirety unambiguously foreclose an
award of expert fees. I agree that, read literally, that provi
sion does not clearly grant authority to award any costs at
all. And one might read it, as the Court does, as referencing
another federal statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1920, which provides
that authority. See ante, at 297–298; see also § 1920 (federal
taxation of cost statute). But such a reading is not inevita
ble. The provision (indeed, the entire Act) says nothing
about that other statute. And one can, consistent with the
language, read the provision as both embodying a general
authority to award costs while also specifying the inclusion
of “reasonable attorneys’ fees” as part of those costs (as say
ing, for example, that a court “may award reasonable attor
neys’ fees as part of [a] costs [award]”).
This latter reading, while linguistically the less natural,
is legislatively the more likely. The majority’s alternative
reading, by cross-referencing only the federal general cost
awarding statute (which applies solely in federal courts),
would produce a jumble of different cost definitions applica
ble to similar IDEA administrative and state-court proceed
ings in different States. See § 1920 (“A judge or clerk of
any court of the United States may tax as costs the follow
ing . . . ” (emphasis added)). This result is particularly odd,
as all IDEA actions must begin in state due process hear
ings, where the federal cost statute clearly does not apply,
and the overwhelming majority of these actions are never
appealed to any court. See GAO, Report to the Ranking
Minority Member, Committee on Health, Education, Labor
and Pensions, U. S. Senate, Special Education: Numbers of
Formal Disputes Are Generally Low and States Are Using
Mediation and Other Strategies to Resolve Conflicts (GAO–

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03–897), p. 13 (Sept. 2003), online at http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d03897.pdf (approximately 3,000 administrative hear
ings annually; under 10% appealed to state or federal court);
see also Moore v. District of Columbia, 907 F. 2d 165, 166
(CADC 1990) (en banc) ( joining other Circuits in holding that
IDEA authorizes an “award of attorney fees to a parent
who prevails in [IDEA] administrative proceedings”). And
when parents do appeal, they can file their actions in either
state or federal courts. 20 U. S. C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2000 ed.,
Supp. V).
Would Congress “obviously” have wanted the content of
the word “costs” to vary from State to State, proceeding to
proceeding? Ante, at 297–298. Why? At most, the major
ity’s reading of the text is plausible; it is not the only possi
ble reading.
C
The majority’s most persuasive argument does not focus
on either the Spending Clause or lack of statutory ambiguity.
Rather, the majority says that “costs” is a term of art. In
light of the law’s long practice of excluding expert fees from
the scope of the word “costs,” along with this Court’s cases
interpreting the word similarly in other statutes, the “legis
lative history is simply not enough.” Ante, at 304.
I am perfectly willing to assume that the majority is cor
rect about the traditional scope of the word “costs.” In two
cases this Court has held that the word “costs” is limited to
the list set forth in 28 U. S. C. § 1920 and does not include
fees paid to experts. See Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gib
bons, Inc., 482 U. S. 437 (1987) (interpreting Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 54(d)); West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey,
499 U. S. 83 (1991) (interpreting 42 U. S. C. § 1988 (1988 ed.)).
But Congress is free to redefine terms of art. See, e. g.,
Casey, 499 U. S., at 88–90 (citing examples of statutes that
shift “ ‘costs of litigation (including . . . expert witness
fees)’ ”). And we have suggested that it might well do so
through a statutory provision worded in a manner similar to

