CARLSBAD TECHNOLOGY, INC. v. HIF BIO, INC., et al.

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635 OCTOBER TERM, 2008
Syllabus
CARLSBAD TECHNOLOGY, INC. v. HIF BIO, INC.,
et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the federal circuit
No. 07–1437. Argued February 24, 2009—Decided May 4, 2009
Respondents filed a state-court suit alleging that petitioner had violated
state and federal law in connection with a patent dispute. After remov
ing the case to Federal District Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1441(c), which
allows removal if the case includes at least one claim over which the
federal court has original jurisdiction, petitioner moved to dismiss the
suit’s only federal claim, which arose under the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Agreeing that respondents
had failed to state a RICO claim upon which relief could be granted, the
District Court dismissed the claim; declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims under § 1367(c)(3),
which allows such a course if the court “has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction”; and remanded the case to state court.
The Federal Circuit dismissed petitioner’s appeal, finding that the re
mand order could be colorably characterized as based on a “lack of sub
ject matter jurisdiction” over the state-law claims, § 1447(c), and was
therefore “not reviewable on appeal,” § 1447(d).
Held: A district court’s order remanding a case to state court after declin
ing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims is not a
remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction for which appellate re
view is barred by §§ 1447(c) and (d). With respect to supplemental ju
risdiction, a federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction over specified
state-law claims, see §§ 1367(a), (c), and its decision whether to exercise
that jurisdiction after dismissing every claim over which it had original
jurisdiction is purely discretionary, see, e. g., Osborn v. Haley, 549 U. S.
225, 245. It is undisputed that when this case was removed, the Dis
trict Court had original jurisdiction over the federal RICO claim under
§ 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims, which
were “so related to claims . . . within such original jurisdiction that they
form[ed] part of the same case or controversy,” § 1367(a). On dismiss
ing the RICO claim, the court retained its statutory supplemental juris
diction over the state-law claims. Its decision not to exercise that stat
utory authority was not based on a jurisdictional defect, but on its

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636 CARLSBAD TECHNOLOGY, INC. v. HIF BIO, INC.
Opinion of the Court
discretionary choice. See Chicago v. International College of Sur
geons, 522 U. S. 156, 173. Pp. 638–641.
508 F. 3d 659, reversed and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Stevens, J.,
post, p. 641, and Scalia, J., post, p. 642, filed concurring opinions.
Breyer, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Souter, J., joined, post,
p. 644.
Glenn W. Rhodes argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Richard L. Stanley and Stephanie
M. Byerly.
Theodore Allison argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief was Bub-Joo S. Lee.
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we decide whether a federal court of appeals
has jurisdiction to review a district court’s order that re
mands a case to state court after declining to exercise sup
plemental jurisdiction over state-law claims under 28 U. S. C.
§ 1367(c). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held
that appellate review of such an order is barred by § 1447(d)
because it viewed the remand order in this case as resting
on the District Court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
over the state-law claims. We disagree and reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
In 2005, respondents filed a complaint against petitioner
and others in California state court, alleging that petitioner
had violated state and federal law in connection with a pat
ent dispute. Petitioner removed the case to the United
States District Court for the Central District of California
pursuant to § 1441(c), which allows removal of an “entire
case” when it includes at least one claim over which the fed
eral district court has original jurisdiction. Petitioner then
filed a motion to dismiss the only federal claim in the lawsuit,
which arose under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or
ganizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. §§ 1961–1968, for failure

