LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, et al. v. RETTELE et al.

550US2 Unit: $U47 [11-28-08 14:32:29] PAGES PGT: OPINBX �
609 OCTOBER TERM, 2006
Per Curiam
LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, et al. v.
RETTELE et al.
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 06–605. Decided May 21, 2007
Respondents filed a 42 U. S. C. § 1983 suit, alleging that their Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
was violated when Los Angeles County Sheriff ’s Department deputies,
who were executing a valid warrant to search a house but were unaware
that the potentially armed suspects being sought had sold the house to
respondents and moved out, ordered the unclothed respondents out of
bed and required them to stand for a few minutes before allowing them
to dress. The District Court granted the defendants summary judg
ment. In reversing, the Ninth Circuit found that the deputies violated
the Fourth Amendment and were not entitled to qualified immunity be
cause a reasonable deputy would have stopped the search upon discover
ing that respondents were of a different race than the suspects and
would not have ordered respondents from their bed.
Held: The deputies did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Officers exe
cuting a search warrant may take reasonable action to secure the prem
ises and to ensure their own safety and the efficacy of the search. Upon
encountering respondents, the deputies acted reasonably to secure the
premises. The presence of one race did not eliminate the possibility
that suspects of a different race were in the residence as well. In or
dering respondents out of bed, the deputies acted reasonably to ensure
their own safety, since blankets and bedding can conceal a weapon and
since one of the suspects was known to own a firearm. There is no
allegation that the detention was prolonged or that respondents were
prevented from dressing any longer than necessary to protect the depu
ties’ safety.
Certiorari granted; 186 Fed. Appx. 765, reversed and remanded.
Per Curiam.
Deputies of the Los Angeles County Sheriff ’s Department
obtained a valid warrant to search a house, but they were
unaware that the suspects being sought had moved out three
months earlier. When the deputies searched the house,

550US2 Unit: $U47 [11-28-08 14:32:29] PAGES PGT: OPINBX �
610 LOS ANGELES COUNTY v. RETTELE
Per Curiam
they found in a bedroom two residents who were of a differ
ent race than the suspects. The deputies ordered these in
nocent residents, who had been sleeping unclothed, out of
bed. The deputies required them to stand for a few minutes
before allowing them to dress.
The residents brought suit under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42
U. S. C. § 1983, naming the deputies and other parties and
accusing them of violating the Fourth Amendment right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Dis
trict Court granted summary judgment to all named defend
ants. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed,
concluding both that the deputies violated the Fourth
Amendment and that they were not entitled to qualified im
munity because a reasonable deputy would have stopped the
search upon discovering that respondents were of a different
race than the suspects and because a reasonable deputy
would not have ordered respondents from their bed. We
grant the petition for certiorari and reverse the judgment of
the Court of Appeals by this summary disposition.
I
From September to December 2001, Los Angeles County
Sheriff ’s Department Deputy Dennis Watters investigated
a fraud and identity-theft crime ring. There were four
suspects of the investigation. One had registered a 9
millimeter Glock handgun. The four suspects were known
to be African-Americans.
On December 11, Watters obtained a search warrant for
two houses in Lancaster, California, where he believed he
could find the suspects. The warrant authorized him to
search the homes and three of the suspects for documents
and computer files. In support of the search warrant an af
fidavit cited various sources showing the suspects resided
at respondents’ home. The sources included Department of
Motor Vehicles reports, mailing address listings, an out
standing warrant, and an Internet telephone directory. In

550US2 Unit: $U47 [11-28-08 14:32:29] PAGES PGT: OPINBX �
611 Cite as: 550 U. S. 609 (2007)
Per Curiam
this Court respondents do not dispute the validity of the
warrant or the means by which it was obtained.
What Watters did not know was that one of the houses
(the first to be searched) had been sold in September to a
Max Rettele. He had purchased the home and moved into
it three months earlier with his girlfriend Judy Sadler and
Sadler’s 17-year-old son Chase Hall. All three, respondents
here, are Caucasians.
On the morning of December 19, Watters briefed six other
deputies in preparation for the search of the houses.
Watters informed them they would be searching for three
African-American suspects, one of whom owned a registered
handgun. The possibility a suspect would be armed caused
the deputies concern for their own safety. Watters had not
obtained special permission for a night search, so he could
not execute the warrant until 7 a.m. See Cal. Penal Code
Ann. § 1533 (West 2000). Around 7:15 Watters and six other
deputies knocked on the door and announced their presence.
Chase Hall answered. The deputies entered the house after
ordering Hall to lie face down on the ground.
The deputies’ announcement awoke Rettele and Sadler.
The deputies entered their bedroom with guns drawn and
ordered them to get out of their bed and to show their hands.
They protested that they were not wearing clothes. Rettele
stood up and attempted to put on a pair of sweatpants, but
deputies told him not to move. Sadler also stood up and
attempted, without success, to cover herself with a sheet.
Rettele and Sadler were held at gunpoint for one to two min
utes before Rettele was allowed to retrieve a robe for Sadler.
He was then permitted to dress. Rettele and Sadler left the
bedroom within three to four minutes to sit on the couch in
the living room.
By that time the deputies realized they had made a mis
take. They apologized to Rettele and Sadler, thanked them
for not becoming upset, and left within five minutes. They
proceeded to the other house the warrant authorized them

