ENGQUIST v. OREGON DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE et al.

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591 OCTOBER TERM, 2007
Syllabus
ENGQUIST v. OREGON DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 07–474. Argued April 21, 2008—Decided June 9, 2008
Petitioner Engquist, an Oregon public employee, filed suit against respond
ents—her agency, her supervisor, and a co-worker—asserting, inter
alia, claims under the Equal Protection Clause: She alleged she had
been discriminated against based on her race, sex, and national origin,
and she also brought a so-called “class-of-one” claim, alleging that she
was fired not because she was a member of an identified class (unlike
her race, sex, and national origin claims), but simply for arbitrary, vin
dictive, and malicious reasons. The jury rejected the class-membership
equal protection claims, but found for Engquist on her class-of-one claim.
The Ninth Circuit reversed in relevant part. Although recognizing
that this Court had upheld a class-of-one equal protection challenge to
state legislative and regulatory action in Village of Willowbrook v.
Olech, 528 U. S. 562, the court below emphasized that this Court has
routinely afforded government greater leeway when it acts as employer
rather than regulator. The court concluded that extending the class
of-one theory to the public employment context would lead to undue
judicial interference in state employment practices and invalidate public
at-will employment.
Held: The class-of-one theory of equal protection does not apply in the
public employment context. Pp. 597–609.
(a) There is a crucial difference between the government exercising
“the power to regulate or license, as lawmaker,” and acting “as proprie
tor, to manage [its] internal operation.” Cafeteria & Restaurant Work
ers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 896. Thus, in the public employment
context, the Court has recognized that government has significantly
greater leeway in its dealings with citizen employees than in bringing
its sovereign power to bear on citizens at large. See, e. g., O’Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U. S. 709, 721–722. The relevant precedent establishes two
main principles: First, government employees do not lose their constitu
tional rights when they go to work, but those rights must be balanced
against the realities of the employment context. See, e. g., id., at 721.
Second, in striking the appropriate balance, the Court considers
whether the claimed employee right implicates the relevant constitu
tional provision’s basic concerns, or whether the right can more readily

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give way to the requirements of the government as employer. See,
e. g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138. Pp. 597–600.
(b) The Court’s equal protection jurisprudence has typically been con
cerned with governmental classifications that “affect some groups of
citizens differently than others.” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420,
425. Olech did recognize that a class-of-one equal protection claim can
in some circumstances be sustained. Its recognition of that theory,
however, was not so much a departure from the principle that the Equal
Protection Clause is concerned with arbitrary government classification,
as it was an application of that principle to the facts in that case: The
government singled Olech out with regard to its regulation of property,
and the cases upon which the Court relied concerned property assess
ment and taxation schemes that were applied in a singular way to par
ticular citizens. What seems to have been significant in Olech and the
cited cases was the existence of a clear standard against which depar
tures, even for a single plaintiff, could be readily assessed. This differ
ential treatment raised a concern of arbitrary classification, and there
fore required that the State provide a rational basis for it. There are
some forms of state action, however, which by their nature involve dis
cretionary decisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective, individu
alized assessments. In such cases treating like individuals differently
is an accepted consequence of the discretion granted to governmental
officials. This principle applies most clearly in the employment context,
where decisions are often subjective and individualized, resting on a
wide array of factors that are difficult to articulate and quantify. Un
like the context of arm’s-length regulation, such as in Olech, treating
seemingly similarly situated individuals differently in the employment
context is par for the course. It is no proper challenge to what in its
nature is a subjective and individualized decision that it was subjective
and individualized. That the Court has never found the Equal Protec
tion Clause implicated in this area is not surprising, given the historical
understanding of the at-will nature of government employment. See,
e. g., McElroy, supra, at 896. Recognition of a claim that the State
treated an employee differently from others for a bad reason, or for no
reason at all, is simply contrary to the at-will concept. The Constitu
tion does not require repudiating that familiar doctrine. Finally, the
Court is guided, as in the past, by the “common-sense realization that
government offices could not function if every employment decision be
came a constitutional matter.” Connick, supra, at 143. If class-of-one
claims were recognized in the employment context, any personnel action
in which a wronged employee can conjure up a claim of differential
treatment would suddenly become the basis for a federal constitutional
claim. The Equal Protection Clause does not require “[t]his displace

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ment of managerial discretion by judicial supervision.” Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410, 423. Pp. 601–609.
478 F. 3d 985, affirmed.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post,
p. 609.
Neal Katyal argued the cause for petitioner. With him
on the briefs were David H. Remes, Jeffrey C. Wu, Virginia
A. Seitz, Jeffrey T. Green, Quin M. Sorenson, Craig A. Cris
pin, and Sarah O’Rourke Schrup.
Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General of Oregon,
argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief
were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Peter Shepherd, Dep
uty Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor
General.
Lisa S. Blatt argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging affirmance. With her on the brief
were former Solicitor General Clement, Acting Solicitor
General Garre, Acting Assistant Attorney General Buc
holtz, and Irene M. Solet.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund, Inc., et al. by William M. Hohengarten, Jon
W. Davidson, Susan L. Sommer, Steven R. Shapiro, and Gary D. Buseck;
for the National Association of Police Organizations, Inc., et al. by William
John Johnson and J. Michael McGuinness; for the National Education
Association et al. by John M. West, Michael D. Simpson, Harold Craig
Becker, and Jonathan P. Hiatt; for the National Employment Lawyers
Association by Kathleen Eldergill; for the National Fraternal Order of
Police by Larry H. James and Christina L. Corl; for Richard Epstein et al.
by Aaron M. Panner; and for Meir J. Westreich by Mr. Westreich, pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Common
wealth of Pennsylvania et al. by Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., Attorney General
of Pennsylvania, John G. Knorr III, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and
Calvin R. Koons, Senior Deputy Attorney General, by Roberto J.
Sa´ nchez-Ramos, Secretary of Justice of Puerto Rico, and by the Attorneys
General for their respective States as follows: Bill McCollum of Florida,
Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Tom Miller of Iowa,