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the statute here—indeed, we cited the Conference Report
language here at issue. Id., at 91–92, n. 5 (characterizing
language as an “apparent effort to depart from ordinary
meaning and to define a term of art” and noting that Con
gress made no such “effort” in respect to 42 U. S. C. § 1988).
Regardless, here the statute itself indicates that Congress
did not intend to use the word “costs” as a term of art. The
HCPA, which added the cost-shifting provision (in § 2) to the
IDEA, also added another provision (in § 4) directing the
GAO to “conduct a study of the impact of the amendments
to the [IDEA] made by section 2” over a 31⁄ 2-year period
following the Act’s effective date. § 4(a), 100 Stat. 797. To
determine the fiscal impact of § 2 (the cost-shifting provi
sion), § 4 ordered the GAO to submit a report to Congress
containing, among other things, the following information:
“Data, for a geographically representative select sample
of States, indicating (A) the specific amount of attor
neys’ fees, costs, and expenses awarded to the prevailing
party, in each action and proceeding under [§ 2] from the
date of the enactment of this Act through fiscal year
1988, and the range of such fees, costs and expenses
awarded in the actions and proceedings under such sec
tion, categorized by type of complaint and (B) for the
same sample as in (A) the number of hours spent by
personnel, including attorneys and consultants, in
volved in the action or proceeding, and expenses in
curred by the parents and the State educational agency
and local educational agency.” § 4(b)(3), id., at 797–798
(emphasis added).
If Congress intended the word “costs” in § 2 to authorize
an award of only those costs listed in the federal cost statute,
why did it use the word “expenses” in § 4(b)(3)(A) as part of
the “amount . . . awarded to the prevailing party”? When
used as a term of art, after all, “costs” does not cover ex
penses. Nor does the federal costs statute cover any ex

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penses—at least not any that Congress could have wanted
the GAO to study. Cf. 28 U. S. C. § 1920 (referring only once
to “expenses,” and doing so solely to refer to special in
terpretation services provided in actions initiated by the
United States).
Further, why did Congress, when asking the GAO (in the
statute itself) to study the “number of hours spent by per
sonnel,” include among those personnel both attorneys “and
consultants”? Who but experts could those consultants be?
Why would Congress want the GAO to study the hours that
those experts “spent,” unless it thought that it would help
keep track of the “costs” that the statute imposed?
Of course, one might, through speculation, find other an
swers to these questions. One might, for example, imagine
that Congress wanted the GAO to study the expenses that
payment of expert fees engendered in state-court proceed
ings where state, but not federal, law requires that “ ‘ex
penses’ other than ‘costs’ might be receivable.” Ante, at
299, n. 1; but see supra, at 319–320. Or one might think
that the word “expenses” is surplusage. Ante, at 299, n. 1;
but see Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 174 (2001) (express
ing Court’s “ ‘reluctan[ce] to treat statutory terms as sur
plusage’ in any setting,” but especially when they play “so
pivotal a place in the statutory scheme”). Or one might be
lieve that Congress was interested in the hours these ex
perts spent, but not in the fees they obtained. Ante, at 299.
But these answers are not necessarily consistent with the
purpose of the GAO study provision, a purpose revealed by
the language of the provision and its position in the statute.
Its placement and its reference to § 2 indicate that Congress
ordered the study to help it keep track of the magnitude of
the reimbursements that an earlier part of the new statute
(namely, § 2) mandated. See 100 Stat. 797 (stating that pur
pose of GAO study was to determine the “impact” of “section
2”). And the only reimbursement requirement that § 2
mandates is the payment of “costs.”

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But why speculate about this? We know what Congress
intended the GAO study to cover. It told the GAO in its
Conference Report that the word “costs” included the costs
of experts. And, not surprisingly, the GAO made clear that
it understood precisely what Congress asked it to do. In its
final report, the GAO wrote: “Parents can receive reimburse
ment from state or local education agencies for some or all
of their attorney fees and related expenses if they are the
prevailing party in part or all of administrative hearings or
court proceedings. Expert witness fees, cost of tests or
evaluations found to be necessary during the case, and
court costs for services rendered during administrative and
court proceedings are examples of reimbursable expenses.”
GAO, Briefing Report to Congressional Requesters, Special
Education: The Attorney Fees Provision of Public Law 99–
372 (GAO/HRD–90–22BR), p. 13 (Nov. 1989) (emphasis
added), online at http://archive.gao.gov/d26t7/140084.pdf. At
the very least, this amounts to some indication that Congress
intended the word “costs,” not as a term of art, not as it was
used in the statutes at issue in Casey and Crawford Fitting,
but rather as including certain additional “expenses.” If
that is so, the claims of tradition, of the interpretation this
Court has given other statutes, cannot be so strong as to
prevent us from examining the legislative history. And that
history could not be more clear about the matter: Congress
intended the statutory phrase “attorneys’ fees as part of the
costs” to include the costs of experts. See Part I, supra.
III
For the reasons I have set forth, I cannot agree with the
majority’s conclusion. Even less can I agree with its failure
to consider fully the statute’s legislative history. That his
tory makes Congress’ purpose clear. And our ultimate ju
dicial goal is to interpret language in light of the statute’s
purpose. Only by seeking that purpose can we avoid the
substitution of judicial for legislative will. Only by reading

