GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL v. DUENAS-ALVAREZ

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183 OCTOBER TERM, 2006
Syllabus
GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL v.
DUENAS-ALVAREZ
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 05–1629. Argued December 5, 2006—Decided January 17, 2007
Respondent, a permanent resident alien, was convicted of violating Cal.
Veh. Code Ann. § 10851(a), under which “[a]ny person who drives or
takes a vehicle not his or her own, without the consent of the owner . . . ,
or any person who is a party or an accessory to or an accomplice in the
driving or unauthorized taking or stealing, is guilty of a public offense.”
(Emphasis added.) The Federal Government then sought to remove
respondent from the United States as an alien convicted of “a theft
offense . . . for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year,” 8
U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43)(G); § 1227(a)(2)(A). The Government claimed that
the California conviction qualified as such a “theft offense” under the
framework set forth in Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575. In
Taylor, the Court considered whether a prior conviction for violating a
state statute criminalizing certain burglary-like behavior fell within the
term “burglary” for sentence-enhancement purposes under 18 U. S. C.
§ 924(e). This Court held that Congress meant that term to refer to
“burglary” in “the generic sense in which the term is now used in the
criminal codes of most States,” 495 U. S., at 598; and that a sentencing
court seeking to determine whether a particular prior conviction was
for generic burglary should normally look to the state statute defining
the crime of conviction, not to the facts of the particular prior case, id.,
at 599–600; but that where state law defines burglary broadly to include
crimes falling outside generic “burglary,” the sentencer should “go be
yond the mere fact of conviction” and examine, e. g., the charging docu
ment and jury instructions to determine whether the earlier “jury was
actually required to find all the elements of generic burglary,” id., at
602. The Federal Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) found respondent removable, but the Ninth Circuit sum
marily remanded in light of its earlier Penuliar decision holding that
“aiding and abetting” a theft is not itself a crime under the generic
definition of theft.
Held: The term “theft offense” in 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) includes the
crime of “aiding and abetting” a theft offense. Pp. 189–194.
(a) One who aids or abets a theft, like a principal who actually partici
pates, commits a crime that falls within the scope of the generic theft

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184 GONZALES v. DUENAS-ALVAREZ
Syllabus
definition accepted by the BIA and the Ninth and other Circuits: the
“taking of property or an exercise of control over property without con
sent with the criminal intent to deprive the owner of rights and benefits
of ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or permanent.”
Penuliar v. Gonzales, 435 F. 3d 961, 969. Since, as the record shows,
state and federal criminal law now uniformly treats principals and aid
ers and abettors alike, “the generic sense in which” the term “theft” “is
now used in the criminal codes of most States,” Taylor, supra, at 598,
covers such “aiders and abettors” as well as principals. And the crimi
nal activities of these aiders and abettors of a generic theft thus fall
within the scope of the term “theft” in the federal statute. Pp. 189–190.
(b) The Court rejects respondent’s argument that Cal. Veh. Code
Ann. § 10851, through the California courts’ application of a “natural and
probable consequences” doctrine, creates a subspecies of the crime fall
ing outside the generic “theft” definition. The fact that, under Califor
nia law, an aider and abettor is criminally responsible not only for the
crime he intends, but also for any crime that naturally and probably
results from his intended crime, does not in itself show that the state
statute covers a nongeneric theft crime. Relatively few jurisdictions
have expressly rejected the “natural and probable consequences” doc
trine, and many States and the Federal Government apply some form
or variation of that doctrine or permit jury inferences of intent in cir
cumstances similar to those in which California has applied the doctrine.
To succeed, respondent must show something special about California’s
version of the doctrine. His attempt to show that, unlike most other
States, California makes a defendant criminally liable for conduct he
did not intend, not even as a known or almost certain byproduct of his
intentional acts, fails because the California cases respondent cites do
not show that California’s law is applied in such a way that is somehow
broader in scope than other States’ laws. Moreover, to find that state
law creates a crime outside the generic definition of a listed crime in a
federal statute requires a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibil
ity, that the State would apply its statute to conduct falling outside the
generic definition. To make that showing, an offender must at least
point to his own case or other cases in which the state courts in fact did
apply the statute in the special (nongeneric) manner for which he ar
gues. Respondent makes no such showing. Pp. 190–194.
(c) Respondent’s additional claims—that § 10851 (1) holds liable acces
sories after the fact, who need not be shown to have committed a theft,
and (2) applies to joyriding, which falls outside the generic “theft” defi
nition—are not considered here because they do not fall within the
terms of the question presented, the lower court did not consider them,
and this Court declines to reach them in the first instance. P. 194.
176 Fed. Appx. 820, vacated and remanded.