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Opinion of the Court
to adequately allege a pattern of racketeering. HIF Bio,
Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals Indus. Co., 508 F. 3d 659,
662 (CA Fed. 2007). The District Court agreed that re
spondents had failed to state a RICO claim upon which relief
could be granted and dismissed the claim pursuant to Fed
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The District Court
also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
the remaining state-law claims pursuant to 28 U. S. C.
§ 1367(c)(3), which provides that a district court “may decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim” if “the
district court has dismissed all claims over which it has origi
nal jurisdiction.” The District Court then remanded the
case to state court as authorized by this Court’s decision in
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U. S. 343 (1988).
Petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, arguing that the District Court
should have exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the
state-law claims because they implicate federal patent-law
rights. 508 F. 3d, at 663. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the appeal, finding that the remand order could “be colorably
characterized as a remand based on lack of subject matter
jurisdiction” and, therefore, could not be reviewed under
§§ 1447(c) and (d), which provide in part that remands for
“lack of subject matter jurisdiction” are “not reviewable on
appeal or otherwise.” See id., at 667.
This Court has not yet decided whether a district court’s
order remanding a case to state court after declining to ex
ercise supplemental jurisdiction is a remand for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction for which appellate review is
barred by §§ 1447(c) and (d). See Powerex Corp. v. Reliant
Energy Services, Inc., 551 U. S. 224, 235, n. 4 (2007) (“We
have never passed on whether Cohill remands are subject
matter jurisdictional for purposes of . . . § 1447(c) and
§ 1447(d)”). We granted certiorari to resolve this question,
555 U. S. 943 (2008), and now hold that such remand orders
are not based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Ac

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638 CARLSBAD TECHNOLOGY, INC. v. HIF BIO, INC.
Opinion of the Court
cordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals
and remand for further proceedings.
II
Appellate review of remand orders is limited by 28 U. S. C.
§ 1447(d), which states:
“An order remanding a case to the State court from
which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or
otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to the
State court from which it was removed pursuant to sec
tion 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or
otherwise.”
This Court has consistently held that § 1447(d) must be read
in pari materia with § 1447(c), thus limiting the remands
barred from appellate review by § 1447(d) to those that are
based on a ground specified in § 1447(c). See Thermtron
Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S. 336, 345–346
(1976); see also Powerex, supra, at 229; Quackenbush v. All
state Ins. Co., 517 U. S. 706, 711–712 (1996); Things Remem
bered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U. S. 124, 127 (1995).*
One type of remand order governed by § 1447(c)—the type
at issue in this case—is a remand order based on a lack of
“subject matter jurisdiction.” § 1447(c) (providing, in rele
vant part, that “[i]f at any time before final judgment it ap
pears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdic
tion, the case shall be remanded”). The question presented
in this case is whether the District Court’s remand order,
*We do not revisit today whether Thermtron was correctly decided.
Neither the brief for petitioner nor the brief for respondents explicitly
asked the Court to do so here, and counsel for both parties clearly stated
at oral argument that they were not asking for Thermtron to be over
ruled. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 16, 22; cf. South Central Bell Telephone Co.
v. Alabama, 526 U. S. 160, 171 (1999). We also note that the parties in
Powerex, Quackenbush, and Things Remembered did not ask for Therm
tron to be overruled.

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Opinion of the Court
which rested on its decision declining to exercise supplemen
tal jurisdiction over respondents’ state-law claims, is a re
mand based on a “lack of subject matter jurisdiction” for
purposes of §§ 1447(c) and (d). It is not.
“Subject matter jurisdiction defines the court’s authority
to hear a given type of case,” United States v. Morton, 467
U. S. 822, 828 (1984); it represents “the extent to which
a court can rule on the conduct of persons or the status
of things,” Black’s Law Dictionary 870 (8th ed. 2004).
This Court’s precedent makes clear that whether a court
has subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim is distinct
from whether a court chooses to exercise that jurisdiction.
See, e. g., Quackenbush, supra, at 712 (holding that an
abstention-based remand is not a remand for “lack of subject
matter jurisdiction” for purposes of §§ 1447(c) and (d)); An
kenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U. S. 689, 704 (1992) (questioning
whether, “even though subject-matter jurisdiction might be
proper, sufficient grounds exist to warrant abstention from
the exercise of that jurisdiction”); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v.
LaPlante, 480 U. S. 9, 16, n. 8 (1987) (referring to exhaustion
requirement as “a matter of comity” that does “not deprive
the federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction” but does
“rende[r] it appropriate for the federal courts to decline ju
risdiction in certain circumstances”).
With respect to supplemental jurisdiction in particular, a
federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction over specified
state-law claims, which it may (or may not) choose to exer
cise. See §§ 1367(a), (c). A district court’s decision whether
to exercise that jurisdiction after dismissing every claim
over which it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary.
See § 1367(c) (“The district courts may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district
court has dismissed all claims over which it has original ju
risdiction” (emphasis added)); Osborn v. Haley, 549 U. S. 225,
245 (2007) (“Even if only state-law claims remained after res
olution of the federal question, the District Court would have

