HAYWOOD v. DROWN et al.

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729 OCTOBER TERM, 2008
Syllabus
HAYWOOD v. DROWN et al.
certiorari to the court of appeals of new york
No. 07–10374. Argued December 3, 2008—Decided May 26, 2009
Believing that damages suits filed by prisoners against state correction
officers were largely frivolous and vexatious, New York passed Correc
tion Law § 24, which divested state courts of general jurisdiction of their
jurisdiction over such suits, including those filed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983,
and replaced those claims with the State’s preferred alternative.
Thereunder, a prisoner will have his claim against a correction officer
dismissed for want of jurisdiction and will be left to pursue a damages
claim against the State in the Court of Claims, a court of limited juris
diction in which the prisoner will not be entitled to attorney’s fees, puni
tive damages, or injunctive relief. Petitioner filed two § 1983 damages
actions against correction employees in state court. Finding that it
lacked jurisdiction under Correction Law § 24, the trial court dismissed
the actions. Affirming, the State Court of Appeals rejected petitioner’s
claim that the state statute’s jurisdictional limitation violated the Su
premacy Clause. It reasoned that because that law treats state and
federal damages actions against correction officers equally—i. e., neither
can be brought in New York courts—it was a neutral rule of judicial
administration and thus a valid excuse for the State’s refusal to enter
tain the federal cause of action.
Held: Correction Law § 24, as applied to § 1983 claims, violates the Su
premacy Clause. Pp. 734–742.
(a) Federal and state law “together form one system of jurisprudence,
which constitutes the law of the land for the State; and the courts of the
two jurisdictions are . . . courts of the same country, having jurisdiction
partly different and partly concurrent.” Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S.
130, 136–137. Both state and federal courts have jurisdiction over
§ 1983 suits. So strong is the presumption of concurrency that it is de
feated only when Congress expressly ousts state courts of jurisdiction,
see, e. g., id., at 136; or “[w]hen a state court refuses jurisdiction because
of a neutral state rule regarding the administration of the courts,” How
lett v. Rose, 496 U. S. 356, 372. As to whether a state law qualifies as
such a neutral rule, States retain substantial leeway to establish the
contours of their judicial systems, but lack authority to nullify a federal
right or cause of action they believe is inconsistent with their local poli
cies. Whatever its merits, New York’s policy of shielding correction
officers from liability when sued for damages arising out of conduct per

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730 HAYWOOD v. DROWN
Syllabus
formed in the scope of their employment is contrary to Congress’ judg
ment that all persons who violate federal rights while acting under color
of state law shall be held liable for damages. “A State may not . . .
relieve congestion in its courts by declaring a whole category of federal
claims to be frivolous.” Id., at 380. Pp. 734–737.
(b) The New York Court of Appeals’ holding was based on the misun
derstanding that Correction Law § 24’s equal treatment of federal and
state claims would guarantee that the statute would pass constitutional
muster. Although the absence of discrimination is essential to this
Court’s finding a state law neutral, nondiscrimination alone is not suffi
cient to guarantee that a state law will be deemed neutral. In addition
to this misplaced reliance on equality, respondents mistakenly treat this
case as implicating the “great latitude [States enjoy] to establish the
structure and jurisdiction of their own courts.” Howlett, 496 U. S., at
372. However, this Court need not decide whether Congress can com
pel a State to offer a forum, otherwise unavailable under state law, to
hear § 1983 suits, because New York has courts of general jurisdiction
that routinely sit to hear analogous § 1983 actions. Pp. 737–742.
9 N. Y. 3d 481, 881 N. E. 2d 180, reversed and remanded.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissent
ing opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia and Alito, JJ., joined as
to Part III, post, p. 742.
Jason E. Murtagh argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs was Nory Miller.
Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General of New York,
argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief
were Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General, Andrea Oser,
Deputy Solicitor General, Nancy A. Spiegel, Senior Assist
ant Solicitor General, and Robert M. Goldfarb, Assistant So
licitor General.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Prisoners’ Legal
Services of New York et al. by Karen Murtagh-Monks and John Boston;
and for Professors of Constitutional Law and of Federal Jurisdiction by
Daniel F. Kolb, and by David L. Shapiro, Judith Resnik, Lauren Kay
Robel, and Steven H. Steinglass, all pro se.

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731 Cite as: 556 U. S. 729 (2009)
Opinion of the Court
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
In our federal system of government, state as well as fed
eral courts have jurisdiction over suits brought pursuant to
42 U. S. C. § 1983, the statute that creates a remedy for viola
tions of federal rights committed by persons acting under
color of state law.1 While that rule is generally applicable
to New York’s supreme courts—the State’s trial courts of
general jurisdiction—New York’s Correction Law § 24 di
vests those courts of jurisdiction over § 1983 suits that seek
money damages from correction officers. New York thus
prohibits the trial courts that generally exercise jurisdiction
over § 1983 suits brought against other state officials from
hearing virtually all such suits brought against state cor
rection officers. The question presented is whether that ex
ceptional treatment of a limited category of § 1983 claims is
consistent with the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution.2
I
Petitioner, an inmate in New York’s Attica Correctional
Facility, commenced two § 1983 actions against several cor
rection employees alleging that they violated his civil rights
1 Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. § 1979, as amended,
42 U. S. C. § 1983, provides in relevant part:
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.”
2 The Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, cl. 2, provides:
“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”

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in connection with three prisoner disciplinary proceedings
and an altercation. Proceeding pro se, petitioner filed his
claims in State Supreme Court and sought punitive damages
and attorney’s fees. The trial court dismissed the actions
on the ground that, under N. Y. Correct. Law Ann. § 24 (West
1987) (hereinafter Correction Law § 24), it lacked jurisdiction
to entertain any suit arising under state or federal law seek
ing money damages from correction officers for actions taken
in the scope of their employment. The intermediate appel
late court summarily affirmed the trial court. 35 App. Div.
3d 1290, 826 N. Y. S. 2d 542 (2006).
The New York Court of Appeals, by a 4-to-3 vote, also
affirmed the dismissal of petitioner’s damages action. The
Court of Appeals rejected petitioner’s argument that Cor
rection Law § 24’s jurisdictional limitation interfered with
§ 1983 and therefore ran afoul of the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution. The majority reasoned
that, because Correction Law § 24 treats state and federal
damages actions against correction officers equally (that is,
neither can be brought in New York courts), the statute
should be properly characterized as a “neutral state rule re
garding the administration of the courts” and therefore a
“valid excuse” for the State’s refusal to entertain the federal
cause of action. 9 N. Y. 3d 481, 487, 881 N. E. 2d 180, 183,
184 (2007) (quoting Howlett v. Rose, 496 U. S. 356, 369, 372
(1990); internal quotation marks omitted). The majority un
derstood our Supremacy Clause precedents to set forth the
general rule that so long as a State does not refuse to hear
a federal claim for the “sole reason that the cause of action
arises under federal law,” its withdrawal of jurisdiction will
be deemed constitutional. 9 N. Y. 3d, at 488, 881 N. E. 2d,
at 184. So read, discrimination vel non is the focal point of
Supremacy Clause analysis.
In dissent, Judge Jones argued that Correction Law § 24
is not a neutral rule of judicial administration. Noting that
the State’s trial courts handle all other § 1983 damages ac

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Opinion of the Court
tions, he concluded that the State had created courts of com
petent jurisdiction to entertain § 1983 suits. In his view,
“once a state opens its courts to hear section 1983 actions, it
may not selectively exclude section 1983 actions by denomi
nating state policies as jurisdictional.” Id., at 497, 881 N. E.
2d, at 191.
Recognizing the importance of the question decided by the
New York Court of Appeals, we granted certiorari. 554
U. S. 902 (2008). We now reverse.
II
Motivated by the belief that damages suits filed by prison
ers against state correction officers were by and large frivo
lous and vexatious, New York passed Correction Law § 24.3
The statute employs a two-step process to strip its courts of
jurisdiction over such damages claims and to replace those
claims with the State’s preferred alternative. The provision
states in full:
“1. No civil action shall be brought in any court of the
state, except by the attorney general on behalf of the
state, against any officer or employee of the department,
in his personal capacity, for damages arising out of any
act done or the failure to perform any act within the
scope of employment and in the discharge of the duties
by such officer or employee.
“2. Any claim for damages arising out of any act done
or the failure to perform any act within the scope of
3 The New York attorney general described Correction Law § 24 as “fur
ther[ing] New York’s legitimate interest in minimizing the disruptive ef
fect of prisoner damages claims against correction employees, many of
which are frivolous and vexatious.” Brief in Opposition 10; see also Ar
teaga v. State, 72 N. Y. 2d 212, 219, 527 N. E. 2d 1194, 1198 (1988) (“In
carrying out their duties relating to security and discipline in the difficult
and sometimes highly stressful prison environment, correction employees
. . . should not be inhibited because their conduct could be the basis of a
damage claim”).

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employment and in the discharge of the duties of any
officer or employee of the department shall be brought
and maintained in the court of claims as a claim against
the state.”
Thus, under this scheme, a prisoner seeking damages from a
correction officer will have his claim dismissed for want of
jurisdiction and will be left, instead, to pursue a claim for
damages against an entirely different party (the State) in the
Court of Claims—a court of limited jurisdiction.4 See N. Y.
Const., Art. VI, § 9; N. Y. Ct. Clms. Law Ann. § 9 (West 1989)
(hereinafter Court of Claims Act).
For prisoners seeking redress, pursuing the Court of
Claims alternative comes with strict conditions. In addition
to facing a different defendant, plaintiffs in that court are
not provided with the same relief, or the same procedural
protections, made available in § 1983 actions brought in state
courts of general jurisdiction. Specifically, under New York
law, plaintiffs in the Court of Claims must comply with a
90-day notice requirement, Court of Claims Act § 9; are not
entitled to a jury trial, § 12; have no right to attorney’s fees,
§ 27; and may not seek punitive damages or injunctive relief,
Sharapata v. Town of Islip, 56 N. Y. 2d 332, 334, 437 N. E.
2d 1104, 1105 (1982).
We must decide whether Correction Law § 24, as applied
to § 1983 claims, violates the Supremacy Clause.
III
This Court has long made clear that federal law is as much
the law of the several States as are the laws passed by their
legislatures. Federal and state law “together form one sys
4 Although the State has waived its sovereign immunity from liability
by allowing itself to be sued in the Court of Claims, a plaintiff seeking
damages against the State in that court cannot use § 1983 as a vehicle for
redress because a State is not a “person” under § 1983. See Will v. Michi
gan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 66 (1989).

