SNYDER v. LOUISIANA

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472 OCTOBER TERM, 2007
Syllabus
SNYDER v. LOUISIANA
certiorari to the supreme court of louisiana
No. 06–10119. Argued December 4, 2007—Decided March 19, 2008
During voir dire in petitioner’s capital murder case, the prosecutor used
peremptory strikes to eliminate black prospective jurors who had sur
vived challenges for cause. The jury convicted petitioner and sen
tenced him to death. Both on direct appeal and on remand in light of
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U. S. 231, the Louisiana Supreme Court re
jected petitioner’s claim that the prosecution’s peremptory strikes of
certain prospective jurors, including Mr. Brooks, were based on race, in
violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79.
Held: The trial judge committed clear error in rejecting the Batson objec
tion to the strike of Mr. Brooks. Pp. 476–486.
(a) Under Batson’s three-step process for adjudicating claims such as
petitioner’s, (1) a defendant must make a prima facie showing that the
challenge was based on race; (2) if so, “ ‘the prosecution must offer a
race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question’ ”; and (3) “ ‘in light
of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine whether the
defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.’ ” Miller-El, supra, at
277 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U. S.
322, 328–329). Unless it is clearly erroneous, the trial court’s ruling
must be sustained on appeal. The trial court’s role is pivotal, for it
must evaluate the demeanor of the prosecutor exercising the challenge
and the juror being excluded. Pp. 476–477.
(b) While all of the circumstances bearing on the racial-animosity
issue must be consulted in considering a Batson objection or reviewing
a ruling claimed to be a Batson error, the explanation given for striking
Mr. Brooks, a college senior attempting to fulfill his student-teaching
obligation, is insufficient by itself and suffices for a Batson error deter
mination. Pp. 477–486.
(1) It cannot be presumed that the trial court credited the prosecu
tion’s first race-neutral reason, that Mr. Brooks looked nervous. Defer
ence is owed to a trial judge’s finding that an attorney credibly relied
on demeanor in exercising a strike, but here, the trial judge simply
allowed the challenge without explanation. Since Mr. Brooks was not
challenged until the day after he was questioned and thus after dozens
of other jurors had been called, the judge might not have recalled his
demeanor. Or he may have found such consideration unnecessary, in

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Syllabus
stead basing his ruling on the second proffered reason for the strike.
P. 479.
(2) That reason—Mr. Brooks’ student-teaching obligation—fails
even under the highly deferential standard of review applicable here.
Mr. Brooks was 1 of more than 50 venire members expressing concern
that jury service or sequestration would interfere with work, school,
family, or other obligations. Although he was initially concerned about
making up lost teaching time, he expressed no further concern once a
law clerk reported that the school’s dean would work with Mr. Brooks
if he missed time for a trial that week, and the prosecutor did not ques
tion him more deeply about the matter. The proffered reason must be
evaluated in light of the circumstances that the colloquy and law clerk
report took place on Tuesday, the prosecution struck Mr. Brooks on
Wednesday, the trial’s guilt phase ended on Thursday, and its penalty
phase ended on Friday. The prosecutor’s scenario—that Mr. Brooks
would have been inclined to find petitioner guilty of a lesser included
offense to obviate the need for a penalty phase—is both highly specula
tive and unlikely. Mr. Brooks would be in a position to shorten the trial
only if most or all of the jurors had favored a lesser verdict. Perhaps
most telling, the trial’s brevity, which the prosecutor anticipated on the
record during voir dire, meant that jury service would not have seri
ously interfered with Mr. Brooks’ ability to complete his student teach
ing. The dean offered to work with him, and the trial occurred rela
tively early in the fall term, giving Mr. Brooks several weeks to make
up the time. The implausibility of the prosecutor’s explanation is rein
forced by his acceptance of white jurors who disclosed conflicting obliga
tions that appear to have been at least as serious as Mr. Brooks’.
Under Batson’s third stage, the prosecution’s pretextual explanation
gives rise to an inference of discriminatory intent. There is no need to
decide here whether, in Batson cases, once a discriminatory intent is
shown to be a motivating factor, the burden shifts to the prosecution to
show that the discriminatory factor was not determinative. It is
enough to recognize that a peremptory strike shown to have been moti
vated in substantial part by discriminatory intent could not be sustained
based on any lesser showing by the prosecution. The record here does
not show that the prosecution would have pre-emptively challenged
Mr. Brooks based on his nervousness alone, and there is no realistic
possibility that the subtle question of causation could be profitably ex
plored further on remand more than a decade after petitioner’s trial.
Pp. 479–486.
942 So. 2d 484, reversed and remanded.

