ROWE, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MAINE v. NEW HAMPSHIRE MOTOR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION et al.

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364 OCTOBER TERM, 2007
Syllabus
ROWE, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MAINE v. NEW
HAMPSHIRE MOTOR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION
et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the first circuit
No. 06–457. Argued November 28, 2007—Decided February 20, 2008
Although a provision of the Federal Aviation Administration Authoriza
tion Act of 1994 forbids States to “enact or enforce a law . . . related to
a price, route, or service of any motor carrier,” 49 U. S. C. § 14501(c)(1),
see also § 41713(b)(4)(A), Maine adopted a law which, inter alia,
(1) specifies that a state-licensed tobacco shipper must utilize a delivery
company that provides a recipient-verification service that confirms the
buyer is of legal age, and (2) adds, in prohibiting unlicensed tobacco
shipments into the State, that a person is deemed to know that a pack
age contains tobacco if it is marked as originating from a Maine-licensed
tobacco retailer or if it is received from someone whose name appears
on an official list of un-licensed tobacco retailers distributed to package
delivery companies. In respondent carrier associations’ suit, the Dis
trict Court and the First Circuit agreed with respondents that Maine’s
recipient-verification and deemed-to-know provisions were pre-empted
by federal law.
Held: Federal law pre-empts the two state-law provisions at issue.
Pp. 370–377.
(a) In interpreting the 1994 federal Act, the Court follows Morales v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374, 378, in which it interpreted
similar language in the pre-emption provision of the Airline Deregula
tion Act of 1978. Voiding state enforcement of consumer-fraud statutes
against deceptive airline-fare advertisements, Morales determined,
inter alia, that the federal Act pre-empted state actions having a “con
nection with” carrier “ ‘rates, routes, or services,’ ” id., at 384; that pre
emption may occur even if a state law has only an indirect effect on
rates, routes, or services, id., at 386; and that pre-emption occurs at
least where state laws have a “significant impact” related to Congress’
deregulatory and pre-emption-related objectives, id., at 390. The
Court also emphasized that the airline Act’s overarching goal of helping
ensure that transportation rates, routes, and services reflects maximum
reliance on competitive market forces, id., at 378, and stated that federal
law might not pre-empt state laws affecting fares only tenuously, re
motely, or peripherally, but did not say where, or how, it would draw
the line on “borderline” questions, id., at 390. Pp. 370–371.

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(b) In light of Morales, the Maine laws at issue are pre-empted. In
regulating delivery service procedures, the recipient-verification provi
sion focuses on trucking and similar services, thereby creating a direct
“connection with” motor-carrier services. See 504 U. S., at 384. It
also has a “significant” and adverse “impact” in respect to the federal
Act’s ability to achieve its pre-emption-related objectives, id., at 390,
because it requires carriers to offer a system of services that the market
does not now provide (and which the carriers would prefer not to offer).
Even were that not so, the law would freeze into place services that
carriers might prefer to discontinue in the future, thereby producing
the very effect the federal law sought to avoid, i. e., a State’s direct
substitution of its own governmental commands for “competitive market
forces” in determining (to a significant degree) the services that motor
carriers will provide. Id., at 378. Maine’s deemed-to-know provision
applies yet more directly to motor-carrier services by creating a conclu
sive presumption of carrier knowledge that a shipment contains tobacco
in the specified circumstances. That presumption means that the law
imposes civil liability upon the carrier, not simply for its knowing trans
port of (unlicensed) tobacco, but for the carrier’s failure sufficiently to
examine every package. The provision thus requires the carrier to
check each shipment for certain markings and to compare it against the
list of proscribed shippers, thereby directly regulating a significant
aspect of the motor carrier’s package pickup and delivery service and
creating the kind of state-mandated regulation that the federal Act
pre-empts. Pp. 371–373.
(c) Maine’s primary arguments for an exception from pre-emption—
that its laws help prevent minors from obtaining cigarettes and thereby
protect its citizens’ public health—are unavailing. The federal law does
not create a public health exception, but, to the contrary, explicitly lists
a set of exceptions that do not include public health. See, e. g.,
§§ 14501(c)(2) to (c)(3). Nor does its legislative history mention specific
state enforcement methods or suggest that Congress made a firm judg
ment about, or even focused upon, the issue here. Maine’s inability to
find significant support for such an exception is not surprising, given the
number of States through which carriers travel, the number of products
carried, the variety of potential adverse public health effects, the many
different kinds of regulatory rules potentially available, and the diffi
culty of finding a legal criterion for separating permissible from imper
missible public-health-oriented regulations. Although federal law does
not generally pre-empt state public health regulation, the state laws at
issue are not general, their impact on carrier rates, routes, or services
is significant, and their connection with trucking is not tenuous, remote,
or peripheral: They aim directly at the carriage of goods, a commercial
field where carriage by commercial motor vehicles plays a major role.