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tem of jurisprudence, which constitutes the law of the land
for the State; and the courts of the two jurisdictions are not
foreign to each other, nor to be treated by each other as such,
but as courts of the same country, having jurisdiction partly
different and partly concurrent.” Claflin v. Houseman, 93
U. S. 130, 136–137 (1876); see Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co.
v. Bombolis, 241 U. S. 211, 222 (1916); The Federalist No. 82,
p. 132 (E. Bourne ed. 1947, Book II) (A. Hamilton) (“[T]he
inference seems to be conclusive, that the State courts would
have a concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising under the
laws of the Union, where it was not expressly prohibited”).
Although § 1983, a Reconstruction-era statute, was passed
“to interpose the federal courts between the States and the
people, as guardians of the people’s federal rights,” Mitchum
v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 242 (1972), state courts as well as
federal courts are entrusted with providing a forum for the
vindication of federal rights violated by state or local officials
acting under color of state law, see Patsy v. Board of Regents
of Fla., 457 U. S. 496, 506–507 (1982) (canvassing the legisla
tive debates of the 1871 Congress and noting that “many
legislators interpreted [§ 1983] to provide dual or concurrent
forums in the state and federal system, enabling the plaintiff
to choose the forum in which to seek relief ”); Maine v. Thi
boutot, 448 U. S. 1, 3, n. 1 (1980).
So strong is the presumption of concurrency that it is de
feated only in two narrowly defined circumstances: first,
when Congress expressly ousts state courts of jurisdiction,
see Bombolis, 241 U. S., at 221; Claflin, 93 U. S., at 136; and
second, “[w]hen a state court refuses jurisdiction because of
a neutral state rule regarding the administration of the
courts,” Howlett, 496 U. S., at 372. Focusing on the latter
circumstance, we have emphasized that only a neutral juris
dictional rule will be deemed a “valid excuse” for departing
from the default assumption that “state courts have inherent
authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudi

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cate claims arising under the laws of the United States.”
Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U. S. 455, 458 (1990).
In determining whether a state law qualifies as a neutral
rule of judicial administration, our cases have established
that a State cannot employ a jurisdictional rule “to dissociate
[itself] from federal law because of disagreement with its
content or a refusal to recognize the superior authority of
its source.” Howlett, 496 U. S., at 371. In other words, al
though States retain substantial leeway to establish the con
tours of their judicial systems, they lack authority to nullify
a federal right or cause of action they believe is inconsistent
with their local policies. “The suggestion that [an] act of
Congress is not in harmony with the policy of the State, and
therefore that the courts of the State are free to decline ju
risdiction, is quite inadmissible, because it presupposes what
in legal contemplation does not exist.” Second Employers’
Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 57 (1912).
It is principally on this basis that Correction Law § 24 vio
lates the Supremacy Clause. In passing Correction Law
§ 24, New York made the judgment that correction officers
should not be burdened with suits for damages arising out
of conduct performed in the scope of their employment. Be
cause it regards these suits as too numerous or too frivolous
(or both), the State’s longstanding policy has been to shield
this narrow class of defendants from liability when sued for
damages.5 The State’s policy, whatever its merits, is con
5 In many respects, Correction Law § 24 operates more as an immunity
from-damages provision than as a jurisdictional rule. Indeed, the original
version of the statute gave correction officers qualified immunity, provid
ing that no officer would be “liable for damages if he shall have acted in
good faith, with reasonable care and upon probable cause.” N. Y. Correct.
Law § 6–b (McKinney Supp. 1947). And, more recently, a state legislative
proposal seeking to extend Correction Law § 24’s scheme to other state
employees explained that its purpose was to grant “the same immunity
from civil damage actions as all other State employees who work in the
prisons.” App. 85.
In Howlett v. Rose, 496 U. S. 356 (1990), we considered the question
whether a Florida school board could assert a state-law immunity defense

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trary to Congress’ judgment that all persons who violate
federal rights while acting under color of state law shall be
held liable for damages. As we have unanimously recog
nized, “[a] State may not . . . relieve congestion in its courts
by declaring a whole category of federal claims to be frivo
lous. Until it has been proved that the claim has no merit,
that judgment is not up to the States to make.” Howlett,
496 U. S., at 380; Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U. S. 42, 55 (1984)
(rejecting as “manifestly inconsistent with the central objec
tive of the Reconstruction–Era civil rights statutes” the
judgment “that factors such as minimizing the diversion of
state officials’ attention from their duties outweigh the inter
est in providing employees ready access to a forum to resolve
valid claims”). That New York strongly favors a rule
shielding correction officers from personal damages liability
and substituting the State as the party responsible for com
pensating individual victims is irrelevant. The State cannot
condition its enforcement of federal law on the demand that
those individuals whose conduct federal law seeks to regu
late must nevertheless escape liability.
IV
While our cases have uniformly applied the principle that
a State cannot simply refuse to entertain a federal claim
based on a policy disagreement, we have yet to confront a
statute like New York’s that registers its dissent by divest
in a § 1983 action brought in state court when the defense would not have
been available if the action had been brought in federal court. We unani
mously held that the State’s decision to extend immunity “over and above
[that which is] already provided in § 1983 . . . directly violates federal law,”
and explained that the “elements of, and the defenses to, a federal cause
of action are defined by federal law.” Id., at 375; Owen v. Independence,
445 U. S. 622, 647, n. 30 (1980); see also R. Fallon, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro,
Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1122 (5th
ed. 2003) (“Federal law governs the immunity in [§ 1983] actions, even
when brought against state officials”). Thus, if Correction Law § 24 were
understood as offering an immunity defense, Howlett would compel the
conclusion that it violates the Supremacy Clause.

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ing its courts of jurisdiction over a disfavored federal claim
in addition to an identical state claim. The New York Court
of Appeals’ holding was based on the misunderstanding that
this equal treatment of federal and state claims rendered
Correction Law § 24 constitutional. 9 N. Y. 3d, at 489, 881
N. E. 2d, at 185 (“Put simply, because Correction Law § 24
does not treat section 1983 claims differently than it treats
related state law causes of action, the Supremacy Clause is
not offended”). To the extent our cases have created this
misperception, we now make clear that equality of treatment
does not ensure that a state law will be deemed a neutral
rule of judicial administration and therefore a valid excuse
for refusing to entertain a federal cause of action.
Respondents correctly observe that, in the handful of cases
in which this Court has found a valid excuse, the state rule at
issue treated state and federal claims equally. In Douglas
v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 279 U. S. 377 (1929), we
upheld a state law that granted state courts discretion to
decline jurisdiction over state and federal claims alike when
neither party was a resident of the State. Later, in Herb v.
Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117 (1945), a city court dismissed an
action brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act
(FELA), 45 U. S. C. § 51 et seq., for want of jurisdiction be
cause the cause of action arose outside the court’s territorial
jurisdiction. We upheld the dismissal on the ground that
the State’s venue laws were not being applied in a way that
discriminated against the federal claim. 324 U. S., at 123.
In a third case, Missouri ex rel. Southern R. Co. v. Mayfield,
340 U. S. 1 (1950), we held that a State’s application of the
forum non conveniens doctrine to bar adjudication of a
FELA case brought by nonresidents was constitutionally
sound as long as the policy was enforced impartially. Id.,
at 4. And our most recent decision finding a valid excuse,
Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U. S. 911 (1997), rested largely on
the fact that Idaho’s rule limiting interlocutory jurisdiction
did not discriminate against § 1983 actions. See id., at 918.

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Although the absence of discrimination is necessary to our
finding a state law neutral, it is not sufficient. A jurisdic
tional rule cannot be used as a device to undermine federal
law, no matter how evenhanded it may appear. As we made
clear in Howlett, “[t]he fact that a rule is denominated juris
dictional does not provide a court an excuse to avoid the
obligation to enforce federal law if the rule does not reflect
the concerns of power over the person and competence over
the subject matter that jurisdictional rules are designed to
protect.” 496 U. S., at 381. Ensuring equality of treatment
is thus the beginning, not the end, of the Supremacy Clause
analysis.
In addition to giving too much weight to equality of treat
ment, respondents mistakenly treat this case as implicating
the “great latitude [States enjoy] to establish the structure
and jurisdiction of their own courts.” Id., at 372. Although
Correction Law § 24 denies state courts authority to enter
tain damages actions against correction officers, this case
does not require us to decide whether Congress may compel
a State to offer a forum, otherwise unavailable under state
law, to hear suits brought pursuant to § 1983. The State of
New York has made this inquiry unnecessary by creating
courts of general jurisdiction that routinely sit to hear analo
gous § 1983 actions. New York’s constitution vests the state
supreme courts with general original jurisdiction, N. Y.
Const., Art. VI, § 7(a), and the “inviolate authority to hear
and resolve all causes in law and equity,” Pollicina v. Miseri
cordia Hospital Medical Center, 82 N. Y. 2d 332, 339, 624
N. E. 2d 974, 977 (1993). For instance, if petitioner had at
tempted to sue a police officer for damages under § 1983, the
suit would be properly adjudicated by a state supreme court.
Similarly, if petitioner had sought declaratory or injunctive
relief against a correction officer, that suit would be heard in
a state supreme court. It is only a particular species of

