MICROSOFT CORP. v. AT&T CORP.

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437 OCTOBER TERM, 2006
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MICROSOFT CORP. v. AT&T CORP.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the federal circuit
No. 05–1056. Argued February 21, 2007—Decided April 30, 2007
It is the general rule under United States patent law that no infringement
occurs when a patented product is made and sold in another country.
There is an exception. Section 271(f) of the Patent Act, adopted in
1984, provides that infringement does occur when one “suppl[ies] . . .
from the United States,” for “combination” abroad, a patented inven
tion’s “components.” 35 U. S. C. § 271(f)(1). This case concerns the ap
plicability of § 271(f) to computer software first sent from the United
States to a foreign manufacturer on a master disk, or by electronic
transmission, then copied by the foreign recipient for installation on
computers made and sold abroad.
AT&T holds a patent on a computer used to digitally encode and com
press recorded speech. Microsoft’s Windows operating system has the
potential to infringe that patent because Windows incorporates soft
ware code that, when installed, enables a computer to process speech in
the manner claimed by the patent. Microsoft sells Windows to foreign
manufacturers who install the software onto the computers they sell.
Microsoft sends each manufacturer a master version of Windows, either
on a disk or via encrypted electronic transmission, which the manufac
turer uses to generate copies. Those copies, not the master version
sent by Microsoft, are installed on the foreign manufacturer’s comput
ers. The foreign-made computers are then sold to users abroad.
AT&T filed an infringement suit charging Microsoft with liability for
the foreign installations of Windows. By sending Windows to foreign
manufacturers, AT&T contended, Microsoft “supplie[d] . . . from the
United States,” for “combination” abroad, “components” of AT&T’s pat
ented speech-processing computer, and, accordingly, was liable under
§ 271(f). Microsoft responded that unincorporated software, because it
is intangible information, cannot be typed a “component” of an invention
under § 271(f). Microsoft also urged that the foreign-generated copies
of Windows actually installed abroad were not “supplie[d] . . . from
the United States.” Rejecting these responses, the District Court held
Microsoft liable under § 271(f), and a divided Federal Circuit panel
affirmed.
Held: Because Microsoft does not export from the United States the cop
ies of Windows installed on the foreign-made computers in question,

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Microsoft does not “suppl[y] . . . from the United States” “components”
of those computers, and therefore is not liable under § 271(f) as currently
written. Pp. 447–459.
(a) A copy of Windows, not Windows in the abstract, qualifies as a
“component” under § 271(f). Section 271(f) attaches liability to the sup
ply abroad of the “components of a patented invention, where such
components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner
as to actively induce the combination of such components.” § 271(f)(1)
(emphasis added). The provision thus applies only to “such compo
nents” as are combined to form the “patented invention” at issue—here,
AT&T’s speech-processing computer. Until expressed as a computer
readable “copy,” e. g., on a CD–ROM, Windows—indeed any software
detached from an activating medium—remains uncombinable. It can
not be inserted into a CD–ROM drive or downloaded from the Internet;
it cannot be installed or executed on a computer. Abstract software
code is an idea without physical embodiment, and as such, it does not
match § 271(f)’s categorization: “components” amenable to “combina
tion.” Windows abstracted from a tangible copy no doubt is informa
tion—a detailed set of instructions—and thus might be compared to a
blueprint (or anything else containing design information). A blueprint
may contain precise instructions for the construction and combination
of the components of a patented device, but it is not itself a combinable
component.
The fact that it is easy to encode software’s instructions onto a
computer-readable medium does not counsel a different answer. The
copy-producing step is what renders software a usable, combinable part
of a computer; easy or not, the extra step is essential. Moreover, many
tools may be used easily and inexpensively to generate the parts of a
device. Those tools are not, however, “components” of the devices in
which the parts are incorporated, at least not under any ordinary under
standing of the term “component.” Congress might have included
within § 271(f)’s compass, for example, not only a patented invention’s
combinable “components,” but also “information, instructions, or tools
from which those components readily may be generated.” It did not.
Pp. 449–452.
(b) Microsoft did not “suppl[y] . . . from the United States” the
foreign-made copies of Windows installed on the computers here in
volved. Under a conventional reading of § 271(f)’s text, those copies
were “supplie[d]” from outside the United States. The Federal Circuit
majority concluded, however, that for software components, the act of
copying is subsumed in the act of supplying. A master sent abroad,
the majority observed, differs not at all from exact copies, generated
easily, inexpensively, and swiftly from the master. Hence, sending a

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single copy of software abroad with the intent that it be replicated
invokes § 271(f) liability for the foreign-made copies. Judge Rader,
dissenting, noted that “supplying” is ordinarily understood to mean
an activity separate and distinct from any subsequent “copying,” “repli
cating,” or “reproducing”—in effect, manufacturing. He further ob
served that the only true difference between software components and
physical components of other patented inventions is that copies of soft
ware are easier to make and transport. But nothing in § 271(f)’s text,
Judge Rader maintained, renders ease of copying a relevant, no less
decisive, factor in triggering liability for infringement. The Court
agrees. Under § 271(f)’s text, the very components supplied from the
United States, and not foreign-made copies thereof, trigger liability
when combined abroad to form the patented invention at issue. While
copying software abroad is indeed easy and inexpensive, the same can
be said of other items, such as keys copied from a master. Section
271(f) contains no instruction to gauge when duplication is easy and
cheap enough to deem a copy in fact made abroad nevertheless “sup
plie[d] . . . from the United States.” The absence of anything address
ing copying in the statutory text weighs against a judicial determination
that replication abroad of a master dispatched from the United States
“supplies” the foreign-made copies from this country. Pp. 452–454.
(c) Any doubt that Microsoft’s conduct falls outside § 271(f)’s compass
would be resolved by the presumption against extraterritoriality. For
eign conduct is generally the domain of foreign law, and in the patent
area, that law may embody different policy judgments about the relative
rights of inventors, competitors, and the public. Applied here, the pre
sumption tugs strongly against construing § 271(f) to encompass as a
“component” not only a physical copy of software, but also software’s
intangible code, and to render “supplie[d] . . . from the United States”
not only exported copies of software, but also duplicates made abroad.
Foreign law alone, not United States law, currently governs the manu
facture and sale of components of patented inventions in foreign coun
tries. If AT&T desires to prevent copying abroad, its remedy lies in
obtaining and enforcing foreign patents. Pp. 454–456.
(d) While reading § 271(f) to exclude from coverage foreign-made cop
ies of software may create a “loophole” in favor of software makers, the
Court is not persuaded that dynamic judicial interpretation of § 271(f) is
in order; the “loophole” is properly left for Congress to consider, and to
close if it finds such action warranted. Section 271(f) was a direct re
sponse to a gap in U. S. patent law revealed by Deepsouth Packing Co.
v. Laitram Corp., 406 U. S. 518, where the items exported were kits
containing all the physical, readily assemblable parts of a machine (not
an intangible set of instructions), and those parts themselves (not

