JONES v. BOCK, WARDEN, et al.

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199 OCTOBER TERM, 2006
Syllabus
JONES v. BOCK, WARDEN, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 05–7058. Argued October 30, 2006—Decided January 22, 2007*
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), in order to address the
large number of prisoner complaints filed in federal court, mandates
early judicial screening of prisoner complaints and requires prisoners
to exhaust prison grievance procedures before filing suit. 42 U. S. C.
§ 1997e(a). Petitioners, inmates in Michigan prisons, filed grievances
using the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) grievance proc
ess. After unsuccessfully seeking redress through that process, peti
tioner Jones filed a § 1983 suit against six prison officials. The District
Court dismissed on the merits as to four of them and as to two others
found that Jones had failed to adequately plead exhaustion in his com
plaint. Petitioner Williams also filed a § 1983 suit after his two MDOC
grievances were denied. The District Court found that he had not ex
hausted his administrative remedies with regard to one of the griev
ances because he had not identified any of the respondents named in the
lawsuit during the grievance process. While the court found Williams’s
other claim properly exhausted, it dismissed the entire suit under the
Sixth Circuit’s total exhaustion rule for PLRA cases. Petitioner Wal
ton’s § 1983 lawsuit also was dismissed under the total exhaustion rule
because his MDOC grievance named only one of the six defendants in
his lawsuit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in each case, relying on its pro
cedural rules that require a prisoner to allege and demonstrate exhaus
tion in his complaint, permit suit only against defendants identified in
the prisoner’s grievance, and require courts to dismiss the entire action
if the prisoner fails to satisfy the exhaustion requirement as to any sin
gle claim in his complaint.
Held: The Sixth Circuit’s rules are not required by the PLRA, and craft
ing and imposing such rules exceeds the proper limits of the judicial
role. Pp. 211–224.
(a) Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and
inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion
in their complaints. There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory
*Together with No. 05–7142, Williams v. Overton et al., and Walton
v. Bouchard et al. (see this Court’s Rule 12.4), also on certiorari to the
same court.

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200 JONES v. BOCK
Syllabus
under the PLRA, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U. S. 516, 524, but it is less clear
whether the prisoner must plead and demonstrate exhaustion in the
complaint or the defendant must raise lack of exhaustion as an affirma
tive defense. Failure to exhaust is better viewed as an affirmative de
fense. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires simply a “short
and plain statement of the claim” in a complaint, and PLRA claims are
typically brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, which does not require ex
haustion at all. The fact that the PLRA dealt extensively with exhaus
tion, but is silent on the issue whether exhaustion must be pleaded or
is an affirmative defense, is strong evidence that the usual practice
should be followed, and the practice under the Federal Rules is to re
gard exhaustion as an affirmative defense, including in the similar statu
tory scheme governing habeas corpus, Day v. McDonough, 547 U. S.
198, 208. Courts should generally not depart from the Federal Rules’
usual practice based on perceived policy concerns. See, e. g., Leather
man v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit,
507 U. S. 163. Those courts that require prisoners to plead and demon
strate exhaustion contend that prisoner complaints must be treated out
side of the typical framework if the PLRA’s screening requirement is to
function effectively. But the screening requirement does not—explic
itly or implicitly—justify deviating from the usual procedural practice
beyond the departures specified by the PLRA itself. Although exhaus
tion was a “centerpiece” of the PLRA, Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U. S. 81,
84, failure to exhaust was notably not added in terms to the enu
merated grounds justifying dismissal upon early screening. Section
1997e(g)—which allows defendants to waive their right to reply to a
prisoner complaint without being deemed to have admitted the com
plaint’s allegations—shows that when Congress meant to depart from
the usual procedural requirements, it did so expressly. Given that the
PLRA does not itself require plaintiffs to plead exhaustion, such a result
“must be obtained by . . . amending the Federal Rules, and not by judi
cial interpretation.” Leatherman, supra, at 168. Pp. 211–217.
(b) Exhaustion is not per se inadequate under the PLRA when an
individual later sued was not named in the grievance. Nothing in the
MDOC policy supports the conclusion that the grievance process was
improperly invoked because an individual later named as a defendant
was not named at the first step of the process; at the time each grievance
was filed here, the MDOC policy did not specifically require a prisoner
to name anyone in the grievance. Nor does the PLRA impose such a
requirement. The “applicable procedural rules” that a prisoner must
properly exhaust, Woodford, supra, at 88, are defined not by the
PLRA, but by the prison grievance process itself. As the MDOC’s pro

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201 Cite as: 549 U. S. 199 (2007)
Syllabus
cedures make no mention of naming particular officials, the Sixth Cir
cuit’s rule imposing such a prerequisite to proper exhaustion is unwar
ranted. The Circuit’s rule may promote early notice to those who might
later be sued, but that has not been thought to be one of the leading
purposes of the exhaustion requirement. The court below should de
termine in the first instance whether petitioners’ grievances otherwise
satisfied the exhaustion requirement. Pp. 217–219.
(c) The PLRA does not require dismissal of the entire complaint when
a prisoner has failed to exhaust some, but not all, of the claims included
in the complaint. Respondents argue that had Congress intended
courts to dismiss only unexhausted claims while retaining the balance
of the lawsuit, it would have used the word “claim” instead of “action”
in § 1997e(a), which provides that “[n]o action shall be brought” unless
administrative procedures are exhausted. That boilerplate language is
used in many instances in the Federal Code, and statutory references
to an “action” have not typically been read to mean that every claim
included in the action must meet the pertinent requirement before the
“action” may proceed. If a complaint contains both good and bad
claims, the court proceeds with the good and leaves the bad. Respond
ents note that the total exhaustion requirement in habeas corpus is an
exception to this general rule, but a court presented with a mixed ha
beas petition typically “allow[s] the petitioner to delete the unexhausted
claims and to proceed with the exhausted claims,” Rhines v. Weber, 544
U. S. 269, 278, which is the opposite of the rule the Sixth Circuit adopted,
and precisely the rule that respondents argue against. Although other
PLRA sections distinguish between actions and claims, respondents’
reading of § 1997e(a) creates its own inconsistencies, and their policy
arguments are also unpersuasive. Pp. 219–224.
No. 05–7058, 135 Fed. Appx. 837; No. 05–7142, 136 Fed. Appx. 846 (second
judgment) and 859 (first judgment), reversed and remanded.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Jean-Claude Andre´, by appointment of the Court, 547
U. S. 1067, argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners
in all cases under this Court’s Rule 12.4.
Linda M. Olivieri, Assistant Attorney General of Michi
gan, argued the cause for respondents in all cases. With
her on the brief were Michael A. Cox, Attorney General,