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language in its light can we maintain the democratic link
between voters, legislators, statutes, and ultimate implemen
tation, upon which the legitimacy of our constitutional sys
tem rests.
In my view, to keep faith with that interpretive goal, we
must retain all traditional interpretive tools—text, struc
ture, history, and purpose. And, because faithful interpre
tation is art as well as science, we cannot, through rule or
canon, rule out the use of any of these tools, automatically
and in advance. Cf. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F. 2d 809, 810–
811 (CA2 1934) (L. Hand, J.).
Nothing in the Constitution forbids us to give significant
weight to legislative history. By disregarding a clear state
ment in a legislative Report adopted without opposition in
both Houses of Congress, the majority has reached a result
no Member of Congress expected or overtly desired. It
has adopted an interpretation that undercuts, rather than
furthers, the statute’s purpose, a “free” and “appropriate”
public education for “all” children with disabilities. See Cir
cuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U. S. 105, 133 (2001)
(Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
JJ., dissenting) (“A method of statutory interpretation that
is deliberately uninformed, and hence unconstrained, may
produce a result that is consistent with a court’s own views
of how things should be, but it may also defeat the very
purpose for which a provision was enacted”). And it has
adopted an approach that, I fear, divorces law from life. See
Duncan, supra, at 193 (Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

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Appendix A to opinion of Breyer, J.
APPENDIXES TO OPINION OF BREYER, J.
A
[Text of Act omitted.]

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Appendix B to opinion of Breyer, J.
B
Excerpts from Congressional Record
132 Cong. Rec. 16823–16825 (1986) (Senate)
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN’S PROTECTION ACT—
CONFERENCE REPORT
Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, I submit a report of the
committee of conference on S. 415 and ask for its immediate
consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The report will be stated.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of
the two Houses on the amendments of the House to the bill
(S. 415) to amend the Education of the Handicapped Act to
authorize the award of reasonable attorneys’ fees to certain
prevailing parties, and to clarify the effect of the Education
of the Handicapped Act on rights, procedures, and remedies
under other laws relating to the prohibition on discrimina
tion, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed
to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses
this report, signed by a majority of the conferees.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the
Senate will proceed to the consideration of the conference
report.
[Floor statements omitted.]
Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, I move adoption of the
conference report.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agree
ing to the conference report.
The conference report was agreed to.
Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the
vote by which the conference report was agreed to.

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C
Excerpts from Congressional Record
132 Cong. Rec. 17607–17612 (House)
CONFERENCE REPORT ON S. 415, HANDICAPPED
CHILDREN’S PROTECTION ACT OF 1986
Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Speaker, I call up the conference
report on the Senate bill (S. 415) to amend the Education of
the Handicapped Act to authorize the award of reasonable
attorneys’ fees to certain prevailing parties, and to clarify
the effect of the Education of the Handicapped Act on rights,
procedures, and remedies under other laws relating to the
prohibition of discrimination.
The Clerk read the title of the Senate bill.
[Floor statements omitted.]
Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance
of my time, and I move the previous question on the confer
ence report.
The previous question was ordered.
The conference report was agreed to.