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594 ENGQUIST v. OREGON DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE
Opinion of the Court
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The question in this case is whether a public employee can
state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging
that she was arbitrarily treated differently from other simi
larly situated employees, with no assertion that the different
treatment was based on the employee’s membership in any
particular class. We hold that such a “class-of-one” theory
of equal protection has no place in the public employment
context.
I
Anup Engquist, the petitioner in this case, was hired in
1992 by Norma Corristan to be an international food stand
ard specialist for the Export Service Center (ESC), a labora
tory within the Oregon Department of Agriculture (ODA).
During the course of her employment, Engquist experienced
repeated problems with Joseph Hyatt, another ODA em
ployee, complaining to Corristan that he had made false
statements about her and otherwise made her life difficult.
Corristan responded by directing Hyatt to attend diversity
and anger management training.
In 2001, John Szczepanski, an assistant director of ODA,
assumed responsibility over ESC, supervising Corristan,
Hyatt, and Engquist. Szczepanski told a client that he could
not “control” Engquist, and that Engquist and Corristan
“would be gotten rid of.” When Engquist and Hyatt
both applied for a vacant managerial post within ESC,
Mike McGrath of Montana, Catherine Cortez Masto of Nevada, Marc
Dann of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Lawrence E. Long
of South Dakota, Robert E. Cooper, Jr., of Tennessee, Mark Shurtleff of
Utah, Robert M. McKenna of Washington, and Bruce A. Salzburg of Wyo
ming; for the League of California Cities et al. by Brian P. Walter; for the
National Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Richard Ruda; and for
the National School Boards Association by Francisco M. Negro´ n, Jr.,
Naomi Gittins, Lisa E. Soronen, Elizabeth Eynon-Kokrda, and Kenneth
W. Hartman.

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Szczepanski chose Hyatt despite Engquist’s greater experi
ence in the relevant field. Later that year, during a round
of across-the-board budget cuts in Oregon, Szczepanski elim
inated Corristan’s position. Finally, on January 31, 2002,
Engquist was informed that her position was being elimi
nated because of reorganization. Engquist’s collective
bargaining agreement gave her the opportunity either to
“bump” to another position at her level, or to take a demo
tion. She was found unqualified for the only other position
at her level and declined a demotion, and was therefore effec
tively laid off.
Engquist subsequently brought suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Oregon against ODA,
Szczepanski, and Hyatt, all respondents here, alleging viola
tions of federal antidiscrimination statutes, the Equal Pro
tection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amend
ment, and state law. As to Engquist’s equal protection
claim, she alleged that the defendants discriminated against
her on the basis of her race, sex, and national origin. She
also brought what is known as a “class-of-one” equal protec
tion claim, alleging that she was fired not because she was a
member of an identified class (unlike her race, sex, and na
tional origin claims), but simply for “arbitrary, vindictive,
and malicious reasons.” App. 10.
The District Court granted the respondents’ motion for
summary judgment as to some of Engquist’s claims, but al
lowed others to go forward, including each of the equal pro
tection claims. As relevant to this case, the District Court
found Engquist’s class-of-one equal protection claim legally
viable, deciding that the class-of-one theory was fully appli
cable in the employment context. Civ. No. 02–1637–AS (D
Ore., Sept. 14, 2004), App. 49, 58, 2004 WL 2066748, *5. The
court held that Engquist could succeed on that theory if she
could prove “that she was singled out as a result of animosity
on the part of Hyatt and Szczepanski”—i. e., “that their ac
tions were spiteful efforts to punish her for reasons unre

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lated to any legitimate state objective”—and if she could
demonstrate, on the basis of that animosity, that “she was
treated differently than others who were similarly situ
ated.” Ibid.
The jury rejected Engquist’s claims of discrimination for
membership in a suspect class—her race, sex, and national
origin claims—but found in her favor on the class-of-one
claim. Specifically, the jury found that Hyatt and Szczepan
ski “intentionally treat[ed] [Engquist] differently than others
similarly situated with respect to the denial of her promo
tion, termination of her employment, or denial of bumping
rights without any rational basis and solely for arbitrary, vin
dictive or malicious reasons.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 3–4.
The jury also found for Engquist on several of her other
claims, and awarded her $175,000 in compensatory damages
and $250,000 in punitive damages.
The Court of Appeals reversed in relevant part. It recog
nized that this Court had upheld a class-of-one equal protec
tion challenge to state legislative and regulatory action in
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U. S. 562 (2000) (per
curiam). 478 F. 3d 985, 992–993 (CA9 2007). The court
below also acknowledged that other Circuits had applied
Olech in the public employment context, 478 F. 3d, at 993
(citing cases), but it disagreed with those courts on the
ground that our cases have routinely afforded government
greater leeway when it acts as employer rather than regula
tor, id., at 993–996. The court concluded that extending the
class-of-one theory of equal protection to the public employ
ment context would lead to undue judicial interference in
state employment practices and “completely invalidate the
practice of public at-will employment.” Id., at 995. The
court accordingly held that the class-of-one theory is “inap
plicable to decisions made by public employers with regard
to their employees.” Id., at 996.
Judge Reinhardt dissented, “agree[ing] with the other cir
cuits that the class-of-one theory of equal protection is appli