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474 SNYDER v. LOUISIANA
Opinion of the Court
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined.
Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined, post,
p. 486.
Stephen B. Bright argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Jelpi P. Picou, Jr., and Marcia
Widder.
Terry M. Boudreaux argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief was Paul D. Connick, Jr.*
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Allen Snyder was convicted of first-degree mur
der in a Louisiana court and was sentenced to death. He
asks us to review a decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court
rejecting his claim that the prosecution exercised some of
its peremptory jury challenges based on race, in violation of
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986). We hold that the
trial court committed clear error in its ruling on a Batson
objection, and we therefore reverse.
I
The crime for which petitioner was convicted occurred in
August 1995. At that time, petitioner and his wife, Mary,
had separated. On August 15, they discussed the possibility
of reconciliation, and Mary agreed to meet with petitioner
the next day. That night, Mary went on a date with Howard
Wilson. During the evening, petitioner repeatedly at
tempted to page Mary, but she did not respond. At approxi
mately 1:30 a.m. on August 16, Wilson drove up to the home
of Mary’s mother to drop Mary off. Petitioner was waiting
at the scene armed with a knife. He opened the driver’s
side door of Wilson’s car and repeatedly stabbed the occu
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Constitution
Project by Seth P. Waxman, Brian M. Boynton, Elisabeth Semel, and Ty
Alper; and for Nine Jefferson Parish Ministers by Samuel Dalton and
James E. Boren.

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pants, killing Wilson and wounding Mary. The State
charged petitioner with first-degree murder and sought the
death penalty based on the aggravating circumstance that
petitioner had knowingly created a risk of death or great
bodily harm to more than one person. See La. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann., Art. 905.4(A)(4) (West Supp. 2008).
Voir dire began on Tuesday, August 27, 1996, and pro
ceeded as follows. During the first phase, the trial court
screened the panel to identify jurors who did not meet Loui
siana’s requirements for jury service or claimed that service
on the jury or sequestration for the duration of the trial
would result in extreme hardship. More than 50 prospec
tive jurors reported that they had work, family, or other
commitments that would interfere with jury service. In
each of those instances, the nature of the conflicting commit
ments was explored, and some of these jurors were dis
missed. App. 58–164.
In the next phase, the court randomly selected panels of
13 potential jurors for further questioning. Id., at 166–167.
The defense and prosecution addressed each panel and ques
tioned the jurors both as a group and individually. At the
conclusion of this questioning, the court ruled on challenges
for cause. Then, the prosecution and the defense were
given the opportunity to use peremptory challenges (each
side had 12) to remove remaining jurors. The court contin
ued this process of calling 13-person panels until the jury
was filled. In accordance with Louisiana law, the parties
were permitted to exercise “backstrikes.” That is, they
were allowed to use their peremptories up until the time
when the final jury was sworn and thus were permitted to
strike jurors whom they had initially accepted when the ju
rors’ panels were called. See La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.,
Art. 795(B)(1) (West 1998); State v. Taylor, 93–2201, pp. 22–
23 (La. 2/28/96), 669 So. 2d 364, 376.
Eighty-five prospective jurors were questioned as mem
bers of a panel. Thirty-six of these survived challenges for