550US2 Unit: $U47 [11-28-08 14:32:29] PAGES PGT: OPINBX �
612 LOS ANGELES COUNTY v. RETTELE
Per Curiam
to search, where they found three suspects. Those suspects
were arrested and convicted.
Rettele and Sadler, individually and as guardians ad litem
for Hall, filed this § 1983 suit against Los Angeles County,
the Los Angeles County Sheriff ’s Department, Deputy Wat
ters, and other members of the sheriff ’s department. Re
spondents alleged petitioners violated their Fourth Amend
ment rights by obtaining a warrant in reckless fashion and
conducting an unreasonable search and detention. The Dis
trict Court held that the warrant was obtained by proper
procedures and the search was reasonable. It concluded in
the alternative that any Fourth Amendment rights the dep
uties violated were not clearly established and that, as a
result, the deputies were entitled to qualified immunity.
On appeal respondents did not challenge the validity of the
warrant; they did argue that the deputies had conducted the
search in an unreasonable manner. A divided panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in an unpub
lished opinion. 186 Fed. Appx. 765 (2006). The majority
held that
“because (1) no African-Americans lived in [respond
ents’] home; (2) [respondents], a Caucasian couple, pur
chased the residence several months before the search
and the deputies did not conduct an ownership inquiry;
(3) the African-American suspects were not accused of
a crime that required an emergency search; and (4) [re
spondents] were ordered out of bed naked and held at
gunpoint while the deputies searched their bedroom for
the suspects and a gun, we find that a reasonable jury
could conclude that the search and detention were ‘un
necessarily painful, degrading, or prolonged,’ and in
volved ‘an undue invasion of privacy,’ Franklin v. Fox
worth, 31 F. 3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1994).” Id., at 766.
Turning to whether respondents’ Fourth Amendment rights
were clearly established, the majority held that a reasonable

550US2 Unit: $U47 [11-28-08 14:32:29] PAGES PGT: OPINBX �
613 Cite as: 550 U. S. 609 (2007)
Per Curiam
deputy should have known the search and detention were
unlawful.
Judge Cowen dissented. In his view the deputies had au
thority to detain respondents for the duration of the search
and were justified in ordering respondents from their bed
because weapons could have been concealed under the bed
covers. He also concluded that, assuming a constitutional
violation, the law was not clearly established.
The Court of Appeals denied rehearing and rehearing en
banc.
II
Because respondents were of a different race than the sus
pects the deputies were seeking, the Court of Appeals held
that “[a]fter taking one look at [respondents], the deputies
should have realized that [respondents] were not the subjects
of the search warrant and did not pose a threat to the depu
ties’ safety.” Ibid. We need not pause long in rejecting
this unsound proposition. When the deputies ordered re
spondents from their bed, they had no way of knowing
whether the African-American suspects were elsewhere in
the house. The presence of some Caucasians in the resi
dence did not eliminate the possibility that the suspects lived
there as well. As the deputies stated in their affidavits, it
is not uncommon in our society for people of different races
to live together. Just as people of different races live and
work together, so too might they engage in joint criminal
activity. The deputies, who were searching a house where
they believed a suspect might be armed, possessed authority
to secure the premises before deciding whether to continue
with the search.
In Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981), this Court
held that officers executing a search warrant for contraband
may “detain the occupants of the premises while a proper
search is conducted.” Id., at 705. In weighing whether the
search in Summers was reasonable the Court first found that
“detention represents only an incremental intrusion on per

550US2 Unit: $U47 [11-28-08 14:32:29] PAGES PGT: OPINBX �
614 LOS ANGELES COUNTY v. RETTELE
Per Curiam
sonal liberty when the search of a home has been authorized
by a valid warrant.” Id., at 703. Against that interest, it
balanced “preventing flight in the event that incriminating
evidence is found”; “minimizing the risk of harm to the offi
cers”; and facilitating “the orderly completion of the search.”
Id., at 702–703; see Muehler v. Mena, 544 U. S. 93 (2005).
In executing a search warrant officers may take reasonable
action to secure the premises and to ensure their own safety
and the efficacy of the search. Id., at 98–100; see also id., at
103 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Summers, supra, at 704–705.
The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is
an objective one. Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 397
(1989) (addressing the reasonableness of a seizure of the per
son). Unreasonable actions include the use of excessive
force or restraints that cause unnecessary pain or are im
posed for a prolonged and unnecessary period of time.
Mena, supra, at 100; Graham, supra, at 396–399.
The orders by the police to the occupants, in the context
of this lawful search, were permissible, and perhaps neces
sary, to protect the safety of the deputies. Blankets and
bedding can conceal a weapon, and one of the suspects was
known to own a firearm, factors which underscore this point.
The Constitution does not require an officer to ignore the
possibility that an armed suspect may sleep with a wea
pon within reach. The reports are replete with accounts of
suspects sleeping close to weapons. See United States v.
Enslin, 327 F. 3d 788, 791 (CA9 2003) (“When [the suspect]
put his hands in the air and began to sit up, his movement
shifted the covers and the marshals could see a gun in the
bed next to him”); see also United States v. Jones, 336 F. 3d
245, 248 (CA3 2003) (suspect kept a 9-millimeter Luger under
his pillow while he slept); United States v. Hightower, 96
F. 3d 211 (CA7 1996) (suspect kept a loaded five-shot hand
gun under his pillow); State v. Willis, 36,759–KA, p. 3 (La.
App. 4/9/03), 843 So. 2d 592, 595 (officers “pulled back the bed
covers and found a .38 caliber Model 10 Smith and Wesson