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suits—those seeking damages relief against correction offi
cers—that the State deems inappropriate for its trial courts.6
We therefore hold that, having made the decision to create
courts of general jurisdiction that regularly sit to entertain
analogous suits, New York is not at liberty to shut the court
house door to federal claims that it considers at odds with
its local policy.7 A State’s authority to organize its courts,
6 While we have looked to a State’s “common-law tort analogues” in
deciding whether a state procedural rule is neutral, see Felder v. Casey,
487 U. S. 131, 146, n. 3 (1988), we have never equated “analogous claims”
with “identical claims.” Instead, we have searched for a similar claim
under state law to determine whether a State has established courts of
adequate and appropriate jurisdiction capable of hearing a § 1983 suit.
See Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386, 388, 394 (1947); Martinez v. California,
444 U. S. 277, 283–284, n. 7 (1980) (“[W]here the same type of claim, if
arising under state law, would be enforced in the state courts, the state
courts are generally not free to refuse enforcement of the federal claim”
(emphasis added)). Section 1983 damages claims against other state offi
cials and equitable claims against correction officers are both sufficiently
analogous to petitioner’s § 1983 claims.
7 The dissent’s contrary view is based on its belief that “States have
unfettered authority to determine whether their local courts may enter
tain a federal cause of action.” Post, at 749 (opinion of Thomas, J.). But
this theory of the Supremacy Clause was raised and squarely rejected in
Howlett. Respondents in that case “argued that a federal court has no
power to compel a state court to entertain a claim over which the state
court has no jurisdiction as a matter of state law.” 496 U. S., at 381; see
also Brief for National Association of Counties et al. as Amici Curiae in
Howlett v. Rose, O. T. 1989, No. 89–5383, pp. 11–13 (“[S]tate courts are
under no obligation to disregard even-handed jurisdictional limitations
that exclude both state and federal claims”). We declared that this argu
ment had “no merit” and explained that it ignored other provisions of the
Constitution, including the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Privileges
and Immunities Clause, which compel States to open their courts to causes
of action over which they would normally lack jurisdiction. See 496 U. S.,
at 381–382; see also Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U. S. 609, 611 (1951) (interpret
ing the Full Faith and Credit Clause and concluding that a State cannot
“escape [its] constitutional obligation to enforce the rights and duties val
idly created under the laws of other states by the simple device of remov
ing jurisdiction from courts otherwise competent”); Angel v. Bullington,
330 U. S. 183, 188 (1947) (noting that the Constitution may “fetter the
freedom of a State to deny access to its courts howsoever much it may

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while considerable, remains subject to the strictures of the
Constitution. See, e. g., McKnett v. St. Louis & San Fran
cisco R. Co., 292 U. S. 230, 233 (1934). We have never
treated a State’s invocation of “jurisdiction” as a trump that
ends the Supremacy Clause inquiry, see Howlett, 496 U. S.,
at 382–383, and we decline to do so in this case. Because
New York’s supreme courts generally have personal jurisdic
tion over the parties in § 1983 suits brought by prisoners
against correction officers and because they hear the lion’s
share of all other § 1983 actions, we find little concerning
“power over the person and competence over the subject
matter” in Correction Law § 24. Id., at 381; see id., at 378–
379 (conducting a similar analysis and concluding that the
Florida courts of general jurisdiction were “fully competent
to provide the remedies [§ 1983] requires”).8
Accordingly, the dissent’s fear that “no state jurisdictional
rule will be upheld as constitutional” is entirely unfounded.
Post, at 769–770, n. 10. Our holding addresses only the
unique scheme adopted by the State of New York—a law
designed to shield a particular class of defendants (correction
regard such withdrawal of jurisdiction ‘the adjective law of the State’, or
the exercise of its right to regulate ‘the practice and procedure’ of its
courts”). We saw no reason to treat the Supremacy Clause differently.
Howlett, 496 U. S., at 382–383. Thus, to the extent the dissent resurrects
this argument, we again reject it.
8 The dissent’s proposed solution would create a blind spot in the Su
premacy Clause. If New York had decided to employ a procedural rule to
burden the enforcement of federal law, the dissent would find the scheme
unconstitutional. Yet simply because New York has decided to impose an
even greater burden on a federal cause of action by selectively withdraw
ing the jurisdiction of its courts, the dissent detects no constitutional viola
tion. Thus, in the dissent’s conception of the Supremacy Clause, a State
could express its disagreement with (and even open hostility to) a federal
cause of action, declare a desire to thwart its enforcement, and achieve
that goal by removing the disfavored category of claims from its courts’
jurisdiction. If this view were adopted, the lesson of our precedents
would be that other States with unconstitutionally burdensome procedural
rules did not go far enough “to avoid the obligation to enforce federal law.”
Howlett, 496 U. S., at 381.

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742 HAYWOOD v. DROWN
Thomas, J., dissenting
officers) from a particular type of liability (damages) brought
by a particular class of plaintiffs (prisoners). Based on the
belief that damages suits against correction officers are frivo
lous and vexatious, see supra, at 733, n. 3, Correction Law
§ 24 is effectively an immunity statute cloaked in jurisdic
tional garb. Finding this scheme unconstitutional merely
confirms that the Supremacy Clause cannot be evaded by
formalism.9
V
The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is re
versed, and the case is remanded to that court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, with whom The Chief Justice, Jus
tice Scalia, and Justice Alito join as to Part III,
dissenting.
The Court holds that New York Correction Law Anno
tated § 24, which divests New York’s state courts of subject
matter jurisdiction over suits seeking money damages from
correction officers, violates the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution, Art. VI, cl. 2, because it requires the dismissal
of federal actions brought in state court under 42 U. S. C.
§ 1983. I disagree. Because neither the Constitution nor
our precedent requires New York to open its courts to § 1983
federal actions, I respectfully dissent.
9 A contrary conclusion would permit a State to withhold a forum for
the adjudication of any federal cause of action with which it disagreed as
long as the policy took the form of a jurisdictional rule. That outcome, in
turn, would provide a roadmap for States wishing to circumvent our prior
decisions. See id., at 383 (rejecting a similar argument that would have
allowed “the State of Wisconsin [to] overrule our decision in Felder . . . by
simply amending its notice-of-claim statute to provide that no state court
would have jurisdiction of an action in which the plaintiff failed to give
the required notice”).

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Thomas, J., dissenting
I
Although the majority decides this case on the basis of the
Supremacy Clause, see ante, at 734–742, the proper starting
point is Article III of the Constitution. Article III, § 1, pro
vides that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”
The history of the drafting and ratification of this Article
establishes that it leaves untouched the States’ plenary
authority to decide whether their local courts will have
subject-matter jurisdiction over federal causes of action.
The text of Article III reflects the Framers’ agreement
that the National Government needed a Supreme Court.
There was sharp disagreement at the Philadelphia Conven
tion, however, over the need for lower federal courts. Sev
eral of the Framers, most notably James Madison, favored a
strong central government that included lower federal tribu
nals. Under the Virginia Plan, the Constitution would have
established a “National Judiciary . . . to consist of one or
more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be cho
sen by the National Legislature.” 1 Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787, p. 21 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) (hereinafter
Farrand). A revised version of the proposal, which stated
that the National Judiciary would “ ‘consist of One supreme
tribunal, and of one or more inferior tribunals,’ ” was ap
proved on June 4, 1787. Id., at 95.
The following day, however, John Rutledge raised an ob
jection to “establishing any national tribunal except a single
supreme one.” Id., at 119. He proposed striking the lan
guage providing for the creation of lower federal courts be
cause state courts were “most proper” for deciding “all cases
in the first instance.” Ibid. According to Rutledge, “the
right of appeal to the supreme national tribunal [was] suffi
cient to secure the national rights [and] uniformity of Judg
m[en]ts,” and the lower federal courts were thus an “unnec
essary encroachment” on the sovereign prerogative of the

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States to adjudicate federal claims. Id., at 124. Madison
nonetheless defended the Virginia Plan. He countered that
“inferior [federal] tribunals . . . dispersed throughout the
Republic” were necessary to meet the needs of the newly
formed government: “An effective Judiciary establishment
commensurate to the legislative authority [is] essential. A
Government without a proper Executive [and] Judiciary
would be the mere trunk of a body without arms or legs
to act or move.” Ibid. But despite Madison’s objections,
Rutledge’s motion prevailed. See id., at 125.
Madison and James Wilson soon thereafter proposed al
ternative language that “ ‘empowered [Congress] to institute
inferior tribunals.’ ” Ibid. This version moderated the
original Virginia Plan because of the “distinction between
establishing such tribunals absolutely, and giving a discre
tion to the Legislature to establish or not establish [inferior
federal courts].” Ibid. Over continued objections that
such courts were an unnecessary expense and an affront to
the States, the scaled-back version of the Virginia Plan
passed. Ibid.
On June 15, 1787, however, the New Jersey Plan was intro
duced. Although it did not directly challenge the decision
to permit Congress to “institute” inferior federal courts, the
plan, among other things, required state courts to adjudicate
federal claims. Id., at 125, 243. In particular, the plan pro
vided that, except for cases of impeachment (over which the
Supreme Court would have original jurisdiction), “all punish
ments, fines, forfeitures [and] penalties . . . shall be adjudged
by the Common law Judiciar[ies] of the State in which any
offence contrary to the true intent [and] meaning of [federal
law] shall have been committed or perpetrated, with liberty
of commencing in the first instance all suits [and] prose
cutions for that purpose in the superior Common law Judi
ciary in such State, subject nevertheless, for the correction
of all errors, both in law [and] fact in rendering judgment,