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202 JONES v. BOCK
Opinion of the Court
Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and John L. Thurber,
Assistant Attorney General.†
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the
Court.
In an effort to address the large number of prisoner com
plaints filed in federal court, Congress enacted the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 110 Stat. 1321–71, as
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1997e et seq. Among other reforms,
the PLRA mandates early judicial screening of prisoner com
plaints and requires prisoners to exhaust prison grievance
procedures before filing suit. 28 U. S. C. § 1915A; 42 U. S. C.
§ 1997e(a). The Sixth Circuit, along with some other lower
courts, adopted several procedural rules designed to imple
†A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for the American
Civil Liberties Union et al. by Margaret Winter, Elizabeth Alexander,
Steven R. Shapiro, Michael J. Steinberg, Kary L. Moss, John Boston, Gio
vanna Shay, Jerome N. Frank, Paul D. Reingold, Stephen Hanlon, San
dra Girard, and David A. Singleton.
A brief of amici curiae was filed for the State of New York et al. by
Eliot Spitzer, former Attorney General of New York, Caitlin J. Halligan,
Solicitor General, Daniel Smirlock, Deputy Solicitor General, Peter H.
Schiff, Senior Counsel, and Robert M. Goldfarb and Martin A. Hotvet,
Assistant Solicitors General, and by the Attorneys General and former
Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Troy King
of Alabama, David Ma´ rquez of Alaska, Mike Beebe of Arkansas, Bill Lock
yer of California, John W. Suthers of Colorado, Carl C. Danberg of Dela
ware, Robert J. Spagnoletti of the District of Columbia, Charles J. Crist,
Jr., of Florida, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho,
Lisa Madigan of Illinois, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Jeremiah
W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Montana, Jon Bruning of
Nebraska, George J. Chanos of Nevada, Wayne Stenehjem of North Da
kota, Jim Petro of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy
Myers of Oregon, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Patrick Lynch
of Rhode Island, Henry McMaster of South Carolina, Lawrence E. Long
of South Dakota, Paul G. Summers of Tennessee, Greg Abbott of Texas,
Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, Robert F. McDonnell of Virginia, Rob Mc-
Kenna of Washington, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, Peggy A.
Lautenschlager of Wisconsin, and Patrick J. Crank of Wyoming.

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Opinion of the Court
ment this exhaustion requirement and facilitate early judi
cial screening. These rules require a prisoner to allege and
demonstrate exhaustion in his complaint, permit suit only
against defendants who were identified by the prisoner in
his grievance, and require courts to dismiss the entire action
if the prisoner fails to satisfy the exhaustion requirement
as to any single claim in his complaint. Other lower courts
declined to adopt such rules. We granted certiorari to re
solve the conflict and now conclude that these rules are not
required by the PLRA, and that crafting and imposing them
exceeds the proper limits on the judicial role.
I
Prisoner litigation continues to “account for an outsized
share of filings” in federal district courts. Woodford v. Ngo,
548 U. S. 81, 94, n. 4 (2006). In 2005, nearly 10 percent of
all civil cases filed in federal courts nationwide were prisoner
complaints challenging prison conditions or claiming civil
rights violations.1 Most of these cases have no merit; many
are frivolous. Our legal system, however, remains com
mitted to guaranteeing that prisoner claims of illegal conduct
by their custodians are fairly handled according to law. The
challenge lies in ensuring that the flood of nonmeritorious
claims does not submerge and effectively preclude consider
ation of the allegations with merit. See Neitzke v. Wil
liams, 490 U. S. 319, 327 (1989).
Congress addressed that challenge in the PLRA. What
this country needs, Congress decided, is fewer and better
prisoner suits. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U. S. 516, 524
(2002) (PLRA intended to “reduce the quantity and improve
1 See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Judicial Facts
and Figures, Tables 4.4, 4.6, http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/
contents.html (as visited Jan. 17, 2007, and available in Clerk of Court’s
case file). That number excludes habeas corpus petitions and motions to
vacate a sentence. If these filings are included, prisoner complaints con
stituted 24 percent of all civil filings in 2005.

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204 JONES v. BOCK
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the quality of prisoner suits”). To that end, Congress en
acted a variety of reforms designed to filter out the bad
claims and facilitate consideration of the good. Key among
these was the requirement that inmates complaining about
prison conditions exhaust prison grievance remedies before
initiating a lawsuit.
The exhaustion provision of the PLRA states:
“No action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under [42 U. S. C. § 1983], or any other Fed
eral law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison,
or other correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U. S. C.
§ 1997e(a).
Requiring exhaustion allows prison officials an opportunity
to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of their responsi
bilities before being haled into court. This has the potential
to reduce the number of inmate suits, and also to improve
the quality of suits that are filed by producing a useful ad
ministrative record. Woodford, supra, at 94–95. In an at
tempt to implement the exhaustion requirement, some lower
courts have imposed procedural rules that have become the
subject of varying levels of disagreement among the federal
courts of appeals.
The first question presented centers on a conflict over
whether exhaustion under the PLRA is a pleading require
ment the prisoner must satisfy in his complaint or an affirm
ative defense the defendant must plead and prove.2 The
2 Compare Steele v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 355 F. 3d 1204, 1210
(CA10 2003) (pleading requirement); Brown v. Toombs, 139 F. 3d 1102,
1104 (CA6 1998) (per curiam) (same); Rivera v. Allin, 144 F. 3d 719, 731
(CA11 1998) (same), with Anderson v. XYZ Correctional Health Servs.,
Inc., 407 F. 3d 674, 681 (CA4 2005) (affirmative defense); Wyatt v. Terhune,
315 F. 3d 1108, 1119 (CA9 2003) (same); Casanova v. Dubois, 304 F. 3d 75,
77, n. 3 (CA1 2002) (same); Ray v. Kertes, 285 F. 3d 287, 295 (CA3 2002)
(same); Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F. 3d 687, 697 (CA8 2001) (same); Massey
v. Helman, 196 F. 3d 727, 735 (CA7 1999) (same); Jenkins v. Haubert, 179