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cable to public employment decisions.” Id., at 1010. We
granted certiorari to resolve this disagreement in the lower
courts, 552 U. S. 1136 (2008), and now affirm.
II
Engquist argues that the Equal Protection Clause forbids
public employers from irrationally treating one employee
differently from others similarly situated, regardless of
whether the different treatment is based on the employee’s
membership in a particular class. She reasons that in Olech,
supra, we recognized in the regulatory context a similar
class-of-one theory of equal protection, Brief for Petitioner
14–15; that the Equal Protection Clause protects individuals,
not classes, id., at 15–17; that the Clause proscribes “discrim
ination arising not only from a legislative act but also from
the conduct of an administrative official,” id., at 17; and
that the Constitution applies to the State not only when it
acts as regulator, but also when it acts as employer, id., at
23–29. Thus, Engquist concludes that class-of-one claims
can be brought against public employers just as against any
other state actors, id., at 29–32, and that differential treat
ment of government employees—even when not based on
membership in a class or group—violates the Equal Protec
tion Clause unless supported by a rational basis, id., at 32,
39–45.
We do not quarrel with the premises of Engquist’s argu
ment. It is well settled that the Equal Protection Clause
“protect[s] persons, not groups,” Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pen˜ a, 515 U. S. 200, 227 (1995) (emphasis deleted), and that
the Clause’s protections apply to administrative as well as
legislative acts, see, e. g., Raymond v. Chicago Union Trac
tion Co., 207 U. S. 20, 35–36 (1907). It is equally well settled
that States do not escape the strictures of the Equal Protec
tion Clause in their role as employers. See, e. g., New York
City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U. S. 568 (1979);
Harrah Independent School Dist. v. Martin, 440 U. S. 194

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(1979) (per curiam); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U. S. 307 (1976) (per curiam). We do not, how
ever, agree that Engquist’s conclusion follows from these
premises. Our traditional view of the core concern of the
Equal Protection Clause as a shield against arbitrary classi
fications, combined with unique considerations applicable
when the government acts as employer as opposed to sover
eign, lead us to conclude that the class-of-one theory of equal
protection does not apply in the public employment context.
A
We have long held the view that there is a crucial differ
ence, with respect to constitutional analysis, between the
government exercising “the power to regulate or license, as
lawmaker,” and the government acting “as proprietor, to
manage [its] internal operation.” Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 896 (1961). This distinc
tion has been particularly clear in our review of state action
in the context of public employment. Thus, “the govern
ment as employer indeed has far broader powers than does
the government as sovereign.” Waters v. Churchill, 511
U. S. 661, 671 (1994) (plurality opinion). “[T]he extra power
the government has in this area comes from the nature of
the government’s mission as employer. Government agen
cies are charged by law with doing particular tasks. Agen
cies hire employees to help do those tasks as effectively and
efficiently as possible.” Id., at 674–675. See also Connick
v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138, 150–151 (1983) (explaining that the
government has a legitimate interest “in ‘promot[ing] effi
ciency and integrity in the discharge of official duties, and
[in] maintain[ing] proper discipline in the public service’ ”
(quoting Ex parte Curtis, 106 U. S. 371, 373 (1882); alter
ations in original)). “The government’s interest in achiev
ing its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is ele
vated from a relatively subordinate interest when it acts as
sovereign to a significant one when it acts as employer.”

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Waters, supra, at 675 (plurality opinion). Given the
“common-sense realization that government offices could not
function if every employment decision became a constitu
tional matter,” Connick, supra, at 143, “constitutional re
view of government employment decisions must rest on dif
ferent principles than review of . . . restraints imposed by
the government as sovereign,” Waters, supra, at 674 (plural
ity opinion).
In light of these basic principles, we have often recognized
that government has significantly greater leeway in its deal
ings with citizen employees than it does when it brings its
sovereign power to bear on citizens at large. Thus, for ex
ample, we have held that the Fourth Amendment does not
require public employers to obtain warrants before conduct
ing a search of an employee’s office. O’Connor v. Ortega,
480 U. S. 709, 721–722 (1987) (plurality opinion). See also
id., at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Although
we recognized that the “legitimate privacy interests of pub
lic employees in the private objects they bring to the work
place may be substantial,” we found that “[a]gainst these pri
vacy interests . . . must be balanced the realities of the
workplace, which strongly suggest that a warrant require
ment would be unworkable.” Id., at 721 (plurality opinion).
We have also found that the Due Process Clause does not
protect a public employee from discharge, even when such
discharge was mistaken or unreasonable. See Bishop v.
Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 350 (1976) (“The Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a guarantee against
incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions”).
Our public employee speech cases are particularly instruc
tive. In Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High
School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563, 568 (1968), we ex
plained that, in analyzing a claim that a public employee was
deprived of First Amendment rights by her employer, we
must seek “a balance between the interests of the [em
ployee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public