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cause; 5 of the 36 were black (as is petitioner); and all 5 of the
prospective black jurors were eliminated by the prosecution
through the use of peremptory strikes. The jury found peti
tioner guilty of first-degree murder and determined that he
should receive the death penalty.
On direct appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court condition
ally affirmed petitioner’s conviction. The court rejected
petitioner’s Batson claim but remanded the case for a nunc
pro tunc determination of petitioner’s competency to stand
trial. State v. Snyder, 98–1078 (La. 4/14/99), 750 So. 2d 832.
Two justices dissented and would have found a Batson viola
tion. See id., at 866 (Johnson, J., dissenting), 863 (Lemmon,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
On remand, the trial court found that petitioner had been
competent to stand trial, and the Louisiana Supreme Court
affirmed that determination. State v. Snyder, 1998–1078
(La. 4/14/04), 874 So. 2d 739. Petitioner petitioned this
Court for a writ of certiorari, and while his petition was
pending, this Court decided Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U. S.
231 (2005). We then granted the petition, vacated the judg
ment, and remanded the case to the Louisiana Supreme
Court for further consideration in light of Miller-El. Sny
der v. Louisiana, 545 U. S. 1137 (2005). On remand, the
Louisiana Supreme Court again rejected Snyder’s Batson
claim, this time by a vote of 4 to 3. See 1998–1078 (La. 9/6/
06), 942 So. 2d 484. We again granted certiorari, 551 U. S.
1144 (2007), and now reverse.
II
Batson provides a three-step process for a trial court to
use in adjudicating a claim that a peremptory challenge was
based on race:
“ ‘First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing
that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the
basis of race[; s]econd, if that showing has been made,

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the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for strik
ing the juror in question[; and t]hird, in light of the
parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine
whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimina
tion.’ ” Miller-El v. Dretke, supra, at 277 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U. S. 322,
328–329 (2003)).
On appeal, a trial court’s ruling on the issue of discrimina
tory intent must be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous.
See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U. S. 352, 369 (1991) (plural
ity opinion); id., at 372 (O’Connor, J., joined by Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment). The trial court has a pivotal role
in evaluating Batson claims. Step three of the Batson in
quiry involves an evaluation of the prosecutor’s credibility,
see 476 U. S., at 98, n. 21, and “the best evidence [of discrimi
natory intent] often will be the demeanor of the attorney
who exercises the challenge,” Hernandez, 500 U. S., at 365
(plurality opinion). In addition, race-neutral reasons for pe
remptory challenges often invoke a juror’s demeanor (e. g.,
nervousness, inattention), making the trial court’s firsthand
observations of even greater importance. In this situation,
the trial court must evaluate not only whether the prosecu
tor’s demeanor belies a discriminatory intent, but also
whether the juror’s demeanor can credibly be said to have
exhibited the basis for the strike attributed to the juror by
the prosecutor. We have recognized that these determina
tions of credibility and demeanor lie “ ‘peculiarly within a
trial judge’s province,’ ” ibid. (quoting Wainwright v. Witt,
469 U. S. 412, 428 (1985)), and we have stated that “in the
absence of exceptional circumstances, we would defer to [the
trial court],” 500 U. S., at 366 (plurality opinion).
III
Petitioner centers his Batson claim on the prosecution’s
strikes of two black jurors, Jeffrey Brooks and Elaine Scott.

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Because we find that the trial court committed clear error
in overruling petitioner’s Batson objection with respect to
Mr. Brooks, we have no need to consider petitioner’s claim
regarding Ms. Scott. See, e. g., United States v. Vasquez-
Lopez, 22 F. 3d 900, 902 (CA9 1994) (“[T]he Constitution for
bids striking even a single prospective juror for a discrimina
tory purpose”); United States v. Lane, 866 F. 2d 103, 105
(CA4 1989); United States v. Clemons, 843 F. 2d 741, 747
(CA3 1988); United States v. Battle, 836 F. 2d 1084, 1086
(CA8 1987); United States v. David, 803 F. 2d 1567, 1571
(CA11 1986).
In Miller-El v. Dretke, the Court made it clear that in
considering a Batson objection, or in reviewing a ruling
claimed to be Batson error, all of the circumstances that bear
upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted. 545
U. S., at 239. Here, as just one example, if there were per
sisting doubts as to the outcome, a court would be required
to consider the strike of Ms. Scott for the bearing it might
have upon the strike of Mr. Brooks. In this case, however,
the explanation given for the strike of Mr. Brooks is by itself
unconvincing and suffices for the determination that there
was Batson error.
When defense counsel made a Batson objection concerning
the strike of Mr. Brooks, a college senior who was attempting
to fulfill his student-teaching obligation, the prosecution of
fered two race-neutral reasons for the strike. The prosecu
tor explained:
“I thought about it last night. Number 1, the main rea
son is that he looked very nervous to me throughout the
questioning. Number 2, he’s one of the fellows that
came up at the beginning [of voir dire] and said he was
going to miss class. He’s a student teacher. My main
concern is for that reason, that being that he might, to
go home quickly, come back with guilty of a lesser ver
dict so there wouldn’t be a penalty phase. Those are
my two reasons.” App. 444.