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to an appeal to the Judiciary of the U[nited] States.” Id.,
at 243, 244.
The introduction of the New Jersey Plan reignited the de
bate over the need for lower federal courts. In light of the
plan’s provision for mandatory state-court jurisdiction over
federal claims, Pierce Butler “could see no necessity for such
tribunals.” 2 id., at 45. Luther Martin added that lower
federal courts would “create jealousies [and] oppositions
in the State tribunals, with the jurisdiction of which they
will interfere.” Id., at 45–46. But Nathaniel Ghorum re
sponded that inferior federal tribunals were “essential to
render the authority of the Nat[ional] Legislature effectual.”
Id., at 46. Edmund Randolph bluntly argued that “the
Courts of the States can not be trusted with the administra
tion of the National laws.” Ibid. George Mason suggested
that, at the very least, “many circumstances might arise not
now to be foreseen, which might render such a power abso
lutely necessary.” Ibid. Roger Sherman also “was willing
to give the power to the Legislature,” even though he
“wished them to make use of the State Tribunals whenever it
could be done . . . with safety to the general interest.” Ibid.
At the conclusion of this debate, the New Jersey Plan, in
cluding its component requiring state-court consideration of
federal claims, was defeated and the Madison-Wilson pro
posal was delivered to the Committee of Detail, see id., at
133. The Committee amended the proposal’s language to its
current form in Article III, which gives Congress the power
to “ordain and establish” inferior federal courts. See id., at
168. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention unani
mously adopted this revised version, see id., at 315, and it
was ultimately ratified by the States.
This so-called Madisonian Compromise bridged the divide
“between those who thought that the establishment of lower
federal courts should be constitutionally mandatory and
those who thought there should be no federal courts at all
except for a Supreme Court with, inter alia, appellate ju

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risdiction to review state court judgments.” R. Fallon,
D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal
Courts and the Federal System 348 (4th ed. 1996). In so
doing, the compromise left to the wisdom of Congress the
creation of lower federal courts: “So far as the inferior Fed
eral Courts were concerned, it was entirely discretionary
with Congress to what extent it would vest Federal judicial
power in them. It could grant to them as much or as little
as it chose of those classes of jurisdiction, enumerated in Ar
ticle III as belonging to the judicial power of the United
States. It could, if it chose, leave to the State Courts all or
any of these classes.” Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and
the State Courts, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 545, 547 (1925) (footnote
omitted).
The assumption that state courts would continue to exer
cise concurrent jurisdiction over federal claims was essential
to this compromise. See The Federalist No. 82, pp. 130, 132
(E. Bourne ed. 1947, Book II) (A. Hamilton) (“[T]he inference
seems to be conclusive, that the State courts would have a
concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising under the laws of
the Union, where it was not expressly prohibited”).1 In
light of that historical understanding, this Court has held
1 Alexander Hamilton’s recognition of “concurrent jurisdiction” should
not be mistaken for a suggestion that the Constitution requires state
courts to hear federal claims. See ante, at 735. He merely understood
that the States would be “divested of no part of their primitive jurisdic
tion” and state courts “in every case in which they were not expressly
excluded by the future acts of the national legislature . . . [would] of course
take cognizance of the causes to which those acts may give birth.” The
Federalist No. 82, at 132. Hamilton thus assumed that state courts would
continue to entertain federal claims consistent with their “primitive juris
diction” under state law. Ibid. But he remained skeptical that state
courts could be forced to entertain federal causes of action when state
law deprived them of jurisdiction over such claims. See Hamilton, The
Examination No. 6 (Jan. 2, 1802), in 25 Papers of Alexander Hamilton 484,
487–488 (H. Syrett ed. 1977) (“[I]t is not to be forgotten, that the right to
employ the agency of the State Courts for executing the laws of the Union,
is liable to question, and has, in fact, been seriously questioned”).

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Thomas, J., dissenting
that, absent an Act of Congress providing for exclusive juris
diction in the lower federal courts, the “state courts have
inherent authority, and are thus presumptively competent,
to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United
States.” Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U. S. 455, 458–459 (1990); see
also Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U. S.
511, 517–518 (1898) (“ ‘[I]n judicial matters the concurrent
jurisdiction of the state tribunals depends altogether upon
the pleasure of Congress, and may be revoked and extin
guished whenever they think proper, in every case in which
the subject-matter can constitutionally be made cognizable
in the Federal courts, and that without an express provision
to the contrary the state courts will retain a concurrent ju
risdiction in all cases where they had jurisdiction originally
over the subject-matter’ ” (quoting 1 J. Kent, Commentaries
on American Law 374–375 (1826) (hereinafter Kent))). As
a result, “if exclusive jurisdiction [in the federal courts] be
neither express nor implied, the State courts have concur
rent jurisdiction whenever, by their own constitution, they
are competent to take it.” Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S.
130, 136 (1876).
The Constitution’s implicit preservation of state authority
to entertain federal claims, however, did not impose a duty
on state courts to do so. As discussed above, there was at
least one proposal to expressly require state courts to take
original jurisdiction over federal claims (subject to appeal in
federal court) that was introduced in an attempt to forestall
the creation of lower federal courts. See supra, at 744–745.
But in light of the failure of this proposal—which was offered
before the adoption of the Madisonian Compromise—the as
sertions by its supporters that state courts would ordinarily
entertain federal causes of action cannot reasonably be
viewed as an assurance that the States would never alter the
subject-matter jurisdiction of their courts. The Framers’
decision to empower Congress to create federal courts that
could either supplement or displace state-court review of fed

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eral claims, as well as the exclusion of any affirmative com
mand requiring the States to consider federal claims in the
text of Article III, confirms this understanding. See U. S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779, 848 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Where the Constitution is silent
about the exercise of a particular power—that is, where the
Constitution does not speak either expressly or by necessary
implication—the Federal Government lacks that power and
the States enjoy it”).2
The earliest decisions addressing this question, written by
then-serving and future Supreme Court Justices, confirm
that state courts remain “tribunals over which the govern
ment of the Union has no adequate control, and which may
be closed to any claim asserted under a law of the United
States.” Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738,
821 (1824); see also Stearns v. United States, 22 F. Cas. 1188,
1192 (No. 13,341) (DC Vt. 1835) (Thompson, J.) (Article III
does not give Congress authority to “compel a state court to
entertain jurisdiction in any case; they are not inferior
2 See also Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madi
sonian Compromise, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 39, 144 (1995) (hereinafter Collins)
(“It is . . . extremely difficult to argue from the debatable assumption that
state courts would be under an obligation to take all Article III judicial
business in the first instance—as a quid pro quo for the Constitution’s
noninclusion of any reference to lower federal courts—to the conclusion
that such a duty still existed when the second half of that bargain was
decisively rejected (in the Madisonian Compromise, no less)”); Pfander,
Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisidiction in State-Party
Cases, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 555, 596 (1994) (“The framers may well have as
sumed that the federal system would simply take the state courts as it
found them; state courts could exercise a concurrent jurisdiction over any
federal claims that fit comfortably within their pre-existing jurisdiction—
what Hamilton in The Federalist called their primitive jurisdiction—so
long as the federal claims were not, by virtue of congressional decree,
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. It seems un
likely, however, that the framers would have chosen to compel the state
courts to entertain federal claims against their will and in violation of
their own jurisdictional limits” (footnotes omitted)).

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Thomas, J., dissenting
courts in the sense of the constitution; they are not ordained
by congress. State courts are left to consult their own duty
from their own state authority and organization”). “The
states, in providing their own judicial tribunals, have a right
to limit, control, and restrict their judicial functions, and ju
risdiction, according to their own mere pleasure.” Mitchell
v. Great Works Milling & Mfg. Co., 17 F. Cas. 496, 499 (No.
9,662) (CCD Me. 1843) (Story, J.). In short, there was
“a very clear intimation given by the judges of the Supreme
Court, that the state courts were not bound in consequence
of any act of congress, to assume and exercise jurisdiction in
such cases. It was merely permitted to them to do so as far,
as was compatible with their state obligations.” Kent 375;
see also id., at 377 (explaining that the Constitution “permits
state courts which are competent for the purpose, and have
an inherent jurisdiction adequate to the case, to entertain
suits in the given cases”).
Under our federal system, therefore, the States have un
fettered authority to determine whether their local courts
may entertain a federal cause of action. Once a State ex
ercises its sovereign prerogative to deprive its courts
of subject-matter jurisdiction over a federal cause of action,
it is the end of the matter as far as the Constitution is
concerned.
The present case can be resolved under this principle
alone. New York Correction Law Annotated § 24, ¶ 1 (West
1987) (NYCLA) provides that “[n]o civil action shall be
brought in any court of the state, except by the attorney
general on behalf of the state, against any officer or employee
of the department, in his personal capacity, for damages aris
ing out of any act done or the failure to perform any act
within the scope of the employment and in the discharge of
the duties by such officer or employee.” The majority and
petitioner agree that this statute erects a jurisdictional bar
that prevents the state courts from entertaining petitioner’s
claim for damages under § 1983. See ante, at 734 (agreeing

