KENNEDY, executrix of the ESTATE OF KENNEDY, DECEASED v. PLAN ADMINISTRATOR FOR DuPONT SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT PLAN et al.

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285 OCTOBER TERM, 2008
Syllabus
KENNEDY, executrix of the ESTATE OF KENNEDY,
DECEASED v. PLAN ADMINISTRATOR FOR DuPONT
SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT PLAN et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fifth circuit
No. 07–636. Argued October 7, 2008—Decided January 26, 2009
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), as rele
vant here, obligates administrators to manage ERISA plans “in accord
ance with the documents and instruments governing” them, 29 U. S. C.
§ 1104(a)(1)(D); requires covered pension benefit plans to “provide that
benefits . . . may not be assigned or alienated,” § 1056(d)(1); and exempts
from this bar qualified domestic relations orders (QDROs), § 1056(d)(3).
The decedent, William Kennedy, participated in his employer’s savings
and investment plan (SIP), with power both to designate a beneficiary
to receive the funds upon his death and to replace or revoke that desig
nation as prescribed by the plan administrator. Under the terms of the
plan, if there is no surviving spouse or designated beneficiary at the
time of death, distribution is made as directed by the estate’s executor
or administrator. Upon their marriage, William designated Liv Ken
nedy his SIP beneficiary and named no contingent beneficiary. Their
subsequent divorce decree divested Liv of her interest in the SIP bene
fits, but William did not execute a document removing Liv as the SIP
beneficiary. On William’s death, petitioner Kari Kennedy, his daughter
and the executrix of his Estate, asked for the SIP funds to be distrib
uted to the Estate, but the plan administrator relied on William’s desig
nation form and paid them to Liv. The Estate filed suit, alleging that
Liv had waived her SIP benefits in the divorce and thus respondents,
the employer and the SIP plan administrator (together, DuPont), had
violated ERISA by paying her. As relevant here, the District Court
entered summary judgment for the Estate, ordering DuPont to pay the
benefits to the Estate. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Liv’s
waiver was an assignment or alienation of her interest to the Estate
barred by § 1056(d)(1).
Held:
1. Because Liv did not attempt to direct her interest in the SIP bene
fits to the Estate or any other potential beneficiary, her waiver did not
constitute an assignment or alienation rendered void under §1056(d)(1).
Pp. 292–299.

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286 KENNEDY v. PLAN ADMINISTRATOR FOR DuPONT
SAV. AND INVESTMENT PLAN
Syllabus
(a) Given the legal meaning of “assigned” and “alienated,” it is fair
to say that Liv did not assign or alienate anything to William or to the
Estate. The Fifth Circuit’s broad reading—that Liv’s waiver indirectly
transferred her interest to the next possible beneficiary, here the Es
tate—is questionable. It would be odd to speak of an estate as the
transferee of its own decedent’s property or of the decedent in his life
time as his own transferee. It would also be strange under the Treas
ury regulation that defines “assignment” and “alienation.” Moreover,
it is difficult to see how certain waivers not barred by the antialienation
provision, e. g., a surviving spouse’s ability to waive a survivor’s annuity
or lump-sum payment, see Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U. S. 833, 843; 29 U. S. C.
§§ 1055(a), (b)(1)(C), (c)(2), would be permissible under the Fifth Circuit’s
reading. These doubts, and exceptions calling the Fifth Circuit’s read
ing into question, point the Court toward the law of trusts that “serves
as ERISA’s backdrop.” Beck v. PACE Int’l Union, 551 U. S. 96, 101.
Section 1056(d)(1) is much like a spendthrift trust provision barring as
signment or alienation of a benefit, see Boggs, supra, at 852, and the
cognate trust law is highly suggestive here. The general principle that
a designated spendthrift beneficiary can disclaim his trust interest mag
nifies the improbability that a statute written with an eye on the old
law would effectively force a beneficiary to take an interest willy-nilly.
The Treasury reads its own regulation to mean that the antialienation
provision is not violated by a beneficiary’s waiver “where the beneficiary
does not attempt to direct her interest in pension benefits to another
person.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18. Being neither
“plainly erroneous [n]or inconsistent with the regulation,” the Treasury
Department’s interpretation is controlling. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S.
452, 461. ERISA’s QDRO provisions shed no light on the validity of a
waiver by a non-QDRO. Pp. 292–297.
(b) DuPont’s additional reasons for saying that ERISA barred Liv’s
waiver are unavailing. Pp. 297–299.
2. Although Liv’s waiver was not nullified by § 1056’s express terms,
the plan administrator did its ERISA duty by paying the SIP benefits
to Liv in conformity with the plan documents. ERISA provides no
exception to the plan administrator’s duty to act in accordance with plan
documents. Thus, the Estate’s claim stands or falls by “the terms of
the plan,” 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), a straightforward rule that lets
employers “ ‘establish a uniform administrative scheme, [with] a set of
standard procedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement of
benefits,’ ” Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U. S. 141, 148. By giving a plan
participant a clear set of instructions for making his own instructions
clear, ERISA forecloses any justification for enquiries into expressions
of intent, in favor of the virtues of adhering to an uncomplicated rule.

