JIMENEZ v. QUARTERMAN, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COR- RECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION

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Syllabus
JIMENEZ v. QUARTERMAN, DIRECTOR, TEXAS
DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COR-
RECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fifth circuit
No. 07–6984. Argued November 4, 2008—Decided January 13, 2009
After petitioner’s state conviction for burglary became final on October
11, 1996, the state appellate court held in state habeas proceedings that
petitioner had been denied his right to appeal and granted him the right
to file an out-of-time appeal. He filed the appeal, his conviction was
affirmed, and his time for seeking certiorari in this Court expired on
January 6, 2004. Petitioner filed a second state habeas application on
December 6, 2004, which was denied on June 29, 2005. He then filed a
federal habeas petition on July 19, 2005, relying on 28 U. S. C.
§ 2244(d)(1)(A) to establish its timeliness. Section 2244(d)(1)(A) pro
vides that the 1-year limitations period for seeking review under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) begins
on “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of
direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.”
Petitioner argued that his judgment became final on January 6, 2004,
when time expired for seeking certiorari review of the decision in his
out-of-time appeal, and that his July 19, 2005, petition was timely be
cause the calculation of AEDPA’s 1-year limitations period excludes the
time “during which [his] properly filed application for State post
conviction . . . review . . . [was] pending,” § 2244(d)(2). The District
Court disagreed, ruling that the proper start date for calculating
AEDPA’s 1-year limitations period under § 2244(d)(1)(A) was October
11, 1996, when petitioner’s conviction first became final. The District
Court dismissed the federal habeas petition as time barred. The Fifth
Circuit denied petitioner’s request for a certificate of appealability.
Held: Where a state court grants a criminal defendant the right to file an
out-of-time direct appeal during state collateral review, but before the
defendant has first sought federal habeas relief, his judgment is not
“final” for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) until the conclusion of the out-of
time direct appeal, or the expiration of the time for seeking certiorari
review of that appeal. This Court must enforce plain statutory lan
guage according to its terms. See, e. g., Lamie v. United States
Trustee, 540 U. S. 526, 534. Under § 2244(d)(1)(A)’s plain language, once
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reopened direct review of petition

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Opinion of the Court
er’s conviction on September 25, 2002, the conviction was no longer final
for § 2244(d)(1)(A) purposes. Rather, the order granting an out-of-time
appeal restored the pendency of the direct appeal, and petitioner’s con
viction was again capable of modification through direct appeal to the
state courts and to this Court on certiorari review. Therefore, it was
not until January 6, 2004, when time for seeking certiorari review of the
decision in the out-of-time appeal expired, that petitioner’s conviction
became “final” through “the conclusion of direct review or the expiration
of the time for seeking such review” under § 2244(d)(1)(A). The Court
rejects respondent’s argument that using the later date created by the
state court’s decision to reopen direct review, thus resetting AEDPA’s
1-year limitations period, undermines the policy of finality that Con
gress established in § 2244(d)(1). See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U. S. 214,
220. Pp. 118–121.
Reversed and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Thomas C. Goldstein argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were Pamela S. Karlan, Jeffrey L.
Fisher, Amy Howe, Kevin K. Russell, and Scott T. Williams.
Sean D. Jordan, Deputy Solicitor General of Texas, argued
the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Greg
Abbott, Attorney General, Kent C. Sullivan, First Assist
ant Attorney General, Eric J. R. Nichols, Deputy Attorney
General for Criminal Justice, James C. Ho, Solicitor Gen
eral, Rance L. Craft and Adam W. Aston, Assistant Solici
tors General, and Marta McLaughlin, Assistant Attorney
General.*
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA) establishes a 1-year time limitation for a
state prisoner to file a federal habeas corpus petition. That
year runs from the latest of four specified dates. 28 U. S. C.
*George A. Cumming, Jr., Jani J. Maselli, Andrea Marsh, and Keith
Hampton filed a brief for the Texas Fair Defense Project et al. as amici
curiae urging reversal.