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Opinion of the Court
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Alito, JJ.,
joined, and in which Stevens, J., joined, as to Parts I, II, and III–B.
Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part,
post, p. 198.
Dan Himmelfarb argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant
Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Kneed
ler, and Donald E. Keener.
Christopher J. Meade argued the cause and filed a brief
for respondent.*
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
Immigration law provides for removal from the United
States of an alien convicted of “a theft offense (including re
ceipt of stolen property) . . . for which the term of impris
onment [is] at least one year.” 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43)(G)
(emphasis added; footnote omitted); § 1227(a)(2)(A). The
question here is whether the term “theft offense” in this fed
eral statute includes the crime of “aiding and abetting” a
theft offense. We hold that it does. And we vacate a Ninth
Circuit determination to the contrary.
I
The Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 163, as
amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. IV),
lists a set of offenses, conviction for any one of which sub
jects certain aliens to removal from the United States,
§ 1227(a). In determining whether a conviction (say, a con
viction for violating a state criminal law that forbids the tak
ing of property without permission) falls within the scope of
*Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the California
Public Defenders Association by Jeremy Maltby; and for the National Im
migration Project of the National Lawyers Guild by Charles A. Rothfeld,
Andrew J. Pincus, and Giovanna Shay.
Meir Feder and Samuel Estreicher filed a brief for Professors of Crimi
nal Law as amici curiae.

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a listed offense (e. g., “theft offense”), the lower courts uni
formly have applied the approach this Court set forth in Tay
lor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575 (1990). E. g., Soliman v.
Gonzales, 419 F. 3d 276, 284 (CA4 2005); Abimbola v. Ash
croft, 378 F. 3d 173, 176–177 (CA2 2004); Huerta-Guevara v.
Ashcroft, 321 F. 3d 883, 886–888 (CA9 2003); Hernandez-
Mancilla v. INS, 246 F. 3d 1002, 1008–1009 (CA7 2001).
Taylor concerned offenses listed in the federal Armed
Career Criminal Act, 18 U. S. C. § 924(e) (2000 ed. and Supp.
IV). That Act mandates a lengthy prison sentence for of
fenders with previous convictions for, e. g., a “violent felony”;
and the Act sets forth certain specific crimes, e. g., “bur
glary,” included in this category. The Court, in Taylor, con
sidered whether a conviction for violating a state statute
criminalizing certain burglary-like behavior fell within the
listed federal term “burglary.” 495 U. S., at 589, 598.
The Court held that Congress meant its listed term “bur
glary” to refer to a specific crime, i. e., “ ‘burglary’ ” in “the
generic sense in which the term is now used in the criminal
codes of most States.” Id., at 598 (emphasis added). The
Court also held that a state conviction qualifies as a burglary
conviction, “regardless of ” the “exact [state] definition or
label” as long as it has the “basic elements” of “generic” bur
glary, namely, “unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or re
maining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a
crime.” Id., at 599. The Court added that, when a sentenc
ing court seeks to determine whether a particular prior con
viction was for a generic burglary offense, it should normally
look not to the facts of the particular prior case, but rather
to the state statute defining the crime of conviction. Id.,
at 599–600.
The Court further noted that a “few States’ burglary stat
utes” “define burglary more broadly” to include both a (ge
nerically defined) listed crime and also one or more nonlisted
crimes. Id., at 599. For example, Massachusetts defines
“burglary” as including not only breaking into “ ‘a building’ ”