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Syllabus
Less certain rules could force plan administrators to examine numerous
external documents purporting to be waivers and draw them into litiga
tion like this over those waivers’ meaning and enforceability. The guar
antee of simplicity is not absolute, since a QDRO’s enforceability may
require an administrator to look for beneficiaries outside plan documents
notwithstanding § 1104(a)(1)(D). But an administrator enforcing a
QDRO must be said to enforce plan documents, not ignore them, and a
QDRO enquiry is relatively discrete, given its specific and objective cri
teria. These are good and sufficient reasons for holding the line, just
as the Court did in holding that ERISA preempted state laws that could
blur the bright-line requirement to follow plan documents in distribut
ing benefits. See Boggs, supra, at 850, and Egelhoff, supra, at 143.
What goes for inconsistent state law goes for a federal common law of
waiver that might obscure a plan administrator’s duty to act “in accord
ance with the documents and instruments.” See Mertens v. Hewitt As
sociates, 508 U. S. 248, 259. This case points out the wisdom of pro
tecting the plan documents rule. Under the SIP, Liv was William’s
designated beneficiary. The plan provided a way to disclaim an interest
in the SIP account, which Liv did not purport to follow. The plan ad
ministrator therefore did exactly what § 1104(a)(1)(D) required and paid
Liv the benefits. Pp. 299–304.
497 F. 3d 426, affirmed.
Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
David A. Furlow argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Kevin Pennell and Stacy L. Kelly.
Mark I. Levy argued the cause for respondents. With
him on the brief were Adam H. Charnes, John M. Vine, Seth
J. Safra, Theodore P. Metzler, Raymond Michael Ripple, and
Donna L. Goodman.
Leondra R. Kruger argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With her on the brief
were former Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney
General Hochman, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Rob
ert F. Hoyt, Donald L. Korb, Nathaniel I. Spiller, and Ed
ward D. Sieger.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for AARP by Mary
Ellen Signorille and Melvin R. Radowitz; for the American Benefits
Council et al. by Kent A. Mason; and for the Western Conference of Team
sters Pension Trust Fund by R. Bradford Huss.

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288 KENNEDY v. PLAN ADMINISTRATOR FOR DuPONT
SAV. AND INVESTMENT PLAN
Opinion of the Court
Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq., generally
obligates administrators to manage ERISA plans “in ac
cordance with the documents and instruments governing”
them. § 1104(a)(1)(D). At a more specific level, the Act re
quires covered pension benefit plans to “provide that bene
fits . . . under the plan may not be assigned or alienated,”
§ 1056(d)(1), but this bar does not apply to qualified domestic
relations orders (QDROs), § 1056(d)(3). The question here is
whether the terms of the limitation on assignment or alien
ation invalidated the act of a divorced spouse, the designated
beneficiary under her ex-husband’s ERISA pension plan,
who purported to waive her entitlement by a federal common
law waiver embodied in a divorce decree that was not a
QDRO. We hold that such a waiver is not rendered invalid
by the text of the antialienation provision, but that the plan
administrator properly disregarded the waiver owing to its
conflict with the designation made by the former husband in
accordance with plan documents.
I
The decedent, William Kennedy, worked for E. I. DuPont
de Nemours & Company and was a participant in its savings
and investment plan (SIP), with power both to “designate
any beneficiary or beneficiaries . . . to receive all or part”
of the funds upon his death, and to “replace or revoke such
designation.” App. 48. The plan requires “[a]ll authoriza
tions, designations and requests concerning the Plan [to] be
made by employees in the manner prescribed by the [plan
administrator],” id., at 52, and provides forms for designating
or changing a beneficiary, id., at 34, 56–57. If at the time
the participant dies “no surviving spouse exists and no bene
ficiary designation is in effect, distribution shall be made to,
or in accordance with the directions of, the executor or ad
ministrator of the decedent’s estate.” Id., at 48.

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Opinion of the Court
The SIP is an ERISA “ ‘employee pension benefit plan,’ ”
497 F. 3d 426, 427 (CA5 2007); 29 U. S. C. § 1002(2), and the
parties do not dispute that the plan satisfies ERISA’s anti
alienation provision, § 1056(d)(1), which requires it to “pro
vide that benefits provided under the plan may not be as
signed or alienated.” 1 The plan does, however, permit a
beneficiary to submit a “qualified disclaimer” of benefits as
defined under the Tax Code, see 26 U. S. C. § 2518, which has
the effect of switching the beneficiary to an “alternate . . .
determined according to a valid beneficiary designation
made by the deceased.” Supp. Record 86–87 (Exh. 15).
In 1971, William married Liv Kennedy, and, in 1974, he
signed a form designating her to take benefits under the SIP,
but naming no contingent beneficiary to take if she dis
claimed her interest. 497 F. 3d, at 427. William and Liv
divorced in 1994, subject to a decree that Liv “is . . . divested
of all right, title, interest, and claim in and to . . . [a]ny and
all sums . . . the proceeds [from], and any other rights related
to any . . . retirement plan, pension plan, or like benefit pro
gram existing by reason of [William’s] past or present or
future employment.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 64–65. Wil
liam did not, however, execute any documents removing Liv
as the SIP beneficiary, 497 F. 3d, at 428, even though he
did execute a new beneficiary-designation form naming his
daughter, Kari Kennedy, as the beneficiary under DuPont’s
Pension and Retirement Plan, also governed by ERISA.
On William’s death in 2001, petitioner Kari Kennedy was
named executrix and asked DuPont to distribute the SIP
1 The plan states that “[e]xcept as provided by Section 401(a)(13) of the
[Internal Revenue] Code, no assignment of the rights or interests of ac
count holders under this Plan will be permitted or recognized, nor shall
such rights or interests be subject to attachment or other legal processes
for debts.” App. 50–51. Title 26 U. S. C. § 401(a)(13)(A), in language sub
stantially tracking the text of § 1056(d)(1), provides that “[a] trust shall
not constitute a qualified trust under this section unless the plan of which
such trust is a part provides that benefits provided under the plan may
not be assigned or alienated.”