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§ 2244(d)(1). This case involves the date provided by
§ 2244(d)(1)(A), which is “the date on which the judgment
became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expira
tion of the time for seeking such review.” Petitioner con
tends that “the date on which the judgment became final”
can be postponed by a state court’s decision during collateral
review to grant a defendant the right to file an out-of-time
direct appeal. The District Court disagreed, holding in
stead that the date could not be moved to reflect the out-of
time appeal, and that petitioner’s federal habeas petition was
untimely for that reason. The United States Court of Ap
peals for the Fifth Circuit denied a certificate of appealabil
ity. See § 2253(c). We now reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings con
sistent with this opinion.
I
After petitioner was sentenced for burglary in 1995, his
attorney filed an appellate brief with the Texas Court of Ap
peals pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738 (1967),
explaining that he was unable to identify any nonfrivolous
ground on which to base an appeal.1 He left a copy of the
1 Petitioner was indicted in August 1991 for felony burglary of a habita
tion, in violation of Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02 (West 1989), enhanced by
a prior felony conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon
under Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.42(c) (West 1974). He entered a plea
agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to the burglary and true to
the enhancement in exchange for an order of deferred adjudication. In
November 1991, the trial court deferred adjudication of the burglary
conviction and ordered that petitioner serve five years of deferred
adjudication probation. In March 1995, the State moved to revoke peti
tioner’s probation based on four alleged violations of the conditions of his
probation. At a November 1995 hearing, petitioner admitted to two of
the violations. The court then heard testimony with respect to the other
two violations and found that petitioner had committed those violations
as well. The court revoked petitioner’s deferred-adjudication probation,
adjudicated him guilty of the enhanced burglary, and sentenced him to a
43-year term of imprisonment.

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brief and a letter (advising petitioner of his right to file a
pro se brief as set forth in Anders, id., at 744) at the county
jail where he believed petitioner to be. Petitioner, however,
had been transferred to a state facility and did not receive
the delivery. The Texas Court of Appeals dismissed the ap
peal on September 11, 1996, and served petitioner with no
tice of the dismissal at the county-jail address that, again,
was the wrong address.
Petitioner eventually learned that his appeal had been dis
missed. He filed an application in state court for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art.
11.07 (Vernon 1977), arguing that he was denied his right to
a meaningful appeal when he was denied the opportunity to
file a pro se brief. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
agreed and, on September 25, 2002, granted petitioner the
right to file an out-of-time appeal:
“[Petitioner] is entitled to an out-of-time appeal in cause
number CR–91–0528–B in the 119th Judicial District
Court of Tom Green County. [Petitioner] is ordered re
turned to that point in time at which he may give writ
ten notice of appeal so that he may then, with the aid of
counsel, obtain a meaningful appeal. For purposes of
the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, all time limits
shall be calculated as if the sentence had been imposed
on the date that the mandate of this Court issues.”
Ex parte Jimenez, No. 74,433 (per curiam), App. 26, 27.
Petitioner thereafter filed the out-of-time appeal. His
conviction was affirmed. The Texas Court of Criminal Ap
peals denied discretionary review on October 8, 2003. Time
for seeking certiorari review of that decision with this Court
expired on January 6, 2004. On December 6, 2004, peti
tioner filed a second application for a writ of habeas corpus
in state court; it was denied on June 29, 2005.
Petitioner then filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas
corpus on July 19, 2005. To establish the timeliness of his

