ARIZONA v. JOHNSON

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323 OCTOBER TERM, 2008
Syllabus
ARIZONA v. JOHNSON
certiorari to the court of appeals of arizona
No. 07–1122. Argued December 9, 2008—Decided January 26, 2009
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, this Court held that a “stop and frisk” may
be conducted without violating the Fourth Amendment’s ban on unrea
sonable searches and seizures if two conditions are met. First, the in
vestigatory stop (temporary detention) must be lawful, a requirement
met in an on-the-street encounter when a police officer reasonably sus
pects that the person apprehended is committing or has committed a
crime. Second, to proceed from a stop to a frisk (patdown for weapons),
the officer must reasonably suspect that the person stopped is armed
and dangerous. For the duration of a traffic stop, the Court recently
confirmed, a police officer effectively seizes “everyone in the vehi
cle,” the driver and all passengers. Brendlin v. California, 551 U. S.
249, 255.
While patrolling near a Tucson neighborhood associated with the
Crips gang, police officers serving on Arizona’s gang task force stopped
an automobile for a vehicular infraction warranting a citation. At the
time of the stop, the officers had no reason to suspect the car’s occupants
of criminal activity. Officer Trevizo attended to respondent Johnson,
the back-seat passenger, whose behavior and clothing caused Trevizo to
question him. After learning that Johnson was from a town with a
Crips gang and had been in prison, Trevizo asked him to get out of the
car in order to question him further, out of the hearing of the front-seat
passenger, about his gang affiliation. Because she suspected that he
was armed, she patted him down for safety when he exited the car.
During the patdown, she felt the butt of a gun. At that point, Johnson
began to struggle, and Trevizo handcuffed him. Johnson was charged
with, inter alia, possession of a weapon by a prohibited possessor. The
trial court denied his motion to suppress the evidence, concluding that
the stop was lawful and that Trevizo had cause to suspect Johnson was
armed and dangerous. Johnson was convicted. The Arizona Court of
Appeals reversed. While recognizing that Johnson was lawfully seized,
the court found that, prior to the frisk, the detention had evolved into
a consensual conversation about his gang affiliation. Trevizo, the court
therefore concluded, had no right to pat Johnson down even if she had
reason to suspect he was armed and dangerous. The Arizona Supreme
Court denied review.

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324 ARIZONA v. JOHNSON
Syllabus
Held: Officer Trevizo’s patdown of Johnson did not violate the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.
Pp. 330–334.
(a) Terry established that, in an investigatory stop based on reason
ably grounded suspicion of criminal activity, the police must be posi
tioned to act instantly if they have reasonable cause to suspect that the
persons temporarily detained are armed and dangerous. 392 U. S.,
at 24. Because a limited search of outer clothing for weapons serves to
protect both the officer and the public, a patdown is constitutional. Id.,
at 23–24, 27, 30–31. Traffic stops, which “resemble, in duration and
atmosphere, the kind of brief detention authorized in Terry,” Berkemer
v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439, n. 29, are “especially fraught with danger
to police officers,” Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1047, who may
minimize the risk of harm by exercising “ ‘unquestioned command of the
situation,’ ” Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U. S. 408, 414. Three decisions
cumulatively portray Terry’s application in a traffic-stop setting. In
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106 (per curiam), the Court held
that “once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic viola
tion, the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle
without violating the Fourth Amendmen[t],” id., at 111, n. 6, because
the government’s “legitimate and weighty” interest in officer safety out
weighs the “de minimis” additional intrusion of requiring a driver, al
ready lawfully stopped, to exit the vehicle, id., at 110–111. Citing
Terry, the Court further held that a driver, once outside the stopped
vehicle, may be patted down for weapons if the officer reasonably con
cludes that the driver might be armed and dangerous. 434 U. S., at 112.
Wilson, 519 U. S., at 413, held that the Mimms rule applies to passen
gers as well as drivers, based on “the same weighty interest in officer
safety.” Brendlin, 551 U. S., at 263, held that a passenger is seized,
just as the driver is, “from the moment [a car stopped by the police
comes] to a halt on the side of the road.” A passenger’s motivation to
use violence during the stop to prevent apprehension for a crime more
grave than a traffic violation is just as great as that of the driver. 519
U. S., at 414. And as “the passengers are already stopped by virtue of
the stop of the vehicle,” id., at 413–414, “the additional intrusion on the
passenger is minimal,” id., at 415. Pp. 330–332.
(b) The Arizona Court of Appeals recognized that, initially, Johnson
was lawfully detained incident to the legitimate stop of the vehicle in
which he was a passenger, but concluded that once Officer Trevizo began
questioning him on a matter unrelated to the traffic stop, patdown au
thority ceased to exist, absent reasonable suspicion that Johnson had
engaged, or was about to engage, in criminal activity. The court por
trayed the interrogation as consensual, and, Johnson emphasizes, Tre