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Sixth Circuit, adopting the former view, requires prisoners
to attach proof of exhaustion—typically copies of the griev
ances—to their complaints to avoid dismissal. If no written
record of the grievance is available, the inmate must plead
with specificity how and when he exhausted the grievance
procedures. Knuckles El v. Toombs, 215 F. 3d 640, 642
(2000).
The next issue concerns how courts determine whether a
prisoner has properly exhausted administrative remedies—
specifically, the level of detail required in a grievance to put
the prison and individual officials on notice of the claim.
The Sixth Circuit requires that a prisoner have identified,
in the first step of the grievance process, each individual
later named in the lawsuit to properly exhaust administra
tive remedies. Burton v. Jones, 321 F. 3d 569, 575 (2003).
Other Circuits have taken varying approaches to this ques
tion, see, e. g., Butler v. Adams, 397 F. 3d 1181, 1183 (CA9
2005) (proper exhaustion requires use of the administrative
process provided by the State; if that process does not re
quire identification of specific persons, neither does the
PLRA); Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F. 3d 503, 522 (CA5 2004)
(“[T]he grievance must provide administrators with a fair
opportunity under the circumstances to address the problem
that will later form the basis of the suit”); Riccardo v.
Rausch, 375 F. 3d 521, 524 (CA7 2004) (exhaustion satisfied
if grievance “served its function of alerting the state and
inviting corrective action”), none going as far as the Sixth
Circuit in requiring in every case that the defendants have
been named from the beginning of the grievance process.
Finally, the Circuits are divided over what the PLRA re
quires when both exhausted and unexhausted claims are in-
F. 3d 19, 28–29 (CA2 1999) (same). See also Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F. 3d
503, 516, n. 7 (CA5 2004) (noting the conflict but not deciding the question);
Jackson v. District of Columbia, 254 F. 3d 262, 267 (CADC 2001) (treating
exhaustion as an affirmative defense).

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cluded in a complaint.3 Some Circuits, including the Sixth
Circuit, apply a “total exhaustion” rule, under which no part
of the suit may proceed if any single claim in the action is
not properly exhausted. See, e. g., Jones Bey v. Johnson,
407 F. 3d 801, 805 (CA6 2005). Among Circuits requiring
total exhaustion there is further disagreement over what to
do if the requirement is not met. Most courts allow the
prisoner to amend his complaint to include only exhausted
claims, e. g., Kozohorsky v. Harmon, 332 F. 3d 1141, 1144
(CA8 2003), but the Sixth Circuit denies leave to amend, dis
misses the action, and requires that it be filed anew with
only exhausted claims, Baxter v. Rose, 305 F. 3d 486, 488
(2002); Jones Bey, supra, at 807. See also McGore v. Wrig
glesworth, 114 F. 3d 601, 612 (1997). Other Circuits reject
total exhaustion altogether, instead dismissing only unex
hausted claims and considering the rest on the merits. See,
e. g., Ortiz v. McBride, 380 F. 3d 649, 663 (CA2 2004).
A
Petitioners are inmates in the custody of the Michigan De
partment of Corrections (MDOC). At the time petitioners
filed their grievances, MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130
(Nov. 1, 2000) set forth the applicable grievance procedures.
1 App. 138–157.4 The policy directive describes what issues
3 Compare Jones Bey v. Johnson, 407 F. 3d 801, 805 (CA6 2005) (requir
ing dismissal of the entire action if one unexhausted claim is present);
Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F. 3d 1181, 1189 (CA10 2004) (same);
Vazquez v. Ragonese, 142 Fed. Appx. 606, 607 (CA3 2005) (per curiam)
(same); Kozohorsky v. Harmon, 332 F. 3d 1141, 1144 (CA8 2003) (same),
with Lira v. Herrera, 427 F. 3d 1164, 1175 (CA9 2005) (allowing dismissal
of only unexhausted claims); Ortiz v. McBride, 380 F. 3d 649, 663 (CA2
2004) (same); Lewis v. Washington, 300 F. 3d 829, 835 (CA7 2002) (same).
See also Johnson, supra, at 523, n. 15 (suggesting that total exhaustion is
an open question in the Fifth Circuit).
4 MDOC has since revised its policy. See Policy Directive 03.02.130 (ef
fective Dec. 19, 2003), App. to Brief for Respondents 1b. The new policy
is not at issue in these cases.

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are grievable and contains instructions for filing and process
ing grievances.
Inmates must first attempt to resolve a problem orally
within two business days of becoming aware of the grievable
issue. Id., at 147. If oral resolution is unsuccessful, the in
mate may proceed to Step I of the grievance process, and
submit a completed grievance form within five business days
of the attempted oral resolution. Id., at 147, 149–150. The
Step I grievance form provided by MDOC (a one-page form
on which the inmate fills out identifying information and is
given space to describe the complaint) advises inmates to be
“brief and concise in describing your grievance issue.” 2 id.,
at 1. The inmate submits the grievance to a designated
grievance coordinator, who assigns it to a respondent—gen
erally the supervisor of the person being grieved. 1 id.,
at 150.
If the inmate is dissatisfied with the Step I response, he
may appeal to Step II by obtaining an appeal form within
five business days of the response, and submitting the appeal
within five business days of obtaining the form. Id., at 152.
The respondent at Step II is designated by the policy, id., at
152–153 (e. g., the regional health administrator for medical
care grievances). If still dissatisfied after Step II, the in
mate may further appeal to Step III using the same appeal
form; the MDOC director is designated as respondent for all
Step III appeals. Id., at 154.
Lorenzo Jones
Petitioner Lorenzo Jones is incarcerated at MDOC’s Sagi
naw Correctional Facility. In November 2000, while in
MDOC’s custody, Jones was involved in a vehicle accident
and suffered significant injuries to his neck and back. Sev
eral months later Jones was given a work assignment he
allegedly could not perform in light of his injuries. Accord
ing to Jones, respondent Paul Morrison—in charge of work
assignments at the prison—made the inappropriate assign

