EC TERM OF YEARS TRUST v. UNITED STATES

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Syllabus
EC TERM OF YEARS TRUST v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fifth circuit
No. 05–1541. Argued February 26, 2007—Decided April 30, 2007
Under 26 U. S. C. § 7426(a)(1), if the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) levies
upon a third party’s property to collect taxes owed by another, the third
party may bring a wrongful levy action against the United States, so
long as such action is brought before “the expiration of 9 months from
the date of the levy,” § 6532(c)(1). In contrast, the limitations period
for a tax-refund action under 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(1) begins with an ad
ministrative claim that may be filed within at least two years, and may
be brought to court within another two years after an administrative
denial. The IRS levied on a bank account in which petitioner (Trust)
had deposited funds because the IRS assumed that the Trust’s creators
had transferred assets to the Trust to evade taxes. The bank re
sponded with a check to the Treasury. Almost a year later, the Trust
and others brought a § 7426(a)(1) action claiming wrongful levies, but
the District Court dismissed the complaint because it was filed after the
9-month limitations period had expired. After unsuccessfully pursuing
a tax refund at the administrative level, the Trust filed a refund action
under § 1346(a)(1). The District Court held that a wrongful levy claim
under § 7426(a)(1) was the sole remedy possible and dismissed, and the
Fifth Circuit affirmed.
Held: The Trust missed § 7426(a)(1)’s deadline for challenging a levy, and
may not bring the challenge as a tax-refund claim under § 1346(a)(1).
Section 7426(a)(1) provides the exclusive remedy for third-party wrong
ful levy claims. “[A] precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more
general remedies,” Brown v. GSA, 425 U. S. 820, 834, and it braces the
preemption claim when resort to a general remedy would effectively
extend the limitations period for the specific one, see id., at 833. If
third parties could avail themselves of § 1346(a)(1)’s general tax-refund
jurisdiction, they could effortlessly evade § 7426(a)(1)’s much shorter
limitations period. The Trust argues that, because United States v.
Williams, 514 U. S. 527, construed § 1346(a)(1)’s general jurisdictional
grant expansively enough to cover third parties’ wrongful levy claims,
treating § 7426(a)(1) as the exclusive avenue for these claims would
amount to a disfavored holding that § 7426(a)(1) implicitly repealed
§ 1346(a)(1)’s pre-existing jurisdictional grant. But this reads Williams
too broadly. Williams involved a lien and was decided on the specific

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Opinion of the Court
understanding that no other remedy was open to the plaintiff. Here,
the Trust challenges a levy and could have made a timely claim under
§ 7426(a)(1). Even if the presumption against implied repeals applied
here, § 7426(a)(1)’s 9-month limitations period cannot be reconciled with
the notion that the same challenge would be open under § 1346(a)(1) for
up to four years. Nor can the two statutory schemes be harmonized
by construing § 7426(a)(1)’s filing deadline to cover only those actions
seeking predeprivation remedies unavailable under § 1346(a)(1). On its
face, § 7426(a)(1) applies to predeprivation and postdeprivation claims
alike. Pp. 433–436.
434 F. 3d 807, affirmed.
Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Francis S. Ainsa, Jr., argued the cause and filed briefs
for petitioner.
Deanne E. Maynard argued the cause for the United
States. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Clem
ent, Assistant Attorney General O’Connor, Deputy Solicitor
General Hungar, Bruce R. Ellisen, and Teresa T. Milton.
Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a challenge to the Internal Revenue Service’s levy
upon the property of a trust, to collect taxes owed by
another, an action specifically authorized by 26 U. S. C.
§ 7426(a)(1), but subject to a statutory filing deadline the
trust missed. The question is whether the trust may still
challenge the levy through an action for tax refund under 28
U. S. C. § 1346(a)(1). We hold that it may not.
I
The Internal Revenue Code provides that “[i]f any person
liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same
after demand, the amount . . . shall be a lien in favor of
the United States upon all property and rights to property,
whether real or personal, belonging to such person.” 26
U. S. C. § 6321. “A federal tax lien, however, is not self
executing,” and the IRS must take “[a]ffirmative action . . .