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Opinion of the Court
but also breaking into a “vehicle” (which falls outside the
generic definition of “burglary,” for a car is not a “ ‘building
or structure’ ”). See Shepard v. United States, 544 U. S. 13,
16, 17 (2005); see also Taylor, 495 U. S., at 599 (discussing
Missouri burglary statutes). In such cases the Court’s “cat
egorical approach” permits the sentencing court “to go be
yond the mere fact of conviction” in order to determine
whether the earlier “jury was actually required to find all
the elements of generic burglary.” Id., at 602; see also
Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F. 3d 45, 54 (CA1 2006) (observing
that some courts refer to this step of the Taylor inquiry as
a “modified categorical approach”). “For example,” the sen
tencing court might examine “the indictment or information
and jury instructions” in the earlier case. 495 U. S., at 602.
In Shepard, we added that, in a nonjury case, the sentencing
court might examine not only the “charging document” but
also “the terms of a plea agreement,” the “transcript of collo
quy between judge and defendant,” or “some comparable ju
dicial record” of information about the “factual basis for the
plea.” 544 U. S., at 26.
II
The case before us concerns the application of the frame
work just set forth to Luis Duenas-Alvarez, the respondent
here, a permanent resident alien of the United States. In
2002, Duenas-Alvarez was convicted of violating Cal. Veh.
Code Ann. § 10851(a) (West 2000). That section states:
“Any person who drives or takes a vehicle not his or her
own, without the consent of the owner thereof, and with
intent either to permanently or temporarily deprive the
owner thereof of his or her title to or possession of the
vehicle, whether with or without intent to steal the
vehicle, or any person who is a party or an accessory
to or an accomplice in the driving or unauthorized tak
ing or stealing, is guilty of a public offense.” (Empha
sis added.)

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After Duenas-Alvarez was convicted, the Federal Govern
ment, claiming that the conviction was for a generic theft
offense, began removal proceedings. A Federal Immigra
tion Judge, agreeing with the Government that the Cali
fornia offense is “a theft offense . . . for which the term of
imprisonment [is] at least one year,” found Duenas-Alvarez
removable. 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (footnote omitted);
§ 1227(a)(2)(A). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
affirmed. Duenas-Alvarez sought review of the BIA’s deci
sion in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
While respondent’s petition for court review was pending,
the Ninth Circuit, in Penuliar v. Ashcroft, 395 F. 3d 1037
(2005), held that the relevant California Vehicle Code provi
sion, § 10851(a), sweeps more broadly than generic theft.
See id., at 1044–1045. In particular, the court said that ge
neric theft has as an element the taking or control of others’
property. But, the court added, the California statutory
phrase “ ‘[who] is a party or an accessory . . . or an accom
plice’ ” would permit conviction “for aiding and abetting a
theft.” Id., at 1044 (emphasis deleted). And the court be
lieved that one might “aid” or “abet” a theft without taking
or controlling property. Id., at 1044–1045 (citing Martinez-
Perez v. Ashcroft, 393 F. 3d 1018 (CA9 2004), withdrawn and
amended, 417 F. 3d 1022 (2005)). Hence, in the Court of Ap
peals’ view, the provision must cover some generically de
fined “theft” crimes and also some other crimes (aiding and
abetting crimes) that, because they are not generically de
fined “theft” crimes, fall outside the scope of the term
“theft” in the immigration statute. 395 F. 3d, at 1044–1045.
The Ninth Circuit subsequently heard Duenas-Alvarez’s
petition for review and summarily remanded the case to the
agency for further proceedings in light of Penuliar. 176
Fed. Appx. 820 (2006). We granted the Government’s peti
tion for certiorari in order to consider the legal validity of
the Ninth Circuit’s holding set forth in Penuliar and applied