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208 JONES v. BOCK
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ment, even though he knew of Jones’s injuries. When Jones
reported to the assignment, he informed the staff member
in charge—respondent Michael Opanasenko—that he could
not perform the work; Opanasenko allegedly told him to do
the work or “ ‘suffer the consequences.’ ” Id., at 20. Jones
performed the required tasks and allegedly aggravated his
injuries. After unsuccessfully seeking redress through
MDOC’s grievance process, Jones filed a complaint in the
Eastern District of Michigan under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for
deliberate indifference to medical needs, retaliation, and
harassment. Jones named as defendants, in addition to
Morrison and Opanasenko, respondents Barbara Bock (the
warden), Valerie Chaplin (a deputy warden), Janet Konkle (a
registered nurse), and Ahmad Aldabaugh (a physician).
A Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal for failure to
state a claim with respect to Bock, Chaplin, Konkle, and Al
dabaugh, and the District Court agreed. 1 App. 41. With
respect to Morrison and Opanasenko, however, the Magis
trate Judge recommended that the suit proceed, finding that
Jones had exhausted his administrative remedies as to those
two. Id., at 18–29. The District Court Judge disagreed.
In his complaint, Jones provided the dates on which his
claims were filed at various steps of the MDOC grievance
procedures. Id., at 41. He did not, however, attach copies
of the grievance forms or describe the proceedings with
specificity. Respondents attached copies of all of Jones’s
grievances to their own motion to dismiss, but the District
Judge ruled that Jones’s failure to meet his burden to plead
exhaustion in his complaint could not be cured by respond
ents. Id., at 42. The Sixth Circuit agreed, holding both
that Jones failed to comply with the specific pleading require
ments applied to PLRA suits, 135 Fed. Appx. 837, 839 (2005)
(per curiam) (citing Knuckles El, 215 F. 3d, at 642), and that,
even if Jones had shown that he exhausted the claims against
Morrison and Opanasenko, dismissal was still required under

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the total exhaustion rule, 135 Fed. Appx., at 839 (citing Jones
Bey, 407 F. 3d, at 806).
Timothy Williams
Petitioner Timothy Williams is incarcerated at MDOC’s
Adrian Correctional Facility. He suffers from noninvolut
ing cavernous hemangiomas in his right arm, a medical con
dition that causes pain, immobility, and disfigurement of
the limb, and for which he has undergone several surger
ies. An MDOC physician recommended further surgery to
provide pain relief, but MDOC’s Correctional Medical Serv
ices denied the recommendation (and subsequent appeals by
the doctor) on the ground that the danger of surgery out
weighed the benefits, which it viewed as cosmetic. The
MDOC Medical Services Advisory Committee upheld this de
cision. After Correctional Medical Services indicated that
it would take the request under advisement, Williams filed a
grievance objecting to the quality of his medical care and
seeking authorization for the surgery. He later filed an
other grievance complaining that he was denied a single
occupancy handicapped cell, allegedly necessary to accommo
date his medical condition. After both grievances were
denied at all stages, Williams filed a complaint in the Eastern
District of Michigan under § 1983, naming as respondents
William Overton (former director of MDOC), David Jamrog
(the warden), Mary Jo Pass and Paul Klee (assistant deputy
wardens), Chad Markwell (corrections officer), Bonnie Pe
terson (health unit manager), and Dr. George Pramstaller
(chief medical officer for MDOC).
The District Judge found that Williams had failed to ex
haust his administrative remedies with regard to his medical
care claim because he had not identified any of the respond
ents named in his lawsuit during the grievance process.5
5 Dr. Pramstaller was mentioned at Step III of the grievance process,
but was apparently never served with the complaint initiating the lawsuit.
The Magistrate Judge stated that even if the claims against Pramstaller

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210 JONES v. BOCK
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Although Williams’s claim concerning the handicapped cell
had been properly exhausted, the District Judge—applying
the total exhaustion rule—dismissed the entire suit. The
Sixth Circuit affirmed. 136 Fed. Appx. 859, 861–863 (2005)
(citing Burton, 321 F. 3d, at 574, Curry v. Scott, 249 F. 3d
493, 504–505 (CA6 2001), and Jones Bey, supra, at 805).
John Walton
Petitioner John Walton is incarcerated at MDOC’s Alger
Maximum Correctional Facility. After assaulting a guard,
he was sanctioned with an indefinite “upper slot” restric
tion.6 Several months later, upon learning that other pris
oners had been given upper slot restrictions of only three
months for the same infraction, he filed a grievance claiming
that this disparity was the result of racial discrimination
(Walton is black, the two other prisoners he identified in his
grievances are white). After the grievance was denied,
Walton filed a complaint in the Western District of Michigan
under § 1983, claiming race discrimination. He named as re
spondents Barbara Bouchard (former warden), Ken Gearin,
David Bergh, and Ron Bobo (assistant deputy wardens),
Catherine Bauman (resident unit manager), and Denise
Gerth (assistant resident unit supervisor).
The District Judge dismissed the lawsuit because Walton
had not named any respondent other than Bobo in his griev
had been properly exhausted they nonetheless were subject to dismissal
under the total exhaustion rule. 1 App. 86, 101. It also appears that
under the Sixth Circuit’s rule requiring a defendant to be named at Step
I of the grievance process, the claims against Pramstaller, who was not
mentioned until Step III, would not have been exhausted. See supra, at
205; n. 7, infra. Because Pramstaller was never served, he is not a re
spondent in this Court.
6 An upper slot restriction limits the inmate to receiving food and paper
work via the lower slot of the cell door. Brief for Respondents 5–6.
Presumably, this is less desirable than access through the upper slot; the
record does not reveal how effective this particular sanction is in discour
aging assaults on staff.