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Thomas, J., dissenting
that “a prisoner seeking damages from a correction officer
will have his claim dismissed for want of jurisdiction”); Brief
for Petitioner 21 (“Every New York court must immediately
dismiss such suits for lack of jurisdiction, regardless of
merit”). Because New York’s decision to withdraw juris
diction over § 1983 damages actions—or indeed, over any
claims—does not offend the Constitution, the judgment
below should be affirmed.
II
The Court has evaded Article III’s limitations by finding
that the Supremacy Clause constrains the States’ authority
to define the subject-matter jurisdiction of their own courts.
See ante, at 734–738. In particular, the Court has held that
“the Federal Constitution prohibits state courts of general
jurisdiction from refusing” to entertain a federal claim
“solely because the suit is brought under a federal law” as a
“state may not discriminate against rights arising under fed
eral laws.” McKnett v. St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co.,
292 U. S. 230, 233–234 (1934). There is no textual or histori
cal support for the Court’s incorporation of this antidiscrimi
nation principle into the Supremacy Clause.
A
1
The Supremacy Clause provides that “[t]his Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Con
trary notwithstanding.” Art. VI, cl. 2. Under this provi
sion, “[t]he laws of the United States are laws in the several
States, and just as much binding on the citizens and courts
thereof as the State laws are . . . . The two together form
one system of jurisprudence, which constitutes the law of the
land for the State.” Claflin, 93 U. S., at 136–137; see also
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 460 (1991); Robb v. Con

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Thomas, J., dissenting
nolly, 111 U. S. 624, 637 (1884). Thus, a valid federal law
is substantively superior to a state law; “if a state meas
ure conflicts with a federal requirement, the state provision
must give way.” Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 111,
120 (1965). As a textual matter, however, the Supremacy
Clause does not address whether a state court must enter
tain a federal cause of action; it provides only a rule of deci
sion that the state court must follow if it adjudicates the
claim. See R. Berger, Congress v. The Supreme Court 245
(1969) (The Supremacy Clause only “ ‘enacts what the law
shall be’. . . . [I]t defines the governing ‘supreme law,’ and
if a State court has jurisdiction, it commands that that law
shall govern”).
The Supremacy Clause’s path to adoption at the Conven
tion confirms this focus. Its precursor was introduced as
part of the New Jersey Plan. See 1 Farrand 245 (“[A]ll Acts
of . . . Cong[ress] made by virtue [and] in pursuance of the
powers hereby . . . vested in them . . . shall be the supreme
law of the respective States so far forth as those Acts . . .
shall relate to the said States or their Citizens”); ibid. (“[T]he
Judiciary of the several States shall be bound thereby in
their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the Indi
vidual States . . . notwithstanding”). But, as explained
above, see supra, at 744–745, the New Jersey Plan also in
cluded an entirely separate provision that addressed state
court jurisdiction, which would have required all federal
questions to “b[e] determined in the first instance in the
courts of the respective states.” 3 Farrand 287. These two
provisions of the New Jersey Plan worked in tandem to re
quire state courts to entertain federal claims and to decide
the substantive dispute in favor of federal law if a conflict
between the two arose.
After the adoption of the Madisonian Compromise and the
defeat of the New Jersey Plan, the Framers returned to the
question of federal supremacy. A proposal was introduced
granting Congress the power to “ ‘negative all laws passed

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by the several States (contravening in the opinion of [Con
gress] the articles of Union, or any treaties subsisting under
the authority of [Congress]).’ ” 2 id., at 27. James Madison
believed the proposal “essential to the efficacy [and] security
of the [Federal] Gov[ernmen]t.” Ibid. But others at the
Convention, including Roger Sherman, “thought it unneces
sary, as the Courts of the States would not consider as valid
any law contravening the Authority of the Union, and which
the legislature would wish to be negatived.” Ibid. In the
end, Madison’s proposal was defeated. Id., at 28. But as a
substitute for that rejected proposal, Luther Martin resur
rected the Supremacy Clause provision from the New Jersey
Plan, and it was unanimously approved. See id., at 28–29.3
This historical record makes clear that the Supremacy
Clause’s exclusive function is to disable state laws that are
substantively inconsistent with federal law—not to require
state courts to hear federal claims over which the courts lack
jurisdiction. This was necessarily the case when the Clause
was first introduced as part of the New Jersey Plan, as it
included a separate provision to confront the jurisdictional
question. Had that plan prevailed and been ratified by the
States, construing the Supremacy Clause to address state
court jurisdiction would have rendered the separate jurisdic
tional component of the New Jersey Plan mere surplusage.
See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 174 (1803) (“It can
not be presumed that any clause in the constitution is in
tended to be without effect”); see also Kelo v. New London,
545 U. S. 469, 507 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
3 As proposed by Luther Martin, the Clause provided as follows:
“ ‘[T]hat the Legislative acts of the [United States] made by virtue [and]
in pursuance of the articles of Union, and all treaties made [and] ratified
under the authority of the [United States] shall be the supreme law of the
respective States, as far as those acts or treaties shall relate to the said
States, or their Citizens and inhabitants—[and] that the Judiciaries of the
several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the
respective laws of the individual States to the contrary notwithstanding.’ ”
2 Farrand 28–29.

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Thomas, J., dissenting
The Supremacy Clause’s exclusive focus on substantive
state law is also evident from the context in which it was
revived. First, the Clause was not adopted until after the
New Jersey Plan’s rejection, as part of the entirely separate
debate over Madison’s proposal to grant Congress the power
to “negative” the laws of the States. By then, the Framers
had already adopted Article III, thereby ending the fight
over state-court jurisdiction. The question before the Con
vention thus was not which courts (state or federal) were
best suited to adjudicate federal claims, but which branch
of Government (Congress or the courts) would be most ef
fective in vindicating the substantive superiority of fed
eral law. The Supremacy Clause was directly responsive to
that question.
Second, the timing of the Clause’s adoption suggests that
the Framers viewed it as achieving the same end as Madi
son’s congressional “negative” proposal. Although Madison
believed that Congress could most effectively countermand
inconsistent state laws,4 the Framers decided that the Judi
4 Madison did not believe that federal courts were up to the task. See
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), reprinted
in 3 id., at 131, 134 (“It may be said that the Judicial authority, under our
new system will keep the States within their proper limits, and supply
the place of a negative on their laws. The answer is, that it is more con
venient to prevent the passage of a law than to declare it void after it is
passed; that this will be particularly the case, where the law aggrieves
individuals, who may be unable to support an appeal [against] a State to
the supreme Judiciary; that a State which would violate the Legislative
rights of the Union, would not be very ready to obey a Judicial decree in
support of them, and that a recurrence to force, which, in the event of
disobedience would be necessary, is an evil which the new Constitution
meant to exclude as far as possible”). He had even less faith in state
courts. See 2 id., at 27–28 (“Confidence can (not) be put in the State
Tribunals as guardians of the National authority and interests”). In light
of Madison’s mistrust of state courts, any suggestion that he drafted Arti
cle III to require state courts to entertain federal claims, or that he advo
cated for the inclusion in the Constitution of a provision guaranteeing the
supremacy of federal law as a means of accomplishing that same goal,

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ciary could adequately perform that function. There is no
evidence that the Framers envisioned the Supremacy Clause
as having a substantively broader sweep than the proposal
it replaced. And, there can be no question that Madison’s
congressional “negative” proposal was entirely unconcerned
with the dispute over whether state courts should be re
quired to exercise jurisdiction over federal claims. Indeed,
Madison’s proposal did not require the States to become en
meshed in any federal business at all; it merely provided that
state laws could be directly nullified if Congress found them
to be inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of the United
States. The role of the Supremacy Clause is no different.
It does not require state courts to entertain federal causes
of action. Rather, it only requires that in reaching the mer
its of such claims, state courts must decide the legal question
in favor of the “[l]aw of the Land.” Art. VI, cl. 2.
For this reason, Representative Fisher Ames explained
during the debate over the First Judiciary Act that “[t]he
law of the United States is a rule to [state-court judges], but
no authority for them. It controlled their decisions, but
could not enlarge their powers.” 1 Annals of Congress 808
(1789) (reprint 2003). And because the Constitution re
quires from state judges only an oath of “Allegiance, and not
an Oath of Office,” the Federal Government “[c]annot compel
them to act—or to become our Officers.” Notes of William
Patterson from Speech on Judiciary Act (June 23, 1789), in 9
Documentary History of the First Federal Congress 1789–
1791, p. 477 (K. Bowling & H. Veit eds. 1988); 1 Annals of
Congress, at 805 (remarks of Rep. Sedgwick, Debate of Aug.
29, 1789) (arguing that inferior federal courts should be es
tablished because state courts “might refuse or neglect to
attend to the national business”); 10 id., at 892 (remarks of
Rep. Harper) (explaining that Congress “cannot enforce on
the State courts, as a matter of duty, a performance of the
would be doubtful. Madison appears to have preferred that the state
courts hear as little federal business as possible.

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acts we confide to them” but arguing that there was “no
cause to complain” “until they refuse to exercise” the juris
diction granted over federal claims).5
The supremacy of federal law, therefore, is not impugned
by a State’s decision to strip its local courts of subject-matter
jurisdiction to hear certain federal claims. Subject-matter
jurisdiction determines only whether a court has the power
to entertain a particular claim—a condition precedent to
reaching the merits of a legal dispute. See Steel Co. v. Citi
zens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 94 (1998) (“With
out jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.
Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases
to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that
of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Although the line between
subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim and the merits of
5 The majority contends that the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the
Privileges and Immunities Clause support its view of the Supremacy
Clause because each “compel[s] States to open their courts to causes of
action over which they would normally lack jurisdiction.” Ante, at 740,
n. 7 (citing Howlett v. Rose, 496 U. S. 356, 381–382 (1990)). But the major
ity has it backwards. The Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Privi
leges and Immunities Clause include a textual prohibition on discrimina
tion that the Supremacy Clause lacks. See Art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and
Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State”); Art. IV, § 2 (“The Citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States”). The Framers’ decision to address state-to-state discrim
ination in these two Clauses without taking similar steps with respect
to federal-state relations governed by the Supremacy Clause aligns with
reasons given for abandoning the Articles of Confederation, see The Fed
eralist No. 42, p. 292 (E. Bourne ed. 1947, Book I) (J. Madison) (describing
the Full Faith and Credit Clause as “an evident and valuable improvement
on the clause relating to this subject in the articles of Confederation”),
and the principle of dual sovereignty that the Constitution preserves, see
Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725 (1869). Accordingly, contrary to the ma
jority’s supposition, there are in fact strong “reason[s] to treat the Suprem
acy Clause differently,” ante, at 741, n. 7, from the Full Faith and Credit
and Privileges and Immunities Clauses.