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366 ROWE v. NEW HAMPSHIRE MOTOR TRANSP. ASSN.
Syllabus
From the perspective of pre-emption, this case is no more “borderline”
than was Morales. Maine argues that to set aside its regulations will
seriously harm its efforts to prevent minors from obtaining cigarettes,
but the Solicitor General points to other legislative alternatives avail
able to the State. Regardless, given Morales’ holding that federal law
pre-empts state consumer-protection laws, federal law must also pre
empt Maine’s efforts directly to regulate carrier services. Pp. 373–377.
448 F. 3d 66, affirmed.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Alito, JJ.,
joined, and in which Scalia, J., joined in part. Ginsburg, J., filed a con
curring opinion, post, p. 377. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in
part, post, p. 378.
G. Steven Rowe, Attorney General of Maine, petitioner, ar
gued the cause pro se. With him on the briefs were Paul
Stern, Deputy Attorney General, and Melissa Reynolds
O’Dea, Christopher C. Taub, and Peter B. LaFond, Assistant
Attorneys General.
Beth S. Brinkmann argued the cause for respondents.
With her on the brief were Paul T. Friedman, Ruth N.
Borenstein, and Lawrence R. Katzin.
Douglas Hallward-Driemeier argued the cause for the
United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With
him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant
Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Kneed
ler, Mark B. Stern, Christine N. Kohl, Paul M. Geier, and
Dale C. Andrews.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Cali
fornia et al. by Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General of California,
Thomas J. Greene, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Manuel Medeiros,
Solicitor General, Dennis Eckhart, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
and Laura Kaplan, Deputy Attorney General, by Roberto J. Sa´ nchez-
Ramos, Secretary of Justice of Puerto Rico, and by the Attorneys General
and other officials for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Troy King
of Alabama, Talis J. Colberg of Alaska, Terry Goddard of Arizona, Dustin
McDaniel of Arkansas, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Carl C.
Danberg of Delaware, Linda Singer of the District of Columbia, Bill Mc-
Collum of Florida, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lawrence Wasden of Idaho,

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Opinion of the Court
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
We here consider whether a federal statute that prohibits
States from enacting any law “related to” a motor carrier
“price, route, or service” pre-empts two provisions of a
Maine tobacco law, which regulate the delivery of tobacco
to customers within the State. 49 U. S. C. §§ 14501(c)(1),
41713(b)(4)(A); see Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 22, §§ 1555–
C(3)(C), 1555–D (second sentence) (2004). We hold that the
federal law pre-empts both provisions.
I
A
In 1978, Congress “determin[ed] that ‘maximum reliance
on competitive market forces’ ” would favor lower airline
fares and better airline service, and it enacted the Airline
Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Steve Carter of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of
Iowa, Michael Plumley, Assistant Attorney General of Kentucky, Martha
Coakley of Massachusetts, Douglas F. Gansler of Maryland, Michael A.
Cox of Michigan, Lori Swanson of Minnesota, Jim Hood of Mississippi,
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Montana, Cather
ine Cortez Masto of Nevada, Gary K. King of New Mexico, Andrew M.
Cuomo of New York, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, Marc Dann of
Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon,
Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Patrick C. Lynch of Rhode Is
land, Henry McMaster of South Carolina, Lawrence E. Long of South Da
kota, Robert E. Cooper, Jr., of Tennessee, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, Wil
liam H. Sorrell of Vermont, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia,
J. B. Van Hollen of Wisconsin, and Kristie Langley, Assistant Attorney
General of Wyoming; for the National Conference of State Legislatures
et al. by Richard Ruda, Scott L. Nelson, and Steven H. Goldblatt; and for
the Tobacco Control Legal Consortium et al. by Kathleen Hoke Dachille.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American
Trucking Associations, Inc., et al. by Evan M. Tager, Robert Digges, Jr.,
Robin S. Conrad, and Amar D. Sarwal; and for Federal Express Corp.
et al. by Robert K. Spotswood, Connie Lewis Lensing, and R. Jeffery
Kelsey.
Carter G. Phillips, Jacqueline G. Cooper, and Joanne Moak filed a brief
for Wine and Spirits Wholesalers of America, Inc., as amicus curiae.