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concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in pro
moting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees.”
We analyzed the contours of this balance more fully in
Connick v. Myers, supra. We explained that the First
Amendment protects public employee speech only when it
falls within the core of First Amendment protection—speech
on matters of public concern. We recognized that the
“ ‘First Amendment does not protect speech and assembly
only to the extent it can be characterized as political,’ ” and
that the government therefore could not generally prohibit
or punish, in its capacity as sovereign, speech on the ground
that it does not touch upon matters of public concern, id., at
147 (quoting Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389 U. S.
217, 223 (1967)). But “[w]hen employee expression cannot
be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political,
social, or other concern to the community, government offi
cials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices.”
Connick, 461 U. S., at 146. As we explained, “absent the
most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appro
priate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel
decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to
the employee’s behavior.” Id., at 147 (citing Bishop, supra,
at 349–350).
Our precedent in the public employee context therefore
establishes two main principles: First, although government
employees do not lose their constitutional rights when they
accept their positions, those rights must be balanced against
the realities of the employment context. Second, in striking
the appropriate balance, we consider whether the asserted
employee right implicates the basic concerns of the relevant
constitutional provision, or whether the claimed right can
more readily give way to the requirements of the govern
ment as employer. With these principles in mind, we come
to the question whether a class-of-one theory of equal protec
tion is cognizable in the public employment context.

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B
Our equal protection jurisprudence has typically been con
cerned with governmental classifications that “affect some
groups of citizens differently than others.” McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425 (1961). See, e. g., Ross v.
Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600, 609 (1974) (“ ‘Equal protection’ . . .
emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State between
classes of individuals whose situations are arguably indistin
guishable”); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodri
guez, 411 U. S. 1, 60 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“[T]he
basic concern of the Equal Protection Clause is with state
legislation whose purpose or effect is to create discrete and
objectively identifiable classes”). Plaintiffs in such cases
generally allege that they have been arbitrarily classified as
members of an “identifiable group.” Personnel Adminis
trator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 279 (1979).
Engquist correctly argues, however, that we recognized in
Olech that an equal protection claim can in some circum
stances be sustained even if the plaintiff has not alleged
class-based discrimination, but instead claims that she has
been irrationally singled out as a so-called “class of one.” In
Olech, a property owner had asked the village of Willow
brook to connect her property to the municipal water supply.
Although the village had required only a 15-foot easement
from other property owners seeking access to the water sup
ply, the village conditioned Olech’s connection on a grant of
a 33-foot easement. Olech sued the village, claiming that
the village’s requirement of an easement 18 feet longer than
the norm violated the Equal Protection Clause. Although
Olech had not alleged that the village had discriminated
against her based on membership in an identifiable class, we
held that her complaint stated a valid claim under the Equal
Protection Clause because it alleged that she had “been in
tentionally treated differently from others similarly situated
and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treat
ment.” 528 U. S., at 564 (citing Sioux City Bridge Co. v.

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Dakota County, 260 U. S. 441 (1923), and Allegheny Pitts
burgh Coal Co. v. Commission of Webster Cty., 488 U. S.
336 (1989)).
Recognition of the class-of-one theory of equal protection
on the facts in Olech was not so much a departure from the
principle that the Equal Protection Clause is concerned with
arbitrary government classification, as it was an application
of that principle. That case involved the government’s reg
ulation of property. Similarly, the cases upon which the
Court in Olech relied concerned property assessment and
taxation schemes. See Allegheny Pittsburgh, supra; Sioux
City Bridge, supra. We expect such legislative or regula
tory classifications to apply “without respect to persons,” to
borrow a phrase from the judicial oath. See 28 U. S. C.
§ 453. As we explained long ago, the Fourteenth Amend
ment “requires that all persons subjected to . . . legislation
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and condi
tions, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities
imposed.” Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 71–72 (1887).
When those who appear similarly situated are nevertheless
treated differently, the Equal Protection Clause requires at
least a rational reason for the difference, to ensure that all
persons subject to legislation or regulation are indeed being
“treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions.”
Thus, when it appears that an individual is being singled out
by the government, the specter of arbitrary classification is
fairly raised, and the Equal Protection Clause requires a “ra
tional basis for the difference in treatment.” Olech, 528
U. S., at 564.
What seems to have been significant in Olech and the cases
on which it relied was the existence of a clear standard
against which departures, even for a single plaintiff, could
be readily assessed. There was no indication in Olech that
the zoning board was exercising discretionary authority
based on subjective, individualized determinations—at least
not with regard to easement length, however typical such