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ance. His claims against the other respondents were thus
not properly exhausted, and the court dismissed the entire
action under the total exhaustion rule. The Sixth Circuit
affirmed, reiterating its requirement that a prisoner must
“file a grievance against the person he ultimately seeks to
sue,” Curry, supra, at 505, and that this requirement can
only be satisfied by naming each defendant at Step I of the
MDOC grievance process. Because Walton had exhausted
prison remedies only as to respondent Bobo, the Sixth Cir
cuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the entire ac
tion. 136 Fed. Appx. 846, 848–849 (2005).
B
Jones sought review in a petition for certiorari, arguing
that the Sixth Circuit’s heightened pleading requirement and
total exhaustion rule contravene the clear language of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the PLRA. Williams
and Walton filed a joint petition under this Court’s Rule 12.4,
contending that the rule requiring every defendant to be
named during the grievance process is not required by the
PLRA, and also challenging the total exhaustion rule. We
granted both petitions for certiorari, 547 U. S. 1002 (2006),
and consolidated the cases for our review.
II
There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under
the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought
in court. Porter, 534 U. S., at 524. What is less clear is
whether it falls to the prisoner to plead and demonstrate
exhaustion in the complaint, or to the defendant to raise lack
of exhaustion as an affirmative defense. The minority rule,
adopted by the Sixth Circuit, places the burden of pleading
exhaustion in a case covered by the PLRA on the prisoner;
most courts view failure to exhaust as an affirmative defense.
See n. 2, supra.

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212 JONES v. BOCK
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We think petitioners, and the majority of courts to con
sider the question, have the better of the argument. Fed
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires simply a “short
and plain statement of the claim” in a complaint, while Rule
8(c) identifies a nonexhaustive list of affirmative defenses
that must be pleaded in response. The PLRA itself is not a
source of a prisoner’s claim; claims covered by the PLRA are
typically brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, which does not
require exhaustion at all, see Patsy v. Board of Regents
of Fla., 457 U. S. 496, 516 (1982). Petitioners assert that
courts typically regard exhaustion as an affirmative defense
in other contexts, see Brief for Petitioners 34–36, and
nn. 12–13 (citing cases), and respondents do not seriously dis
pute the general proposition. We have referred to exhaus
tion in these terms, see, e. g., Wright v. Universal Maritime
Service Corp., 525 U. S. 70, 75 (1998) (referring to “failure
to exhaust” as an “affirmative defens[e]”), including in the
similar statutory scheme governing habeas corpus, Day v.
McDonough, 547 U. S. 198, 208 (2006) (referring to exhaus
tion as a “defense”). The PLRA dealt extensively with the
subject of exhaustion, see 42 U. S. C. §§ 1997e(a), (c)(2), but
is silent on the issue whether exhaustion must be pleaded
by the plaintiff or is an affirmative defense. This is strong
evidence that the usual practice should be followed, and the
usual practice under the Federal Rules is to regard exhaus
tion as an affirmative defense.
In a series of recent cases, we have explained that courts
should generally not depart from the usual practice under
the Federal Rules on the basis of perceived policy concerns.
Thus, in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelli
gence and Coordination Unit, 507 U. S. 163 (1993), we unani
mously reversed the Court of Appeals for imposing a height
ened pleading standard in § 1983 suits against municipalities.
We explained that “[p]erhaps if [the] Rules . . . were rewrit
ten today, claims against municipalities under § 1983 might
be subjected to the added specificity requirement . . . . But

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that is a result which must be obtained by the process of
amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpreta
tion.” Id., at 168.
In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U. S. 506 (2002), we
unanimously reversed the Court of Appeals for requiring
employment discrimination plaintiffs to specifically allege
the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination. We
explained that “the Federal Rules do not contain a height
ened pleading standard for employment discrimination
suits,” and a “requirement of greater specificity for particu
lar claims” must be obtained by amending the Federal Rules.
Id., at 515 (citing Leatherman). And just last Term, in Hill
v. McDonough, 547 U. S. 573 (2006), we unanimously rejected
a proposal that § 1983 suits challenging a method of execu
tion must identify an acceptable alternative: “Specific plead
ing requirements are mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and not, as a general rule, through case-by-case
determinations of the federal courts.” Id., at 582 (citing
Swierkiewicz).
The Sixth Circuit and other courts requiring prisoners to
plead and demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints con
tend that if the “new regime” mandated by the PLRA for
prisoner complaints is to function effectively, prisoner com
plaints must be treated outside of this typical framework.
See Baxter, 305 F. 3d, at 489. These courts explain that the
PLRA not only imposed a new mandatory exhaustion re
quirement, but also departed in a fundamental way from the
usual procedural ground rules by requiring judicial screening
to filter out nonmeritorious claims: Courts are to screen in
mate complaints “before docketing, if feasible or, . . . as soon
as practicable after docketing,” and dismiss the complaint if
it is “frivolous, malicious, . . . fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted[,] or . . . seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U. S. C.
§§ 1915A(a), (b). All this may take place before any respon
sive pleading is filed—unlike in the typical civil case, defend

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ants do not have to respond to a complaint covered by the
PLRA until required to do so by the court, and waiving the
right to reply does not constitute an admission of the allega
tions in the complaint. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 1997e(g)(1), (2).
According to respondents, these departures from the normal
litigation framework of complaint and response mandate a
different pleading requirement for prisoner complaints, if the
screening is to serve its intended purpose. See, e. g., Baxter,
supra, at 489 (“This court’s heightened pleading standards
for complaints covered by the PLRA are designed to facili
tate the Act’s screening requirements . . . ”); Knuckles El,
215 F. 3d, at 642. See also Brief for Respondents 17.
We think that the PLRA’s screening requirement does
not—explicitly or implicitly—justify deviating from the
usual procedural practice beyond the departures specified by
the PLRA itself. Before the PLRA, the in forma pauperis
provision of § 1915, applicable to most prisoner litigation,
permitted sua sponte dismissal only if an action was frivo
lous or malicious. 28 U. S. C. § 1915(d) (1994 ed.); see also
Neitzke, 490 U. S., at 320 (concluding that a complaint that
fails to state a claim was not frivolous under § 1915(d) and
thus could not be dismissed sua sponte). In the PLRA,
Congress added failure to state a claim and seeking mone
tary relief from a defendant immune from such relief as
grounds for sua sponte dismissal of in forma pauperis cases,
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) (2000 ed.), and provided for judicial screening
and sua sponte dismissal of prisoner suits on the same four
grounds, § 1915A(b); 42 U. S. C. § 1997e(c)(1). Although ex
haustion was a “centerpiece” of the PLRA, Woodford, 548
U. S., at 84, failure to exhaust was notably not added in
terms to this enumeration. There is thus no reason to sup
pose that the normal pleading rules have to be altered to
facilitate judicial screening of complaints specifically for fail
ure to exhaust.
Some courts have found that exhaustion is subsumed
under the PLRA’s enumerated ground authorizing early dis