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Opinion of the Court
Deregulation Act. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
504 U. S. 374, 378 (1992) (quoting 49 U. S. C. App. § 1302(a)(4)
(1988 ed.)); see 92 Stat. 1705. In order to “ensure that the
States would not undo federal deregulation with regulation
of their own,” that Act “included a pre-emption provision”
that said “no State . . . shall enact or enforce any law . . .
relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier.” Mo
rales, supra, at 378; 49 U. S. C. App. § 1305(a)(1) (1988 ed.).
In 1980, Congress deregulated trucking. See Motor Car
rier Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 793. And a little over a decade
later, in 1994, Congress similarly sought to pre-empt state
trucking regulation. See Federal Aviation Administration
Authorization Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 1605–1606; see also ICC
Termination Act of 1995, 109 Stat. 899. In doing so, it bor
rowed language from the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
and wrote into its 1994 law language that says: “[A] State . . .
may not enact or enforce a law . . . related to a price, route,
or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the trans
portation of property.” 49 U. S. C. § 14501(c)(1); see also
§ 41713(b)(4)(A) (similar provision for combined motor-air
carriers).
The State of Maine subsequently adopted An Act To Regu
late the Delivery and Sales of Tobacco Products and To Pre
vent the Sale of Tobacco Products to Minors, 2003 Me. Acts
p. 1089, two sections of which are relevant here. The first
section forbids anyone other than a Maine-licensed tobacco
retailer to accept an order for delivery of tobacco. Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann., Tit. 22, § 1555–C(1). It then adds that, when a
licensed retailer accepts an order and ships tobacco, the re
tailer must “utilize a delivery service” that provides a special
kind of recipient-verification service. § 1555–C(3)(C). The
delivery service must make certain that (1) the person who
bought the tobacco is the person to whom the package is
addressed; (2) the person to whom the package is addressed
is of legal age to purchase tobacco; (3) the person to whom

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Opinion of the Court
the package is addressed has himself or herself signed for
the package; and (4) the person to whom the package is ad
dressed, if under the age of 27, has produced a valid
government-issued photo identification with proof of age.
Ibid. Violations are punishable by civil penalties. See
§§ 1555–C(3)(E) to C(3)(F) (first offense up to $1,500; subse
quent offenses up to $5,000).
The second section forbids any person “knowingly” to
“transport” a “tobacco product” to “a person” in Maine un
less either the sender or the receiver has a Maine license.
§ 1555–D. It then adds that a “person is deemed to know
that a package contains a tobacco product” (1) if the package
is marked as containing tobacco and displays the name and
license number of a Maine-licensed tobacco retailer; or (2) if
the person receives the package from someone whose name
appears on a list of un-licensed tobacco retailers that Maine’s
attorney general distributes to various package-delivery
companies. Ibid. (emphasis added); see also §§ 1555–
C(3)(B), 1555–D(1). Violations are again punishable by civil
penalties. § 1555–D(2) (up to $1,500 per violation against vi
olator and/or violator’s employer).
B
Respondents, several transport carrier associations,
brought this lawsuit in federal court, claiming that federal
law pre-empts several sections of Maine’s statute. The Dis
trict Court held (among other things) that federal law pre
empts the portions of the two sections we have described,
namely, the “recipient-verification” provision (§ 1555–
C(3)(C)) and the “deemed to know” provision (the second
sentence of § 1555–D). See 377 F. Supp. 2d 197, 220 (Me.
2005). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
agreed that federal law pre-empted the two provisions. 448
F. 3d 66, 82 (2006). We granted certiorari to review these
determinations. 551 U. S. 1144 (2007).