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foreign-made copies of them) would be combined abroad by foreign buy
ers. Having attended to that gap, Congress did not address other argu
able gaps, such as the loophole AT&T describes. Given the expanded
extraterritorial thrust AT&T’s reading of § 271(f) entails, the patent
protective determination AT&T seeks must be left to Congress. Cf.
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417,
431. Congress is doubtless aware of the ease with which electronic
media such as software can be copied, and has not left the matter un
touched. See the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U. S. C. § 1201
et seq. If patent law is to be adjusted better to account for the realities
of software distribution, the alteration should be made after focused
legislative consideration, not by the Judiciary forecasting Congress’
likely disposition. Pp. 456–459.
414 F. 3d 1366, reversed.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to footnote
14. Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined that opinion in full.
Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring as to all but footnote 14, in which
Thomas and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 459. Stevens, J., filed a dis
senting opinion, post, p. 462. Roberts, C. J., took no part in the consider
ation or decision of the case.
Theodore B. Olson argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Miguel A. Estrada, Mark A. Perry,
Matthew D. McGill, Amir C. Tayrani, T. Andrew Culbert,
and Dale M. Heist.
Daryl Joseffer argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were
Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General
Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Hungar, John J. Sullivan,
Joan Bernott Maginnis, John M. Whealan, Thomas W.
Krause, and Heather F. Auyang.
Seth P. Waxman argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were William G. McElwain, Jonathan E.
Nuechterlein, and Mark C. Fleming.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Amazon.com, Inc.,
et al. by Jeffrey S. Love and John D. Vandenberg; for Autodesk, Inc., by
John Dragseth and Frank E. Scherkenbach; for the Business Software
Alliance by Viet D. Dinh; for Eli Lilly and Co. by Robert A. Armitage and
James J. Kelley; for Intel Corp. by Joel W. Nomkin, Jonathan M. James,

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Opinion of the Court
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court, ex
cept as to footnote 14.
It is the general rule under United States patent law that
no infringement occurs when a patented product is made and
sold in another country. There is an exception. Section
271(f) of the Patent Act, adopted in 1984, provides that in
fringement does occur when one “supplies . . . from the
United States,” for “combination” abroad, a patented inven
tion’s “components.” 35 U. S. C. § 271(f)(1). This case con
cerns the applicability of § 271(f) to computer software first
sent from the United States to a foreign manufacturer on a
master disk, or by electronic transmission, then copied by
the foreign recipient for installation on computers made and
sold abroad.
AT&T holds a patent on an apparatus for digitally encod
ing and compressing recorded speech. Microsoft’s Windows
operating system, it is conceded, has the potential to infringe
AT&T’s patent, because Windows incorporates software code
Dan L. Bagatell, Stefani E. Shanberg, Steven R. Rodgers, and Tina M.
Chappell; for Intellectual Property Professors by John F. Duffy, Mark
Lemley, and William H. Neukom; for Shell Oil Co. by Richard L. Stanley
and John D. Norris; for the Software Freedom Law Center by Eben Mog
len and Richard Fontana; for the Software & Information Industry Asso
ciation by Gregory S. Coleman, Amber H. Rovner, and Edward R. Reines;
and for Yahoo! Inc. by Christopher J. Wright, Timothy J. Simeone, Joseph
K. Siino, and Lisa G. McFall.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for BayhDole25,
Inc., by Stephen J. Marzen and Susan K. Finston; for the U. S. Philips
Corp. et al. by John M. DiMatteo, Eugene Chang, Jack E. Haken, and
Edward Blocker; and for the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation et al.
by Richard G. Taranto, Munir R. Meghjee, and Anne M. Lockner.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Intellectual Property
Law Association by Joseph R. Re and Irfan A. Lateef; for the Bar of the
District of Columbia, Patent, Trademark & Copyright Section by David
W. Long and Vandana Koelsch; for the Fe´ de´ ration Internationale des Con
seils en Proprie´ te´ Industrielle (FICPI) by John P. Sutton; for the Houston
Intellectual Property Law Association by Albert B. Kimball, Jr., and Mi
chael G. Locklar; and for Edward S. Lee by Mr. Lee, pro se.

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that, when installed, enables a computer to process speech
in the manner claimed by that patent. It bears emphasis,
however, that uninstalled Windows software does not in
fringe AT&T’s patent any more than a computer standing
alone does; instead, the patent is infringed only when a
computer is loaded with Windows and is thereby rendered
capable of performing as the patented speech processor.
The question before us: Does Microsoft’s liability extend to
computers made in another country when loaded with Win
dows software copied abroad from a master disk or elec
tronic transmission dispatched by Microsoft from the United
States? Our answer is “No.”
The master disk or electronic transmission Microsoft sends
from the United States is never installed on any of the
foreign-made computers in question. Instead, copies made
abroad are used for installation. Because Microsoft does
not export from the United States the copies actually in
stalled, it does not “suppl[y] . . . from the United States”
“components” of the relevant computers, and therefore is not
liable under § 271(f) as currently written.
Plausible arguments can be made for and against extend
ing § 271(f) to the conduct charged in this case as infringing
AT&T’s patent. Recognizing that § 271(f) is an exception to
the general rule that our patent law does not apply extrater
ritorially, we resist giving the language in which Congress
cast § 271(f) an expansive interpretation. Our decision
leaves to Congress’ informed judgment any adjustment of
§ 271(f) it deems necessary or proper.
I
Our decision some 35 years ago in Deepsouth Packing Co.
v. Laitram Corp., 406 U. S. 518 (1972), a case about a shrimp
deveining machine, led Congress to enact § 271(f). In that
case, Laitram, holder of a patent on the time-and-expense
saving machine, sued Deepsouth, manufacturer of an in
fringing deveiner. Deepsouth conceded that the Patent Act