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missal for “fail[ure] to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted.” 28 U. S. C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), 1915(e)(2)(B); 42
U. S. C. § 1997e(c)(1). See Baxter, supra, at 489; Steele v.
Federal Bureau of Prisons, 355 F. 3d 1204, 1210 (CA10 2003);
Rivera v. Allin, 144 F. 3d 719, 731 (CA11 1998). The point
is a bit of a red herring. A complaint is subject to dismissal
for failure to state a claim if the allegations, taken as true,
show the plaintiff is not entitled to relief. If the allegations,
for example, show that relief is barred by the applicable stat
ute of limitations, the complaint is subject to dismissal for
failure to state a claim; that does not make the statute of
limitations any less an affirmative defense, see Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 8(c). Whether a particular ground for opposing a
claim may be the basis for dismissal for failure to state a
claim depends on whether the allegations in the complaint
suffice to establish that ground, not on the nature of the
ground in the abstract. See Leveto v. Lapina, 258 F. 3d 156,
161 (CA3 2001) (“[A] complaint may be subject to dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6) when an affirmative defense . . . appears
on its face” (internal quotation marks omitted)). See also
Lopez-Gonzalez v. Comerio, 404 F. 3d 548, 551 (CA1 2005)
(dismissing a complaint barred by the statute of limitations
under Rule 12(b)(6)); Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue
Shield, 152 F. 3d 67, 74–75 (CA2 1998) (dismissing a com
plaint barred by official immunity under Rule 12(b)(6)). See
also 5B C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Proce
dure § 1357, pp. 708–710, 721–729 (3d ed. 2004). Determin
ing that Congress meant to include failure to exhaust under
the rubric of “failure to state a claim” in the screening provi
sions of the PLRA would thus not support treating exhaus
tion as a pleading requirement rather than an affirmative
defense.
The argument that screening would be more effective if
exhaustion had to be shown in the complaint proves too
much; the same could be said with respect to any affirmative
defense. The rejoinder that the PLRA focused on exhaus

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tion rather than other defenses simply highlights the failure
of Congress to include exhaustion in terms among the enu
merated grounds justifying dismissal upon early screening.
As noted, that is not to say that failure to exhaust cannot be
a basis for dismissal for failure to state a claim. It is to say
that there is no basis for concluding that Congress implicitly
meant to transform exhaustion from an affirmative defense
to a pleading requirement by the curiously indirect route of
specifying that courts should screen PLRA complaints and
dismiss those that fail to state a claim.
Respondents point to 42 U. S. C. § 1997e(g) as confirming
that the usual pleading rules should not apply to PLRA suits,
but we think that provision supports petitioners. It spec
ifies that defendants can waive their right to reply to a
prisoner complaint without the usual consequence of being
deemed to have admitted the allegations in the complaint.
See § 1997e(g)(1) (allowing defendants to waive their re
sponse without admitting the allegations “[n]otwithstanding
any other law or rule of procedure”). This shows that when
Congress meant to depart from the usual procedural require
ments, it did so expressly.
We conclude that failure to exhaust is an affirmative de
fense under the PLRA, and that inmates are not required
to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their com
plaints. We understand the reasons behind the decisions of
some lower courts to impose a pleading requirement on
plaintiffs in this context, but that effort cannot fairly be
viewed as an interpretation of the PLRA. “Whatever
temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might
wisely suggest,” the judge’s job is to construe the statute—
not to make it better. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the
Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 533 (1947). The
judge “must not read in by way of creation,” but instead
abide by the “duty of restraint, th[e] humility of function as
merely the translator of another’s command.” Id., at 533–
534. See United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U. S. 95, 103

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(1897) (“No mere omission . . . which it may seem wise to
have specifically provided for, justif[ies] any judicial addition
to the language of the statute”). Given that the PLRA does
not itself require plaintiffs to plead exhaustion, such a result
“must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal
Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.” Leatherman, 507
U. S., at 168.
III
The Sixth Circuit threw out the Williams and Walton suits
because those prisoners had not identified in their initial
grievances each defendant they later sued. 136 Fed. Appx.,
at 862–863; id., at 848–849. See Burton, 321 F. 3d, at 575.7
Here again the lower court’s procedural rule lacks a textual
basis in the PLRA. The PLRA requires exhaustion of
“such administrative remedies as are available,” 42 U. S. C.
§ 1997e(a), but nothing in the statute imposes a “name all
defendants” requirement along the lines of the Sixth Cir
cuit’s judicially created rule. Respondents argue that with
out such a rule the exhaustion requirement would become
a “ ‘useless appendage,’ ” Brief for Respondents 44 (quoting
Woodford, 548 U. S., at 93), but the assertion is hyperbole,
and the citation of Woodford misplaced.
Woodford held that “proper exhaustion” was required
under the PLRA, and that this requirement was not satis
fied when grievances were dismissed because prisoners had
7 This “name all defendants” rule apparently applies even when a pris
oner does not learn the identity of the responsible party until a later step
of the grievance process. Upon learning the identity of the responsible
party, the prisoner is required to bring an entirely new grievance to prop
erly exhaust. 136 Fed. Appx. 846, 849 (CA6 2005) (“At that point [after
he learned, in response to a Step I grievance, that Gearin was responsible
for the upper slot restriction], Walton was armed with all of the informa
tion that he needed to file a Step I grievance against . . . Gearin—and a
federal complaint against Gearin once the claim had been exhausted—but
he simply chose not to follow this route”). At oral argument, Michigan
admitted that it did not agree with at least this application of the rule.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 44–45.