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Syllabus
vizo testified that Johnson could have refused to exit the vehicle and to
submit to the patdown. But Trevizo also testified that she never ad
vised Johnson he did not have to answer her questions or otherwise
cooperate with her. A lawful roadside stop begins when a vehicle is
pulled over for investigation of a traffic violation. The temporary sei
zure of driver and passengers ordinarily continues, and remains reason
able, for the duration of the stop. Normally, the stop ends when the
police have no further need to control the scene, and inform the driver
and passengers they are free to leave. An officer’s inquiries into mat
ters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop do not convert the
encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as the
inquiries do not measurably extend the stop’s duration. See Muehler
v. Mena, 544 U. S. 93, 100–101. A reasonable passenger would under
stand that during the time a car is lawfully stopped, he or she is not
free to terminate the encounter with the police and move about at will.
Nothing occurred in this case that would have conveyed to Johnson that,
prior to the frisk, the traffic stop had ended or that he was otherwise
free “to depart without police permission.” Brendlin, 551 U. S., at 257.
Trevizo was not required by the Fourth Amendment to give Johnson an
opportunity to depart without first ensuring that, in so doing, she was
not permitting a dangerous person to get behind her. Pp. 332–334.
217 Ariz. 58, 170 P. 3d 667, reversed and remanded.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Joseph L. Parkhurst, Assistant Attorney General of Ari
zona, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the
briefs were Terry Goddard, Attorney General, Mary R.
O’Grady, Solicitor General, Kent E. Cattani, Chief Counsel,
and Diane Leigh Hunt, Assistant Attorney General.
Toby J. Heytens argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were
former Solicitor General Garre, Acting Assistant Attorney
General Friedrich, and Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben.
Andrew J. Pincus argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were Charles Rothfeld, M. Edith Cunning
ham, and Dan M. Kahan.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Illi
nois et al. by Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Michael A. Sco
dro, Solicitor General, and Jane Elinor Notz, Deputy Solicitor General,

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326 ARIZONA v. JOHNSON
Opinion of the Court
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the authority of police officers to “stop
and frisk” a passenger in a motor vehicle temporarily seized
upon police detection of a traffic infraction. In a pathmark
ing decision, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), the Court con
sidered whether an investigatory stop (temporary detention)
and frisk (patdown for weapons) may be conducted without
violating the Fourth Amendment’s ban on unreasonable
searches and seizures. The Court upheld “stop and frisk”
as constitutionally permissible if two conditions are met.
First, the investigatory stop must be lawful. That require
ment is met in an on-the-street encounter, Terry determined,
when the police officer reasonably suspects that the person
apprehended is committing or has committed a criminal of
fense. Second, to proceed from a stop to a frisk, the police
and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Troy
King of Alabama, Dustin McDaniel of Arkansas, John W. Suthers of Colo
rado, Joseph R. Biden III of Delaware, Bill McCollum of Florida, Mark
J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Steve Carter of Indi
ana, Steve Six of Kansas, Jack Conway of Kentucky, G. Steven Rowe of
Maine, Douglas F. Gansler of Maryland, Martha Coakley of Massachu
setts, Michael A. Cox of Michigan, Lori Swanson of Minnesota, Mike Mc-
Grath of Montana, Catherine Cortez Masto of Nevada, Kelly A. Ayotte of
New Hampshire, Anne Milgram of New Jersey, Gary K. King of New
Mexico, Roy Cooper of North Carolina, Nancy H. Rogers of Ohio, W. A.
Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Thomas W. Cor
bett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Patrick C. Lynch of Rhode Island, Lawrence E.
Long of South Dakota, Robert E. Cooper, Jr., of Tennessee, Greg Abbott
of Texas, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, Rob
ert F. McDonnell of Virginia, Robert M. McKenna of Washington, J. B.
Van Hollen of Wisconsin, and Bruce A. Salzburg of Wyoming; for Ameri
cans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. by Wayne W. Schmidt,
James P. Manak, Richard Weintraub, Michael E. McNeff, Eric B. Ed
wards, and Bernard J. Farber; for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation
by Kent S. Scheidegger; and for the National League of Cities et al. by
Richard Ruda.
Meir Feder, Donald B. Ayer, and Samuel Estreicher filed a brief for
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae
urging affirmance.