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determinations may be as a general zoning matter. See id.,
at 565 (Breyer, J., concurring in result). Rather, the com
plaint alleged that the board consistently required only a 15
foot easement, but subjected Olech to a 33-foot easement.
This differential treatment raised a concern of arbitrary clas
sification, and we therefore required that the State provide
a rational basis for it.
In Allegheny Pittsburgh, cited by the Olech Court, the
applicable standard was market value, but the county de
parted from that standard in basing some assessments on
quite dated purchase prices. Again, there was no sugges
tion that the “dramatic differences in valuation” for similar
property parcels, 488 U. S., at 341, were based on subjective
considerations of the sort on which appraisers often rely, see
id., at 338–342, 345. Sioux City Bridge, also cited in Olech,
was the same sort of case, recognizing an equal protection
claim when one taxpayer’s property was assessed at 100 per
cent of its value, while all other property was assessed at
55 percent, without regard to articulated differences in the
properties. See 260 U. S., at 445–447.
There are some forms of state action, however, which by
their nature involve discretionary decisionmaking based on
a vast array of subjective, individualized assessments. In
such cases the rule that people should be “treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions” is not violated
when one person is treated differently from others, because
treating like individuals differently is an accepted conse
quence of the discretion granted. In such situations, allow
ing a challenge based on the arbitrary singling out of a par
ticular person would undermine the very discretion that such
state officials are entrusted to exercise.
Suppose, for example, that a traffic officer is stationed on
a busy highway where people often drive above the speed
limit, and there is no basis upon which to distinguish them.
If the officer gives only one of those people a ticket, it may
be good English to say that the officer has created a class of

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people that did not get speeding tickets, and a “class of one”
that did. But assuming that it is in the nature of the par
ticular government activity that not all speeders can be
stopped and ticketed, complaining that one has been singled
out for no reason does not invoke the fear of improper gov
ernment classification. Such a complaint, rather, challenges
the legitimacy of the underlying action itself—the decision
to ticket speeders under such circumstances. Of course, an
allegation that speeding tickets are given out on the basis of
race or sex would state an equal protection claim, because
such discriminatory classifications implicate basic equal pro
tection concerns. But allowing an equal protection claim
on the ground that a ticket was given to one person and
not others, even if for no discernible or articulable reason,
would be incompatible with the discretion inherent in the
challenged action. It is no proper challenge to what in its
nature is a subjective, individualized decision that it was
subjective and individualized.
This principle applies most clearly in the employment con
text, for employment decisions are quite often subjective and
individualized, resting on a wide array of factors that are
difficult to articulate and quantify. As Engquist herself
points out, “[u]nlike the zoning official, the public employer
often must take into account the individual personalities and
interpersonal relationships of employees in the workplace.
The close relationship between the employer and employee,
and the varied needs and interests involved in the employ
ment context, mean that considerations such as concerns
over personality conflicts that would be unreasonable as
grounds for ‘arm’s-length’ government decisions (e. g., zon
ing, licensing) may well justify different treatment of a public
employee.” Brief for Petitioner 48. Unlike the context of
arm’s-length regulation, such as in Olech, treating seemingly
similarly situated individuals differently in the employment
context is par for the course.

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Opinion of the Court
Thus, the class-of-one theory of equal protection—which
presupposes that like individuals should be treated alike, and
that to treat them differently is to classify them in a way
that must survive at least rationality review—is simply a
poor fit in the public employment context. To treat employ
ees differently is not to classify them in a way that raises
equal protection concerns. Rather, it is simply to exer
cise the broad discretion that typically characterizes the
employer-employee relationship. A challenge that one has
been treated individually in this context, instead of like
everyone else, is a challenge to the underlying nature of the
government action.
Of course, that is not to say that the Equal Protection
Clause, like other constitutional provisions, does not apply
to public employers. Indeed, our cases make clear that
the Equal Protection Clause is implicated when the govern
ment makes class-based decisions in the employment con
text, treating distinct groups of individuals categorically
differently. See, e. g., Beazer, 440 U. S., at 593 (upholding
city’s exclusion of methadone users from employment under
rational-basis review); Martin, 440 U. S., at 199–201 (clas
sification between teachers who had complied with a
continuing-education requirement and those who had not is
rational and does not violate the Equal Protection Clause);
Murgia, 427 U. S., at 314–317 (upholding a mandatory retire
ment age—a classification based on age—under rational
basis review). The dissent’s broad statement that we “ex
cep[t] state employees from the Fourteenth Amendment’s
protection against unequal and irrational treatment at the
hands of the State,” post, at 610 (opinion of Stevens, J.), is
thus plainly not correct. But we have never found the
Equal Protection Clause implicated in the specific circum
stance where, as here, government employers are alleged to
have made an individualized, subjective personnel decision
in a seemingly arbitrary or irrational manner.