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missed deadlines set by the grievance policy. Id., at 93–95.
At the time each of the grievances at issue here was filed,
in contrast, the MDOC policy did not contain any provision
specifying who must be named in a grievance. MDOC’s pol
icy required only that prisoners “be as specific as possible”
in their grievances, 1 App. 148, while at the same time the
required forms advised them to “[b]e brief and concise,” 2
id., at 1. The MDOC grievance form does not require a pris
oner to identify a particular responsible party, and the re
spondent is not necessarily the allegedly culpable prison of
ficial, but rather an administrative official designated in the
policy to respond to particular types of grievances at differ
ent levels. Supra, at 207. The grievance policy specifically
provides that the grievant at Step I “shall have the opportu
nity to explain the grievance more completely at [an] inter
view, enabling the Step I respondent to gather any additional
information needed to respond to the grievance.” 1 App.
151. Nothing in the MDOC policy itself supports the conclu
sion that the grievance process was improperly invoked sim
ply because an individual later named as a defendant was not
named at the first step of the grievance process.
Nor does the PLRA impose such a requirement. In
Woodford, we held that to properly exhaust administrative
remedies prisoners must “complete the administrative re
view process in accordance with the applicable procedural
rules,” 548 U. S., at 88—rules that are defined not by the
PLRA, but by the prison grievance process itself. Compli
ance with prison grievance procedures, therefore, is all that
is required by the PLRA to “properly exhaust.” The level
of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the griev
ance procedures will vary from system to system and claim
to claim, but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the
PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion. As
MDOC’s procedures make no mention of naming particular
officials, the Sixth Circuit’s rule imposing such a prerequisite
to proper exhaustion is unwarranted.

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We have identified the benefits of exhaustion to include
allowing a prison to address complaints about the program
it administers before being subjected to suit, reducing litiga
tion to the extent complaints are satisfactorily resolved, and
improving litigation that does occur by leading to the prepa
ration of a useful record. See id., at 88–91; Porter, 534 U. S.,
at 524–525. The Sixth Circuit rule may promote early no
tice to those who might later be sued, but that has not been
thought to be one of the leading purposes of the exhaustion
requirement. See Johnson, 385 F. 3d, at 522 (“We are mind
ful that the primary purpose of a grievance is to alert prison
officials to a problem, not to provide personal notice to a
particular official that he may be sued; the grievance is not
a summons and complaint that initiates adversarial litiga
tion”); see also Brief for American Civil Liberties Union
et al. as Amici Curiae 8–9, and n. 6 (collecting grievance
procedures and noting that the majority do not require pris
oners to identify specific individuals).
We do not determine whether the grievances filed by peti
tioners satisfied the requirement of “proper exhaustion,”
Woodford, supra, at 93, but simply conclude that exhaustion
is not per se inadequate simply because an individual later
sued was not named in the grievances. We leave it to the
court below in the first instance to determine the sufficiency
of the exhaustion in these cases.
IV
The final issue concerns how courts should address com
plaints in which the prisoner has failed to exhaust some, but
not all, of the claims asserted in the complaint.8 All agree
8 Although we reverse the Sixth Circuit’s rulings on the substantive ex
haustion requirements as to all three petitioners, the question whether a
total exhaustion rule is contemplated by the PLRA is not moot. In
Jones’s case, the Sixth Circuit ruled in the alternative that total exhaus
tion required dismissal. 135 Fed. Appx. 837, 839 (2005) (per curiam)
(“[E]ven if Jones had shown he had exhausted some of his claims, the

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that no unexhausted claim may be considered. The issue is
whether the court should proceed with the exhausted claims,
or instead—as the Sixth Circuit has held—dismiss the entire
action if any one claim is not properly exhausted. See Jones
Bey, 407 F. 3d, at 807.9
Here the Sixth Circuit can point to language in the PLRA
in support of its rule. Section 1997e(a) provides that “[n]o
action shall be brought” unless administrative procedures
are exhausted. Respondents argue that if Congress in
tended courts to dismiss only unexhausted claims while re
taining the balance of the lawsuit, the word “claim” rather
than “action” would have been used in this provision.
This statutory phrasing—“no action shall be brought”—is
boilerplate language. There are many instances in the Fed
eral Code where similar language is used, but such language
has not been thought to lead to the dismissal of an entire
action if a single claim fails to meet the pertinent standards.
Statutes of limitations, for example, are often introduced by
a variant of the phrase “no action shall be brought,” see, e. g.,
Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U. S. 410, 416 (1998); 18
U. S. C. § 1030(g) (2000 ed., Supp. IV), but we have never
heard of an entire complaint being thrown out simply be
cause one of several discrete claims was barred by the stat
ute of limitations, and it is hard to imagine what purpose
such a rule would serve. The same is true with respect to
other uses of the “no action shall be brought” phrasing. See,
e. g., Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Federal Emergency Manage
ment Agency, 126 F. 3d 461, 471 (CA3 1997) (dismissing only
district court properly dismissed the complaint because Jones did not show
that he had exhausted all of his claims”).
9 After we granted certiorari, the Sixth Circuit suggested that the adop
tion of a total exhaustion rule in that Circuit in Jones Bey ran contrary to
previous panel decisions and was therefore not controlling. Spencer v.
Bouchard, 449 F. 3d 721, 726 (2006). See also Rule 206(c) (CA6 2006).
As total exhaustion was applied in the cases under review, and the Sixth
Circuit is not the only court to apply this rule, we do not concern ourselves
with this possible intracircuit split.