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290 KENNEDY v. PLAN ADMINISTRATOR FOR DuPONT
SAV. AND INVESTMENT PLAN
Opinion of the Court
funds to William’s estate (hereinafter Estate). Ibid. Du-
Pont, instead, relied on William’s designation form and paid
the balance of some $400,000 to Liv. Ibid. The Estate then
sued respondents DuPont and the SIP plan administra
tor (together, DuPont), claiming that the divorce decree
amounted to a waiver of the SIP benefits on Liv’s part, and
that DuPont had violated ERISA by paying the benefits to
William’s designee.2
So far as it matters here, the District Court entered sum
mary judgment for the Estate, to which it ordered DuPont
to pay the value of the SIP benefits. The court relied on
Fifth Circuit precedent establishing that a beneficiary can
waive his rights to the proceeds of an ERISA plan “ ‘pro
vided that the waiver is explicit, voluntary, and made in good
faith.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 38 (quoting Manning v.
Hayes, 212 F. 3d 866, 874 (CA5 2000)).
The Fifth Circuit nonetheless reversed, distinguishing
prior decisions enforcing federal common law waivers of
ERISA benefits because they involved life-insurance poli
cies, which are considered “ ‘welfare plan[s]’ ” under ERISA
and consequently free of the antialienation provision. 497
F. 3d, at 429. The Court of Appeals held that Liv’s waiver
constituted an assignment or alienation of her interest in the
SIP benefits to the Estate, and so could not be honored. Id.,
at 430. The court relied heavily on the ERISA provision
for bypassing the antialienation provision when a marriage
2 The Estate now says that William’s beneficiary-designation form for
the Pension and Retirement Plan applied to the SIP as well, but the form
on its face applies only to DuPont’s “Pension and Retirement Plan.” App.
62. In the District Court, in fact, the Estate stipulated that William
“never executed any forms or documents to remove or replace Liv Ken
nedy as his sole beneficiary under either the SIP or [a plan that merged
into the SIP].” Id., at 28. In any event, the Estate did not raise this
argument in the Court of Appeals, and we will not address it in the first
instance. See Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U. S. 638, 645–646 (1992).

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breaks up: under 29 U. S. C. § 1056(d)(3),3 a court order that
satisfies certain statutory requirements is known as a
QDRO, which is exempt from the bar on assignment or alien
ation. Because the Kennedys’ divorce decree was not a
QDRO, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that it could not give ef
fect to Liv’s waiver incorporated in it, given that “ERISA
provides a specific mechanism—the QDRO—for addressing
the elimination of a spouse’s interest in plan benefits, but
that mechanism is not invoked.” 497 F. 3d, at 431.
We granted certiorari to resolve a split among the Courts
of Appeals and State Supreme Courts over a divorced
spouse’s ability to waive pension plan benefits through a di
vorce decree not amounting to a QDRO.4 552 U. S. 1178
(2008). We subsequently realized that this case implicates
the further split over whether a beneficiary’s federal common
law waiver of plan benefits is effective where that waiver is
inconsistent with plan documents,5 and after oral argument
we invited supplemental briefing on that latter issue, upon
3 Section 1056(d)(3)(A) provides that the antialienation provision “shall
apply to the creation, assignment, or recognition of a right to any benefit
payable with respect to a participant pursuant to a domestic relations
order, except that paragraph (1) shall not apply if the order is determined
to be a qualified domestic relations order.”
4 Compare Altobelli v. IBM Corp., 77 F. 3d 78 (CA4 1996) (federal com
mon law waiver in divorce decree does not conflict with antialienation
provision); Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund v.
Brown, 897 F. 2d 275 (CA7 1990) (en banc) (same); Keen v. Weaver, 121
S. W. 3d 721 (Tex. 2003) (same), with McGowan v. NJR Serv. Corp., 423
F. 3d 241 (CA3 2005) (federal common law waiver in divorce decree barred
by antialienation provision).
5 Compare Altobelli, supra (federal common law waiver controls); Mo
hamed v. Kerr, 53 F. 3d 911 (CA8 1995) (same); Brandon v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 18 F. 3d 1321 (CA5 1994) (same); Fox Valley, supra (same); Strong v.
Omaha Constr. Industry Pension Plan, 270 Neb. 1, 701 N. W. 2d 320
(2005) (same); Keen, supra (same), with Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Marsh, 119 F. 3d 415 (CA6 1997) (plan documents control); Krishna v.
Colgate Palmolive Co., 7 F. 3d 11 (CA2 1993) (same).