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barred it from making and selling its deveining machine in
the United States, but sought to salvage a portion of its busi
ness: Nothing in United States patent law, Deepsouth urged,
stopped it from making in the United States the parts of its
deveiner, as opposed to the machine itself, and selling those
parts to foreign buyers for assembly and use abroad. Id.,
at 522–524.1 We agreed.
Interpreting our patent law as then written, we reiterated
in Deepsouth that it was “not an infringement to make or
use a patented product outside of the United States.” Id.,
at 527; see 35 U. S. C. § 271(a) (1970 ed.) (“[W]hoever without
authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within
the United States during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent.”). Deepsouth’s foreign buyers did not
infringe Laitram’s patent, we held, because they assembled
and used the deveining machines outside the United States.
Deepsouth, we therefore concluded, could not be charged
with inducing or contributing to an infringement. 406 U. S.,
at 526–527.2 Nor could Deepsouth be held liable as a direct
infringer, for it did not make, sell, or use the patented inven
tion—the fully assembled deveining machine—within the
United States. The parts of the machine were not them
selves patented, we noted, hence export of those parts, unas
sembled, did not rank as an infringement of Laitram’s patent.
Id., at 527–529.
Laitram had argued in Deepsouth that resistance to exten
sion of the patent privilege to cover exported parts “derived
1 Deepsouth shipped its deveining equipment “to foreign customers in
three separate boxes, each containing only parts of the 13⁄ 4-ton machines,
yet the whole [was] assemblable in less than one hour.” Deepsouth Pack
ing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U. S. 518, 524 (1972).
2 See 35 U. S. C. § 271(b) (1970 ed.) (“Whoever actively induces infringe
ment of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”); § 271(c) (rendering liable
as a contributory infringer anyone who sells or imports a “component” of a
patented invention, “knowing the same to be especially made or especially
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article
or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing use”).

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from too narrow and technical an interpretation of the [Pat
ent Act].” Id., at 529. Rejecting that argument, we re
ferred to prior decisions holding that “a combination patent
protects only against the operable assembly of the whole and
not the manufacture of its parts.” Id., at 528. Congress’
codification of patent law, we said, signaled no intention to
broaden the scope of the privilege. Id., at 530 (“When, as
here, the Constitution is permissive, the sign of how far Con
gress has chosen to go can come only from Congress.”).
And we again emphasized that
“[o]ur patent system makes no claim to extraterritorial
effect; these acts of Congress do not, and were not in
tended to, operate beyond the limits of the United
States; and we correspondingly reject the claims of oth
ers to such control over our markets.” Id., at 531 (quot
ing Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 195 (1857)).
Absent “a clear congressional indication of intent,” we
stated, courts had no warrant to stop the manufacture and
sale of the parts of patented inventions for assembly and use
abroad. 406 U. S., at 532.
Focusing its attention on Deepsouth, Congress enacted
§ 271(f). See Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, § 101,
98 Stat. 3383; Fisch & Allen, The Application of Domestic
Patent Law to Exported Software: 35 U. S. C. § 271(f), 25
U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 557, 565 (2004) (hereinafter Fisch &
Allen) (“Congress specifically intended § 271(f) as a response
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Deepsouth”).3 The
provision expands the definition of infringement to include
3 See also, e. g., Patent Law Amendments of 1984, S. Rep. No. 98–663,
pp. 2–3 (1984) (describing § 271(f) as “a response to the Supreme Court’s
1972 Deepsouth decision which interpreted the patent law not to make it
infringement where the final assembly and sale is abroad”); Section-by-
Section Analysis of H. R. 6286, 130 Cong. Rec. 28069 (1984) (“This proposal
responds to the United States Supreme Court decision in Deepsouth . . .
concerning the need for a legislative solution to close a loophole in [the]
patent law.”).

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supplying from the United States a patented invention’s
components:
“(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to
be supplied in or from the United States all or a substan
tial portion of the components of a patented invention,
where such components are uncombined in whole or in
part, in such manner as to actively induce the combina
tion of such components outside of the United States in
a manner that would infringe the patent if such combina
tion occurred within the United States, shall be liable as
an infringer.
“(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to
be supplied in or from the United States any component
of a patented invention that is especially made or espe
cially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substan
tial noninfringing use, where such component is uncom
bined in whole or in part, knowing that such component
is so made or adapted and intending that such compo
nent will be combined outside of the United States in a
manner that would infringe the patent if such combina
tion occurred within the United States, shall be liable as
an infringer.” 35 U. S. C. § 271(f).
II
Windows is designed, authored, and tested at Microsoft’s
Redmond, Washington, headquarters. Microsoft sells Win
dows to end users and computer manufacturers, both foreign
and domestic. Purchasing manufacturers install the soft
ware onto the computers they sell. Microsoft sends to each
of the foreign manufacturers a master version of Windows,
either on a disk or via encrypted electronic transmission.
The manufacturer uses the master version to generate cop
ies. Those copies, not the master sent by Microsoft, are in
stalled on the foreign manufacturer’s computers. Once as

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sembly is complete, the foreign-made computers are sold to
users abroad. App. to Pet. for Cert. 45a–46a.4
AT&T’s patent (’580 patent) is for an apparatus (as rele
vant here, a computer) capable of digitally encoding and com
pressing recorded speech. Windows, the parties agree, con
tains software that enables a computer to process speech in
the manner claimed by the ’580 patent. In 2001, AT&T filed
an infringement suit in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, charging Microsoft with
liability for domestic and foreign installations of Windows.
Neither Windows software (e. g., in a box on the shelf) nor
a computer standing alone (i. e., without Windows installed)
infringes AT&T’s patent. Infringement occurs only when
Windows is installed on a computer, thereby rendering it
capable of performing as the patented speech processor.
Microsoft stipulated that by installing Windows on its own
computers during the software development process, it di
rectly infringed the ’580 patent.5 Microsoft further ac
knowledged that by licensing copies of Windows to manufac
turers of computers sold in the United States, it induced
infringement of AT&T’s patent.6 Id., at 42a; Brief for Peti
tioner 3–4; Brief for Respondent 9, 19.
Microsoft denied, however, any liability based on the mas
ter disks and electronic transmissions it dispatched to for
eign manufacturers, thus joining issue with AT&T. By
sending Windows to foreign manufacturers, AT&T con
tended, Microsoft “supplie[d] . . . from the United States,”
4 Microsoft also distributes Windows to foreign manufacturers indi
rectly, by sending a master version to an authorized foreign “replicator”;
the replicator then makes copies and ships them to the manufacturers.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 45a–46a.
5 See 35 U. S. C. § 271(a) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, of
fers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or
imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of
the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”).
6 See § 271(b) (“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall
be liable as an infringer.”).