550US2 Unit: $U47 [11-28-08 14:32:29] PAGES PGT: OPINBX �
615 Cite as: 550 U. S. 609 (2007)
Per Curiam
revolver located near where defendant’s left hand had been”);
State v. Kypreos, 115 Wash. App. 207, 61 P. 3d 352 (2002)
(suspect kept a handgun in the bed).
The deputies needed a moment to secure the room and
ensure that other persons were not close by or did not pre
sent a danger. Deputies were not required to turn their
backs to allow Rettele and Sadler to retrieve clothing or to
cover themselves with the sheets. Rather, “[t]he risk of
harm to both the police and the occupants is minimized if
the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the
situation.” Summers, 452 U. S., at 702–703.
This is not to say, of course, that the deputies were free to
force Rettele and Sadler to remain motionless and standing
for any longer than necessary. We have recognized that
“special circumstances, or possibly a prolonged detention,”
might render a search unreasonable. See id., at 705, n. 21.
There is no accusation that the detention here was pro
longed. The deputies left the home less than 15 minutes
after arriving. The detention was shorter and less restric
tive than the 2- to 3-hour handcuff detention upheld in Mena.
See 544 U. S., at 100. And there is no allegation that the
deputies prevented Sadler and Rettele from dressing longer
than necessary to protect their safety. Sadler was unclothed
for no more than two minutes, and Rettele for only slightly
more time than that. Sadler testified that once the police
were satisfied that no immediate threat was presented, “they
wanted us to get dressed and they were pressing us really
fast to hurry up and get some clothes on.” Deposition of
Judy Lorraine Sadler in No. CV–0206262–RSWL (RNBX)
(CD Cal., June 10, 2003), Doc. 26, Exh. 4, p. 55.
The Fourth Amendment allows warrants to issue on prob
able cause, a standard well short of absolute certainty.
Valid warrants will issue to search the innocent, and people
like Rettele and Sadler unfortunately bear the cost. Offi
cers executing search warrants on occasion enter a house
when residents are engaged in private activity; and the re

550US2 Unit: $U47 [11-28-08 14:32:29] PAGES PGT: OPINBX �
616 LOS ANGELES COUNTY v. RETTELE
Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
sulting frustration, embarrassment, and humiliation may be
real, as was true here. When officers execute a valid war
rant and act in a reasonable manner to protect themselves
from harm, however, the Fourth Amendment is not violated.
As respondents’ constitutional rights were not violated,
“there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning quali
fied immunity.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 201 (2001).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Souter would deny the petition for a writ of
certiorari.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
concurring in the judgment.
This case presents two separate questions: (1) whether the
four circumstances identified in the Court of Appeals’ unpub
lished opinion established a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether the seizure violated respondents’ Fourth Amend
ment rights, see ante, at 612; (2) whether the officers were
nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity because the right
was not clearly established. The fact that the judges on the
Court of Appeals disagreed on both questions convinces me
that they should not have announced their decision in an un
published opinion.
In answering the first question, the Ninth Circuit majority
relied primarily on Franklin v. Foxworth, 31 F. 3d 873 (CA9
1994). As Judge Cowen’s discussion of Franklin demon
strates, that case surely does not clearly establish the uncon
stitutionality of the officers’ conduct.* Consequently, re
*See 186 Fed. Appx. 765, 767 (2006) (dissenting opinion) (“In Franklin
v. Foxworth, 31 F. 3d 873 (9th Cir. 1994), we found unconstitutional the
officers’ failure to provide clothing to a gravely ill man before exposing

550US2 Unit: $U47 [11-28-08 14:32:29] PAGES PGT: OPINBX �
617 Cite as: 550 U. S. 609 (2007)
Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
gardless of the proper answer to the constitutional question,
the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. I would
reverse on that ground and disavow the unwise practice of
deciding constitutional questions in advance of the necessity
for doing so. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U. S.
833, 859 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Ac
cordingly, I concur in the Court’s judgment.
his genitals to twenty-three strangers for over two hours, under circum
stances where there was no reason why the man was not given clothing.
Id. at 876–78. We concluded that the detention was conducted in ‘a man
ner that wantonly and callously subjected an obviously ill and incapaci
tated person to entirely unnecessary and unjustifiable degradation and
suffering.’ Id. at 878. Here, in contrast, Plaintiffs were not gravely ill,
and their brief exposure, which lasted, at most, three or four minutes, was
outweighed by the safety risks associated with allowing two occupants to
remain in bed under covers during execution of a search warrant”).