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Opinion of the Court
officer must reasonably suspect that the person stopped is
armed and dangerous.
For the duration of a traffic stop, we recently confirmed, a
police officer effectively seizes “everyone in the vehicle,” the
driver and all passengers. Brendlin v. California, 551 U. S.
249, 255 (2007). Accordingly, we hold that, in a traffic-stop
setting, the first Terry condition—a lawful investigatory
stop—is met whenever it is lawful for police to detain an
automobile and its occupants pending inquiry into a vehicu
lar violation. The police need not have, in addition, cause to
believe any occupant of the vehicle is involved in criminal
activity. To justify a patdown of the driver or a passenger
during a traffic stop, however, just as in the case of a pedes
trian reasonably suspected of criminal activity, the police
must harbor reasonable suspicion that the person subjected
to the frisk is armed and dangerous.
I
On April 19, 2002, Officer Maria Trevizo and Detectives
Machado and Gittings, all members of Arizona’s gang task
force, were on patrol in Tucson near a neighborhood associ
ated with the Crips gang. At approximately 9 p.m., the of
ficers pulled over an automobile after a license plate check
revealed that the vehicle’s registration had been suspended
for an insurance-related violation. Under Arizona law, the
violation for which the vehicle was stopped constituted a
civil infraction warranting a citation. At the time of the
stop, the vehicle had three occupants—the driver, a front
seat passenger, and a passenger in the back seat, Lemon
Montrea Johnson, the respondent here. In making the stop
the officers had no reason to suspect anyone in the vehicle of
criminal activity. See App. 29–30.
The three officers left their patrol car and approached the
stopped vehicle. Machado instructed all of the occupants to
keep their hands visible. Id., at 14. He asked whether
there were any weapons in the vehicle; all responded no.

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Id., at 15. Machado then directed the driver to get out of
the car. Gittings dealt with the front-seat passenger, who
stayed in the vehicle throughout the stop. See id., at 31.
While Machado was getting the driver’s license and informa
tion about the vehicle’s registration and insurance, see id.,
at 42–43, Trevizo attended to Johnson.
Trevizo noticed that, as the police approached, Johnson
looked back and kept his eyes on the officers. Id., at 12.
When she drew near, she observed that Johnson was wearing
clothing, including a blue bandana, that she considered con
sistent with Crips membership. Id., at 17. She also no
ticed a scanner in Johnson’s jacket pocket, which “struck
[her] as highly unusual and cause [for] concern,” because
“most people” would not carry around a scanner that way
“unless they’re going to be involved in some kind of criminal
activity or [are] going to try to evade the police by listening
to the scanner.” Id., at 16. In response to Trevizo’s ques
tions, Johnson provided his name and date of birth but said
he had no identification with him. He volunteered that he
was from Eloy, Arizona, a place Trevizo knew was home to
a Crips gang. Johnson further told Trevizo that he had
served time in prison for burglary and had been out for about
a year. 217 Ariz. 58, 60, 170 P. 3d 667, 669 (App. 2007).
Trevizo wanted to question Johnson away from the front
seat passenger to gain “intelligence about the gang [Johnson]
might be in.” App. 19. For that reason, she asked him to
get out of the car. Ibid. Johnson complied. Based on
Trevizo’s observations and Johnson’s answers to her ques
tions while he was still seated in the car, Trevizo suspected
that “he might have a weapon on him.” Id., at 20. When
he exited the vehicle, she therefore “patted him down for
officer safety.” Ibid. During the patdown, Trevizo felt the
butt of a gun near Johnson’s waist. 217 Ariz., at 60, 170
P. 3d, at 669. At that point Johnson began to struggle, and
Trevizo placed him in handcuffs. Ibid.

