PURCELL et al. v. GONZALEZ et al. on application for stay

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CASES ADJUDGED
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AT
OCTOBER TERM, 2006
PURCELL et al. v. GONZALEZ et al.
on application for stay
No. 06A375 (06–532). Decided October 20, 2006*
Plaintiffs below, Arizona residents, Indian tribes, and community groups,
brought suit in federal court challenging the State’s new voter identifi-
cation requirements. The District Court denied their request for a pre-
liminary injunction but issued no findings of fact or conclusions of law
at that time. When, on appeal, plaintiffs received a briefing schedule
concluding after the November election, they sought an injunction pend-
ing appeal, which the Ninth Circuit granted without explanation. Sub-
sequently, the District Court issued its findings of fact and conclusions
of law.
Held: There is no indication that the Ninth Circuit gave the necessary
deference to the discretion of the District Court, and this was error.
By failing to provide any factual findings or reasoning of its own, the
Ninth Circuit left this Court in the position of evaluating the Circuit’s
bare order in light of the District Court’s ultimate findings, which have
not been shown to be incorrect. While this Court expresses no opinion
on the correct disposition of the appeals or ultimate resolution of the
cases, vacating the Ninth Circuit’s order shall of necessity allow the
election to proceed without an injunction suspending the requirements.
Certiorari granted; vacated and remanded.
*Together with No. 06A379 (06–533), Arizona et al. v. Gonzalez et al.,
also on application for stay.
1

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2 PURCELL v. GONZALEZ
Per Curiam
Per Curiam.
The State of Arizona and county officials from four of its
counties seek relief from an interlocutory injunction entered
by a two-judge motions panel of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. Justice Kennedy has referred the appli-
cants’ filings to the Court. We construe the filings of the
State and the county officials as petitions for certiorari; we
grant the petitions; and we vacate the order of the Court
of Appeals.
I
In 2004, Arizona voters approved Proposition 200. The
measure sought to combat voter fraud by requiring voters
to present proof of citizenship when they register to vote
and to present identification when they vote on election day.
The election procedures implemented to effect Proposition
200 do not necessarily result in the turning away of qualified,
registered voters by election officials for lack of proper iden-
tification. A voter who arrives at the polls on election day
without identification may cast a conditional provisional bal-
lot. For that ballot to be counted, the voter is allowed five
business days to return to a designated site and present
proper identification. In addition any voter who knows he
or she cannot secure identification within five business days
of the election has the option to vote before election day
during the early voting period. The State has determined
that, because there is adequate time during the early voting
period to compare the voters’ signatures on the ballot with
their signatures on the registration rolls, voters need not
present identification if voting early.
Arizona is a covered jurisdiction under § 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. So it was required to preclear any new
voting “standard, practice, or procedure” with either the
United States Attorney General or the District Court for the
District of Columbia to ensure its new voting policy did “not
have the purpose [or] effect of denying or abridging the right
to vote on account of race or color,” 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. See

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3 Cite as: 549 U. S. 1 (2006)
Per Curiam
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U. S. 461, 461–462 (2003). On
May 6, 2005, the United States Attorney General precleared
the procedures Arizona adopted under Proposition 200.
In the District Court the plaintiffs in this action are resi-
dents of Arizona, Indian tribes, and various community orga-
nizations. In May 2006, these plaintiffs brought suit chal-
lenging Proposition 200’s identification requirements. On
September 11, 2006, the District Court denied their request
for a preliminary injunction, but it did not at that time issue
findings of fact or conclusions of law. These findings were
important because resolution of legal questions in the Court
of Appeals required evaluation of underlying factual issues.
The plaintiffs appealed the denial, and the Clerk of the
Court of Appeals set a briefing schedule that concluded on
November 21, two weeks after the upcoming November 7
election. The plaintiffs then requested an injunction pend-
ing appeal from the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to the
Court of Appeals’ rules, the request for an injunction was
assigned to a two-judge motions/screening panel. See Rule
3–3 (CA9 2002). On October 5, after receiving lengthy writ-
ten responses from the State and the county officials but
without oral argument, the panel issued a four-sentence
order enjoining Arizona from enforcing Proposition 200’s
provisions pending disposition, after full briefing, of the ap-
peals of the denial of a preliminary injunction. The Court of
Appeals offered no explanation or justification for its order.
Four days later, the court denied a motion for reconsidera-
tion. The order denying the motion likewise gave no ration-
ale for the court’s decision.
Despite the time-sensitive nature of the proceedings and
the pendency of a request for emergency relief in the Court
of Appeals, the District Court did not issue its findings of
fact and conclusions of law until October 12. It then con-
cluded that “plaintiffs have shown a possibility of success on
the merits of some of their arguments but the Court cannot
say that at this stage they have shown a strong likelihood.”