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II
A
In Morales, this Court interpreted the pre-emption provi
sion in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. See 504 U. S.,
at 378. And we follow Morales in interpreting similar lan
guage in the 1994 Act before us here. We have said that
“when judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of
an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same lan
guage in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the
intent to incorporate its judicial interpretations as well.”
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547
U. S. 71, 85 (2006) (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted). Here, the Congress that wrote the language be
fore us copied the language of the air-carrier pre-emption
provision of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. Compare
49 U. S. C. §§ 14501(c)(1), 41713(b)(4)(A), with 49 U. S. C. App.
§ 1305(a)(1) (1988 ed.); see also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 103–677,
pp. 82–83, 85 (1994) (hereinafter H. R. Conf. Rep.). And
it did so fully aware of this Court’s interpretation of that
language as set forth in Morales. See H. R. Conf. Rep., at
83 (motor carriers will enjoy “the identical intrastate pre
emption of prices, routes and services as that originally
contained in” the Airline Deregulation Act); ibid. (express
ing agreement with “the broad preemption interpretation
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Morales”);
id., at 85.
In Morales, the Court determined: (1) that “[s]tate en
forcement actions having a connection with, or reference to,”
carrier “ ‘rates, routes, or services’ are pre-empted,” 504
U. S., at 384 (emphasis added); (2) that such pre-emption may
occur even if a state law’s effect on rates, routes, or services
“is only indirect,” id., at 386 (internal quotation marks omit
ted); (3) that, in respect to pre-emption, it makes no differ
ence whether a state law is “consistent” or “inconsistent”
with federal regulation, id., at 386–387 (emphasis deleted);

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and (4) that pre-emption occurs at least where state laws
have a “significant impact” related to Congress’ deregulatory
and pre-emption-related objectives, id., at 390. The Court
described Congress’ overarching goal as helping ensure
transportation rates, routes, and services that reflect “maxi
mum reliance on competitive market forces,” thereby stimu
lating “efficiency, innovation, and low prices,” as well as “va
riety” and “quality.” Id., at 378 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Morales held that, given these principles, federal
law pre-empts States from enforcing their consumer-fraud
statutes against deceptive airline-fare advertisements. Id.,
at 391. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U. S.
219, 226–228 (1995) (federal law pre-empts application of a
State’s general consumer-protection statute to an airline’s
frequent flyer program).
Finally, Morales said that federal law might not pre-empt
state laws that affect fares in only a “tenuous, remote, or
peripheral . . . manner,” such as state laws forbidding gam
bling. 504 U. S., at 390 (internal quotation marks omitted).
But the Court did not say where, or how, “it would be appro
priate to draw the line,” for the state law before it did not
“present a borderline question.” Ibid. (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Wolens, supra, at 226.
B
In light of Morales, we find that federal law pre-empts the
Maine laws at issue here. Section 1555–C(3)(C) of the Maine
statute forbids licensed tobacco retailers to employ a “deliv
ery service” unless that service follows particular delivery
procedures. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 22, § 1555–C(3)(C).
In doing so, it focuses on trucking and other motor-carrier
services (which make up a substantial portion of all “delivery
services,” § 1551(1–C)), thereby creating a direct “connection
with” motor-carrier services. See Morales, 504 U. S., at 384.
At the same time, the provision has a “significant” and
adverse “impact” in respect to the federal Act’s ability to