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for “combination” abroad, “components” of AT&T’s patented
speech processor; accordingly, AT&T urged, Microsoft was
liable under § 271(f). See supra, at 445 (reproducing text of
§ 271(f)). Microsoft responded that unincorporated soft
ware, because it is intangible information, cannot be typed a
“component” of an invention under § 271(f). In any event,
Microsoft urged, the foreign-generated copies of Windows
actually installed abroad were not “supplie[d] . . . from the
United States.” Rejecting these responses, the District
Court held Microsoft liable under § 271(f). 71 USPQ 2d 1118
(SDNY 2004). On appeal, a divided panel of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. 414 F. 3d 1366
(2005). We granted certiorari, 549 U. S. 991 (2006), and
now reverse.
III
A
This case poses two questions: First, when, or in what
form, does software qualify as a “component” under § 271(f)?
Second, were “components” of the foreign-made computers
involved in this case “supplie[d]” by Microsoft “from the
United States”? 7
As to the first question, no one in this litigation argues
that software can never rank as a “component” under
§ 271(f). The parties disagree, however, over the stage at
which software becomes a component. Software, the “set of
instructions, known as code, that directs a computer to per
form specified functions or operations,” Fantasy Sports
Properties, Inc. v. SportsLine.com, Inc., 287 F. 3d 1108, 1118
(CA Fed. 2002), can be conceptualized in (at least) two ways.
One can speak of software in the abstract: the instructions
7 The record leaves unclear which paragraph of § 271(f) AT&T’s claim
invokes. While there are differences between § 271(f)(1) and (f)(2), see,
e. g., infra, at 458, n. 18, the parties do not suggest that those differences
are outcome determinative. Cf. infra, at 454, n. 16 (explaining why both
paragraphs yield the same result). For clarity’s sake, we focus our analy
sis on the text of § 271(f)(1).

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themselves detached from any medium. (An analogy: The
notes of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony.) One can alterna
tively envision a tangible “copy” of software, the instructions
encoded on a medium such as a CD–ROM. (Sheet music for
Beethoven’s Ninth.) AT&T argues that software in the ab
stract, not simply a particular copy of software, qualifies as
a “component” under § 271(f). Microsoft and the United
States argue that only a copy of software, not software in
the abstract, can be a component.8
The significance of these diverse views becomes appar
ent when we turn to the second question: Were components
of the foreign-made computers involved in this case “sup
plie[d]” by Microsoft “from the United States”? If the
relevant components are the copies of Windows actually
installed on the foreign computers, AT&T could not per
suasively argue that those components, though generated
abroad, were “supplie[d] . . . from the United States” as
§ 271(f) requires for liability to attach.9 If, on the other
hand, Windows in the abstract qualifies as a component
within § 271(f)’s compass, it would not matter that the mas
ter copies of Windows software dispatched from the United
8 Microsoft and the United States stress that to count as a component,
the copy of software must be expressed as “object code.” “Software in
the form in which it is written and understood by humans is called ‘source
code.’ To be functional, however, software must be converted (or ‘com
piled’) into its machine-usable version,” a sequence of binary number in
structions typed “object code.” Brief for United States as Amicus Cu
riae 4, n. 1; 71 USPQ 2d 1118, 1119, n. 5 (SDNY 2004) (recounting
Microsoft’s description of the software development process). It is stipu
lated that object code was on the master disks and electronic transmissions
Microsoft dispatched from the United States.
9 On this view of “component,” the copies of Windows on the master
disks and electronic transmissions that Microsoft sent from the United
States could not themselves serve as a basis for liability, because those
copies were not installed on the foreign manufacturers’ computers. See
§ 271(f)(1) (encompassing only those components “combin[ed] . . . outside
of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such
combination occurred within the United States”).

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States were not themselves installed abroad as working
parts of the foreign computers.10
With this explanation of the relationship between the two
questions in view, we further consider the twin inquiries.
B
First, when, or in what form, does software become a
“component” under § 271(f)? We construe § 271(f)’s terms
“in accordance with [their] ordinary or natural meaning.”
FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U. S. 471, 476 (1994). Section 271(f) ap
plies to the supply abroad of the “components of a patented
invention, where such components are uncombined in whole
or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the combi
nation of such components.” § 271(f)(1) (emphasis added).
The provision thus applies only to “such components” 11 as
are combined to form the “patented invention” at issue. The
patented invention here is AT&T’s speech-processing
computer.
Until it is expressed as a computer-readable “copy,” e. g.,
on a CD–ROM, Windows software—indeed any software de
tached from an activating medium—remains uncombinable.
It cannot be inserted into a CD–ROM drive or downloaded
from the Internet; it cannot be installed or executed on a
computer. Abstract software code is an idea without phys
ical embodiment, and as such, it does not match § 271(f)’s
categorization: “components” amenable to “combination.”
Windows abstracted from a tangible copy no doubt is in
formation—a detailed set of instructions—and thus might
10 The Federal Circuit panel in this case, relying on that court’s prior
decision in Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F. 3d 1325
(2005), held that software qualifies as a component under § 271(f). We
are unable to determine, however, whether the Federal Circuit panels
regarded as a component software in the abstract, or a copy of software.
11 “Component” is commonly defined as “a constituent part,” “element,”
or “ingredient.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the
English Language 466 (1981).