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petition, he relied on 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), which pro
vides “the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review” as the trigger for AEDPA’s 1-year limi
tations period. Petitioner argued that his judgment thus
became final on January 6, 2004,2 when time expired for seek
ing certiorari review of the decision in his out-of-time appeal.
Until that date, petitioner argued, direct review of his state
court conviction was not complete.
With January 6, 2004, as the start date, petitioner con
tended that his July 19, 2005, petition was timely because
the statute excludes from the 1-year limitations period “[t]he
time during which a properly filed application for State
post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to
the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” § 2244(d)(2).
Petitioner had a state habeas application pending from De
cember 6, 2004, through June 29, 2005, so less than one year
of included time—specifically, 355 days—passed between
January 6, 2004, and July 19, 2005.
The District Court disagreed and dismissed the federal ha
beas petition as time barred. In the District Court’s view,
the proper start date for AEDPA’s 1-year limitations period
was October 11, 1996, when time for seeking discretionary
review of the decision in petitioner’s first direct appeal ex
pired. The District Court concluded that it could not take
into account the Texas court’s later decision reopening peti
tioner’s direct appeal because Circuit precedent established
that “ ‘AEDPA provides for only a linear limitations period,
one that starts and ends on specific dates, with only the pos
sibility that tolling will expand the period in between.’ ”
Order, Civ. Action No. 6:05–CV–05–C (ND Tex., Oct. 23,
2006), App. 75, 90 (quoting Salinas v. Dretke, 354 F. 3d 425,
429 (CA5 2004)). Therefore, the District Court reasoned,
2 In the District Court, petitioner contended that this date was January
8, 2004, but petitioner’s time for seeking certiorari review actually expired
two days earlier.

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the limitations period began on October 11, 1996, and ended
on October 11, 1997, because petitioner had not sought any
state or federal collateral review by that date.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s request for a cer
tificate of appealability, finding that he had “failed to demon
strate that reasonable jurists would debate the correctness
of the district court’s conclusion that the § 2254 petition is
time-barred.” Order, No. 06–11240 (May 25, 2007), App.
124, 125. We granted certiorari, 552 U. S. 1256 (2008), and
now reverse and remand for further proceedings.3
II
As with any question of statutory interpretation, our anal
ysis begins with the plain language of the statute. Lamie
v. United States Trustee, 540 U. S. 526, 534 (2004). It is well
established that, when the statutory language is plain, we
must enforce it according to its terms. See, e. g., Dodd v.
United States, 545 U. S. 353, 359 (2005); Lamie, supra, at 534;
Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank,
N. A., 530 U. S. 1, 6 (2000); Caminetti v. United States, 242
U. S. 470, 485 (1917).
The parties agree that the statutory provision that deter
mines the timeliness of petitioner’s habeas petition is 28
U. S. C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). That subsection defines the starting
3 We do not decide whether petitioner is entitled to a certificate of ap
pealability on remand because we are presented solely with the Court of
Appeals’ decision on the timeliness of the petition under 28 U. S. C.
§ 2244(d). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural
grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim,”
as here, a certificate of appealability should issue only when the prisoner
shows both “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was
correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U. S. 473, 484
(2000) (emphasis added). We make no judgment regarding the merits of
petitioner’s federal constitutional claims.

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date for purposes of the 1-year AEDPA limitations period as
“the date on which the judgment became final by the conclu
sion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking
such review.” The only disputed question before us is
whether the date on which direct review became “final”
under the statute is October 11, 1996, when petitioner’s con
viction initially became final, or January 6, 2004, when the
out-of-time appeal granted by the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals became final. We agree with petitioner that, under
the plain meaning of the statutory text, the latter date
controls.
Finality is a concept that has been “variously defined; like
many legal terms, its precise meaning depends on context.”
Clay v. United States, 537 U. S. 522, 527 (2003). But here,
the finality of a state-court judgment is expressly defined by
statute as “the conclusion of direct review or the expiration
of the time for seeking such review.” § 2244(d)(1)(A).
With respect to postconviction relief for federal prisoners,
this Court has held that the conclusion of direct review oc
curs when “this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on
direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari.”
Id., at 527, 528–532 (interpreting § 2255, ¶ 6(1)). We have
further held that if the federal prisoner chooses not to seek
direct review in this Court, then the conviction becomes final
when “the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.” Id.,
at 527. In construing the similar language of § 2244(d)(1)(A),
we see no reason to depart from this settled understanding,
which comports with the most natural reading of the statu
tory text. See Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U. S. 327, 332–335
(2007) (citing Clay, supra, at 528, n. 3). As a result, direct
review cannot conclude for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) until
the “availability of direct appeal to the state courts,”
Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U. S. 383, 390 (1994), and to this
Court, Lawrence, supra, at 332–333, has been exhausted.
Until that time, the “process of direct review” has not
“com[e] to an end” and “a presumption of finality and legal