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achieve its pre-emption-related objectives. Id., at 390.
The Solicitor General and the carrier associations claim (and
Maine does not deny) that the law will require carriers to
offer a system of services that the market does not now pro
vide (and which the carriers would prefer not to offer). And
even were that not so, the law would freeze into place serv
ices that carriers might prefer to discontinue in the future.
The Maine law thereby produces the very effect that the
federal law sought to avoid, namely, a State’s direct substitu
tion of its own governmental commands for “competitive
market forces” in determining (to a significant degree) the
services that motor carriers will provide. Id., at 378 (inter
nal quotation marks omitted).
We concede that the regulation here is less “direct” than
it might be, for it tells shippers what to choose rather than
carriers what to do. Nonetheless, the effect of the regula
tion is that carriers will have to offer tobacco delivery serv
ices that differ significantly from those that, in the absence
of the regulation, the market might dictate. And that being
so, “treating sales restrictions and purchase restrictions dif
ferently for pre-emption purposes would make no sense.”
Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. South Coast Air Quality Manage
ment Dist., 541 U. S. 246, 255 (2004). If federal law pre
empts state efforts to regulate, and consequently to affect,
the advertising about carrier rates and services at issue in
Morales, it must pre-empt Maine’s efforts to regulate carrier
delivery services themselves.
Section 1555–D’s “deemed to know” provision applies yet
more directly to motor-carrier services. The provision cre
ates a conclusive presumption of carrier knowledge that a
shipment contains tobacco when it is marked as originating
from a Maine-licensed tobacco retailer or is sent by anyone
Maine has specifically identified as an unlicensed tobacco re
tailer. That presumption means that the Maine law imposes
civil liability upon the carrier, not simply for its knowing

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transport of (unlicensed) tobacco, but for the carrier’s failure
sufficiently to examine every package. The provision thus
requires the carrier to check each shipment for certain mark
ings and to compare it against the Maine attorney general’s
list of proscribed shippers. And it thereby directly regu
lates a significant aspect of the motor carrier’s package
pickup and delivery service. In this way it creates the kind
of state-mandated regulation that the federal Act pre-empts.
Maine replies that the regulation will impose no significant
additional costs upon carriers. But even were that so (and
the carriers deny it), Maine’s reply is off the mark. As with
the recipient-verification provision, the “deemed to know”
provision would freeze in place and immunize from competi
tion a service-related system that carriers do not (or in the
future might not) wish to provide. Supra, at 371–372. To
allow Maine to insist that the carriers provide a special
checking system would allow other States to do the same.
And to interpret the federal law to permit these, and similar,
state requirements could easily lead to a patchwork of state
service-determining laws, rules, and regulations. That
state regulatory patchwork is inconsistent with Congress’
major legislative effort to leave such decisions, where feder
ally unregulated, to the competitive marketplace. See H. R.
Conf. Rep., at 87. If federal law pre-empts state regulation
of the details of an air carrier’s frequent flyer program, a
program that primarily promotes carriage, see Wolens,
supra, at 226–228, it must pre-empt state regulation of the
essential details of a motor carrier’s system for picking up,
sorting, and carrying goods—essential details of the car
riage itself.
C
Maine’s primary arguments focus upon the reason why it
has enacted the provisions in question. Maine argues for an
exception from pre-emption on the ground that its laws help
it prevent minors from obtaining cigarettes. In Maine’s