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Defense counsel disputed both explanations, id., at 444–445,
and the trial judge ruled as follows: “All right. I’m going
[to] allow the challenge. I’m going to allow the challenge,”
id., at 445. We discuss the prosecution’s two proffered
grounds for striking Mr. Brooks in turn.
A
With respect to the first reason, the Louisiana Supreme
Court was correct that “nervousness cannot be shown from
a cold transcript, which is why . . . the [trial] judge’s evalua
tion must be given much deference.” 942 So. 2d, at 496. As
noted above, deference is especially appropriate where a
trial judge has made a finding that an attorney credibly re
lied on demeanor in exercising a strike. Here, however, the
record does not show that the trial judge actually made a
determination concerning Mr. Brooks’ demeanor. The trial
judge was given two explanations for the strike. Rather
than making a specific finding on the record concerning
Mr. Brooks’ demeanor, the trial judge simply allowed the
challenge without explanation. It is possible that the judge
did not have any impression one way or the other concerning
Mr. Brooks’ demeanor. Mr. Brooks was not challenged until
the day after he was questioned, and by that time dozens of
other jurors had been questioned. Thus, the trial judge may
not have recalled Mr. Brooks’ demeanor. Or, the trial judge
may have found it unnecessary to consider Mr. Brooks’ de
meanor, instead basing his ruling completely on the second
proffered justification for the strike. For these reasons, we
cannot presume that the trial judge credited the prosecutor’s
assertion that Mr. Brooks was nervous.
B
The second reason proffered for the strike of Mr. Brooks—
his student-teaching obligation—fails even under the highly
deferential standard of review that is applicable here. At
the beginning of voir dire, when the trial court asked the

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members of the venire whether jury service or sequestration
would pose an extreme hardship, Mr. Brooks was 1 of more
than 50 members of the venire who expressed concern that
jury service or sequestration would interfere with work,
school, family, or other obligations.
When Mr. Brooks came forward, the following exchange
took place:
“MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: . . . I’m a student at
Southern University, New Orleans. This is my last se
mester. My major requires me to student teach, and
today I’ve already missed a half a day. That is part of
my—it’s required for me to graduate this semester.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Mr. Brooks, if you—how
many days would you miss if you were sequestered on
this jury? Do you teach every day?
“MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: Five days a week.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Five days a week.
“MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: And it’s 8:30 through 3:00.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If you missed this week, is
there any way that you could make it up this semester?
“MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: Well, the first two weeks
I observe, the remaining I begin teaching, so there is
something I’m missing right now that will better me
towards my teaching career.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Is there any way that you
could make up the observed observation [sic] that
you’re missing today, at another time?
“MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: It may be possible, I’m
not sure.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. So that—
“THE COURT: Is there anyone we could call, like a
Dean or anything, that we could speak to?
“MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: Actually I spoke to my
Dean, Doctor Tillman, who’s at the university probably
right now.
“THE COURT: All right.