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292 KENNEDY v. PLAN ADMINISTRATOR FOR DuPONT
SAV. AND INVESTMENT PLAN
Opinion of the Court
which the disposition of this case ultimately turns. We now
affirm, albeit on reasoning different from the Fifth Circuit’s
rationale.
II
A
By its terms, the antialienation provision, § 1056(d)(1), re
quires a plan to provide expressly that benefits be neither
“assigned” nor “alienated,” the operative verbs having his
tories of legal meaning: to “assign” is “[t]o transfer; as to
assign property, or some interest therein,” Black’s Law
Dictionary 152 (4th rev. ed. 1968), and to “alienate” is “[t]o
convey; to transfer the title to property,” id., at 96. We
think it fair to say that Liv did not assign or alienate any
thing to William or to the Estate later standing in his shoes.
The Fifth Circuit saw the waiver as an assignment or
alienation to the Estate, thinking that Liv’s waiver trans
ferred the SIP benefits to whoever would be next in line;
without a designated contingent beneficiary, the Estate
would take them. The court found support in the applicable
Treasury Department regulation that defines “assignment”
and “alienation” to include
“[a]ny direct or indirect arrangement (whether revocable
or irrevocable) whereby a party acquires from a par
ticipant or beneficiary a right or interest enforceable
against the plan in, or to, all or any part of a plan benefit
payment which is, or may become, payable to the par
ticipant or beneficiary.” 26 CFR § 1.401(a)–13(c)(1)(ii)
(2008).
See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U. S. 833, 851–852 (1997) (relying
upon the regulation to interpret the meaning of “assign
ment” and “alienation” in § 1056(d)(1)). The Circuit treated
Liv’s waiver as an “ ‘indirect arrangement’ ” whereby the Es
tate gained an “ ‘interest enforceable against the plan.’ ”
497 F. 3d, at 430.
Casting the alienation net this far, though, raises questions
that leave one in doubt. Although it is possible to speak of

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Opinion of the Court
the waiver as an “arrangement” having the indirect effect of
a transfer to the next possible beneficiary, it would be odd
usage to speak of an estate as the transferee of its own dece
dent’s property, just as it would be to speak of the decedent
in his lifetime as his own transferee. And treating the es
tate or even the ultimate estate beneficiary as the assignee
or transferee would be strange under the terms of the regu
lation: it would be hard to say the estate or future beneficiary
“acquires” a right or interest when at the time of the waiver
there was no estate and the beneficiary of a future estate
might be anyone’s guess. If there were a contingent bene
ficiary (or the participant made a subsequent designation)
the estate would get no interest; as for an estate beneficiary,
the identity could ultimately turn on the law of intestacy
applied to facts as yet unknown, or on the contents of the
participant’s subsequent will, or simply on the participant’s
future exercise of (or failure to invoke) the power to desig
nate a new beneficiary directly under the terms of the plan.
Thus, if such a waiver created an “arrangement” assigning
or transferring anything under the statute, the assignor
would be blindfolded, operating, at best, on the fringe of
what “assignment” or “alienation” normally suggests.
The questionability of this broad reading is confirmed by
exceptions to it that are apparent right off the bat. Take
the case of a surviving spouse’s interest in pension benefits,
for example. Depending on the circumstances, a surviving
spouse has a right to a survivor’s annuity or to a lump-sum
payment on the death of the participant, unless the spouse
has waived the right and the participant has eliminated
the survivor annuity benefit or designated a different ben
eficiary. See Boggs, supra, at 843; 29 U. S. C. §§ 1055(a),
(b)(1)(C), (c)(2). This waiver by a spouse is plainly not
barred by the antialienation provision. Likewise, DuPont
concedes that a qualified disclaimer under the Tax Code,
which allows a party to refuse an interest in property and
thereby eliminate federal tax, would not violate the anti

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SAV. AND INVESTMENT PLAN
Opinion of the Court
alienation provision. See Brief for Respondents 21–23; 26
U. S. C. § 2518. In each example, though, we fail to see how
these waivers would be permissible under the Fifth Circuit’s
reading of the statute and regulation.
Our doubts, and the exceptions that call the Fifth Circuit’s
reading into question, point us toward authority we have
drawn on before, the law of trusts that “serves as ERISA’s
backdrop.” Beck v. PACE Int’l Union, 551 U. S. 96, 101
(2007). We explained before that § 1056(d)(1) is much like a
spendthrift trust provision barring assignment or alienation
of a benefit, see Boggs, supra, at 852, and the cognate trust
law is highly suggestive here. Although the beneficiary of
a spendthrift trust traditionally lacked the means to transfer
his beneficial interest to anyone else, he did have the power
to disclaim prior to accepting it, so long as the disclaimer
made no attempt to direct the interest to a beneficiary in his
stead. See 2 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 58(1), Com
ment c, p. 359 (2001) (“A designated beneficiary of a spend
thrift trust is not required to accept or retain an interest
prescribed by the terms of the trust. . . . On the other hand,
a purported disclaimer by which the beneficiary attempts to
direct who is to receive the interest is a precluded transfer”);
E. Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts § 524, p. 603 (2d ed. 1947)
(“The American cases, though not entirely clear, generally
take the view that the interest under a spendthrift trust may
be disclaimed”); Roseberry v. Moncure, 245 Va. 436, 439, 429
S. E. 2d 4, 6 (1993) (“ ‘If a trust is created without notice to
the beneficiary or the beneficiary has not accepted the bene
ficial interest under the trust, he can disclaim’ ” (quoting 1
A. Scott & W. Fratcher, Law of Trusts § 36.1, p. 389 (4th ed.
1987) (hereinafter Fratcher))).
We do not mean that the whole law of spendthrift trusts
and disclaimers turns up in § 1056(d)(1), but the general prin
ciple that a designated spendthrift can disclaim his trust in
terest magnifies the improbability that a statute written
with an eye on the old law would effectively force a benefi