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to enforce collection of the unpaid taxes.” United States v.
National Bank of Commerce, 472 U. S. 713, 720 (1985). One
of its “principal tools,” ibid., is a levy, which is a “legally
sanctioned seizure and sale of property,” Black’s Law Dic
tionary 926 (8th ed. 2004); see also § 6331(b) (“The term ‘levy’
as used in this title includes the power of distraint and sei
zure by any means”).
To protect against a “ ‘[w]rongful’ ” imposition upon “prop
erty which is not the taxpayer’s,” S. Rep. No. 1708, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess., 30 (1966), the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966
added § 7426(a)(1), providing that “[i]f a levy has been made
on property . . . any person (other than the person against
whom is assessed the tax out of which such levy arose) who
claims an interest in . . . such property and that such prop
erty was wrongfully levied upon may bring a civil action
against the United States in a district court.” 80 Stat. 1143.
The action must, however, be brought before “the expiration
of 9 months from the date of the levy.” 1 § 6532(c)(1). This
short limitations period contrasts with its counterpart in a
tax-refund action under 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(1), which begins
with an administrative claim that may be filed within at least
two years, and may be brought to court within another two
after an administrative denial.2 The demand for greater
1 This period can be extended for up to 12 months if the third party
makes an administrative request for the return of the property wrongfully
levied upon. See 26 U. S. C. § 6532(c)(2).
2 Title 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(1) gives district courts “jurisdiction, concur
rent with the United States Court of Federal Claims,” over “[a]ny civil
action against the United States for the recovery of,” among other things,
“any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected.” A taxpayer may bring such an action within two
years after the IRS disallows the taxpayer’s administrative refund claim.
See 26 U. S. C. §§ 6532(a)(1)–(2); see also § 7422(a) (requiring a taxpayer
to file the administrative claim before seeking a refund in court). An
administrative refund claim must, in turn, be filed within two years from
the date the tax was paid or three years from the time the tax return was
filed, whichever is later. See § 6511(a).

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haste when a third party contests a levy is no accident; as
the Government explained in the hearings before passage of
the Act, “[s]ince after seizure of property for nonpayment of
taxes [an IRS] district director is likely to suspend further
collection activities against the taxpayer, it is essential that
he be advised promptly if he has seized property which does
not belong to the taxpayer.” Hearings on H. R. 11256 and
H. R. 11290 before the House Committee on Ways and
Means, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 57–58 (1966) (written statement
of Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury);
see also id., at 72 (statement of Laurens Williams, Chairman,
Special Committee on Federal Liens, American Bar Associa
tion) (“A short (9 month) statute of limitations is provided,
because it is important to get such controversies decided
quickly so the Government may pursue the taxpayer’s own
property if it made a mistake the first time”).
II
After Elmer W. Cullers, Jr., and Dorothy Cullers estab
lished the EC Term of Years Trust in 1991, the IRS assessed
federal tax liabilities against them for what the Government
claimed (and the Trust does not dispute, see Tr. of Oral Arg.
7) were unwarranted income tax deductions in the 1980s.
The Government assumed that the Cullerses had transferred
assets to the Trust to evade taxes, and so filed a tax lien
against the Trust in August 1999. The Trust denied any
obligation, but for the sake of preventing disruptive collec
tion efforts by the IRS, it deposited funds in a bank account,
against which the IRS issued a notice of levy to the bank in
September 1999. In October, the bank responded with a
check for over $3 million to the United States Treasury.
Almost a year after that, the Trust ( joined by several
other trusts created by the Cullerses) brought a civil action
under 26 U. S. C. § 7426(a)(1) claiming wrongful levies, but
the District Court dismissed it because the complaint was
filed after the 9-month limitations period had expired, see

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§ 6532(c)(1). The court also noted that tax-refund claims
under 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(1) were not open to the plaintiff
trusts because § 7426 “ ‘affords the exclusive remedy for an
innocent third party whose property is confiscated by the
IRS to satisfy another person’s tax liability.’ ” BSC Term
of Years Trust v. United States, 2001–1 USTC ¶ 50,174,
p. 87,237, n. 1, 87 AFTR 2d ¶ 2001–390, p. 2001–547, n. 1 (WD
Tex. 2000) (quoting Texas Comm. Bank Fort Worth, N. A. v.
United States, 896 F. 2d 152, 156 (CA5 1990); emphasis de
leted). At first the Trust sought review by the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, but then voluntarily dismissed
its appeal. BSC Term of Years Trust v. United States, 87
AFTR 2d ¶ 2001–1039, p. 2001–2532 (2001).
After unsuccessfully pursuing a tax refund at the adminis
trative level, the Trust filed a second action, this one for a
refund under § 1346(a)(1). The District Court remained of
the view that a claim for a wrongful levy under § 7426(a)(1)
had been the sole remedy possible and dismissed.3 The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
Because the Ninth Circuit, on the contrary, has held that
§ 7426(a)(1) is not the exclusive remedy for third parties chal
lenging a levy, see WWSM Investors v. United States, 64
F. 3d 456 (1995), we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict,
549 U. S. 990 (2006). We affirm.
III
“In a variety of contexts the Court has held that a pre
cisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general reme
dies.” Brown v. GSA, 425 U. S. 820, 834 (1976); see Block v.
North Dakota ex rel. Board of Univ. and School Lands, 461
U. S. 273, 284–286 (1983) (adverse claimants to real property
of the United States may not rely on “officer’s suits” or on
other general remedies because the Quiet Title Act of 1972
3 The District Court declined to dismiss the Trust’s claim on res judicata
grounds, and the Government does not argue claim or issue preclusion in
this Court, see Brief for United States 5, n. 2.