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“MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: Would you like to speak
to him?
“THE COURT: Yeah.
“MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: I don’t have his card
on me.
“THE COURT: Why don’t you give [a law clerk] his
number, give [a law clerk] his name and we’ll call him
and we’ll see what we can do.
“(MR. JEFFREY BROOKS LEFT THE BENCH).”
App. 102–104.
Shortly thereafter, the court again spoke with Mr. Brooks:
“THE LAW CLERK: Jeffrey Brooks, the requirement
for his teaching is a three hundred clock hour observa
tion. Doctor Tillman at Southern University said that
as long as it’s just this week, he doesn’t see that it would
cause a problem with Mr. Brooks completing his obser
vation time within this semester.
“(MR. BROOKS APPROACHED THE BENCH)
“THE COURT: We talked to Doctor Tillman and he
says he doesn’t see a problem as long as it’s just this
week, you know, he’ll work with you on it. Okay?
“MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: Okay.
“(MR. JEFFREY BROOKS LEFT THE BENCH).”
Id., at 116.
Once Mr. Brooks heard the law clerk’s report about the
conversation with Doctor Tillman, Mr. Brooks did not ex
press any further concern about serving on the jury, and the
prosecution did not choose to question him more deeply
about this matter.
The colloquy with Mr. Brooks and the law clerk’s report
took place on Tuesday, August 27; the prosecution struck
Mr. Brooks the following day, Wednesday, August 28; the
guilt phase of petitioner’s trial ended the next day, Thursday,
August 29; and the penalty phase was completed by the end
of the week, on Friday, August 30.

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The prosecutor’s second proffered reason for striking
Mr. Brooks must be evaluated in light of these circum
stances. The prosecutor claimed to be apprehensive that
Mr. Brooks, in order to minimize the student-teaching hours
missed during jury service, might have been motivated to
find petitioner guilty, not of first-degree murder, but of a
lesser included offense because this would obviate the need
for a penalty phase proceeding. But this scenario was
highly speculative. Even if Mr. Brooks had favored a quick
resolution, that would not have necessarily led him to reject
a finding of first-degree murder. If the majority of ju
rors had initially favored a finding of first-degree murder,
Mr. Brooks’ purported inclination might have led him to
agree in order to speed the deliberations. Only if all or most
of the other jurors had favored the lesser verdict would
Mr. Brooks have been in a position to shorten the trial by
favoring such a verdict.
Perhaps most telling, the brevity of petitioner’s trial—
something that the prosecutor anticipated on the record dur
ing voir dire 1—meant that serving on the jury would not
have seriously interfered with Mr. Brooks’ ability to com
plete his required student teaching. As noted, petitioner’s
trial was completed by Friday, August 30. If Mr. Brooks,
who reported to court and was peremptorily challenged
on Wednesday, August 28, had been permitted to serve,
he would have missed only two additional days of student
teaching, Thursday, August 29, and Friday, August 30.
Mr. Brooks’ dean promised to “work with” Mr. Brooks to see
that he was able to make up any student-teaching time that
he missed due to jury service; the dean stated that he did
not think that this would be a problem; and the record con
tains no suggestion that Mr. Brooks remained troubled after
hearing the report of the dean’s remarks. In addition, al
though the record does not include the academic calendar of
1 See, e. g., App. 98, 105, 111, 121, 130, 204.

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Mr. Brooks’ university, it is apparent that the trial occurred
relatively early in the fall semester. With many weeks re
maining in the term, Mr. Brooks would have needed to make
up no more than an hour or two per week in order to compen
sate for the time that he would have lost due to jury service.
When all of these considerations are taken into account,
the prosecutor’s second proffered justification for striking
Mr. Brooks is suspicious.
The implausibility of this explanation is reinforced by the
prosecutor’s acceptance of white jurors who disclosed con
flicting obligations that appear to have been at least as seri
ous as Mr. Brooks’. We recognize that a retrospective com
parison of jurors based on a cold appellate record may be
very misleading when alleged similarities were not raised at
trial. In that situation, an appellate court must be mindful
that an exploration of the alleged similarities at the time of
trial might have shown that the jurors in question were not
really comparable. In this case, however, the shared charac
teristic, i. e., concern about serving on the jury due to con
flicting obligations, was thoroughly explored by the trial
court when the relevant jurors asked to be excused for
cause.2
A comparison between Mr. Brooks and Roland Laws, a
white juror, is particularly striking. During the initial
stage of voir dire, Mr. Laws approached the court and of
fered strong reasons why serving on the sequestered jury
would cause him hardship. Mr. Laws stated that he was
“a self-employed general contractor,” with “two houses that
are nearing completion, one [with the occupants] . . . mov
ing in this weekend.” Id., at 129. He explained that, if
he served on the jury, “the people won’t [be able to] move
2 The Louisiana Supreme Court did not hold that petitioner had proce
durally defaulted reliance on a comparison of the African-American jurors
whom the prosecution struck with white jurors whom the prosecution ac
cepted. On the contrary, the State Supreme Court itself made such a
comparison. See 942 So. 2d 484, 495–496 (2006).