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4 PURCELL v. GONZALEZ
Per Curiam
Order in No. CV 06–1268–PHX–ROS etc. (D. Ariz., Oct. 11,
2006), pp. 7–8, App. to Application for Stay of Injunction, Tab
5 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The
District Court then found the balance of the harms and the
public interest counseled in favor of denying the injunction.
II
“A State indisputably has a compelling interest in preserv-
ing the integrity of its election process.” Eu v. San Fran-
cisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U. S. 214, 231
(1989). Confidence in the integrity of our electoral proc-
esses is essential to the functioning of our participatory
democracy. Voter fraud drives honest citizens out of the
democratic process and breeds distrust of our government.
Voters who fear their legitimate votes will be outweighed
by fraudulent ones will feel disenfranchised. “[T]he right of
suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the
weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly pro-
hibiting the free exercise of the franchise.” Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 555 (1964). Countering the State’s com-
pelling interest in preventing voter fraud is the plaintiffs’
strong interest in exercising the “fundamental political
right” to vote. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 336 (1972)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Although the likely ef-
fects of Proposition 200 are much debated, the possibility
that qualified voters might be turned away from the polls
would caution any district judge to give careful consideration
to the plaintiffs’ challenges.
Faced with an application to enjoin operation of voter
identification procedures just weeks before an election, the
Court of Appeals was required to weigh, in addition to the
harms attendant upon issuance or nonissuance of an injunc-
tion, considerations specific to election cases and its own
institutional procedures. Court orders affecting elections,
especially conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter

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5 Cite as: 549 U. S. 1 (2006)
Per Curiam
confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the
polls. As an election draws closer, that risk will increase.
So the Court of Appeals may have deemed this consideration
to be grounds for prompt action. Furthermore, it might
have given some weight to the possibility that the nonpre-
vailing parties would want to seek en banc review. In the
Ninth Circuit that procedure, involving voting by all active
judges and an en banc hearing by a court of 15, can consume
further valuable time. These considerations, however, can-
not be controlling here. It was still necessary, as a proce-
dural matter, for the Court of Appeals to give deference to
the discretion of the District Court. We find no indication
that it did so, and we conclude this was error.
Although at the time the Court of Appeals issued its order
the District Court had not yet made factual findings to which
the Court of Appeals owed deference, see Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 52(a), by failing to provide any factual findings or in-
deed any reasoning of its own the Court of Appeals left this
Court in the position of evaluating the Court of Appeals’
bare order in light of the District Court’s ultimate findings.
There has been no explanation given by the Court of Appeals
showing the ruling and findings of the District Court to be
incorrect. In view of the impending election, the necessity
for clear guidance to the State of Arizona, and our conclusion
regarding the Court of Appeals’ issuance of the order we
vacate the order of the Court of Appeals.
We underscore that we express no opinion here on the
correct disposition, after full briefing and argument, of the
appeals from the District Court’s September 11 order or on
the ultimate resolution of these cases. As we have noted,
the facts in these cases are hotly contested, and “[n]o bright
line separates permissible election-related regulation from
unconstitutional infringements.” Timmons v. Twin Cities
Area New Party, 520 U. S. 351, 359 (1997). Given the immi-
nence of the election and the inadequate time to resolve the

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6 PURCELL v. GONZALEZ
Stevens, J., concurring
factual disputes, our action today shall of necessity allow the
election to proceed without an injunction suspending the
voter identification rules.
The order of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the cases
are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 45.3, the Clerk is
directed to issue the judgment in these cases forthwith.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, concurring.
Allowing the election to proceed without enjoining the
statutory provisions at issue will provide the courts with a
better record on which to judge their constitutionality. At
least two important factual issues remain largely unresolved:
the scope of the disenfranchisement that the novel identifi-
cation requirements will produce, and the prevalence and
character of the fraudulent practices that allegedly justify
those requirements. Given the importance of the constitu-
tional issues, the Court wisely takes action that will enhance
the likelihood that they will be resolved correctly on the
basis of historical facts rather than speculation.