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ciary to take an interest willy-nilly. Common sense and
common law both say that “[t]he law certainly is not so ab
surd as to force a man to take an estate against his will.”
Townson v. Tickell, 3 Barn. & Ald. 31, 36, 106 Eng. Rep. 575,
576–577 (K. B. 1819).6
The Treasury is certainly comfortable with the state of the
old law, for the way it reads its own regulation “no party
‘acquires from’ a beneficiary a ‘right or interest enforceable
against a plan’ pursuant to a beneficiary’s waiver of rights
where the beneficiary does not attempt to direct her interest
in pension benefits to another person.” Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 18. And, being neither “plainly
erroneous [n]or inconsistent with the regulation,” the Treas
6 DuPont argues that Liv’s waiver would have been an invalid disclaimer
at common law because it was given for consideration in the divorce settle
ment. But the authorities DuPont cites fail to support the proposition
that a beneficiary’s otherwise valid disclaimer was invalid at common law
because she received consideration. See Roseberry v. Moncure, 245 Va.,
at 439, 429 S. E. 2d, at 6; Smith v. Bank of Del., 43 Del. Ch. 124, 126–127,
219 A. 2d 576, 577 (1966); Preminger v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 54 Mich.
App. 361, 368–369, 220 N. W. 2d 795, 798–799 (1974); 4 Fratcher § 337.1
(4th ed. 1989); 1 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 36, Comment c (1957).
It is true that the receipt of consideration prevents a beneficiary from
making a qualified disclaimer for gift tax purposes, see 26 CFR
§ 25.2518–2 (2008), and there is common law authority for the proposition
that a renunciation by a devisee is ineffective against existing creditors if
“it is shown that those who would take such property on renunciation had
agreed to pay to the devisee something of value in consideration of such
renunciation.” 6 W. Bowe & D. Parker, Page on Law of Wills § 49.5, p. 48
(2005); see also Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Iowa 474, 478–479, 187 N. W.
20, 22 (1922). But at common law the receipt of consideration did not
necessarily render a disclaimer invalid. See Commerce Trust Co. v. Fast,
396 S. W. 2d 683, 686–687 (Mo. 1965); Central Nat. Bank v. Eells, 5 Ohio
Misc. 187, 189–192, 215 N. E. 2d 77, 80–81 (Ohio P. Ct. 1965); In re Wimp
eris, [1914] 1 Ch. 502, 508–510; see also In re Estate of Baird, 131 Wash.
2d 514, 519, n. 5, 933 P. 2d 1031, 1034, n. 5 (1997). In any event, our point
is not that Liv’s waiver was a valid disclaimer at common law: only that
reading the terms of 29 U. S. C. § 1056(d)(1) to bar all non-QDRO waivers
is unsound in light of background common law principles.

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Opinion of the Court
ury Department’s interpretation of its regulation is control
ling. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452, 461 (1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted).7
The Fifth Circuit found “significant support” for its con
trary holding in the QDRO subsections, reasoning that “[i]n
the marital-dissolution context, the QDRO provisions supply
the sole exception to the anti-alienation provision,” 497 F. 3d,
at 430, a point that echoes in DuPont’s argument here. But
the negative implication of the QDRO language is not that
simple. If a QDRO provided a way for a former spouse like
Liv merely to waive benefits, this would be powerful evi
dence that the antialienation provision was meant to deny
any effect to a waiver within a divorce decree but not a
QDRO, else there would have been no need for the QDRO
exception. But this is not so, and DuPont’s argument rests
on a false premise. In fact, a beneficiary seeking only to
relinquish her right to benefits cannot do this by a QDRO,
for a QDRO by definition requires that it be the “creat[ion]
or recogni[tion of] the existence of an alternate payee’s
right to, or assign[ment] to an alternate payee [of] the right
7 It is true that the Government’s position regarding the applicability of
the antialienation provision to a waiver has fluctuated. The Labor De
partment previously took the position that “application of such a federal
common-law waiver rule to pension plans would conflict with ERISA’s
anti-alienation provision.” Brief for Secretary of Labor as Amicus Cu
riae in Keen v. Weaver, No. 01–0447 (Tex. 2003), p. 16. And it likewise
asserted that “waiver of pension benefits is generally impermissible under
[§ 1056(d)(1)].” Brief for Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in In re
Estate of Egelhoff, No. 67626–7 (Wash. 2001), p. 5. The Labor Depart
ment has reconsidered that view and has now taken the Treasury’s po
sition. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20, n. 6. But “the
change in interpretation alone presents no separate ground for disregard
ing the [Treasury’s and the Labor] Department’s present interpretation.”
Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U. S. 158, 171 (2007). Nor
does the fact that the interpretation is stated in a legal brief make it
unworthy of deference, as “[t]here is simply no reason to suspect that the
interpretation does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment
on the matter in question.” Auer, 519 U. S., at 462.