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be compared to a blueprint (or anything containing design
information, e. g., a schematic, template, or prototype). A
blueprint may contain precise instructions for the con
struction and combination of the components of a patented
device, but it is not itself a combinable component of that
device. AT&T and its amici do not suggest otherwise.
Cf. Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F. 3d 1113, 1117–
1119 (CA Fed. 2004) (transmission abroad of instructions
for production of patented computer chips not covered by
§ 271(f)).
AT&T urges that software, at least when expressed as
machine-readable object code, is distinguishable from design
information presented in a blueprint. Software, unlike a
blueprint, is “modular”; it is a stand-alone product developed
and marketed “for use on many different types of computer
hardware and in conjunction with many other types of soft
ware.” Brief for Respondent 5; Tr. of Oral Arg. 46. Soft
ware’s modularity persists even after installation; it can be
updated or removed (deleted) without affecting the hardware
on which it is installed. Ibid. Software, unlike a blueprint,
is also “dynamic.” Ibid. After a device has been built ac
cording to a blueprint’s instructions, the blueprint’s work is
done (as AT&T puts it, the blueprint’s instructions have been
“exhausted,” ibid.). Software’s instructions, in contrast, are
contained in and continuously performed by a computer.
Brief for Respondent 27–28; Tr. of Oral Arg. 46. See also
Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F. 3d 1325,
1339 (CA Fed. 2005) (“[S]oftware code . . . drives the func
tional nucleus of the finished computer product.” (quoting
Imagexpo, L. L. C. v. Microsoft Corp., 299 F. Supp. 2d 550,
553 (ED Va. 2003))).
The distinctions advanced by AT&T do not persuade us to
characterize software, uncoupled from a medium, as a com
binable component. Blueprints too, or any design informa
tion for that matter, can be independently developed, bought,

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and sold. If the point of AT&T’s argument is that we do not
see blueprints lining stores’ shelves, the same observation
may be made about software in the abstract: What retailers
sell, and consumers buy, are copies of software. Likewise,
before software can be contained in and continuously per
formed by a computer, before it can be updated or deleted,
an actual, physical copy of the software must be delivered
by CD–ROM or some other means capable of interfacing
with the computer.12
Because it is so easy to encode software’s instructions onto
a medium that can be read by a computer, AT&T intimates,
that extra step should not play a decisive role under § 271(f).
But the extra step is what renders the software a usable,
combinable part of a computer; easy or not, the copy
producing step is essential. Moreover, many tools may be
used easily and inexpensively to generate the parts of a de
vice. A machine for making sprockets might be used by a
manufacturer to produce tens of thousands of sprockets an
hour. That does not make the machine a “component” of
the tens of thousands of devices in which the sprockets are
incorporated, at least not under any ordinary understanding
of the term “component.” Congress, of course, might have
included within § 271(f)’s compass, for example, not only com
binable “components” of a patented invention, but also “in
formation, instructions, or tools from which those compo
nents readily may be generated.” It did not. In sum, a
12 The dissent, embracing AT&T’s argument, contends that, “unlike a
blueprint that merely instructs a user how to do something, software
actually causes infringing conduct to occur.” Post, at 464 (opinion of Ste
vens, J.). We have emphasized, however, that Windows can “caus[e] in
fringing conduct to occur”—i. e., function as part of AT&T’s speech
processing computer—only when expressed as a computer-readable copy.
Abstracted from a usable copy, Windows code is intangible, uncombinable
information, more like notes of music in the head of a composer than
“a roller that causes a player piano to produce sound.” Ibid.

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copy of Windows, not Windows in the abstract, qualifies as
a “component” under § 271(f).13
C
The next question, has Microsoft “supplie[d] . . . from the
United States” components of the computers here involved?
Under a conventional reading of § 271(f)’s text, the answer
would be “No,” for the foreign-made copies of Windows actu
ally installed on the computers were “supplie[d]” from places
outside the United States. The Federal Circuit majority
concluded, however, that “for software ‘components,’ the act
of copying is subsumed in the act of ‘supplying.’ ” 414 F. 3d,
at 1370. A master sent abroad, the majority observed, dif
fers not at all from the exact copies, easily, inexpensively,
and swiftly generated from the master; hence “sending a sin
gle copy abroad with the intent that it be replicated invokes
§ 271(f) liability for th[e] foreign-made copies.” Ibid.; cf.
post, at 464 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A] master disk is
the functional equivalent of a warehouse of components . . .
that Microsoft fully expects to be incorporated into foreign
manufactured computers.”).
Judge Rader, dissenting, noted that “supplying” is ordi
narily understood to mean an activity separate and distinct
from any subsequent “copying, replicating, or reproducing—
in effect manufacturing.” 414 F. 3d, at 1372–1373 (internal
quotation marks omitted); see id., at 1373 (“[C]opying and
supplying are separate acts with different consequences—
particularly when the ‘supplying’ occurs in the United States
and the copying occurs in Du¨ sseldorf or Tokyo. As a matter
of logic, one cannot supply one hundred components of a pat
13 We need not address whether software in the abstract, or any other
intangible, can ever be a component under § 271(f). If an intangible
method or process, for instance, qualifies as a “patented invention” under
§ 271(f) (a question as to which we express no opinion), the combinable
components of that invention might be intangible as well. The invention
before us, however, AT&T’s speech-processing computer, is a tangible
thing.