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ity” cannot yet have “attache[d] to the conviction and sen
tence,” Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 887 (1983).
Under the statutory definition, therefore, once the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals reopened direct review of peti
tioner’s conviction on September 25, 2002,4 petitioner’s con
viction was no longer final for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A).
Rather, the order “granting an out-of-time appeal restore[d]
the pendency of the direct appeal,” Ex parte Torres, 943
S. W. 2d 469, 472 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997), and petitioner’s
conviction was again capable of modification through direct
appeal to the state courts and to this Court on certiorari
review. Therefore, it was not until January 6, 2004, when
time for seeking certiorari review in this Court expired, that
petitioner’s conviction became “final” through “the conclu
sion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking
such review” under § 2244(d)(1)(A).
Respondent objects, observing that the Court has pre
viously acknowledged Congress’ intent “to advance the fi
nality of criminal convictions” with the “tight time line” of
§ 2244(d)(1)(A), Mayle v. Felix, 545 U. S. 644, 662 (2005),
which “pinpoint[s]” a uniform federal date of finality that
does not “vary from State to State,” Clay, supra, at 530, 531.
In respondent’s view, permitting a state court to reopen di
rect review, and thus reset AEDPA’s 1-year limitations pe
riod, undermines the policy of finality that Congress estab
4 We do not here decide whether petitioner could have sought timely
federal habeas relief between October 11, 1997, when the 1-year limita
tions period initially expired, and September 25, 2002, when the state
court ordered that his direct review be reopened. Were such a petition
timely, though, it would not be through application of § 2244(d)(1)(A) be
cause we have previously held that the possibility that a state court may
reopen direct review “does not render convictions and sentences that are
no longer subject to direct review nonfinal,” Beard v. Banks, 542 U. S. 406,
412 (2004). We do not depart from that rule here; we merely hold that,
where a state court has in fact reopened direct review, the conviction is
rendered nonfinal for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) during the pendency of
the reopened appeal.

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lished in § 2244(d)(1). But it is the plain language of
§ 2244(d)(1) that pinpoints the uniform date of finality set by
Congress. And that language points to the conclusion of di
rect appellate proceedings in state court. The statute thus
carries out “AEDPA’s goal of promoting ‘comity, finality, and
federalism’ by giving state courts ‘the first opportunity to
review [the] claim,’ and to ‘correct’ any ‘constitutional viola
tion in the first instance.’ ” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U. S. 214,
220 (2002) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 420, 436
(2000); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U. S. 838, 844–845 (1999)).
The statute requires a federal court, presented with an indi
vidual’s first petition for habeas relief, to make use of the
date on which the entirety of the state direct appellate re
view process was completed. Here, that date was January
6, 2004.
* * *
Our decision today is a narrow one. We hold that, where
a state court grants a criminal defendant the right to file an
out-of-time direct appeal during state collateral review, but
before the defendant has first sought federal habeas relief,
his judgment is not yet “final” for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A).
In such a case, “the date on which the judgment became final
by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the
time for seeking such review” must reflect the conclusion of
the out-of-time direct appeal, or the expiration of the time
for seeking review of that appeal. Because the Court of Ap
peals denied a certificate of appealability based on a contrary
reading of the statute, we reverse the judgment and remand
the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.