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Opinion of the Court
discretion, consistent with Article III, to retain jurisdic
tion”); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 514 (2006)
(“[W]hen a court grants a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a federal claim, the court generally retains discretion
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U. S. C.
§ 1367, over pendent state-law claims”); see also 13D C.
Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper, & R. Freer, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 3567.3, pp. 428–432 (3d ed. 2008) (“Once it
has dismissed the claims that invoked original bases of sub
ject matter jurisdiction, all that remains before the federal
court are state-law claims. . . . The district court retains dis
cretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction [over them]”).
As a result, “the [district] court’s exercise of its discre
tion under § 1367(c) is not a jurisdictional matter. Thus, the
court’s determination may be reviewed for abuse of dis
cretion, but may not be raised at any time as a jurisdic
tional defect.” 16 J. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice
§ 106.05[4], p. 106–27 (3d ed. 2009).
It is undisputed that when this case was removed to fed
eral court, the District Court had original jurisdiction over
the federal RICO claim pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1331 and
supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims because
they were “so related to claims in the action within such
original jurisdiction that they form[ed] part of the same case
or controversy under Article III of the United States Consti
tution,” § 1367(a). Upon dismissal of the federal claim, the
District Court retained its statutory supplemental jurisdic
tion over the state-law claims. Its decision declining to ex
ercise that statutory authority was not based on a jurisdic
tional defect but on its discretionary choice not to hear the
claims despite its subject-matter jurisdiction over them.
See Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 522 U. S.
156, 173 (1997) (“Depending on a host of factors, then—in
cluding the circumstances of the particular case, the nature
of the state law claims, the character of the governing state
law, and the relationship between the state and federal

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Stevens, J., concurring
claims—district courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction
over supplemental state law claims”). The remand order,
therefore, is not based on a “lack of subject matter jurisdic
tion” for purposes of the bar to appellate review created by
§§ 1447(c) and (d).
The Court of Appeals held to the contrary based on its
conclusion that “every § 1367(c) remand necessarily involves
a predicate finding that the claims at issue lack an independ
ent basis of subject matter jurisdiction.” 508 F. 3d, at 667.
But, as explained above, §§ 1367(a) and (c) provide a basis for
subject-matter jurisdiction over any properly removed state
claim. See Osborn, supra, at 245; Arbaugh, supra, at 514.
We thus disagree with the Court of Appeals that the remand
at issue here “can be colorably characterized as a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.” 508 F. 3d, at 667.
* * *
When a district court remands claims to a state court after
declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the remand
order is not based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction for
purposes of §§ 1447(c) and (d). The judgment of the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is reversed, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, concurring.
In his dissenting opinion in Thermtron Products, Inc. v.
Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S. 336, 360 (1976), then-Justice Rehn
quist remarked that he could “perceive no justification for
the Court’s decision to ignore the express directive of Con
gress in favor of what it personally perceives to be ‘justice’
in this case.” He began his dissent with a comment that is
also applicable to the case before us today: “The Court of
Appeals not unreasonably believed that 28 U. S. C. § 1447(d)
means what it says. It says:

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Scalia, J., concurring
‘An order remanding a case to the State court from
which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or
otherwise . . . .’ ” Id., at 354.
Today, as in Thermtron, the Court holds that § 1447(d) does
not mean what it says.
If we were writing on a clean slate, I would adhere to the
statute’s text. But Thermtron’s limiting construction ap
plies equally to this case as it did to Powerex Corp. v. Reliant
Energy Services, Inc., 551 U. S. 224, 229–230 (2007), Quack
enbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U. S. 706, 711–712 (1996), and
Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U. S. 124, 127–128
(1995), and stare decisis compels the conclusion that the Dis
trict Court’s remand order is reviewable notwithstanding
§ 1447(d)’s unambiguous contrary command. The Court’s
adherence to precedent in this case represents a welcome
departure from its sometimes single-minded focus on literal
text. Accordingly, I join the Court’s opinion.
Justice Scalia, concurring.
The Court today does nothing more than accurately apply
to the facts of this case our holding in Thermtron Products,
Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S. 336 (1976). Ante, at 638–
641.* As the Court notes, neither party has asked us to
reconsider Thermtron, and we thus have no occasion to re
visit that decision here, see ante, at 638, n.
I write separately, though, to note that our decision in
Thermtron was questionable in its day and is ripe for recon
sideration in the appropriate case. Title 28 U. S. C. § 1447(d)
states that “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court
*Contrary to Justice Breyer’s suggestion, this case does not involve
reading another “exceptio[n]” into 28 U. S. C. § 1447(d)’s language. See
post, at 645 (concurring opinion). Not, that is, if you think Thermtron
was rightly decided. Unlike Osborn v. Haley, 549 U. S. 225 (2007), this
case simply involves applying Thermtron’s in pari materia reading of
§ 1447(d) to the facts of this case.