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ented invention without first making one hundred copies of
the component . . . .”). He further observed: “The only true
difference between making and supplying software compo
nents and physical components [of other patented inventions]
is that copies of software components are easier to make and
transport.” Id., at 1374. But nothing in § 271(f)’s text,
Judge Rader maintained, renders ease of copying a relevant,
no less decisive, factor in triggering liability for infringe
ment. See ibid. We agree.
Section 271(f) prohibits the supply of components “from
the United States . . . in such manner as to actively induce
the combination of such components.” § 271(f)(1) (emphasis
added). Under this formulation, the very components sup
plied from the United States, and not copies thereof, trigger
§ 271(f) liability when combined abroad to form the patented
invention at issue. Here, as we have repeatedly noted, see
supra, at 441, 442, 445–446, the copies of Windows actually
installed on the foreign computers were not themselves sup
plied from the United States.14 Indeed, those copies did not
exist until they were generated by third parties outside the
United States.15 Copying software abroad, all might agree,
14 In a footnote, Microsoft suggests that even a disk shipped from the
United States, and used to install Windows directly on a foreign computer,
would not give rise to liability under § 271(f) if the disk were removed
after installation. See Brief for Petitioner 37, n. 11; cf. post, at 460, 461–
462 (Alito, J., concurring in part). We need not and do not reach that
issue here.
15 The dissent analogizes Microsoft’s supply of master versions of Win
dows abroad to “the export of an inventory of . . . knives to be warehoused
until used to complete the assembly of an infringing machine.” Post,
at 463. But as we have underscored, foreign-made copies of Windows,
not the masters Microsoft dispatched from the United States, were in
stalled on the computers here involved. A more apt analogy, therefore,
would be the export of knives for copying abroad, with the foreign-made
copies “warehoused until used to complete the assembly of an infringing
machine.” Ibid. Without stretching § 271(f) beyond the text Congress
composed, a copy made entirely abroad does not fit the description “sup
plie[d] . . . from the United States.”

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is indeed easy and inexpensive. But the same could be said
of other items: “Keys or machine parts might be copied from
a master; chemical or biological substances might be created
by reproduction; and paper products might be made by elec
tronic copying and printing.” Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 24. See also supra, at 451–452 (rejecting
argument similarly based on ease of copying in construing
“component”). Section 271(f) contains no instruction to
gauge when duplication is easy and cheap enough to deem a
copy in fact made abroad nevertheless “supplie[d] . . . from
the United States.” The absence of anything addressing
copying in the statutory text weighs against a judicial deter
mination that replication abroad of a master dispatched from
the United States “supplies” the foreign-made copies from
the United States within the intendment of § 271(f).16
D
Any doubt that Microsoft’s conduct falls outside § 271(f)’s
compass would be resolved by the presumption against ex
traterritoriality, on which we have already touched. See
supra, at 442, 444. The presumption that United States law
governs domestically but does not rule the world applies
16 Our analysis, while focusing on § 271(f)(1), is equally applicable to
§ 271(f)(2). But cf. post, at 463 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting “para
graph (2) . . . best supports AT&T’s position here”). While the two para
graphs differ, among other things, on the quantity of components that
must be “supplie[d] . . . from the United States” for liability to attach, see
infra, at 458, n. 18, that distinction does not affect our analysis. Para
graph (2), like (1), covers only a “component” amenable to “combination.”
§ 271(f)(2); see supra, at 449–452 (explaining why Windows in the abstract
is not a combinable component). Paragraph (2), like (1), encompasses only
the “suppl[y] . . . from the United States” of “such [a] component” as will
itself “be combined outside of the United States.” § 271(f)(2); see supra,
at 452–453 and this page (observing that foreign-made copies of Windows
installed on computers abroad were not “supplie[d] . . . from the United
States”). It is thus unsurprising that AT&T does not join the dissent in
suggesting that the outcome might turn on whether we view the case
under paragraph (1) or (2).

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with particular force in patent law. The traditional under
standing that our patent law “operate[s] only domestically
and d[oes] not extend to foreign activities,” Fisch & Allen
559, is embedded in the Patent Act itself, which provides
that a patent confers exclusive rights in an invention within
the United States. 35 U. S. C. § 154(a)(1) (patentee’s rights
over invention apply to manufacture, use, or sale “through
out the United States” and to importation “into the United
States”). See Deepsouth, 406 U. S., at 531 (“Our patent sys
tem makes no claim to extraterritorial effect”; our legislation
“d[oes] not, and [was] not intended to, operate beyond the
limits of the United States, and we correspondingly reject
the claims of others to such control over our markets.”
(quoting Brown, 19 How., at 195)).
As a principle of general application, moreover, we have
stated that courts should “assume that legislators take ac
count of the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations
when they write American laws.” F. Hoffmann-La Roche
Ltd v. Empagran S. A., 542 U. S. 155, 164 (2004); see EEOC
v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 248 (1991).
Thus, the United States accurately conveyed in this case:
“Foreign conduct is [generally] the domain of foreign law,”
and in the area here involved, in particular, foreign law “may
embody different policy judgments about the relative rights
of inventors, competitors, and the public in patented inven
tions.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28. Ap
plied to this case, the presumption tugs strongly against con
struction of § 271(f) to encompass as a “component” not only
a physical copy of software, but also software’s intangible
code, and to render “supplie[d] . . . from the United States”
not only exported copies of software, but also duplicates
made abroad.
AT&T argues that the presumption is inapplicable because
Congress enacted § 271(f) specifically to extend the reach of
United States patent law to cover certain activity abroad.
But as this Court has explained, “the presumption is not de

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feated . . . just because [a statute] specifically addresses [an]
issue of extraterritorial application,” Smith v. United States,
507 U. S. 197, 204 (1993); it remains instructive in determin
ing the extent of the statutory exception, see Empagran,
542 U. S., at 161–162, 164–165; Smith, 507 U. S., at 204.
AT&T alternately contends that the presumption holds no
sway here given that § 271(f), by its terms, applies only to
domestic conduct, i. e., to the supply of a patented invention’s
components “from the United States.” § 271(f)(1). AT&T’s
reading, however, “converts a single act of supply from the
United States into a springboard for liability each time a
copy of the software is subsequently made [abroad] and com
bined with computer hardware [abroad] for sale [abroad.]”
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29; see 414 F. 3d,
at 1373, 1375 (Rader, J., dissenting). In short, foreign law
alone, not United States law, currently governs the manufac
ture and sale of components of patented inventions in foreign
countries. If AT&T desires to prevent copying in foreign
countries, its remedy today lies in obtaining and enforcing
foreign patents. See Deepsouth, 406 U. S., at 531.17
IV
AT&T urges that reading § 271(f) to cover only those cop
ies of software actually dispatched from the United States
creates a “loophole” for software makers. Liability for in
fringing a United States patent could be avoided, as Micro
soft’s practice shows, by an easily arranged circumven
tion: Instead of making installation copies of software in
the United States, the copies can be made abroad, swiftly
and at small cost, by generating them from a master supplied
17 AT&T has secured patents for its speech processor in Canada, France,
Germany, Great Britain, Japan, and Sweden. App. in No. 04–1285 (CA
Fed.), p. 1477. AT&T and its amici do not relate what protections and
remedies are, or are not, available under these foreign regimes. Cf. Brief
for Respondent 46 (observing that “foreign patent protections are some
times weaker than their U. S. counterparts” (emphasis added)).