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that claim can at times prove difficult to draw, see Arbaugh
v. Y & H C orp.,546 U. S. 500, 513–515 (2006); see also Bell
v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 682 (1946), the distinction is crucial in
the Supremacy Clause context. If the state court does not
reach the merits of the dispute for lack of statutory or con
stitutional jurisdiction, the preeminence of federal law re
mains undiminished.
Accordingly, the superiority of federal law as a substantive
matter does not trigger an obligation on States to keep their
courts jurisdictionally neutral with respect to federal- and
state-law claims. “The federal law in any field within which
Congress is empowered to legislate is the supreme law of the
land in the sense that it may supplant state legislation in
that field, but not in the sense that it may supplant the exist
ing rules of litigation in state courts. Congress has full
power to provide its own courts for litigating federal rights.
The state courts belong to the States.” Brown v. Gerdes,
321 U. S. 178, 193 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
2
The Court was originally faithful to this conception of fed
eral supremacy. In Claflin, the Court concluded that be
cause the federal statute under consideration did not deprive
the state court of jurisdiction, the state court was competent
to resolve the claim. See 93 U. S., at 136–137 (“[R]ights,
whether legal or equitable, acquired under the laws of the
United States, may be prosecuted in the United States
courts, or in the State courts, competent to decide rights of
the like character and class; subject, however, to this qualifi
cation, that where a right arises under a law of the United
States, Congress may, if it see[s] fit, give to the Federal
courts exclusive jurisdiction”). But the Court was careful
to also explain that the Constitution did not impose an obli
gation on the States to accept jurisdiction over such claims.
See id., at 137 (explaining that there “is no reason why the
State courts should not be open for the prosecution of rights

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growing out of the laws of the United States, to which their
jurisdiction is competent, and not denied”). The Consti
tution instead left the States with the choice—but not the
obligation—to entertain federal actions. See id., at 139
(“[W]here no direction is given [from Congress] on the sub
ject, it was assumed, in our early judicial history, that the
State courts retained their usual jurisdiction concurrently
with the Federal Courts invested with jurisdiction in like
cases”).
Then in Second Employers’ Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1
(1912), the Court applied the rule set forth in Claflin and
correctly rejected a Connecticut court’s refusal to enforce
the 1908 Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45
U. S. C. § 51 et seq. FELA neither provided for exclusive
federal jurisdiction nor attempted to require state courts to
entertain claims brought under it. See 223 U. S., at 54–55.
Therefore, the statute was enforceable “as of right, in the
courts of the States when their jurisdiction, as prescribed by
local laws, is adequate to the occasion.” Id., at 55 (emphasis
added). Connecticut had not deprived its courts of subject
matter jurisdiction over FELA claims; thus, the state court’s
refusal to hear the claim was “not because the ordinary juris
diction of the Superior Courts, as defined by the constitution
and laws of the State, was deemed inadequate or not adapted
to the adjudication of such a case.” Ibid. Rather, the state
court took the position that “it would be inconvenient and
confusing for the same court, in dealing with cases of the
same general class, to apply in some the standards of right
established by the congressional act and in others the differ
ent standards recognized by the laws of the State.” Id., at
55–56.
The Court’s reversal of such a decision is compatible with
the original understanding of Article III and the Supremacy
Clause. Because there was no question that the state court
had subject-matter jurisdiction under state law to adjudicate
the federal claim, id., at 57, the Court correctly observed

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that the state court’s refusal to decide the case amounted to
a policy dispute with federal law: “When Congress, in the
exertion of the power confided to it by the Constitution,
adopted that [federal] act, it spoke for all the people and all
the States, and thereby established a policy for all. That
policy is as much the policy of Connecticut as if the act had
emanated from its own legislature, and should be respected
accordingly in the courts of the State.” Ibid. It was for
this specific reason, then, that the Court rejected Connecti
cut’s refusal to adjudicate the federal claim. As the Court
correctly noted, the “existence of the jurisdiction creates an
implication of duty to exercise it, and that its exercise may
be onerous does not militate against that implication.” Id.,
at 58.
But nothing in Second Employers’ suggested that the Su
premacy Clause could pre-empt a state law that deprived
the local court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the federal
claim. Instead, the Second Employers’ Court took exactly
the opposite position on this question: “[W]e deem it well to
observe that there is not here involved any attempt by Con
gress to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of state courts
. . . but only a question of the duty of such a court, when its
ordinary jurisdiction as prescribed by local laws is appro
priate to the occasion.” Id., at 56–57.
The Court again confronted this issue in Douglas v. New
York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 279 U. S. 377 (1929). There, the
Court considered whether a New York court was required to
hear a claim brought under FELA. Unlike the Connecticut
court in Second Employers’, however, the New York court
did not have jurisdiction under state law to entertain the
federal cause of action. 279 U. S., at 386–387. As a result,
this Court upheld the state-court ruling that dismissed the
claim. The Court explained that FELA did “not purport to
require State Courts to entertain suits arising under it, but
only to empower them to do so, so far as the authority of the

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United States is concerned. It may very well be that if the
Supreme Court of New York [was] given no discretion, being
otherwise competent, it would be subject to a duty. But
there is nothing in the Act of Congress that purports to force
a duty upon such Courts as against an otherwise valid ex
cuse.” Id., at 387–388. In other words, because the New
York court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under state
law, it was not “otherwise competent” to adjudicate the fed
eral claim.
In sum, Claflin, Second Employers’, and Douglas together
establish that a state court’s inability to entertain a federal
claim because of a lack of state-law jurisdiction is an “other
wise valid excuse” that in no way denies the superiority of
federal substantive law. It simply disables the state court
from adjudicating a claim brought under that federal law.
3
It was not until five years after Douglas that the Court
used the Supremacy Clause to strike down a state jurisdic
tional statute for its failure to permit state-court adjudica
tion of federal claims. See McKnett, 292 U. S. 230. The
Court started by correctly noting that it “was settled” in
Second Employers’ “that a state court whose ordinary juris
diction as prescribed by local laws is appropriate to the occa
sion, may not refuse to entertain suits under [FELA].” 292
U. S., at 233. Yet, even though the Alabama court lacked
such jurisdiction over the relevant federal claim pursuant to
a state statute, the McKnett Court held that the state court
had improperly dismissed the federal claim. Id., at 231–234.
According to the Court, “[w]hile Congress has not at
tempted to compel states to provide courts for the enforce
ment of [FELA], the Federal Constitution prohibits state
courts of general jurisdiction from refusing to do so solely
because the suit is brought under a federal law. The denial
of jurisdiction by the Alabama court is based solely upon the

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source of law sought to be enforced. The plaintiff is cast out
because he is suing to enforce a federal act. A state may
not discriminate against rights arising under federal laws.”
Id., at 233–234.
For all the reasons identified above, McKnett cannot be
reconciled with the decisions of this Court that preceded it.
Unlike the Connecticut court in Second Employers’, the Ala
bama Supreme Court did not indulge its own bias against
adjudication of federal claims in state court by refusing to
hear a federal claim over which it had subject-matter juris
diction. Rather, like the New York court decision affirmed
in Douglas, the Alabama court’s dismissal merely respected
a jurisdictional barrier to adjudication of the federal claim
imposed by state law. The fact that Alabama courts were
competent to hear similar state-law claims should have been
immaterial. Alabama had exercised its sovereign right
to establish the subject-matter jurisdiction of its courts.
Under Claflin and its progeny, that legislative judgment
should have been upheld.
Despite McKnett’s infidelity to the Constitution and more
than a century of Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Court’s
later decisions have repeated McKnett’s declaration that
state jurisdictional statutes must be policed for antifederal
discrimination. See, e. g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386, 394
(1947) (“It is conceded that this same type of claim arising
under Rhode Island law would be enforced by that State’s
courts. . . . Under these circumstances the State courts are
not free to refuse enforcement of petitioners’ claim”); How
lett v. Rose, 496 U. S. 356, 375 (1990) (“[W]hether the ques
tion is framed in pre-emption terms, as petitioner would
have it, or in the obligation to assume jurisdiction over a
‘federal’ cause of action, . . . the Florida court’s refusal to
entertain one discrete category of § 1983 claims, when the
court entertains similar state-law actions against state de
fendants, violates the Supremacy Clause”). The outcome in
these cases, however, can be reconciled with first principles

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notwithstanding the Court’s stated reliance on McKnett’s
flawed interpretation of the Supremacy Clause.6
In Testa, the Court struck down the Rhode Island Su
preme Court’s refusal to entertain a claim under the federal
Emergency Price Control Act. There was no dispute that
“the Rhode Island courts [had] jurisdiction adequate and ap
propriate under established local law to adjudicate this ac
tion.” 330 U. S., at 394, and n. 13. The Rhode Island court
nevertheless declined to exercise that jurisdiction under its
decision in Robinson v. Norato, 71 R. I. 256, 258, 43 A. 2d
467, 468 (1945), which had relied on a “universally acknowl
edged” doctrine “of private international law” as a basis for
refusing to adjudicate federal “penal” claims. Because the
Rhode Island Supreme Court had invoked this common-law
doctrine despite the existence of state-law statutory jurisdic
tion over the federal claims, this Court correctly ruled that
the state court’s “policy against enforcement . . . of statutes
of other states and the United States which it deems penal,
[could not] be accepted as a ‘valid excuse.’ ” 330 U. S., at
392–393.
6 Other decisions also have articulated this antidiscrimination principle.
See, e. g., Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U. S. 911 (1997); Missouri ex rel. South
ern R. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U. S. 1 (1950); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117
(1945); Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., 315 U. S. 698 (1942). The out
comes in these cases nonetheless preserved state-court jurisdictional au
tonomy. In Johnson and Herb, the Court sustained the state-court dis
missals of the federal claims as nondiscriminatory. See Johnson, supra,
at 918–920; Herb, supra, at 123. In Mayfield, the Court never decided
whether the state court had jurisdiction over the relevant federal claim;
rather, it remanded the case to the Missouri Supreme Court based on the
state court’s possibly erroneous interpretation of federal law at issue in
that case. See 340 U. S., at 4–5. Finally, in Miles, the Court struck down
a Tennessee decision that enjoined a citizen of that State from pursuing a
FELA action in Missouri state court “on grounds of inequity.” 315 U. S.,
at 702. The Court correctly held that, so long as jurisdiction existed
under Missouri law, the Tennessee court could not rely on its own notions
of “inequity” to thwart the vindication of a federal right in state court.
Ibid.