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view, federal law does not pre-empt a State’s efforts to pro
tect its citizens’ public health, particularly when those laws
regulate so dangerous an activity as underage smoking.
Despite the importance of the public health objective, we
cannot agree with Maine that the federal law creates an ex
ception on that basis, exempting state laws that it would
otherwise pre-empt. The Act says nothing about a public
health exception. To the contrary, it explicitly lists a set of
exceptions (governing motor vehicle safety, certain local
route controls, and the like), but the list says nothing about
public health. See 49 U. S. C. §§ 14501(c)(2) to (c)(3); see also
§ 41713(b)(4)(B). Maine suggests that the provision’s history
indicates that Congress’ primary concern was not with the
sort of law it has enacted, but instead with state “economic”
regulation. See, e. g., H. R. Conf. Rep., at 88; see also Co
lumbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U. S.
424, 440 (2002). But it is frequently difficult to distinguish
between a State’s “economic”-related and “health”-related
motivations, see infra, at 375, and, indeed, the parties vigor
ously dispute Maine’s actual motivation for the laws at issue
here. Consequently, it is not surprising that Congress de
clined to insert the term “economic” into the operative lan
guage now before us, despite having at one time considered
doing so. See S. Rep. No. 95–631, p. 171 (1978) (reprinting
Senate bill).
Maine’s argument for an implied “public health” or “to
bacco” exception to federal pre-emption rests largely upon
(1) legislative history containing a list of nine States, with
laws resembling Maine’s, that Congress thought did not reg
ulate “intrastate prices, routes and services of motor carri
ers,” see H. R. Conf. Rep., at 86; and (2) the Synar Amend
ment, a law that denies States federal funds unless they
forbid sales of tobacco to minors, see 42 U. S. C. §§ 300x–
26(a)(1), (b)(1). The legislative history, however, does not
suggest Congress made a firm judgment about, or even
focused upon, the issue now before us. And the Synar

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Amendment nowhere mentions the particular state enforce
ment method here at issue; indeed, it does not mention spe
cific state enforcement methods at all.
Maine’s inability to find significant support for some kind
of “public health” exception is not surprising. “Public
health” does not define itself. Many products create “public
health” risks of differing kind and degree. To accept
Maine’s justification in respect to a rule regulating services
would legitimate rules regulating routes or rates for similar
public health reasons. And to allow Maine directly to regu
late carrier services would permit other States to do the
same. Given the number of States through which carriers
travel, the number of products, the variety of potential ad
verse public health effects, the many different kinds of regu
latory rules potentially available, and the difficulty of finding
a legal criterion for separating permissible from impermissi
ble public-health-oriented regulations, Congress is unlikely
to have intended an implicit general “public health” excep
tion broad enough to cover even the shipments at issue here.
This is not to say that this federal law generally pre-empts
state public health regulation: for instance, state regulation
that broadly prohibits certain forms of conduct and affects,
say, truckdrivers, only in their capacity as members of the
public (e. g., a prohibition on smoking in certain public
places). We have said that federal law does not pre-empt
state laws that affect rates, routes, or services in “too tenu
ous, remote, or peripheral a manner.” Morales, 504 U. S.,
at 390 (internal quotation marks omitted). And we have
written that the state laws whose “effect” is “forbidden”
under federal law are those with a “significant impact” on
carrier rates, routes, or services. Id., at 388, 390 (emphasis
added).
In this case, the state law is not general, it does not affect
truckers solely in their capacity as members of the general
public, the impact is significant, and the connection with
trucking is not tenuous, remote, or peripheral. The state

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statutes aim directly at the carriage of goods, a commercial
field where carriage by commercial motor vehicles plays a
major role. The state statutes require motor-carrier opera
tors to perform certain services, thereby limiting their abil
ity to provide incompatible alternative services; and they do
so simply because the State seeks to enlist the motor-carrier
operators as allies in its enforcement efforts. Given these
circumstances, from the perspective of pre-emption, this case
is no more “borderline” than was Morales. Id., at 390 (in
ternal quotation marks omitted); see also Wolens, 513 U. S.,
at 226.
Maine adds that it possesses legal authority to prevent
any tobacco shipments from entering into or moving within
the State, and that the broader authority must encompass
the narrower authority to regulate the manner of tobacco
shipments. But even assuming purely for argument’s sake
that Maine possesses the broader authority, its conclusion
does not follow. To accept that conclusion would permit
Maine to regulate carrier routes, carrier rates, and carrier
services, all on the ground that such regulation would not
restrict carriage of the goods as seriously as would a total
ban on shipments. And it consequently would severely un
dermine the effectiveness of Congress’ pre-emptive provi
sion. Indeed, it would create the very exception that we
have just rejected, extending that exception to all other
products a State might ban. We have explained why we do
not believe Congress intended that result. Supra, at 373–
375 and this page.
Finally, Maine says that to set aside its regulations will
seriously harm its efforts to prevent cigarettes from falling
into the hands of minors. The Solicitor General denies that
this is so. He suggests that Maine, like other States, can
prohibit all persons from providing tobacco products to mi
nors (as it already has, see Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 22,
§ 1555–B(2) (Supp. 2007)); that it can ban all non-face-to-face
sales of tobacco; that it might pass other laws of general