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here, namely, the holding that “aiding and abetting” a theft
is not itself a crime that falls within the generic definition of
theft. We conclude that the Ninth Circuit erred.
III
The Ninth Circuit, like other Circuits and the BIA, ac
cepted as a generic definition of theft, the “taking of prop
erty or an exercise of control over property without consent
with the criminal intent to deprive the owner of rights and
benefits of ownership, even if such deprivation is less than
total or permanent.” Penuliar v. Gonzales, 435 F. 3d 961,
969 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). See Abim
bola, 378 F. 3d, at 176 (analyzing the BIA’s definition and
citing cases from three other Circuits, including the Ninth
Circuit, approving that definition). The question before us
is whether one who aids or abets a theft falls, like a principal,
within the scope of this generic definition. We conclude that
he does.
The common law divided participants in a felony into four
basic categories: (1) first-degree principals, those who actu
ally committed the crime in question; (2) second-degree prin
cipals, aiders and abettors present at the scene of the crime;
(3) accessories before the fact, aiders and abettors who
helped the principal before the basic criminal event took
place; and (4) accessories after the fact, persons who helped
the principal after the basic criminal event took place. See
Standefer v. United States, 447 U. S. 10, 15 (1980). In the
course of the 20th century, however, American jurisdictions
eliminated the distinction among the first three categories.
Id., at 16–19; Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U. S. 613,
618 (1949).
Indeed, every jurisdiction—all States and the Federal
Government—has “expressly abrogated the distinction”
among principals and aiders and abettors who fall into the
second and third categories. 2 W. LaFave, Substantive

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Criminal Law § 13.1(e), p. 333 (2d ed. 2003) (LaFave). The
Solicitor General has presented us with a comprehensive ac
count of the law of all States and federal jurisdictions as well.
And we have verified that these jurisdictions treat similarly
principals and aiders and abettors who fall into the second or
third common-law category. See Appendix A, infra. Since
criminal law now uniformly treats those who fall into the
first three categories alike, “the generic sense in which” the
term “theft” “is now used in the criminal codes of most
States,” Taylor, 495 U. S., at 598, covers such “aiders and
abettors” as well as principals. And the criminal activities
of these aiders and abettors of a generic theft must them
selves fall within the scope of the term “theft” in the fed
eral statute.
A
Duenas-Alvarez does not defend the Ninth Circuit’s posi
tion. He agrees with the Government that generically
speaking the law treats aiders and abettors during and be
fore the crime the same way it treats principals; and that the
immigration statute must then treat them similarly as well.
Instead, Duenas-Alvarez argues that the California Vehicle
Code provision in other ways reaches beyond generic theft
to cover certain nongeneric crimes.
Duenas-Alvarez points out that California defines “aiding
and abetting” such that an aider and abettor is criminally
responsible not only for the crime he intends, but also for
any crime that “naturally and probably” results from his in
tended crime. People v. Durham, 70 Cal. 2d 171, 181, 449
P. 2d 198, 204 (1969) (“ ‘aider and abettor . . . liable for the
natural and reasonable or probable consequences of any act
that he knowingly aided or encouraged’ ” (quoting People v.
Villa, 156 Cal. App. 2d 128, 134 (1957); emphasis deleted)).
This fact alone does not show that the statute covers a non
generic theft crime, for relatively few jurisdictions (only 10
in Duenas-Alvarez’s own view) have expressly rejected the