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Testa thus represents a routine application of the rule of
law set forth in Second Employers’: As long as jurisdiction
over a federal claim exists as a matter of state law, state
court judges cannot sua sponte refuse to enforce federal law
because they disagree with Congress’ decision to allow for
adjudication of certain federal claims in state court. See 330
U. S., at 393 (“[A] state court cannot ‘refuse to enforce the
right arising from the law of the United States because of
conceptions of impolicy or want of wisdom on the part of
Congress in having called into play its lawful powers’ ” (quot
ing Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U. S.
211, 222 (1916))).7
In Howlett, the Court likewise correctly struck down a
Florida Supreme Court decision affirming the dismissal of a
§ 1983 suit on state-law sovereign immunity grounds. See
496 U. S., at 361, 375–381. The Florida court had inter
preted the State’s statutory “waiver of sovereign immunity”
not to extend to federal claims brought in state court. Id.,
at 361 (citing Fla. Stat. § 768.28 (1989)). According to the
state court, absent a statutory waiver, Florida’s pre-existing
common-law sovereign immunity rule provided a “blanket
7 Despite suggestions to the contrary, see ante, at 734–735; Howlett, 496
U. S. 356, the Court’s decision in Bombolis, 241 U. S. 211, which held that
the Seventh Amendment does not require a unanimous jury verdict when
federal civil claims are adjudicated in state court, provides no support for
the antidiscrimination principle. As quoted above, the Court (in dicta)
accurately summarized the holding of Second Employers’. See 241 U. S.,
at 222. The Court also reiterated that before a state court owes a duty
to enforce federal law, it must have subject-matter jurisdiction over the
claim under state law. See id., at 221 (“[L]awful rights of the citizen,
whether arising from a legitimate exercise of state or national power . . .
are concurrently subject to be enforced in the courts of the State or nation
when such rights come within the general scope of the jurisdiction con
ferred upon such courts by the authority, State or nation, creating them”);
id., at 222 (explaining that state courts are “charged with the duty to
safeguard and enforce the right of every citizen without reference to the
particular exercise of governmental power from which the right may have
arisen, if only the authority to enforce such right comes generally within
the scope of the jurisdiction conferred by the government creating them”).

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immunity on [state] governmental entities from federal civil
rights actions under § 1983” brought in Florida courts. 496
U. S., at 364. Based on this rule, the Florida Supreme Court
affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of the § 1983 suit
against the state officials. See id., at 359; see also Howlett
v. Rose, 537 So. 2d 706, 708 (Fla. App. 1989) (concluding that
Florida’s “common law immunity” rule barred “the use of its
courts for suits against the state in those state courts”).
No antidiscrimination rule was required to strike down the
Florida Supreme Court’s decision. Even though several
Florida courts had concluded that the defense of sovereign
immunity was jurisdictional, see 496 U. S., at 361, n. 5, “[t]he
force of the Supremacy Clause is not so weak that it can be
evaded by mere mention of the word ‘jurisdiction,’ ” id., at
382–383. That is, state courts cannot evade their obligation
to enforce federal law by simply characterizing a statute or
common-law rule as “jurisdictional”; the state law must in
fact operate in a jurisdictional manner. No matter where
the line between subject-matter jurisdiction and the merits
is drawn, see supra, at 755–756, Florida’s “common law im
munity” rule crossed it.
First, because the Florida Supreme Court had dismissed
the § 1983 lawsuit with prejudice, its decision was on the
merits. Cf. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531
U. S. 497, 505 (2001) (“ ‘[W]ith prejudice’ is an acceptable
form of shorthand for ‘an adjudication upon the merits’ ”
(quoting 9 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Prac
tice and Procedure § 2373, p. 396, n. 4 (1981))). Second, Flor
ida’s sovereign immunity rule violated the Supremacy
Clause by operating as a state-law defense to a federal law.
See Martinez v. California, 444 U. S. 277, 284, n. 8 (1980)
(“ ‘[P]ermitt[ing] a state immunity defense to have control
ling effect’ ” over a federal claim violates the Supremacy
Clause). Resolving a federal claim with preclusive effect
based on a state-law defense is far different from simply clos
ing the door of the state courthouse to that federal claim.
The first changes federal law by denying relief on the merits;

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the second merely dictates the forum in which the federal
claim will be heard.
In the end, of course, “the ultimate touchstone of constitu
tionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said
about it.” Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U. S. 466,
491–492 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). And contrary
to McKnett, the Constitution does not require state courts
to give equal billing to state and federal claims. To read the
Supremacy Clause to include an antidiscrimination princi
ple undermines the compromise that shaped Article III and
contradicts the original understanding of the Constitution.
There is no justification for preserving such a principle. But
even if the Court chooses to adhere to the antidiscrimination
rule as part of the Supremacy Clause inquiry, the rule’s infi
delity to the text, structure, and history of the Constitution
counsels against extending the principle any further than our
precedent requires. Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S.
549, 584–585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); see infra, at
768–775.
B
Although the Supremacy Clause does not, on its own force,
pre-empt state jurisdictional statutes of any kind, it may still
pre-empt state law once Congress has acted. Federal law
must prevail when Congress validly enacts a statute that
expressly supersedes state law, see Sprietsma v. Mercury
Marine, 537 U. S. 51, 62–63 (2002); United States v. Locke,
529 U. S. 89, 109 (2000), or when the state law conflicts
with a federal statute, see American Telephone & Telegraph
Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 524 U. S. 214 (1998);
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132
(1963). NYCLA § 24 does not fall prey to either category of
pre-emption.8
8 Because 42 U. S. C. § 1983 does not pre-empt NYCLA § 24, there is no
need to reach the more difficult question of whether Congress has the
delegated authority under the Constitution to require state courts to en
tertain a federal cause of action. Compare Printz v. United States, 521

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First, federal law does not expressly require New York
courts to accept jurisdiction over § 1983 suits. Under § 1983,
any state official who denies “any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof . . . any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” The
statute addresses who may sue and be sued for violations of
federal law. But it includes no substantive command requir
ing New York to provide a state judicial forum to a § 1983
plaintiff. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U. S. 131, 158 (1988)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Section 1983 . . . creates no sub
stantive law. . . . Its purpose, as we have repeatedly said,
‘was to interpose the federal courts between the States and
the people, as guardians of the people’s federal rights’ ”
(quoting Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U. S. 496, 503
(1982))). Like FELA, therefore, § 1983 does not “enlarge or
regulate the jurisdiction of state courts.” Second Employ
ers’, 223 U. S., at 56.9
U. S. 898, 907 (1997) (suggesting that Congress’ authority in this regard
was “perhaps implicit in one of the provisions of the Constitution [Article
III, § 1], and was explicit in another [Article VI, cl. 2]”); Prakash, Field
Office Federalism, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1957, 2032 (1993) (“As a matter of original
understanding, the Founding Generation understood that state courts
could be commandeered to enforce federal law”), with Prigg v. Pennsylva
nia, 16 Pet. 539, 615 (1842) (concluding that state courts could not “be
compelled to enforce” the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act); Collins 45 (concluding
as an original matter that “states did not have to accept unwanted federal
civil and criminal judicial business, and that Congress could not compel
them to do so”).
9 The history surrounding § 1983’s enactment also supports this conclu
sion. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U. S. 131, 158 (1988) (O’Connor, J., dissent
ing) (“[T]he original version of § 1983 provided that the federal courts
would have exclusive jurisdiction of actions arising under it. This fact is
conclusive proof that the Congress which enacted § 1983 over 100 years
ago, could not possibly have meant thereby to alter the operation of state
courts in any way . . . . Abandoning the rule of exclusive federal jurisdic
tion over § 1983 actions, and thus restoring the tradition of concurrent

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Second, NYCLA § 24 does not conflict with § 1983. See
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U. S. 555, 589–590 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in judgment) (explaining that the Court has alter
natively described the standard for conflict pre-emption as
“physical impossibility” and “direct conflict” (internal quota
tion marks omitted)). As explained above, Congress did not
grant § 1983 plaintiffs a “right” to bring their claims in state
court or “guarantee” that the state forum would remain open
to their suits. See id., at 593. Moreover, Congress has cre
ated inferior federal courts that have the power to adjudicate
all § 1983 actions. And this Court has expressly determined
that § 1983 plaintiffs do not have to exhaust state-court
remedies before proceeding in federal court. See Patsy,
supra, at 516.
Therefore, even if every state court closed its doors to
§ 1983 plaintiffs, the plaintiffs could proceed with their claims
in the federal forum. See, e. g., Felder, supra, at 160 (O’Con
nor, J., dissenting) (“Every plaintiff has the option of pro
ceeding in federal court, and the Wisconsin statute has not
the slightest effect on that right”). And because the dis
missal of § 1983 claims from state court pursuant to NYCLA
§ 24 is for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, see supra, at
749–750, it has no preclusive effect on claims refiled in fed
eral court, see Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90, 94, 105 (1980)
(requiring “a final judgment on the merits” before a § 1983
claim would be barred in federal court under the doctrine of
claim preclusion), and thus does not alter the substance of
the federal claim. Any contention that NYCLA § 24 con
flicts with § 1983 therefore would be misplaced.
The Court nevertheless has relied on an expansive brand
of “conflict” pre-emption to strike down state-court proce
dural rules that are perceived to “burde[n] the exercise of
the federal right” in state court. Felder, 487 U. S., at 141.
In such cases, the Court has asked if the state-law rule, when
jurisdiction . . . did not leave behind a pre-emptive grin without a statu
tory cat” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