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in.” Id., at 130. Mr. Laws also had demanding family
obligations:
“[M]y wife just had a hysterectomy, so I’m running the
kids back and forth to school, and we’re not originally
from here, so I have no family in the area, so between
the two things, it’s kind of bad timing for me.” Ibid.
Although these obligations seem substantially more pressing
than Mr. Brooks’, the prosecution questioned Mr. Laws and
attempted to elicit assurances that he would be able to serve
despite his work and family obligations. See ibid. (prose
cutor asking Mr. Laws “[i]f you got stuck on jury duty
anyway . . . would you try to make other arrangements as
best you could?”). And the prosecution declined the oppor
tunity to use a peremptory strike on Mr. Laws. Id., at 549.
If the prosecution had been sincerely concerned that
Mr. Brooks would favor a lesser verdict than first-degree
murder in order to shorten the trial, it is hard to see why
the prosecution would not have had at least as much concern
regarding Mr. Laws.
The situation regarding another white juror, John Donnes,
although less fully developed, is also significant. At the end
of the first day of voir dire, Mr. Donnes approached the court
and raised the possibility that he would have an important
work commitment later that week. Id., at 349. Because
Mr. Donnes stated that he would know the next morning
whether he would actually have a problem, the court sug
gested that Mr. Donnes raise the matter again at that time.
Ibid. The next day, Mr. Donnes again expressed concern
about serving, stating that, in order to serve, “I’d have to
cancel too many things,” including an urgent appointment at
which his presence was essential. Id., at 467–468. Despite
Mr. Donnes’ concern, the prosecution did not strike him.
Id., at 490.
As previously noted, the question presented at the third
stage of the Batson inquiry is “ ‘whether the defendant has

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shown purposeful discrimination.’ ” Miller-El v. Dretke,
545 U. S., at 277 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The prosecution’s
proffer of this pretextual explanation naturally gives rise to
an inference of discriminatory intent. See id., at 252 (opin
ion of the Court) (noting the “pretextual significance” of a
“stated reason [that] does not hold up”); Purkett v. Elem,
514 U. S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam) (“At [the third] stage,
implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will)
be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination”); Her
nandez, 500 U. S., at 365 (plurality opinion) (“In the typical
peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be
whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory
challenge should be believed”). Cf. St. Mary’s Honor Cen
ter v. Hicks, 509 U. S. 502, 511 (1993) (“[R]ejection of the
defendant’s proffered [nondiscriminatory] reasons will per
mit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional
discrimination”).
In other circumstances, we have held that, once it is shown
that a discriminatory intent was a substantial or motivating
factor in an action taken by a state actor, the burden shifts
to the party defending the action to show that this factor
was not determinative. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U. S.
222, 228 (1985). We have not previously applied this rule in
a Batson case, and we need not decide here whether that
standard governs in this context. For present purposes, it
is enough to recognize that a peremptory strike shown to
have been motivated in substantial part by discriminatory
intent could not be sustained based on any lesser showing by
the prosecution. And in light of the circumstances here—
including absence of anything in the record showing that the
trial judge credited the claim that Mr. Brooks was nervous,
the prosecution’s description of both of its proffered explana
tions as “main concern[s],” App. 444, and the adverse infer
ence noted above—the record does not show that the prose
cution would have pre-emptively challenged Mr. Brooks
based on his nervousness alone. See Hunter, supra, at 228.