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“natural and probable consequences” doctrine. See Brief
for Respondent 21–22; Appendix B, infra. Moreover, many
States and the Federal Government apply some form or vari
ation of that doctrine, or permit jury inferences of intent in
circumstances similar to those in which California has ap
plied the doctrine, as explained below. See Appendix C,
infra. To succeed, Duenas-Alvarez must show something
special about California’s version of the doctrine—for exam
ple, that California in applying it criminalizes conduct that
most other States would not consider “theft.”
Duenas-Alvarez attempts to make just such a showing.
In particular, he says that California’s doctrine, unlike that
of most other States, makes a defendant criminally liable for
conduct that the defendant did not intend, not even as a
known or almost certain byproduct of the defendant’s inten
tional acts. See 1 LaFave § 5.2(a), at 341 (person intends
that which he knows “is practically certain to follow from
his conduct”). At oral argument, Duenas-Alvarez’s counsel
suggested that California’s doctrine, for example, might hold
an individual who wrongly bought liquor for an underage
drinker criminally responsible for that young drinker’s later
(unforeseen) reckless driving. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 44.
And Duenas-Alvarez refers to several California cases in
order to prove his point. See Brief for Respondent 19.
We have reviewed those cases, however, and we cannot
agree that they show that California’s law is somehow spe
cial. In the first case, People v. Nguyen, 21 Cal. App. 4th
518, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323 (1993), the Third Appellate District
in California upheld the jury conviction of individuals who
had aided several robberies at houses of prostitution, for aid
ing and abetting a sexual assault used by one of the individu
als to convince a proprietor, by frightening her, to give up
property. Id., at 528, 533–534, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 329, 333.
The court, in upholding the verdict, wrote that “knowledge
of another’s criminal purpose is not sufficient for aiding and

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abetting; the defendant must also share that purpose or in
tend to commit, encourage, or facilitate the commission of
the crime.” Id., at 530, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 330 (emphasis
added). The court added that “[w]hile the defendants par
ticipated in the criminal endeavor the foreseeability of sexual
assault went from possible or likely to certain, yet defend
ants continued to lend their aid and assistance to the en
deavor.” Id., at 534, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 333 (emphasis
added). The court said that the jury could find that the
defendants’
“continuing participation in the criminal endeavor aided
the perpetrators by providing the control and security
they needed to tarry long enough to commit the sexual
offense, by helping to convince the victim that resistance
would be useless, and by dissuading the victim’s em
ployee from any notion she may have formed of going to
the victim’s assistance.”
And the court concluded:
“Under these circumstances it will not do for defendants
to assert that they were concerned only with robbery
and bear no responsibility for the sexual assault.” Id.,
at 533–534, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 333.
People v. Simpson, 66 Cal. App. 2d 319 (1944), affirmed a
kidnaping and robbery conviction on an aiding and abetting
theory. Id., at 322. Although the defendant argued to the
appeals court that she and her compatriots had not planned
to kidnap the robbery victim, the record showed that she
had brought the gun used to intimidate the victim while he
was tied up and placed in a car, in which she and her co
robbers rode with the victim to another location while they
robbed him. Id., at 322–323. As in Nguyen, the court, not
ing that kidnaping was the means by which the robbery was
committed, found that the defendant had the requisite “mo
tive,” or intent to commit the kidnaping. 66 Cal. App. 2d,
at 326.

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People v. Montes, 74 Cal. App. 4th 1050, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d
482 (1999), affirmed an attempted murder conviction where
a confederate of the defendant shot the victim after the de
fendant committed armed assault, simple assault, and breach
of the peace. Id., at 1055, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 485. The
court found that the conduct for which the appellant was
charged with assault and breach of the peace was a
“confrontation . . . punctuated by threats and weaponry” “in
the context of an ongoing rivalry between . . . two gangs
[that] acted violently toward each other.” Ibid. The court
reasoned that the escalating violence, resulting in someone
being shot, was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s
intended act of participating in the gang confrontation.
Ibid.
Although the court in Montes applied a more expansive
concept of “motive” or “intent” than did the courts in
Nguyen and Simpson, we cannot say that those concepts as
used in any of these cases extend significantly beyond the
concept as set forth in the cases of other States. See Ap
pendix C, infra.
Moreover, in our view, to find that a state statute creates
a crime outside the generic definition of a listed crime in a
federal statute requires more than the application of legal
imagination to a state statute’s language. It requires a real
istic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State
would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the ge
neric definition of a crime. To show that realistic probabil
ity, an offender, of course, may show that the statute was so
applied in his own case. But he must at least point to his
own case or other cases in which the state courts in fact did
apply the statute in the special (nongeneric) manner for
which he argues.
Because Duenas-Alvarez makes no such showing here, we
cannot find that California’s statute, through the California
courts’ application of a “natural and probable consequences”