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from the United States. The Federal Circuit majority found
AT&T’s plea compelling:
“Were we to hold that Microsoft’s supply by exportation
of the master versions of the Windows® software—spe
cifically for the purpose of foreign replication—avoids
infringement, we would be subverting the remedial na
ture of § 271(f), permitting a technical avoidance of the
statute by ignoring the advances in a field of technol
ogy—and its associated industry practices—that devel
oped after the enactment of § 271(f). . . . Section 271(f),
if it is to remain effective, must therefore be interpreted
in a manner that is appropriate to the nature of the tech
nology at issue.” 414 F. 3d, at 1371.
While the majority’s concern is understandable, we are not
persuaded that dynamic judicial interpretation of § 271(f) is
in order. The “loophole,” in our judgment, is properly left
for Congress to consider, and to close if it finds such action
warranted.
There is no dispute, we note again, that § 271(f) is inappli
cable to the export of design tools—blueprints, schematics,
templates, and prototypes—all of which may provide the in
formation required to construct and combine overseas the
components of inventions patented under United States law.
See supra, at 449–452. We have no license to attribute to
Congress an unstated intention to place the information
Microsoft dispatched from the United States in a separate
category.
Section 271(f) was a direct response to a gap in our pat
ent law revealed by this Court’s Deepsouth decision. See
supra, at 444, and n. 3. The facts of that case were undeni
ably at the fore when § 271(f) was in the congressional hop
per. In Deepsouth, the items exported were kits containing
all the physical, readily assemblable parts of a shrimp de
veining machine (not an intangible set of instructions), and
those parts themselves (not foreign-made copies of them)

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would be combined abroad by foreign buyers. Having at
tended to the gap made evident in Deepsouth, Congress did
not address other arguable gaps: Section 271(f) does not
identify as an infringing act conduct in the United States
that facilitates making a component of a patented invention
outside the United States; nor does the provision check “sup
pl[ying] . . . from the United States” information, instruc
tions, or other materials needed to make copies abroad.18
Given that Congress did not home in on the loophole AT&T
describes, and in view of the expanded extraterritorial
thrust AT&T’s reading of § 271(f) entails, our precedent leads
us to leave in Congress’ court the patent-protective determi
nation AT&T seeks. Cf. Sony Corp. of America v. Univer
sal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417, 431 (1984) (“In a case
like this, in which Congress has not plainly marked our
course, we must be circumspect in construing the scope of
rights created by a legislative enactment which never con
templated such a calculus of interests.”).
Congress is doubtless aware of the ease with which soft
ware (and other electronic media) can be copied, and has not
left the matter untouched. In 1998, Congress addressed
“the ease with which pirates could copy and distribute a
copyrightable work in digital form.” Universal City Stu
dios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F. 3d 429, 435 (CA2 2001). The re
sulting measure, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17
U. S. C. § 1201 et seq., “backed with legal sanctions the efforts
of copyright owners to protect their works from piracy
behind digital walls such as encryption codes or password
protections.” Universal City Studios, 273 F. 3d, at 435. If
18 Section 271(f)’s text does, in one respect, reach past the facts of Deep
south. While Deepsouth exported kits containing all the parts of its de
veining machines, § 271(f)(1) applies to the supply abroad of “all or a sub
stantial portion of ” a patented invention’s components. And § 271(f)(2)
applies to the export of even a single component if it is “especially made
or especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.”

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Alito, J., concurring in part
the patent law is to be adjusted better “to account for the
realities of software distribution,” 414 F. 3d, at 1370, the al
teration should be made after focused legislative consider
ation, and not by the Judiciary forecasting Congress’ likely
disposition.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Ap
peals for the Federal Circuit is
Reversed.
The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
Justice Alito, with whom Justice Thomas and Justice
Breyer join, concurring as to all but footnote 14.
I agree with the Court that no “component[s]” of the
foreign-made computers involved in this case were “sup
plie[d]” by Microsoft “from the United States.” 35 U. S. C.
§ 271(f)(1). I write separately because I reach this conclu
sion through somewhat different reasoning.
I
Computer programmers typically write programs in a
“human readable” programming language. This “ ‘source
code’ ” is then generally converted by the computer into a
“machine readable code” or “machine language” expressed
in a binary format. Brief for Respondent 5, n. 1 (citing R.
White, How Computers Work 87, 94 (8th ed. 2006)); E. Wal
ters, Essential Guide to Computing 204–205 (2001). During
the Windows writing process, the program exists in the form
of machine readable code on the magnetic tape fields of Mi
crosoft’s computers’ hard drives. White, supra, at 144–145;
Walters, supra, at 54–55.
When Microsoft finishes writing its Windows program in
the United States, it encodes Windows onto CD–ROMs
known as “ ‘golden master[s]’ ” in the form of machine read

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able code. App. 31, ¶ 4. This is done by engraving each
disk in a specific way such that another computer can read
the engravings, understand what they mean, and write the
code onto the magnetic fields of its hard drive. Ibid.; Brief
for Petitioner 4, n. 2.
Microsoft ships these disks (or sends the code via elec
tronic transmission) abroad, where the code is copied onto
other disks that are then placed into foreign-made computers
for purposes of installing the Windows program. App. 31–
32, ¶¶ 5–8. No physical aspect of a Windows CD–ROM—
original disk or copy—is ever incorporated into the computer
itself. See Stenograph L. L. C. v. Bossard Assocs., Inc., 144
F. 3d 96, 100 (CADC 1998) (noting that, within the context of
the Copyright Act, “installation of software onto a computer
results in ‘copying’ ”); White, supra, at 144–145, 172–173.
The intact CD–ROM is then removed and may be discarded
without affecting the computer’s implementation of the
code.* The parties agree for purposes of this litigation that
a foreign-made computer containing the Windows code
would violate AT&T’s patent if present in the United States.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a, ¶ 5.
II
A
I agree with the Court that a component of a machine,
whether a shrimp deveiner or a personal computer, must be
something physical. Ante, at 449–452. This is because the
word “component,” when concerning a physical device, is
most naturally read to mean a physical part of the device.
See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 466
(1976) (component is “constituent part: ingredient”); Ran
dom House Dictionary of the English Language 301 (1967)
*In a sense, the whole process is akin to an author living prior to the
existence of the printing press, who created a story in his mind, wrote a
manuscript, and sent it to a scrivener, who in turn copied the story by
hand into a blank book.