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486 SNYDER v. LOUISIANA
Thomas, J., dissenting
Nor is there any realistic possibility that this subtle question
of causation could be profitably explored further on remand
at this late date, more than a decade after petitioner’s trial.
* * *
We therefore reverse the judgment of the Louisiana Su
preme Court and remand the case for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joins,
dissenting.
Petitioner essentially asks this Court to second-guess the
fact-based determinations of the Louisiana courts as to the
reasons for a prosecutor’s decision to strike two jurors. The
evaluation of a prosecutor’s motives for striking a juror is at
bottom a credibility judgment, which lies “ ‘peculiarly within
a trial judge’s province.’ ” Hernandez v. New York, 500
U. S. 352, 365 (1991) (plurality opinion) (quoting Wainwright
v. Witt, 469 U. S. 412, 428 (1985)); Hernandez, supra, at 372
(O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); ante, at 477. “[I]n
the absence of exceptional circumstances, we [should] defer
to state-court factual findings.” Hernandez, 500 U. S., at
366 (plurality opinion). None of the evidence in the record
as to jurors Jeffrey Brooks and Elaine Scott demonstrates
that the trial court clearly erred in finding they were not
stricken on the basis of race. Because the trial court’s de
termination was a “permissible view of the evidence,” id., at
369, I would affirm the judgment of the Louisiana Supreme
Court.
The Court begins by setting out the “deferential stand
ard,” ante, at 479, that we apply to a trial court’s resolution
of a Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), claim, noting
that we will overturn a ruling on the question of discrimina
tory intent only if it is “clearly erroneous,” ante, at 477.
Under this standard, we “will not reverse a lower court’s

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487 Cite as: 552 U. S. 472 (2008)
Thomas, J., dissenting
finding of fact simply because we would have decided the
case differently.” Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U. S. 234, 242
(2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, a re
viewing court must ask “whether, ‘on the entire evidence,’ it
is ‘left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed.’ ” Ibid. (quoting United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, 395 (1948)).
The Court acknowledges two reasons why a trial court
“has a pivotal role in evaluating Batson claims.” Ante,
at 477. First, the Court notes that the trial court is
uniquely situated to judge the prosecutor’s credibility be
cause the best evidence of discriminatory intent “ ‘often will
be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the chal
lenge.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Hernandez, supra, at 365 (plurality
opinion)). Second, it recognizes that the trial court’s “first
hand observations” of the juror’s demeanor are of “grea[t]
importance” in determining whether the prosecutor’s neutral
basis for the strike is credible. Ante, at 477.
The Court’s conclusion, however, reveals that it is only
paying lipservice to the pivotal role of the trial court. The
Court second-guesses the trial court’s determinations in this
case merely because the judge did not clarify which of the
prosecutor’s neutral bases for striking Mr. Brooks was dis
positive. But we have never suggested that a reviewing
court should defer to a trial court’s resolution of a Batson
challenge only if the trial court made specific findings with
respect to each of the prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral
reasons. To the contrary, when the grounds for a trial
court’s decision are ambiguous, an appellate court should not
presume that the lower court based its decision on an im
proper ground, particularly when applying a deferential
standard of review. See Sprint/United Management Co. v.
Mendelsohn, ante, at 386.
The prosecution offered two neutral bases for striking
Mr. Brooks: his nervous demeanor and his stated concern
about missing class. App. 444. The trial court, in rejecting