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to, receive all or a portion of the benefits payable with
respec t to a par ticipant under a plan. ” 29 U. S. C.
§ 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I). There is no QDRO for a simple waiver;
there must be some succeeding designation of an alternate
payee.8 Not being a mechanism for simply renouncing a
claim to benefits, then, the QDRO provisions shed no light
on whether a beneficiary may waive by a non-QDRO.
In sum, Liv did not attempt to direct her interest in the
SIP benefits to the Estate or any other potential beneficiary,
and accordingly we think that the better view is that her
waiver did not constitute an assignment or alienation ren
dered void under the terms of § 1056(d)(1).
B
DuPont has three other reasons for saying that Liv’s
waiver was barred by ERISA. They are unavailing.
First, it argues that even if the waiver is not an assign
ment or alienation barred under the terms of § 1056(d)(1),
§ 1056(d)(3)(A) still prohibits it, in providing that § 1056(d)(1)
“shall apply to the creation, assignment, or recognition of a
right to any benefit payable with respect to a participant
pursuant to a domestic relations order [that is not a QDRO].”
At the very least, DuPont reasons, Liv’s waiver included a
“recognition” of William’s rights with respect to the SIP ben
efits. But DuPont overlooks the point that when subsection
(d)(3)(A) provides that the bar to assignments or alienations
extends to non-QDROs, it does nothing to expand the scope
of prohibited assignment and alienation under subsection
(d)(1). Whether Liv’s action is seen as a waiver or as a do
mestic relations order that incorporated a waiver, subsection
8 Even if one understands Liv’s waiver to have resulted somehow in her
interest reverting to William, he does not qualify as an “alternate payee,”
which is defined by statute as “any spouse, former spouse, child, or other
dependent of a participant who is recognized by a domestic relations order
as having a right to receive all, or a portion of, the benefits payable under
a plan with respect to such participant.” 29 U. S. C. § 1056(d)(3)(K).

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(d)(1) does not cover it and § 1056(d)(3)(A) does not independ
ently bar it.
Second, DuPont relies upon § 1056(d)(3)(H)(iii)(II), provid
ing that if a domestic relations order is not a QDRO, “the
plan administrator shall pay the segregated amounts (includ
ing any interest thereon) to the person or persons who would
have been entitled to such amounts if there had been no
order.” According to DuPont, because the divorce decree
was not a QDRO this provision calls for paying benefits as if
there had been no order. But DuPont has wrenched this
language out of its setting, reading clause (iii) of subpara
graph (H) as if there were no clause (i):
“During any period in which the issue of whether a do
mestic relations order is a qualified [QDRO] domestic
relations order is being determined . . . the plan adminis
trator shall separately account for the amounts (herein
after in this subparagraph referred to as the ‘segregated
amounts’) which would have been payable to the al
ternate payee during such period if the order had been
determined to be a [QDRO].” § 1056(d)(3)(H)(i).
Thus it is clear that subparagraph (H) speaks of a domestic
relations order that distributes certain benefits (the “segre
gated amounts”) to an alternate payee, when the question
for the plan administrator is whether the order is effective
as a QDRO. That is the circumstance in which, for want of
a QDRO, clause (iii) tells the plan administrator not to pay
the alternate, but to distribute the segregated amounts as if
there had been no order. Clause (iii) does not, as DuPont
suggests, state a general rule that a non-QDRO is a nullity
in any proceeding that would affect the determination of a
beneficiary. And of course clause (iii) says nothing here at
all; the divorce decree names no alternate payee, and there
are consequently no “segregated amounts.”
Third, DuPont claims that a plan cannot recognize a
waiver of benefits in a non-QDRO divorce decree because

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ERISA preempts “any and all State laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan,” with
“State law” being defined to include “decisions” or “other
State action having the effect of law.” 9 §§ 1144(a), (c)(1).
DuPont says that Liv’s waiver, expressed in a state-court
decision and related to an employee benefit plan, is thus
preempted. But recognizing a waiver in a divorce decree
would not be giving effect to state law; the argument is that
the waiver should be treated as a creature of federal common
law, in which case its setting in a state divorce decree would
be only happenstance. A court would merely be applying
federal law to a document that might also have independent
significance under state law. See, e. g., Melton v. Melton,
324 F. 3d 941, 945–946 (CA7 2003); Clift v. Clift, 210 F. 3d
268, 271–272 (CA5 2000); Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877
F. 2d 692, 693–694 (CA8 1989).
III
The waiver’s escape from inevitable nullity under the ex
press terms of the antialienation clause does not, however,
control the decision of this case, and the question remains
whether the plan administrator was required to honor Liv’s
waiver with the consequence of distributing the SIP balance
to the Estate.10 We hold that it was not, and that the plan
9 This preemption provision does not apply to QDROs. See § 1144(b)(7).
10 Despite our following answer to the question here, our conclusion that
§ 1056(d)(1) does not make a nullity of a waiver leaves open any questions
about a waiver’s effect in circumstances in which it is consistent with plan
documents. Nor do we express any view as to whether the Estate could
have brought an action in state or federal court against Liv to obtain the
benefits after they were distributed. Compare Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U. S.
833, 853 (1997) (“If state law is not pre-empted, the diversion of retirement
benefits will occur regardless of whether the interest in the pension plan
is enforced against the plan or the recipient of the pension benefit”), with
Sweebe v. Sweebe, 474 Mich. 151, 156–159, 712 N. W. 2d 708, 712–713 (2006)
(distinguishing Boggs and holding that “while a plan administrator must
pay benefits to the named beneficiary as required by ERISA,” after the
benefits are distributed “the consensual terms of a prior contractual agree