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606 ENGQUIST v. OREGON DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE
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This is not surprising, given the historical understanding
of the nature of government employment. We long ago rec
ognized the “settled principle that government employment,
in the absence of legislation, can be revoked at the will of the
appointing officer.” McElroy, 367 U. S., at 896. The basic
principle of at-will employment is that an employee may be
terminated for a “ ‘good reason, bad reason, or no reason
at all.’ ” Reply Brief for Petitioner 27. See Andrews v.
Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 406 U. S. 320, 324 (1972)
(“[T]he very concept of ‘wrongful discharge’ implies some
sort of statutory or contractual standard that modifies the
traditional common-law rule that a contract of employment
is terminable by either party at will”). Thus, “[w]e have
never held that it is a violation of the Constitution for a gov
ernment employer to discharge an employee based on sub
stantively incorrect information.” Waters, 511 U. S., at 679
(plurality opinion). See also Connick, 461 U. S., at 146–147
(“[O]rdinary dismissals from government service . . . are not
subject to judicial review even if the reasons for the dis
missal are alleged to be mistaken or unreasonable” (citing
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564
(1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593 (1972); and
Bishop, 426 U. S. 341)). “And an at-will government em
ployee . . . generally has no claim based on the Constitution
at all.” Waters, supra, at 679 (plurality opinion). See, e. g.,
Bishop, supra, at 349–350.
State employers cannot, of course, take personnel actions
that would independently violate the Constitution. See
supra, at 598–600. But recognition of a class-of-one theory
of equal protection in the public employment context—that
is, a claim that the State treated an employee differently
from others for a bad reason, or for no reason at all—is sim
ply contrary to the concept of at-will employment. The
Constitution does not require repudiating that familiar
doctrine.
To be sure, Congress and all the States have, for the most
part, replaced at-will employment with various statutory

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Opinion of the Court
schemes protecting public employees from discharge for im
permissible reasons. See, e. g., 5 U. S. C. § 2302(b)(10) (2006
ed.) (supervisor of covered federal employee may not “dis
criminate . . . on the basis of conduct which does not ad
versely affect the performance of the employee or applicant
or the performance of others”). See also Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 20–21. But a government’s deci
sion to limit the ability of public employers to fire at will is
an act of legislative grace, not constitutional mandate.
Indeed, recognizing the sort of claim Engquist presses
could jeopardize the delicate balance governments have
struck between the rights of public employees and “the gov
ernment’s legitimate purpose in ‘promot[ing] efficiency and
integrity in the discharge of official duties, and [in] main
tain[ing] proper discipline in the public service.’ ” Connick,
supra, at 150–151 (quoting Ex parte Curtis, 106 U. S., at 373;
alterations in original). Thus, for example, although most
federal employees are covered by the Civil Service Reform
Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1111, Congress has specifically excluded
some groups of employees from its protection, see, e. g., 5
U. S. C. § 2302(a)(2)(C) (excluding from coverage, inter alia,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence
Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency). Were we to
find that the Equal Protection Clause subjects the govern
ment to equal protection review for every allegedly arbitrary
employment action, we will have undone Congress’s (and the
States’) careful work.
In concluding that the class-of-one theory of equal protec
tion has no application in the public employment context—
and that is all we decide—we are guided, as in the past, by
the “common-sense realization that government offices could
not function if every employment decision became a constitu
tional matter.” Connick, supra, at 143. If, as Engquist
suggests, plaintiffs need not claim discrimination on the basis
of membership in some class or group, but rather may argue
only that they were treated by their employers worse than

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608 ENGQUIST v. OREGON DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE
Opinion of the Court
other employees similarly situated, any personnel action in
which a wronged employee can conjure up a claim of differ
ential treatment will suddenly become the basis for a federal
constitutional claim. Indeed, an allegation of arbitrary dif
ferential treatment could be made in nearly every instance
of an assertedly wrongful employment action—not only hir
ing and firing decisions, but any personnel action, such as
promotion, salary, or work assignments—on the theory that
other employees were not treated wrongfully. See 478
F. 3d, at 995. On Engquist’s view, every one of these em
ployment decisions by a government employer would become
the basis for an equal protection complaint.
Engquist assures us that accepting her view would not
pose too much of a practical problem. Specifically, Engquist
argues that a plaintiff in a class-of-one employment case
would have to prove that the government’s differential treat
ment was intentional, that the plaintiff was treated differ
ently from other similarly situated persons, and that the un
equal treatment was not rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose. Brief for Petitioner 36–39. And be
cause a “governmental employment decision is . . . rational
whenever the discrimination relates to a legitimate govern
ment interest,” it is in practice “difficult for plaintiffs to show
that the government has failed to meet this standard.” Id.,
at 41. Justice Stevens makes a similar argument, stating
“that all but a handful [of class-of-one complaints] are dis
missed well in advance of trial.” Post, at 615.
We agree that, even if we accepted Engquist’s claim, it
would be difficult for a plaintiff to show that an employment
decision is arbitrary. But this submission is beside the
point. The practical problem with allowing class-of-one
claims to go forward in this context is not that it will be too
easy for plaintiffs to prevail, but that governments will be
forced to defend a multitude of such claims in the first place,
and courts will be obliged to sort through them in a search
for the proverbial needle in a haystack. The Equal Protec

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Stevens, J., dissenting
tion Clause does not require “[t]his displacement of manage
rial discretion by judicial supervision.” Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U. S. 410, 423 (2006).
In short, ratifying a class-of-one theory of equal protection
in the context of public employment would impermissibly
“constitutionalize the employee grievance.” Connick, 461
U. S., at 154. “The federal court is not the appropriate
forum in which to review the multitude of personnel deci
sions that are made daily by public agencies.” Bishop, 426
U. S., at 349. Public employees typically have a variety of
protections from just the sort of personnel actions about
which Engquist complains, but the Equal Protection Clause
is not one of them.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter and Jus
tice Ginsburg join, dissenting.
Congress has provided a judicial remedy for individuals
whose federal constitutional rights are violated by state ac
tion, 42 U. S. C. § 1983.1 In prior cases, we have refused to
craft new remedies for the violation of constitutional rights
of federal employees, Bush v. Lucas, 462 U. S. 367 (1983), or
for the nonconstitutional claims of state employees, Bishop
v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341 (1976). But refusal to give effect to
the congressionally mandated remedy embodied in § 1983
would be impermissible. To avoid this result, the Court
today concludes that Engquist suffered no constitutional vio
lation at all, and that there was thus no harm to be remedied.
1 Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory
or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .”