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doctrine, creates a subspecies of the Vehicle Code section
crime that falls outside the generic definition of “theft.”
B
Duenas-Alvarez makes two additional claims. First, he
argues that § 10851 holds liable accessories after the fact; and
to prove that an individual was an accessory after the fact
does not require the Government to show that the individual
committed a theft. Second, Duenas-Alvarez argues that
§ 10851 applies, not only to auto theft, but also to joyriding,
which he argues involves so limited a deprivation of the use
of a car that it falls outside the generic “theft” definition.
See Van Vechten v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 239 N. Y.
303, 146 N. E. 432 (1925) (Cardozo, J.) (citing cases for propo
sition that a very temporary use is not theft).
We shall not consider these claims. The question that we
agreed to decide is whether “ ‘theft offense’ ” in the federal
statute “includes aiding and abetting the commission of the
offense.” See Brief for Petitioner I. Context makes clear
that “aiding and abetting” in this question referred to the
use of that term in Penuliar, i. e., to the second and third
common-law categories (principal in the second degree, ac
cessory before the fact), see supra, at 189, see also Brief for
Petitioner 13, and not to “accessory after the fact.” Thus
neither this claim nor the “joyriding” claim falls within the
terms of the question presented. Regardless, the lower
court did not consider the claims, and we decline to reach
them in the first instance. See National Collegiate Athletic
Assn. v. Smith, 525 U. S. 459, 469–470 (1999); Roberts v.
Galen of Va., Inc., 525 U. S. 249, 253–254 (1999) (per curiam);
United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U. S. 51, 72–73 (1998).
For these reasons we vacate the Ninth Circuit’s judgment
and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.

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Appendix A to opinion of the Court
APPENDIXES TO OPINION OF THE COURT
A
Ala. Code §§ 13A–2–20, 13A–2–23 (2006); Alaska Stat.
§§ 11.16.100, 11.16.110 (2004); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13–301,
13–302, 13–303(A) (West 2001); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5–2–402,
5–2–403(a) (2006); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 18–1–601, 18–1–
603 (2006); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a–8(a) (2005); Del. Code Ann.,
Tit. 11, § 271 (1995); D. C. Code § 22–1805 (2001); Fla. Stat.
§ 777.011 (2006); Ga. Code Ann. § 16–2–20 (2003); Haw. Rev.
Stat. §§ 702–221, 702–222 (1993); Idaho Code § 19–1430 (Lexis
2004); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, §§ 5/5–1, 5/5–2 (West 2004);
Ind. Code § 35–41–2–4 (West 2004); Iowa Code § 703.1 (2005);
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21–3205(1) (1995); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 502.020(1) (West 2006); La. Stat. Ann. § 14:24 (West 1997);
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17–A, § 57(1) (2006); Md. Crim. Proc.
Code Ann. § 4–204(b) (Lexis Supp. 2006); Mass. Gen. Laws,
ch. 274, § 2 (West 2004); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 767.39
(West 2000); Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2004); Miss. Code
Ann. § 97–1–3 (2006); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 562.036, 562.041(1)
(2000); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45–2–301, 45–2–302 (2005); Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 28–206 (1995); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 195.020 (2003);
N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 626:8 (Supp. 2006); N. J. Stat. Ann.
§ 2C:2–6 (West 2005); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 30–1–13 (2004); N. Y.
Penal Law Ann. § 20.00 (West 2004); N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 14–5.2 (Lexis 2005); N. D. Cent. Code Ann. § 12.1–03–01(1)
(Lexis 1997); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2923.03(A), (F) (Lexis
2006); Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 172 (West 2001); Ore. Rev. Stat.
§§ 161.150, 161.155 (2003); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 306 (2002); R. I.
Gen. Laws § 11–1–3 (2002); S. C. Code Ann. § 16–1–40 (2003);
S. D. Codified Laws §§ 22–3–3, 22–3–3.1 (1998); Tenn. Code
Ann. §§ 39–11–401(a), 39–11–402 (2006); Tex. Penal Code
Ann. §§ 7.01, 7.02(a) (West 2003); Utah Code Ann. § 76–2–202
(Lexis 2003); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, §§ 3–4 (1998); Va. Code
Ann. § 18.2–18 (Lexis 2004); Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.08.020