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administrator did its statutory ERISA duty by paying the
benefits to Liv in conformity with the plan documents.
ERISA requires “[e]very employee benefit plan [to] be es
tablished and maintained pursuant to a written instrument,”
29 U. S. C. § 1102(a)(1), “specify[ing] the basis on which pay
ments are made to and from the plan,” § 1102(b)(4). The
plan administrator is obliged to act “in accordance with the
documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as
such documents and instruments are consistent with the pro
visions of [Title I] and [Title IV] of [ERISA],” § 1104(a)(1)(D),
and ERISA provides no exemption from this duty when it
comes time to pay benefits. On the contrary, § 1132(a)(1)(B)
(which the Estate happens to invoke against DuPont here)
reinforces the directive, with its provision that a participant
or beneficiary may bring a cause of action “to recover bene
fits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his
rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to
future benefits under the terms of the plan.”
The Estate’s claim therefore stands or falls by “the terms
of the plan,” § 1132(a)(1)(B), a straightforward rule of hewing
to the directives of the plan documents that lets employers
“ ‘establish a uniform administrative scheme, [with] a set of
standard procedures to guide processing of claims and dis
bursement of benefits,’ ” 11 Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U. S.
141, 148 (2001) (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,
482 U. S. 1, 9 (1987)); see also Curtiss-Wright Corp. v.
ment may prevent the named beneficiary from retaining those proceeds”);
Pardee v. Pardee, 2005 OK CIV App. 27, ¶¶ 20, 27, 112 P. 3d 308, 313–314,
315–316 (2004) (distinguishing Boggs and holding that ERISA did not pre
empt enforcement of allocation of ERISA benefits in state-court divorce
decree as “the pension plan funds were no longer entitled to ERISA pro
tection once the plan funds were distributed”).
11 We express no view regarding the ability of a participant or benefi
ciary to bring a cause of action under 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) where the
terms of the plan fail to conform to the requirements of ERISA and the
party seeks to recover under the terms of the statute.

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Schoonejongen, 514 U. S. 73, 83 (1995) (ERISA’s statutory
scheme “is built around reliance on the face of written plan
documents”). The point is that by giving a plan participant
a clear set of instructions for making his own instructions
clear, ERISA forecloses any justification for enquiries into
nice expressions of intent, in favor of the virtues of adhering
to an uncomplicated rule: “simple administration, avoid[ing]
double liability, and ensur[ing] that beneficiaries get what’s
coming quickly, without the folderol essential under less
certain rules.” Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers
Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F. 2d 275, 283 (CA7 1990) (East
erbrook, J., dissenting).
And the cost of less certain rules would be too plain. Plan
administrators would be forced “to examine a multitude of
external documents that might purport to affect the dispen
sation of benefits,” Altobelli v. IBM Corp., 77 F. 3d 78, 82–83
(CA4 1996) (Wilkinson, C. J., dissenting), and be drawn into
litigation like this over the meaning and enforceability of
purported waivers. The Estate’s suggestion that a plan ad
ministrator could resolve these sorts of disputes through in
terpleader actions merely restates the problem with the Es
tate’s position: it would destroy a plan administrator’s ability
to look at the plan documents and records conforming to
them to get clear distribution instructions, without going
into court.
The Estate of course is right that this guarantee of sim
plicity is not absolute. The very enforceability of QDROs
means that sometimes a plan administrator must look for
the beneficiaries outside plan documents notwithstanding
§ 1104(a)(1)(D); § 1056(d)(3)(J) provides that a “person who is
an alternate payee under a [QDRO] shall be considered for
purposes of any provision of [ERISA] a beneficiary under
the plan.” But this in effect means that a plan administra
tor who enforces a QDRO must be said to enforce plan docu
ments, not ignore them. In any case, a QDRO enquiry is
relatively discrete, given the specific and objective criteria