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claims that fail to comply with the citizen suit notification
requirement of 16 U. S. C. § 1540(g)(2), which states that “[n]o
action may be commenced” until an agency has declined to
act after being given written notice).
More generally, statutory references to an “action” have
not typically been read to mean that every claim included in
the action must meet the pertinent requirement before the
“action” may proceed. See, e. g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Alla
pattah Services, Inc., 545 U. S. 546, 560–563 (2005) (District
Court had jurisdiction over a “civil action” under 28 U. S. C.
§ 1367(a), even if it might not have jurisdiction over each sep
arate claim pressed in the action); Chicago v. International
College of Surgeons, 522 U. S. 156, 166 (1997) (District Court
had jurisdiction over removed “civil action” even if every
claim did not satisfy jurisdictional prerequisites).
As a general matter, if a complaint contains both good and
bad claims, the court proceeds with the good and leaves the
bad. “[O]nly the bad claims are dismissed; the complaint as
a whole is not. If Congress meant to depart from this norm,
we would expect some indication of that, and we find none.”
Robinson v. Page, 170 F. 3d 747, 748–749 (CA7 1999) (consid
ering § 1997e(e)).
Respondents note an exception to this general rule, the
total exhaustion rule in habeas corpus. In Rose v. Lundy,
455 U. S. 509, 522 (1982), we held that “mixed” habeas peti
tions—containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims—
cannot be adjudicated. This total exhaustion rule applied in
habeas was initially derived from considerations of “comity
and federalism,” not any statutory command. Rhines v.
Weber, 544 U. S. 269, 273 (2005); id., at 274 (noting that Con
gress “preserved Lundy’s total exhaustion requirement” in
28 U. S. C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)). Separate claims in a single ha
beas petition generally seek the same relief from custody,
and success on one is often as good as success on another.
In such a case it makes sense to require exhaustion of all
claims in state court before allowing the federal action to

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proceed. A typical PLRA suit with multiple claims, on the
other hand, may combine a wide variety of discrete com
plaints, about interactions with guards, prison conditions,
generally applicable rules, and so on, seeking different relief
on each claim. There is no reason failure to exhaust on one
necessarily affects any other. In any event, even if the ha
beas total exhaustion rule is pertinent, it does not in fact
depart from the usual practice—as we recently held, a court
presented with a mixed habeas petition “should allow the
petitioner to delete the unexhausted claims and to proceed
with the exhausted claims . . . .” Rhines, supra, at 278.
This is the opposite of the rule the Sixth Circuit adopted,
and precisely the rule that respondents argue against.
Respondents’ reading of 42 U. S. C. § 1997e(a) to contain a
total exhaustion rule is bolstered by the fact that other sec
tions of the PLRA distinguish between actions and claims.
Section 1997e(c)(1), for example, provides that a court shall
dismiss an action for one of four enumerated deficiencies,
while § 1997e(c)(2) allows a court to dismiss a claim for one
of these reasons without first determining whether the claim
is exhausted. Similarly, 28 U. S. C. § 1915A(b) directs dis
trict courts to dismiss “the complaint, or any portion of the
complaint,” before docketing under certain circumstances.
This demonstrates that Congress knew how to differentiate
between the entire action and particular claims when it
wanted to, and suggests that its use of “action” rather than
“claim” in 42 U. S. C. § 1997e(a) should be given effect.
But the interpretation respondents advocate creates its
own inconsistencies. Section 1997e(e) contains similar lan
guage, “[n]o . . . action may be brought . . . for mental or
emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior
showing of physical injury,” yet respondents cite no case in
terpreting this provision to require dismissal of the entire
lawsuit if only one claim does not comply, and again we see
little reason for such an approach. Accord, Cassidy v. Indi
ana Dept. of Corrections, 199 F. 3d 374, 376–377 (CA7 2000)

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(dismissing only the portions of the complaint barred by
§ 1997e(e)); see also Williams v. Ollis, 230 F. 3d 1361 (CA6
2000) (unpublished table decision) (same). Interpreting the
phrase “no action shall be brought” to require dismissal of
the entire case under § 1997e(a) but not § 1997e(e) would con
travene our normal rules of statutory construction. Na
tional Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co.,
522 U. S. 479, 501–502 (1998).
In pressing the total exhaustion argument, respondents
also marshal the policy and purpose underlying the PLRA—
this time in a supporting rather than lead role. The invig
orated exhaustion requirement is a “centerpiece” of the
statute, Woodford, 548 U. S., at 84, and if the exhaustion
requirement of § 1997e(a) is not effectuated by a total ex
haustion rule, they argue, inmates will have little incen
tive to ensure that they have exhausted all available admin
istrative remedies before proceeding to court. The PLRA
mandated early judicial screening to reduce the burden of
prisoner litigation on the courts; a total exhaustion rule
allows courts promptly to dismiss an action upon identify
ing an unexhausted claim. The alternative approach turns
judges into editors of prisoner complaints, rather than creat
ing an incentive for prisoners to exhaust properly. See Ross
v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F. 3d 1181, 1190 (CA10 2004).
We are not persuaded by these policy arguments. In fact,
the effect of a total exhaustion rule could be that inmates
will file various claims in separate suits, to avoid the possibil
ity of an unexhausted claim tainting the others. That would
certainly not comport with the purpose of the PLRA to
reduce the quantity of inmate suits. Additionally, district
judges who delve into a prisoner complaint only to realize it
contains an unexhausted claim, requiring dismissal of the en
tire complaint under the total exhaustion rule, will often
have to begin the process all over again when the prisoner
refiles. In light of typically short prison grievance time lim
its, prisoners’ refiled complaints will often be identical to

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what the district court would have considered had it simply
dismissed unexhausted claims as it encountered them and
proceeded with the exhausted ones. Perhaps filing fees and
concerns about the applicability of the “three strikes” rule,
28 U. S. C. § 1915(g), would mitigate these effects, but the
debate about consequences is close enough that there is no
clear reason to depart from the more typical claim-by-claim
approach.
* * *
We are not insensitive to the challenges faced by the lower
federal courts in managing their dockets and attempting to
separate, when it comes to prisoner suits, not so much wheat
from chaff as needles from haystacks. We once again reiter
ate, however—as we did unanimously in Leatherman, Swier
kiewicz, and Hill—that adopting different and more onerous
pleading rules to deal with particular categories of cases
should be done through established rulemaking procedures,
and not on a case-by-case basis by the courts.
The judgments of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit are reversed, and the cases are remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.