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196 GONZALES v. DUENAS-ALVAREZ
Appendix C to opinion of the Court
(2006); W. Va. Code Ann. § 61–11–6 (Lexis 2005); Wis. Stat.
§ 939.05 (2003–2004); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–1–201 (2005).
B
Alaska Stat. § 11.16.110; Riley v. State, 60 P. 3d 204, 214, 219–
221 (Alaska App. 2002); Tarnef v. State, 512 P. 2d 923, 928
(Alaska 1973); State v. Phillips, 202 Ariz. 427, 435–437, 46 P.
3d 1048, 1056–1058 (2002); State v. Wall, 212 Ariz. 1, 4–5, 126
P. 3d 148, 151–152 (2006); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18–1–603;
Bogdanov v. People, 941 P. 2d 247, 250–252, and n. 8, as
amended by 955 P. 2d 997 (Colo. 1997), disapproved of on
other grounds by Griego v. People, 19 P. 3d 1, 7–8 (Colo.
2001); Wilson-Bey v. United States, 903 A. 2d 818, 821–822
(D. C. 2006); Kitt v. United States, 904 A. 2d 348, 354–356
(D. C. 2006); Commonwealth v. Richards, 363 Mass. 299, 305–
308, 293 N. E. 2d 854, 859–860 (1973); Commonwealth v.
Daughtry, 417 Mass. 136, 137–140, 627 N. E. 2d 928, 930–931
(1994); Mont. Code Ann. § 45–2–302; State ex rel. Keyes v.
Montana 13th Jud. Dist. Ct., 288 Mont. 27, 32–35, 955 P. 2d
639, 642–643 (1998); Sharma v. State, 118 Nev. 648, 653–657,
56 P. 3d 868, 871–873 (2002) (per curiam); cf. Bolden v. State,
121 Nev. 908, 921–922, 124 P. 3d 191, 200 (2005); State v. Car
rasco, 1997–NMSC–047, ¶¶ 5–13, 946 P. 2d 1075, 1079–1080;
State v. Bacon, 163 Vt. 279, 286–292, 658 A. 2d 54, 60–63
(1995); State v. Pitts, 174 Vt. 21, 23–27, 800 A. 2d 481, 483–
485 (2002).
C
See, e. g., 2 LaFave § 13.3(b), at 361–362, nn. 27–29 (2d ed.
2003 and Supp. 2007) (identifying cases applying the doctrine
in California, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Maine, Minnesota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin, as well as in
other States where the continued viability of the doctrine is
unclear); State v. Medeiros, 599 A. 2d 723, 726 (R. I. 1991)
(aider and abettor intends natural and probable conse
quences of his acts). See also Beasley v. State, 360 So. 2d
1275, 1278 (Fla. App. 1978); Ga. Code Ann. § 16–2–20; Jack