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Johnson was charged in state court with, inter alia, pos
session of a weapon by a prohibited possessor. He moved
to suppress the evidence as the fruit of an unlawful search.
The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the stop
was lawful and that Trevizo had cause to suspect Johnson
was armed and dangerous. See App. 74–78. A jury con
victed Johnson of the gun-possession charge. See 217 Ariz.,
at 60–61, 170 P. 3d, at 669–670.
A divided panel of the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed
Johnson’s conviction. Id., at 59, 170 P. 3d, at 668. Recog
nizing that “Johnson was [lawfully] seized when the officers
stopped the car,” id., at 62, 170 P. 3d, at 671, the court never
theless concluded that prior to the frisk the detention had
“evolved into a separate, consensual encounter stemming
from an unrelated investigation by Trevizo of Johnson’s pos
sible gang affiliation,” id., at 64, 170 P. 3d, at 673. Absent
“reason to believe Johnson was involved in criminal activity,”
the Arizona appeals court held, Trevizo “had no right to pat
him down for weapons, even if she had reason to suspect he
was armed and dangerous.” Ibid.
Judge Espinosa dissented. He found it “highly unrealistic
to conclude that merely because [Trevizo] was courteous and
Johnson cooperative, the ongoing and virtually simultaneous
chain of events [had] somehow ‘evolved into a consensual
encounter’ in the few short moments involved.” Id., at 66,
170 P. 3d, at 675. Throughout the episode, he stressed,
Johnson remained “seized as part of [a] valid traffic stop.”
Ibid. Further, he maintained, Trevizo “had a reasonable
basis to consider [Johnson] dangerous,” id., at 67, 170 P. 3d,
at 676, and could therefore ensure her own safety and that
of others at the scene by patting down Johnson for weapons.
The Arizona Supreme Court denied review. No. CR–07–
0290–PR, 2007 Ariz. LEXIS 154 (Nov. 29, 2007). We
granted certiorari, 554 U. S. 916 (2008), and now reverse the
judgment of the Arizona Court of Appeals.

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II
A
We begin our consideration of the constitutionality of Of
ficer Trevizo’s patdown of Johnson by looking back to the
Court’s leading decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968).
Terry involved a stop for interrogation of men whose conduct
had attracted the attention of a patrolling police officer.
The officer’s observation led him reasonably to suspect that
the men were casing a jewelry shop in preparation for a rob
bery. He conducted a patdown, which disclosed weapons
concealed in the men’s overcoat pockets. This Court upheld
the lower courts’ determinations that the interrogation was
warranted and the patdown, permissible. See id., at 8.
Terry established the legitimacy of an investigatory stop
“in situations where [the police] may lack probable cause for
an arrest.” Id., at 24. When the stop is justified by suspi
cion (reasonably grounded, but short of probable cause) that
criminal activity is afoot, the Court explained, the police of
ficer must be positioned to act instantly on reasonable suspi
cion that the persons temporarily detained are armed and
dangerous. Ibid. Recognizing that a limited search of
outer clothing for weapons serves to protect both the officer
and the public, the Court held the patdown reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 23–24, 27, 30–31.
“[M]ost traffic stops,” this Court has observed, “resemble,
in duration and atmosphere, the kind of brief detention au
thorized in Terry.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420,
439, n. 29 (1984). Furthermore, the Court has recognized
that traffic stops are “especially fraught with danger to po
lice officers.” Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1047 (1983).
“ ‘The risk of harm to both the police and the occupants [of a
stopped vehicle] is minimized,’ ” we have stressed, “ ‘if the
officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the sit
uation.’ ” Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U. S. 408, 414 (1997)
(quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 702–703

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(1981)); see Brendlin, 551 U. S., at 258. Three decisions cu
mulatively portray Terry’s application in a traffic-stop set
ting: Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106 (1977) (per
curiam); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U. S. 408 (1997); and
Brendlin v. California, 551 U. S. 249 (2007).
In Mimms, the Court held that “once a motor vehicle has
been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police offi
cers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without
violating the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of unreason
able searches and seizures.” 434 U. S., at 111, n. 6. The
government’s “legitimate and weighty” interest in officer
safety, the Court said, outweighs the “de minimis” additional
intrusion of requiring a driver, already lawfully stopped, to
exit the vehicle. Id., at 110–111. Citing Terry as control
ling, the Court further held that a driver, once outside the
stopped vehicle, may be patted down for weapons if the offi
cer reasonably concludes that the driver “might be armed
and presently dangerous.” 434 U. S., at 112.
Wilson held that the Mimms rule applied to passengers
as well as to drivers. Specifically, the Court instructed that
“an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get
out of the car pending completion of the stop.” 519 U. S., at
415. “[T]he same weighty interest in officer safety,” the
Court observed, “is present regardless of whether the occu
pant of the stopped car is a driver or passenger.” Id., at 413.
It is true, the Court acknowledged, that in a lawful traffic
stop, “[t]here is probable cause to believe that the driver has
committed a minor vehicular offense,” but “there is no such
reason to stop or detain the passengers.” Ibid. On the
other hand, the Court emphasized, the risk of a violent en
counter in a traffic-stop setting “stems not from the ordinary
reaction of a motorist stopped for a speeding violation, but
from the fact that evidence of a more serious crime might be
uncovered during the stop.” Id., at 414. “[T]he motivation
of a passenger to employ violence to prevent apprehension
of such a crime,” the Court stated, “is every bit as great as