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610 ENGQUIST v. OREGON DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE
Stevens, J., dissenting
In so holding, the Court—as it did in Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U. S. 410 (2006)—carves a novel exception out of state
employees’ constitutional rights. In Garcetti, the Court cre
ated a new substantive rule excepting a category of speech
by state employees from the protection of the First Amend
ment. Today, the Court creates a new substantive rule ex
cepting state employees from the Fourteenth Amendment’s
protection against unequal and irrational treatment at the
hands of the State. Even if some surgery were truly neces
sary to prevent governments from being forced to defend a
multitude of equal protection “class of one” claims, the Court
should use a scalpel rather than a meataxe.
I
Our decision in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U. S.
562 (2000) (per curiam), applied a rule that had been an ac
cepted part of our equal protection jurisprudence for dec
ades: Unless state action that intentionally singles out an
individual, or a class of individuals, for adverse treatment is
supported by some rational justification, it violates the Four
teenth Amendment’s command that no State shall “deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.”
Our opinion in Olech emphasized that the legal issue would
have been the same whether the class consisted of one or
five members, because “the number of individuals in a class
is immaterial for equal protection analysis.” Id., at 564, n.
The outcome of that case was not determined by the size of
the disadvantaged class, and the majority does not—indeed
cannot—dispute the settled principle that the Equal Protec
tion Clause protects persons, not groups. See ante, at 597.
Nor did the outcome in Olech turn on the fact that the
village was discriminating against a property owner rather
than an employee. The majority does not dispute that the
strictures of the Equal Protection Clause apply to the States
in their role as employers as well as regulators. See ante,

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Stevens, J., dissenting
at 597. And indeed, we have made clear that “the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and other provisions of the Federal Constitu
tion afford protection to employees who serve the gov
ernment as well as to those who are served by them, and
§ 1983 provides a cause of action for all citizens injured by
an abridgment of those protections.” Collins v. Harker
Heights, 503 U. S. 115, 119–120 (1992).
Rather, the outcome of Olech was dictated solely by the
absence of a rational basis for the discrimination. As we
explained:
“Our cases have recognized successful equal protec
tion claims brought by a ‘class of one,’ where the plain
tiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated
differently from others similarly situated and that there
is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. In
so doing, we have explained that ‘[t]he purpose of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
is to secure every person within the State’s jurisdic
tion against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by
its improper execution through duly constituted agents.’
“ . . . [Olech’s] complaint also alleged that the Village’s
demand was ‘irrational and wholly arbitrary’ . . . .
These allegations, quite apart from the Village’s subjec
tive motivation, are sufficient to state a claim for relief
under traditional equal protection analysis.” 528 U. S.,
at 564, 565 (some internal quotation marks and cita
tions omitted).
Here, as in Olech, Engquist alleged that the State’s actions
were arbitrary and irrational. In response, the State of
fered no explanation whatsoever for its decisions; it did not
claim that Engquist was a subpar worker, or even that her
personality made her a poor fit in the workplace or that her
colleagues simply did not enjoy working with her. In fact,

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612 ENGQUIST v. OREGON DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE
Stevens, J., dissenting
the State explicitly disclaimed the existence of any work
place or performance-based rationale.2 See, e. g., Reply
Brief for Petitioner 17, 19. The jury proceeded to find that
the respondents intentionally treated Engquist “differently
than others similarly situated with respect to the . . . termi
nation of her employment . . . without any rational basis and
solely for arbitrary, vindictive or malicious reasons.” App.
to Pet. for Cert. 3–4. The jury’s verdict thus established
that there was no rational basis for either treating Engquist
differently from other employees or for the termination of
her employment. The State does not dispute this finding.
Under our reasoning in Olech, the absence of any justifica
tion for the discrimination sufficed to establish the constitu
tional violation.
The majority nonetheless concludes, based on “unique
considerations applicable when the government acts as em
ployer,” that the “class-of-one” theory of equal protection
is not applicable in the public-employment context. Ante,
at 598. Its conclusion is based upon speculation about inapt
hypothetical cases, and an incorrect evaluation of the impor
tance of the government’s interest in preserving a regime
of “at-will” employment. Its reasoning is flawed on both
counts.
II
The majority asserts that public-employment decisions
should be carved out of our equal protection jurisprudence
because employment decisions (as opposed to, for example,
zoning decisions) are inherently discretionary. I agree that
employers must be free to exercise discretionary authority.
But there is a clear distinction between an exercise of discre
tion and an arbitrary decision. A discretionary decision rep
2 But for this disclaimer, the lower court could have dismissed the claim
if it discerned “any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide
a rational basis for the [State’s actions],” even one not put forth by the
State. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U. S. 307, 313 (1993).
The disclaimer, however, negated that possibility.