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197 Cite as: 549 U. S. 183 (2007)
Appendix C to opinion of the Court
son v. State, 278 Ga. 235, 235–237, 599 S. E. 2d 129, 131–132
(2004); Jordan v. State, 272 Ga. 395, 395–397, 530 S. E. 2d 192,
193–194 (2000); Crawford v. State, 210 Ga. App. 36, 36–37, 435
S. E. 2d 64, 65 (1993); State v. Ehrmantrout, 100 Idaho 202,
595 P. 2d 1097 (1979) (per curiam); State v. Meyers, 95–750,
pp. 5–7 (La. App. 11/26/96), 683 So. 2d 1378, 1382; State v.
Holmes, 388 So. 2d 722, 725–727 (La. 1980); People v. Robin
son, 475 Mich. 1, 8–9, 715 N. W. 2d 44, 49 (2006); Welch v.
State, 566 So. 2d 680, 684–685 (Miss. 1990); State v. Roberts,
709 S. W. 2d 857, 863, and n. 6 (Mo. 1986); State v. Ferguson,
20 S. W. 3d 485, 497 (Mo. 2000); State v. Logan, 645 S. W. 2d
60, 64–65 (Mo. App. 1982); State v. Leonor, 263 Neb. 86, 95–
97, 638 N. W. 2d 798, 807 (2002); N. J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2–6;
State v. Torres, 183 N. J. 554, 566–567, 874 A. 2d 1084, 1092
(2005); State v. Weeks, 107 N. J. 396, 401–406, 526 A. 2d 1077,
1080–1082 (1987); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.03; State v.
Johnson, 93 Ohio St. 3d 240, 242–246, 754 N. E. 2d 796, 799–
801 (2001); State v. Herring, 94 Ohio St. 3d 246, 248–251, 762
N. E. 2d 940, 947–948 (2002); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 161.155; State
v. Pine, 336 Ore. 194, 203–205, 206–208, and n. 6, 82 P. 3d
130, 135, 137, and n. 6 (2003); State v. Anlauf, 164 Ore. App.
672, 674–677, and n. 1, 995 P. 2d 547, 548–549, and n. 1 (2000);
Hudgins v. Moore, 337 S. C. 333, 339, n. 5, 524 S. E. 2d 105,
108, n. 5 (1999); S. D. Codified Laws § 22–3–3; State v. Tofani,
2006 SD 63, ¶¶ 31–48, 719 N. W. 2d 391, 400–405; State v.
Richmond, 90 S. W. 3d 648, 654–656 (Tenn. 2002); Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 7.02; Ex parte Thompson, 179 S. W. 3d 549, 552
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Gordon v. State, 640 S. W. 2d 743,
758 (Tex. App. 1982); Utah Code Ann. § 76–2–202; State v.
Alvarez, 872 P. 2d 450, 461 (Utah 1994); State v. Crick, 675
P. 2d 527, 534 (Utah 1983); State v. Rodoussakis, 204 W. Va.
58, 77, 511 S. E. 2d 469, 488 (1998); Jahnke v. State, 692 P. 2d
911, 921–922 (Wyo. 1984); Fales v. State, 908 P. 2d 404, 408
(Wyo. 1995); United States v. Edwards, 303 F. 3d 606, 637
(CA5 2002), cert. denied, 537 U. S. 1192 (2003); United States
v. Walker, 99 F. 3d 439, 443 (CADC 1996); United States v.

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198 GONZALES v. DUENAS-ALVAREZ
Opinion of Stevens, J.
Miller, 22 F. 3d 1075, 1078–1079 (CA11 1994); United States
v. Moore, 936 F. 2d 1508, 1527 (CA7), cert. denied, 502 U. S.
991 (1991); United States v. Graewe, 774 F. 2d 106, 108, n. 1
(CA6 1985), cert. denied, 474 U. S. 1068 and 1069 (1986);
United States v. Barnett, 667 F. 2d 835, 841 (CA9 1982);
United States v. DeLaMotte, 434 F. 2d 289, 293 (CA2 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U. S. 921 (1971).
Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
While I join Parts I, II, and III–B of the Court’s opinion,
as well as its judgment, I do not join Part III–A. I am not
prepared to disagree with anything said in Part III–A, but
I believe we would be well advised to withhold comment on
issues of California law until after they have been addressed
by the Court of Appeals in the first instance. Limiting our
decision to the question we granted certiorari to answer,
though not a rigid rule, is generally prudent. Doing so
seems particularly wise whenever reaching beyond the ques
tion presented requires analysis of disputed issues of state
law. Because circuit judges are generally more familiar
with the law of the States within their respective jurisdic
tions than we are, we have often followed the sound practice
of deferring to the courts of appeals on such matters even
when we did not necessarily share their views. See, e. g.,
Haring v. Prosise, 462 U. S. 306, 314 (1983); Bishop v. Wood,
426 U. S. 341, 345–346, and n. 10 (1976) (collecting cases); see
also Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U. S. 1,
16 (2004). I would adhere to that settled practice in this
case.