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for a domestic relations order that qualifies as a QDRO,12 see
§§ 1056(d)(3)(C), (D), requirements that amount to a stat
utory checklist working to “spare [an administrator] from
litigation-fomenting ambiguities,” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Wheaton, 42 F. 3d 1080, 1084 (CA7 1994). This is a far
cry from asking a plan administrator to figure out whether
a claimed federal common law waiver was knowing and vol
untary, whether its language addressed the particular bene
fits at issue, and so forth, on into factually complex and sub
jective determinations. See, e. g., Altobelli, supra, at 83
(Wilkinson, C. J., dissenting) (“[W]aiver provisions are often
sweeping in their terms, leaving their precise effect on plan
benefits unclear”); Mohamed v. Kerr, 53 F. 3d 911, 915 (CA8
1995) (making “fact-driven determination” that marriage ter
mination agreement constituted a valid waiver under federal
common law).
These are good and sufficient reasons for holding the line,
just as we have done in cases of state laws that might blur
the bright-line requirement to follow plan documents in dis
tributing benefits. Two recent preemption cases are in
structive here. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U. S. 833, held that
ERISA preempted a state law permitting the testamentary
transfer of a nonparticipant spouse’s community property in
12 To qualify as a QDRO, a divorce decree must “clearly specif[y]” the
name and last known mailing address of the participant and the name and
mailing address of each alternate payee covered by the order; the amount
or percentage of the participant’s benefits to be paid by the plan to each
such alternate payee or the manner in which such amount or percentage
is to be determined; the number of payments or period to which the order
applies; and each plan to which such order applies. § 1056(d)(3)(C). A
domestic relations order cannot qualify as a QDRO if it requires a plan to
provide any type or form of benefit, or any option, not otherwise provided
under the plan; requires the plan to provide increased benefits; or requires
the payment of benefits to an alternate payee that are required to be paid
to another alternate payee under another order previously determined
to be a QDRO. § 1056(d)(3)(D). A plan is required to establish writ
ten procedures for determining whether a domestic relations order is a
QDRO. § 1056(d)(3)(G)(ii).

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terest in undistributed pension plan benefits. We rejected
the entreaty to create “through case law . . . a new class of
persons for whom plan assets are to be held and adminis
tered,” explaining that “[t]he statute is not amenable to this
sweeping extratextual extension.” Id., at 850. And in
Egelhoff we held that ERISA preempted a state law provid
ing that the designation of a spouse as the beneficiary of a
nonprobate asset is revoked automatically upon divorce.
532 U. S., at 143. We said the law was at fault for standing
in the way of making payments “simply by identifying the
beneficiary specified by the plan documents,” id., at 148, and
thus for purporting to “undermine the congressional goal of
‘minimiz[ing] the administrative and financial burden[s]’ on
plan administrators,” id., at 149–150 (quoting Ingersoll-Rand
Co. v. McClendon, 498 U. S. 133, 142 (1990)); see Egelhoff,
supra, at 147, n. 1 (identifying “the conflict between the plan
documents (which require making payments to the named
beneficiary) and the statute (which requires making pay
ments to someone else)”).
What goes for inconsistent state law goes for a federal
common law of waiver that might obscure a plan administra
tor’s duty to act “in accordance with the documents and in
struments.” See Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U. S.
248, 259 (1993) (“The authority of courts to develop a ‘federal
common law’ under ERISA . . . is not the authority to revise
the text of the statute”). And this case does as well as any
other in pointing out the wisdom of protecting the plan docu
ments rule. Under the terms of the SIP Liv was William’s
designated beneficiary. The plan provided an easy way for
William to change the designation, but for whatever reason
he did not. The plan provided a way to disclaim an interest
in the SIP account, but Liv did not purport to follow it.13
13 The Estate does not contend that Liv’s waiver was a valid disclaimer
under the terms of the plan. We do not address a situation in which the
plan documents provide no means for a beneficiary to renounce an interest
in benefits.

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T h e p l a n a d m i n i s t r a t o r t h e re fo re di d e xa c t ly wh at
§ 1104(a)(1)(D) required: “the documents control, and those
name [the ex-wife].” McMillan v. Parrott, 913 F. 2d 310,
312 (CA6 1990).
It is no answer, as the Estate argues, that William’s
beneficiary-designation form should not control because it is
not one of the “documents and instruments governing the
plan” under § 1104(a)(1)(D) and was not treated as a plan doc
ument by the plan administrator. That is beside the point.
It is uncontested that the SIP and the summary plan descrip
tion are “documents and instruments governing the plan.”
See Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U. S., at 84 (explaining that
29 U. S. C. §§ 1024(b)(2) and (b)(4) require a plan administra
tor to make available the “governing plan documents”).
Those documents provide that the plan administrator will
pay benefits to a participant’s designated beneficiary, with
designations and changes to be made in a particular way.
William’s designation of Liv as his beneficiary was made in
the way required; Liv’s waiver was not.14
IV
Although Liv’s waiver was not rendered a nullity by the
terms of § 1056, the plan administrator properly distributed
the SIP benefits to Liv in accordance with the plan docu
ments. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed
on the latter ground.
It is so ordered.
14 The Estate also contends that requiring a plan administrator to dis
tribute benefits in conformity with plan documents will allow a beneficiary
who murders a participant to obtain benefits under the terms of the plan.
The “slayer” case is not before us, and we do not address it. See Egelhoff
v. Egelhoff, 532 U. S. 141, 152 (2001) (declining to decide whether ERISA
preempts state statutes forbidding a murdering heir from receiving prop
erty as a result of the killing).