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Stevens, J., dissenting
resents a choice of one among two or more rational alterna
tives. See 1 H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic
Problems in the Making and Application of Law 162 (Tent.
ed. 1958) (defining discretion as “the power to choose be
tween two or more courses of action each of which is thought
of as permissible”). The choice may be mistaken or unwise
without being irrational. If the arguments favoring each al
ternative are closely balanced, the need to make a choice may
justify using a coin toss as a tiebreaker. Moreover, the
Equal Protection Clause proscribes arbitrary decisions—
decisions unsupported by any rational basis—not unwise
ones. Accordingly, a discretionary decision with any “rea
sonably conceivable” rational justification will not support
an equal protection claim; only a truly arbitrary one will.
There is therefore no need to create an exception for the
public-employment context in order to prevent these discre
tionary decisions from giving rise to equal protection claims.
The hypothetical situations posited by the majority do not
prove otherwise. The hypothetical traffic officer described
in the Court’s opinion, ante, at 603–604, had a rational basis
for giving a ticket to every speeder passing him on the high
way. His inability to arrest every driver in sight provides
an adequate justification for making a random choice from a
group of equally guilty and equally accessible violators. As
such, the Court is quite correct in stating that “allowing an
equal protection claim on the ground that a ticket was given
to one person and not others, even if for no discernible or
articulable reason, would be incompatible with the discretion
inherent in the challenged action.” Ante, at 604. If there
were no justification for the arrest, there would be no need
to invoke the Equal Protection Clause because the officer’s
conduct would violate the Fourth Amendment. But as
noted, a random choice among rational alternatives does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause.
A comparable hypothetical decision in the employment
context (e. g., a supervisor who is required to eliminate one

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614 ENGQUIST v. OREGON DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE
Stevens, J., dissenting
position due to an involuntary reduction in force and who
chooses to terminate one of several equally culpable employ
ees) also differs from the instant case insofar as it assumes
the existence of a rational basis for the individual decision.
The fact that a supervisor might not be able to explain why
he terminated one employee rather than another will not
give rise to an equal protection claim so long as there was
a rational basis for the termination itself and for the deci
sion to terminate just one, rather than all, of the culpable
employees.
Instead of using a scalpel to confine so-called “class of one”
claims to cases involving a complete absence of any conceiv
able rational basis for the adverse action and the differential
treatment of the plaintiff, the Court adopts an unnecessarily
broad rule that tolerates arbitrary and irrational decisions in
the employment context.
III
The majority’s decision also rests on the premise that
“[t]he Constitution does not require repudiating th[e] familiar
doctrine” of at-will employment. Ante, at 606. In the
1890’s that doctrine applied broadly to government employ
ment, see McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass.
216, 29 N. E. 517 (1892), but for many years now “ ‘the theory
that public employment which may be denied altogether may
be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreason
able, has been uniformly rejected.’ ” Keyishian v. Board of
Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y., 385 U. S. 589, 605–606
(1967). Indeed, recent constitutional decisions and statu
tory enactments have all but nullified the significance of the
doctrine. See, e. g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347 (1976);
Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U. S. 62 (1990); see
also 5 U. S. C. § 2302(b)(10) (2006 ed.) (supervisor of covered
federal employee may not “discriminate . . . on the basis of
conduct which does not adversely affect the performance of
the employee or applicant or the performance of others”).
Accordingly, preserving the remnants of “at-will” employ

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Stevens, J., dissenting
ment provides a feeble justification for creating a broad
exception to a well-established category of constitutional
protections.3
IV
Presumably the concern that actually motivates today’s
decision is fear that governments will be forced to defend
against a multitude of “class of one” claims unless the Court
wields its meataxe forthwith. Experience demonstrates,
however, that these claims are brought infrequently,4 that
the vast majority of such claims are asserted in complaints
advancing other claims as well, and that all but a handful are
dismissed well in advance of trial. Experience also demon
strates that there are in fact rare cases in which a petty
tyrant has misused governmental power. Proof that such
misuse was arbitrary because unsupported by any conceiv
able rational basis should suffice to establish a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause without requiring its victim also
to prove that the tyrant was motivated by a particular vari
ety of class-based animus. When the allegations of a com
plaint plainly identify “the proverbial needle in a haystack,”
ante, at 608, a federal court should not misconstrue the Con
stitution in order to make it even easier to dismiss unmerito
rious claims.
* * *
In sum, there is no compelling reason to carve arbitrary
public employment decisions out of the well-established cate
3 Moreover, equal protection scrutiny is not incompatible with at-will
employment since courts applying rational-basis scrutiny are able to rely
on any conceivable reason for government action, and the government
therefore need not explain its actual reason for terminating or disciplining
the employee.
4 Prior to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case, “class of one” claims
arising in the public-employment context were permitted by every court
that was presented with one. Yet there have been only approximately
150 cases—both in the district courts and the courts of appeals—address
ing such claims since Olech.

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616 ENGQUIST v. OREGON DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE
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gory of equal protection violations when the familiar rational
review standard can sufficiently limit these claims to only
wholly unjustified employment actions. Accordingly, I re
spectfully dissent.