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is their exclusive recourse); see also Stonite Products Co.
v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U. S. 561 (1942) (venue in patent
infringement cases is governed by a statute dealing specifi
cally with patents, not a general venue provision). It braces
the preemption claim when resort to a general remedy would
effectively extend the limitations period for the specific one.
See Brown v. GSA, supra, at 833 (rejecting an interpretation
that would “driv[e] out of currency” a narrowly aimed provi
sion “with its rigorous . . . time limitations” by permitting
“access to the courts under other, less demanding statutes”);
see also Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U. S. 113, 122–
123 (2005) (concluding that 47 U. S. C. § 332(c) precludes re
sort to the general cause of action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983,
in part because § 332 “limits relief in ways that § 1983 does
not” by requiring judicial review to be sought within 30
days); 544 U. S., at 130, n. (Stevens, J., concurring in judg
ment) (same).
Resisting the force of the better fitted statute requires a
good countervailing reason, and none appears here. Con
gress specifically tailored § 7426(a)(1) to third-party claims of
wrongful levy, and if third parties could avail themselves of
the general tax-refund jurisdiction of § 1346(a)(1), they could
effortlessly evade the levy statute’s 9-month limitations pe
riod thought essential to the Government’s tax collection.
The Trust argues that in United States v. Williams, 514
U. S. 527 (1995), we construed the general jurisdictional
grant of § 1346(a)(1) expansively enough to cover third
parties’ wrongful levy claims. So, according to the Trust,
treating § 7426(a)(1) as the exclusive avenue for these
claims would amount to a disfavored holding that § 7426(a)(1)
implicitly repealed the pre-existing jurisdictional grant of
§ 1346(a)(1). See Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426
U. S. 148 (1976); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535 (1974).
But the Trust reads Williams too broadly. Although we
decided that § 1346(a)(1) authorizes a tax-refund claim by a
third party whose property was subjected to an allegedly

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wrongful tax lien, we so held on the specific understanding
that no other remedy, not even a timely claim under
§ 7426(a)(1), was open to the plaintiff in that case. See Wil
liams, supra, at 536–538. Here, on the contrary, the Trust
challenges a levy, not a lien, and could have made a timely
claim under § 7426(a)(1) for the relief it now seeks under
§ 1346(a)(1).4
And even if the canon against implied repeals applied here,
the Trust still could not prevail. We simply cannot reconcile
the 9-month limitations period for a wrongful levy claim
under § 7426(a)(1) with the notion that the same challenge
would be open under § 1346(a)(1) for up to four years. See
Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 503 (1936)
(“[W]here provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable
conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes
an implied repeal of the earlier one”). On this point, the
Trust proposes that the two statutory schemes can be “har
4 It has been commonly understood that Williams did not extend
§ 1346(a)(1) to parties in the Trust’s position. See 434 F. 3d 807, 810 (CA5
2006) (case below) (“To construe Williams to allow an alternative remedy
under § 1346, with its longer statute of limitations period, would under
mine the surety provided by the clear avenue to recovery under § 7426”
(citation omitted)); Dahn v. United States, 127 F. 3d 1249, 1253 (CA10 1997)
(“[T]here were no tax levies involved in [Williams]. Thus, the Court
was concerned solely with the reach of § 1346 per se; the exclusivity of a
concurrent § 7426 claim was never in issue. Indeed, the Court specifically
emphasized the inapplicability of § 7426 (or any other meaningful remedy)
to reinforce its broad reading of § 1346”); WWSM Investors v. United
States, 64 F. 3d 456, 459 (CA9 1995) (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (“The Su
preme Court recognized Williams as a refund, not a wrongful levy, case,
and [did not] even hint that § 7426 was not the exclusive remedy for a
claimed wrongful levy”); Rev. Rul. 2005–49, 2005–2 Cum. Bull. 126 (“The
rationale in Williams is inapplicable to wrongful levy suits because Con
gress created an exclusive remedy under section 7426 for third persons
claiming an interest in property levied upon by the [IRS]”); but see
WWSM Investors, supra, at 459 (majority opinion) (“[S]eizing money from
WWSM’s bank account is functionally equivalent to what the IRS did in
Williams—placing a lien on property in escrow under circumstances
which compelled Mrs. Williams to pay the IRS and discharge the lien”).

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monized” by construing the deadline for filing § 7426(a)(1)
claims to cover only those actions seeking “pre-deprivation”
remedies unavailable under § 1346(a)(1). See Reply Brief
for Petitioner 6. But this reading would violate the clear
text of § 7426(a)(1), which on its face applies to pre
deprivation and postdeprivation claims alike. See 26
U. S. C. § 7426(a)(1) (“Such action may be brought without
regard to whether such property has been surrendered to or
sold by the Secretary”).
* * *
The Trust missed the deadline for challenging a levy under
§ 7426(a)(1), and may not bring the challenge as a tax-refund
claim under § 1346(a)(1). The judgment of the Court of Ap
peals is accordingly affirmed.
It is so ordered.