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(component is “a component part; constituent”). Further
more, § 271(f) requires that the component be “combined”
with other components to form the infringing device, mean
ing that the component must remain a part of the device.
Webster’s, supra, at 452 (combine means “to join in physical
or chemical union”; “to become one”; “to unite into a chemical
compound”); Random House, supra, at 293 (combine means
“to bring or join into a close union or whole”). For these
reasons, I agree with the Court that a set of instructions on
how to build an infringing device, or even a template of the
device, does not qualify as a component. Ante, at 449–450.
B
As the parties agree, an inventor can patent a machine
that carries out a certain process, and a computer may con
stitute such a machine when it executes commands—given
to it by code—that allow it to carry out that process. Such
a computer would not become an infringing device until
enough of the code is installed on the computer to allow it to
execute the process in question. The computer would not
be an infringing device prior to the installation, or even dur
ing the installation. And the computer remains an infring
ing device after the installation process because, even though
the original installation device (such as a CD–ROM) has been
removed from the computer, the code remains on the hard
drive.
III
Here, Windows software originating in the United States
was sent abroad, whether on a master disk or by means of
an electronic transmission, and eventually copied onto the
hard drives of the foreign-made computers. Once the copy
ing process was completed, the Windows program was re
corded in a physical form, i. e., in magnetic fields on the
computers’ hard drives. See Brief for Respondent 5. The
physical form of the Windows program on the master disk,
i. e., the engravings on the CD–ROM, remained on the disk

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in a form unchanged by the copying process. See Brief for
Petitioner 4, n. 2 (citing White, How Computers Work, at
144–145, 172–173). There is nothing in the record to suggest
that any physical part of the disk became a physical part of
the foreign-made computer, and such an occurrence would be
contrary to the general workings of computers.
Because no physical object originating in the United
States was combined with these computers, there was no
violation of § 271(f). Accordingly, it is irrelevant that the
Windows software was not copied onto the foreign-made
computers directly from the master disk or from an elec
tronic transmission that originated in the United States. To
be sure, if these computers could not run Windows without
inserting and keeping a CD–ROM in the appropriate drive,
then the CD–ROMs might be components of the computer.
But that is not the case here.
* * *
Because the physical incarnation of code on the Windows
CD–ROM supplied from the United States is not a “com
ponent” of an infringing device under § 271(f), it logically
follows that a copy of such a CD–ROM also is not a compo
nent. For this reason, I join the Court’s opinion, except
for footnote 14.
Justice Stevens, dissenting.
As the Court acknowledges, “[p]lausible arguments can be
made for and against extending § 271(f) to the conduct
charged in this case as infringing AT&T’s patent.” Ante,
at 442. Strong policy considerations, buttressed by the pre
sumption against the application of domestic patent law in
foreign markets, support Microsoft Corporation’s position.
I am, however, persuaded that an affirmance of the Court of
Appeals’ judgment is more faithful to the intent of the Con
gress that enacted § 271(f) than a reversal.

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Stevens, J., dissenting
The provision was a response to our decision in Deepsouth
Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U. S. 518 (1972), holding
that a patent on a shrimp deveining machine had not been
infringed by the export of components for assembly abroad.
Paragraph (1) of § 271(f) would have been sufficient on its
own to overrule Deepsouth,* but it is paragraph (2) that best
supports AT&T’s position here. It provides:
“Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be
supplied in or from the United States any component of
a patented invention that is especially made or espe
cially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substan
tial noninfringing use, where such component is uncom
bined in whole or in part, knowing that such component
is so made or adapted and intending that such compo
nent will be combined outside of the United States in a
manner that would infringe the patent if such combina
tion occurred within the United States, shall be liable as
an infringer.” § 271(f)(2).
Under this provision, the export of a specially designed knife
that has no use other than as a part of a patented deveining
machine would constitute infringement. It follows that
§ 271(f)(2) would cover the export of an inventory of such
knives to be warehoused until used to complete the assembly
of an infringing machine.
The relevant component in this case is not a physical item
like a knife. Both Microsoft and the Court think that means
it cannot be a “component.” See ante, at 449. But if a disk
*“Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or
from the United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a
patented invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or
in part, in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such com
ponents outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the
patent if such combination occurred within the United States, shall be
liable as an infringer.” 35 U. S. C. § 271(f)(1).

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464 MICROSOFT CORP. v. AT&T CORP.
Stevens, J., dissenting
with software inscribed on it is a “component,” I find it diffi
cult to understand why the most important ingredient of that
component is not also a component. Indeed, the master disk
is the functional equivalent of a warehouse of components—
components that Microsoft fully expects to be incorporated
into foreign-manufactured computers. Put somewhat dif
ferently: On the Court’s view, Microsoft could be liable under
§ 271(f) only if it sends individual copies of its software di
rectly from the United States with the intent that each copy
would be incorporated into a separate infringing computer.
But it seems to me that an indirect transmission via a master
disk warehouse is likewise covered by § 271(f).
I disagree with the Court’s suggestion that because soft
ware is analogous to an abstract set of instructions, it cannot
be regarded as a “component” within the meaning of § 271(f).
See ante, at 449–450. Whether attached or detached from
any medium, software plainly satisfies the dictionary defini
tion of that word. See ante, at 449, n. 11 (observing that
“ ‘[c]omponent’ is commonly defined as ‘a constituent part,’
‘element,’ or ‘ingredient’ ”). And unlike a blueprint that
merely instructs a user how to do something, software actu
ally causes infringing conduct to occur. It is more like a
roller that causes a player piano to produce sound than sheet
music that tells a pianist what to do. Moreover, it is surely
not “a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for
substantial noninfringing use” as that term is used in
§ 271(f)(2). On the contrary, its sole intended use is an in
fringing use.
I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.