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that of the driver.” Ibid. Moreover, the Court noted, “as
a practical matter, the passengers are already stopped by
virtue of the stop of the vehicle,” id., at 413–414, so “the
additional intrusion on the passenger is minimal,” id., at 415.
Completing the picture, Brendlin held that a passenger is
seized, just as the driver is, “from the moment [a car stopped
by the police comes] to a halt on the side of the road.” 551
U. S., at 263. A passenger therefore has standing to chal
lenge a stop’s constitutionality. Id., at 256–259.
After Wilson, but before Brendlin, the Court had stated,
in dictum, that officers who conduct “routine traffic stop[s]”
may “perform a ‘patdown’ of a driver and any passengers
upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dan
gerous.” Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U. S. 113, 117–118 (1998).
That forecast, we now confirm, accurately captures the com
bined thrust of the Court’s decisions in Mimms, Wilson,
and Brendlin.
B
The Arizona Court of Appeals recognized that, initially,
Johnson was lawfully detained incident to the legitimate stop
of the vehicle in which he was a passenger. See 217 Ariz., at
64, 170 P. 3d, at 673. But, that court concluded, once Officer
Trevizo undertook to question Johnson on a matter unrelated
to the traffic stop, i. e., Johnson’s gang affiliation, patdown
authority ceased to exist, absent reasonable suspicion that
Johnson had engaged, or was about to engage, in criminal
activity. See id., at 65, 170 P. 3d, at 674. In support of
the Arizona court’s portrayal of Trevizo’s interrogation of
Johnson as “consensual,” Johnson emphasizes Trevizo’s testi
mony at the suppression hearing. Responding to the prose
cutor’s questions, Trevizo affirmed her belief that Johnson
could have “refused to get out of the car” and “to turn
around for the pat down.” App. 41.
It is not clear why the prosecutor, in opposing the suppres
sion motion, sought to portray the episode as consensual.
Cf. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429 (1991) (holding that po

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lice officers’ search of a bus passenger’s luggage can be based
on consent). In any event, Trevizo also testified that she
never advised Johnson he did not have to answer her ques
tions or otherwise cooperate with her. See App. 45. And
during cross-examination, Trevizo did not disagree when de
fense counsel asked “in fact, you weren’t seeking [Johnson’s]
permission . . . ?” Id., at 36. As the dissenting judge ob
served, “consensual” is an “unrealistic” characterization of
the Trevizo-Johnson interaction. “[T]he encounter . . . took
place within minutes of the stop”; the patdown followed
“within mere moments” of Johnson’s exit from the vehicle;
beyond genuine debate, the point at which Johnson could
have felt free to leave had not yet occurred. See 217 Ariz.,
at 66, 170 P. 3d, at 675.1
A lawful roadside stop begins when a vehicle is pulled over
for investigation of a traffic violation. The temporary sei
zure of driver and passengers ordinarily continues, and re
mains reasonable, for the duration of the stop. Normally,
the stop ends when the police have no further need to control
the scene, and inform the driver and passengers they are
free to leave. See Brendlin, 551 U. S., at 258. An officer’s
inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the
traffic stop, this Court has made plain, do not convert the
encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long
as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of
the stop. See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U. S. 93, 100–101 (2005).
In sum, as stated in Brendlin, a traffic stop of a car com
municates to a reasonable passenger that he or she is not
free to terminate the encounter with the police and move
about at will. See 551 U. S., at 257. Nothing occurred in
1 The Court of Appeals majority did not assert that Johnson reasonably
could have felt free to leave. Instead, the court said “a reasonable person
in Johnson’s position would have felt free to remain in the vehicle.” 217
Ariz. 58, 64, 170 P. 3d 667, 673 (2007). That position, however, appears at
odds with our decision in Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U. S. 408 (1997). See
supra, at 331–332.

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this case that would have conveyed to Johnson that, prior to
the frisk, the traffic stop had ended or that he was otherwise
free “to depart without police permission.” Ibid. Officer
Trevizo surely was not constitutionally required to give
Johnson an opportunity to depart the scene after he exited
the vehicle without first ensuring that, in so doing, she was
not permitting a dangerous person to get behind her.2
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Arizona Court
of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
2 The Arizona Court of Appeals assumed, “without deciding, that Tre
vizo had reasonable suspicion that Johnson was armed and dangerous.”
217 Ariz., at 64, 170 P. 3d, at 673. We do not foreclose the appeals court’s
consideration of that issue on remand.