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from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or
otherwise.” The statute provides a single exception—not
remotely implicated in this case—for certain civil rights
cases removed under § 1443. See § 1447(d). As then-
Justice Rehnquist understatingly observed in his Thermtron
dissent, it would not be “unreasonabl[e] [to] believ[e] that 28
U. S. C. § 1447(d) means what it says,” 423 U. S., at 354; and
what it says is no appellate review of remand orders. See
also Osborn v. Haley, 549 U. S. 225, 263 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Since the District Court’s order in this case
“remand[ed] a case to the State court from which it was re
moved,” it should be—in the words of § 1447(d)—“not re
viewable on appeal or otherwise.” Q. E. D.
Over the years, the Court has replaced the statute’s clear
bar on appellate review with a hodgepodge of jurisdictional
rules that have no evident basis even in common sense.
Under our decisions, there is no appellate jurisdiction to re
view remands for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, see
Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U. S.
224, 232 (2007), though with exception, see Osborn v. Haley,
supra, at 243–244; there is jurisdiction to review remands of
supplemental state-law claims, and other remands based on
abstention, see Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U. S.
706, 711–712 (1996), though presumably no jurisdiction to re
view remands based on the “defects” referenced in § 1447(c).
See also post, at 644–645 (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing
similar anomalies). If this muddle represents a welcome de
parture from the literal text, see ante, at 642 (Stevens, J.,
concurring), the world is mad.
This mess—entirely of our own making—does not in my
view require expert reexamination of this area of the law,
see post, at 645 (Breyer, J., concurring). It requires only
the reconsideration of our decision in Thermtron—and a wel
come return to the Court’s focus on congressionally enacted
text.

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Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Souter joins,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion. I write separately to note an
anomaly about the way 28 U. S. C. § 1447 works. In this
case, we consider a District Court’s decision not to retain on
its docket a case that once contained federal-law issues but
now contains only state-law issues. All agree that the law
grants the District Court broad discretion to determine
whether it should keep such cases on its docket, that a deci
sion to do so (or not to do so) rarely involves major legal
questions, and that (even if wrong) a district court decision
of this kind will not often have major adverse consequences.
We now hold that § 1447 permits appellate courts to review
a district court decision of this kind, even if only for abuse
of discretion.
Contrast today’s decision with our decision two Terms ago
in Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U. S.
224 (2007). In that case, we considered a District Court’s
decision to remand a case in which a Canadian province
owned power company had sought removal—a matter that
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 specifically
authorizes federal judges (in certain instances) to decide.
See §§ 1441(d); 1603(a). The case presented a difficult legal
question involving the commercial activities of a foreign sov
ereign; and the District Court’s decision (if wrong) had po
tentially serious adverse consequences, namely, preventing a
sovereign power from obtaining the federal trial to which
the law (in its view) entitled it. We nonetheless held that
§ 1447 forbids appellate courts from reviewing a district
court decision of this kind. Id., at 238–239.
Thus, we have held that § 1447 permits review of a district
court decision in an instance where that decision is unlikely
to be wrong and where a wrong decision is unlikely to work
serious harm. And we have held that § 1447 forbids review
of a district court decision in an instance where that decision

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may well be wrong and where a wrong decision could work
considerable harm. Unless the circumstances I describe are
unusual, something is wrong. And the fact that we have
read other exceptions in the statute’s absolute-sounding lan
guage suggests that such circumstances are not all that un
usual. See Osborn v. Haley, 549 U. S. 225, 240–244 (2007);
Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S. 336,
350–352 (1976).
Consequently, while joining the majority, I suggest that
experts in this area of the law reexamine the matter with
an eye toward determining whether statutory revision is
appropriate.