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377 Cite as: 552 U. S. 364 (2008)
Ginsburg, J., concurring
(non-carrier-specific) applicability; and that it can, if neces
sary, seek appropriate federal regulation (see, e. g., H. R.
4081, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (2007) (proposed bill regulating
tobacco shipment); H. R. 4128, 110th Cong., 1st Sess.,
§§ 1411–1416, pp. 577–583 (2007) (proposed bill providing
criminal penalties for trafficking in contraband tobacco)).
Regardless, given Morales, where the Court held that fed
eral law pre-empts state consumer-protection laws, we find
that federal law must also pre-empt Maine’s efforts directly
to regulate carrier services.
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Ginsburg, concurring.
Today’s decision declares key portions of Maine’s Tobacco
Delivery Law incompatible with the Federal Aviation Ad
ministration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA). The
breadth of the FAAAA’s preemption language, 49 U. S. C.
§§ 14501(c)(1) and 41713(b)(4)(A), coupled with our decisions
closely in point, Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504
U. S. 374 (1992), and American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513
U. S. 219 (1995), impel that conclusion. I write separately
to emphasize the large regulatory gap left by an application
of the FAAAA perhaps overlooked by Congress, and the ur
gent need for the National Legislature to fill that gap.
Tobacco use by children and adolescents, we have recog
nized, may be “the single most significant threat to public
health in the United States.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 161 (2000). But no comprehen
sive federal law currently exists to prevent tobacco sellers
from exploiting the underage market. Instead, Congress
has encouraged state efforts. Congress has done so by pro
viding funding incentives for the States to pass legislation
making it unlawful to “sell or distribute any [tobacco] prod
uct to any individual under the age of 18.” Synar Amend

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378 ROWE v. NEW HAMPSHIRE MOTOR TRANSP. ASSN.
Scalia, J., concurring in part
ment, 106 Stat. 394, 42 U. S. C. § 300x–26(a)(1). See Loril
lard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U. S. 525, 552, 571 (2001).
State measures to prevent youth access to tobacco, how
ever, are increasingly thwarted by the ease with which to
bacco products can be purchased through the Internet. “As
cyberspace acts as a risk-free zone where minors can anony
mously purchase tobacco, unrestricted online tobacco sales
create a major barrier to comprehensive youth tobacco con
trol.” Brief for Tobacco Control Legal Consortium et al. as
Amici Curiae 10 (footnote omitted). See also Brief for Cali
fornia et al. as Amici Curiae 9 (“Illegal Internet tobacco
sales have reached epidemic proportions.”).
Maine and its amici maintain that, to guard against deliv
ery of tobacco products to children, “the same sort of age
verification safeguards [must be] used when tobacco is
handed over-the-doorstep as . . . when it is handed over-the
counter.” Brief for Petitioner 8; Brief for California et al.
as Amici Curiae 11; Brief for Tobacco Control Legal Consor
tium et al. as Amici Curiae 11–12; cf. Brief for United States
as Amicus Curiae 16. The FAAAA’s broad preemption
provisions, the Court holds, bar States from adopting this
sensible enforcement strategy. While I join the Court’s
opinion, I doubt that the drafters of the FAAAA, a statute
designed to deregulate the carriage of goods, anticipated the
measure’s facilitation of minors’ access to tobacco. Now
alerted to the problem, Congress has the capacity to act with
care and dispatch to provide an effective solution.
Justice Scalia, concurring in part.
I join the opinion of the Court, except those portions (ante,
at 370, 373, and 374) that rely on the reports of committees
of one House of Congress to show the intent of that full
House and of the other—with regard to propositions that are
apparent from the text of the law, unnecessary to the disposi
tion of the case, or both.