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defendant’s Batson challenge, stated only “All right. I’m
going [to] allow the challenge. I’m going to allow the chal
lenge.” App. 445. The Court concedes that “the record
does not show” whether the trial court made its determina
tion based on Mr. Brooks’ demeanor or his concern for miss
ing class, ante, at 479, but then speculates as to what the
trial court might have thought about Mr. Brooks’ demeanor.
As a result of that speculation, the Court concludes that it
“cannot presume that the trial judge credited the prosecu
tor’s assertion that Mr. Brooks was nervous.” Ibid. Inex
plicably, however, the Court concludes that it can presume
that the trial court impermissibly relied on the prosecutor’s
supposedly pretextual concern about Mr. Brooks’ teaching
schedule, even though nothing in the record supports that
interpretation over the one the Court rejects.
Indeed, if the record suggests anything, it is that the judge
was more influenced by Mr. Brooks’ nervousness than by his
concern for missing class. Following an exchange about
whether his desire to get back to class would make
Mr. Brooks more likely to support a verdict on a lesser in
cluded offense because it might avoid a penalty phase, de
fense counsel offered its primary rebuttal to the prosecutor’s
proffered neutral reasons. Immediately after argument on
the nervousness point, the judge ruled on the Batson chal
lenge, even interrupting the prosecutor to do so:
“MR. VASQUEZ: . . . His main problem yesterday was
the fact that he didn’t know if he would miss some teach
ing time as a student teacher. The clerk called the
school and whoever it was and the Dean said that
wouldn’t be a problem. He was told that this would go
through the weekend, and he expressed that that was
his only concern, that he didn’t have any other problems.
“As far as him looking nervous, hell, everybody out
here looks nervous. I’m nervous.
“MR. OLINDE: Judge, it’s—

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Thomas, J., dissenting
“MR. VASQUEZ: Judge, that’s—You know.
“MR. OLINDE: —a question of this: It’s a peremptory
challenge. We need 12 out of 12 people. Mr. Brooks
was very uncertain and very nervous looking and—
“THE COURT: All right. I’m going [to] allow the
cha l lenge. I’m goi ng to a l low the cha l lenge. ”
App. 445.
Although this exchange is certainly not hard-and-fast evi
dence of the trial court’s reasoning, it undermines the Court’s
presumption that the trial judge relied solely on Mr. Brooks’
concern for missing school.
The Court also concludes that the trial court’s determina
tion lacked support in the record because the prosecutor
failed to strike two other jurors with similar concerns.
Ante, at 483–484. Those jurors, however, were never men
tioned in the argument before the trial court, nor were they
discussed in the filings or opinions on any of the three occa
sions this case was considered by the Louisiana Supreme
Court.* Petitioner failed to suggest a comparison with
those two jurors in his petition for certiorari, and apparently
only discovered this “clear error” in the record when draft
ing his brief before this Court. We have no business over
turning a conviction, years after the fact and after extensive
intervening litigation, based on arguments not presented to
the courts below. Cf. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U. S. 231, 283
(2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Because I believe that the trial court did not clearly err in
rejecting petitioner’s Batson challenge with respect to
Mr. Brooks, I also must address the strike of Ms. Scott. The
prosecution’s neutral explanation for striking Ms. Scott was
*While the Court correctly observes that the Louisiana Supreme Court
made a comparison between Mr. Brooks and unstricken white jurors, that
is true only as to jurors Vicki Chauffe, Michael Sandras, and Arthur
Yeager. 1998–1078, pp. 15–18 (La. 9/6/06), 942 So. 2d 484, 495–496. The
Court, on the other hand, focuses on Roland Laws and John Donnes, who
were never discussed below in this context.

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that she was unsure about her ability to impose the death
penalty. Like the claims made about Mr. Brooks, there is
very little in the record either to support or to undermine
the prosecution’s asserted rationale for striking Ms. Scott.
But the trial court had the benefit of observing the exchange
between the prosecutor and Ms. Scott, and accordingly was
in the best position to judge whether the prosecutor’s assess
ment of her response was credible. When asked if she could
consider the death penalty, her first response was inaudible.
App. 360. The trial court, with the benefit of contextual
clues not apparent on a cold transcript, was better positioned
to evaluate whether Ms. Scott was merely soft-spoken or
seemed hesitant in her responses. Similarly, a firsthand ob
servation of demeanor is the only thing that could give suffi
cient content to Ms. Scott’s ultimate response—“I think I
could,” id., at 361—to determine whether the prosecution’s
concern about her willingness to impose the death penalty
was well founded. Given the trial court’s expertise in mak
ing credibility determinations and its firsthand knowledge of
the voir dire exchanges, it is entirely proper to defer to its
judgment. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment below.