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applied “to § 1983 actions brought in state courts [is] consist
ent with the goals of the federal civil rights laws, or does
the enforcement of such a requirement instead ‘stan[d] as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress’ ”? See id., at 138
(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941)).
There has been no suggestion in this case, however, that
NYCLA § 24 is a procedural rule that must be satisfied in
order to bring the § 1983 action in state court. See supra,
at 749–750; infra, at 768; see also ante, at 742, n. 9. As ex
plained above, petitioner’s claim was not procedurally defi
cient; the state court simply lacked the power to adjudicate
the claim. See supra, at 749–750. Thus, the Felder line of
cases is inapplicable to this case.
But even if there were such a claim made in this case, the
Supremacy Clause supplies this Court with no authority to
pre-empt a state procedural law merely because it “burdens
the exercise” of a federal right in state court. “Under the
Supremacy Clause, state law is pre-empted only by federal
law ‘made in Pursuance’ of the Constitution, Art. VI, cl. 2—
not by extratextual considerations of the purposes underly
ing congressional inaction,” such as a desire to ensure that
federal law is not burdened by state-law procedural obliga
tions. Wyeth, 555 U. S., at 603 (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment). A sweeping approach to pre-emption based on
perceived congressional purposes “leads to the illegitimate—
and thus, unconstitutional—invalidation of state laws.” Id.,
at 604. I cannot agree with the approach employed in Fel
der “that pre-empts state laws merely because they ‘stand
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives’ of federal law . . . as perceived
by this Court.” 555 U. S., at 604.
III
Even accepting the entirety of the Court’s precedent in
this area of the law, however, I still could not join the majori

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ty’s resolution of this case as it mischaracterizes and broad
ens this Court’s decisions. The majority concedes not only
that NYCLA § 24 is jurisdictional, but that the statute is
neutral with respect to federal and state claims. Neverthe
less, it concludes that the statute violates the Supremacy
Clause because it finds that “equality of treatment does not
ensure that a state law will be deemed a neutral rule of judi
cial administration and therefore a valid excuse for refusing
to entertain a federal cause of action.” Ante, at 738. This
conclusion is incorrect in light of Court precedent for sev
eral reasons.
A
The majority mischaracterizes this Court’s precedent
when it asserts that jurisdictional neutrality is “the begin
ning, not the end, of the Supremacy Clause analysis.” Ante,
at 739. As explained above, see supra, at 751–764, “subject
to only one limitation, each State of the Union may estab
lish its own judicature, distribute judicial power among the
courts of its choice, [and] define the conditions for the exer
cise of their jurisdiction and the modes of their proceeding,
to the same extent as Congress is empowered to establish a
system of inferior federal courts within the limits of federal
judicial power.” Brown, 321 U. S., at 188 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). That “one limitation” is the neutrality princi
ple that the Court has found in the Supremacy Clause. See
id., at 189 (“The only limitation upon the freedom of a State
to define the jurisdiction of its own courts is that . . . [it]
must treat litigants under the Federal act as other litigants
are treated” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Herb v. Pit
cairn, 324 U. S. 117, 123 (1945) (“The freedom of the state
courts so to decide is, of course, subject to the qualification
that the cause of action must not be discriminated against
because it is a federal one”). Here, it is conceded that New
York has deprived its courts of subject-matter jurisdiction
over a particular class of claims on terms that treat federal
and state actions equally. See ante, at 731, 737–738. That

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is all this Court’s precedent requires. See supra, at 750,
760.
The majority’s assertion that jurisdictional neutrality is
not the touchstone because “[a] jurisdictional rule cannot be
used as a device to undermine federal law, no matter how
evenhanded it may appear,” ante, at 739, reflects a misunder
standing of the law. A jurisdictional statute simply de
prives the relevant court of the power to decide the case
altogether. See 10A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Fed
eral Practice and Procedure § 2713, p. 239 (3d ed. 1998) (“If
the court has no jurisdiction, it has no power to enter a judg
ment on the merits and must dismiss the action”); Restate
ment (Second) of Judgments § 11, p. 108 (1980) (defining
subject-matter jurisdiction as a court’s “authority to adjudi
cate the type of controversy involved in the action”). Such
a statute necessarily operates without prejudice to the adju
dication of the matter in a competent forum. See supra, at
755–756. Jurisdictional statutes therefore by definition are
incapable of undermining federal law. NYCLA § 24 no more
undermines § 1983 than the amount-in-controversy require
ment for federal diversity jurisdiction undermines state law.
See 28 U. S. C. § 1332. The relevant law (state or federal)
remains fully operative in both circumstances. The sole
consequence of the jurisdictional barrier is that the law can
not be enforced in one particular judicial forum.10
10 If by asserting that state law is not permitted to “undermine federal
law,” ante, at 739, the majority instead is arguing that NYCLA § 24 is a
procedural rule that too heavily “burdens the exercise of the federal right”
in state court, see Felder, 487 U. S., at 141, its argument is equally mis
placed. First, the majority concedes that NYCLA § 24 is not a state pro
cedural rule. See ante, at 741, n. 8. Second, applying the reasoning of
Felder to a jurisdictional statute like NYCLA § 24 would overrule all of
the Court’s decisions upholding state laws that decline jurisdiction over
federal claims, and would virtually ensure that in future cases, no state
jurisdictional rule will be upheld as constitutional. By simply rendering
a federal claim noncognizable in state court, a statute depriving a state
court of subject-matter jurisdiction (even under the terms and conditions

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As a result, the majority’s focus on New York’s reasons
for enacting this jurisdictional statute is entirely misplaced.
See ante, at 736–737. The States “remain independent and
autonomous within their proper sphere of authority. ”
Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898, 928 (1997). New York
has the organic authority, therefore, to tailor the jurisdiction
of state courts to meet its policy goals. See Fay v. Noia,
372 U. S. 391, 466–467 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The
right of the State to regulate its own procedures governing
the conduct of litigants in its courts, and its interest in super
vision of those procedures, stand on the same constitutional
plane as its right and interest in framing ‘substantive’ laws
governing other aspects of the conduct of those within its
borders”).
It may be true that it was “Congress’ judgment that all
persons who violate federal rights while acting under color
of state law shall be held liable for damages.” Ante, at 737.
But Congress has not enforced that judgment by statutorily
requiring the States to open their courts to all § 1983 claims.
See n. 8, supra. And this Court has “never held that state
courts must entertain § 1983 suits. ” National Private
Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 515 U. S. 582,
587, n. 4 (1995). Our decisions have held only that the
States cannot use jurisdictional statutes to discriminate
against federal claims. Because NYCLA § 24 does not vio
late this command, any policy-driven reasons for depriving
permitted by this Court’s precedent) will always violate Felder’s command
that a state rule must not undermine the “remedial objectives” of a federal
claim, see 487 U. S., at 138. The jurisdictional statute also will unavoid
ably implicate Felder’s concern that a state rule should not inevitably
produce a different outcome depending on whether a claim is asserted in
state or federal court, see ibid. A state jurisdictional statute necessarily
will result in a different outcome in state court, where it will cause dis
missal of the federal claim, than in federal court, where that claim will be
heard. It is for this reason that the Court has been careful to keep its
examination of state jurisdictional statutes and state procedural rules in
different categories.

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jurisdiction over a “federal claim in addition to an identical
state claim,” ante, at 738, are irrelevant for purposes of the
Supremacy Clause.
This Court’s decision in Howlett is not to the contrary.
Despite the majority’s assertion, Howlett does not stand for
the proposition “that a State cannot employ a jurisdictional
rule ‘to dissociate [itself] from federal law because of dis
agreement with its content or a refusal to recognize the su
perior authority of its source.’ ” Ante, at 736 (quoting How
lett, 496 U. S., at 371). As an initial matter, the majority
lifts the above quotation—which was merely part of a pas
sage explaining that a “State may not discriminate against
federal causes of action,” id., at 372—entirely out of context.
Howlett’s reiteration of McKnett’s neutrality command,
which is all the selected quotation reflects, see 496 U. S., at
372–373, offers no refuge to the majority in light of its con
cession that NYCLA § 24 affords “equal treatment” to “fed
eral and state claims.” Ante, at 738.
Howlett instead stands for the unremarkable proposition
that States may not add immunity defenses to § 1983. See
ante, at 736–737, n. 5 (explaining that Howlett held that
“a Florida school board could [not] assert a state-law immu
nity defense in a § 1983 action brought in state court” be
cause “the ‘elements of, and the defenses to, a federal cause
of action are defined by federal law’ ” (quoting 496 U. S., at
375)). A state law is not jurisdictional just because the leg
islature has “denominated” it as such. Id., at 381. As the
majority observes, the State’s “invocation of ‘jurisdiction’ ”
cannot “trump” the “Supremacy Clause inquiry,” ante, at
741. The majority, therefore, is correct that a state court’s
decision “to nullify a federal right or cause of action [that it]
believe[s] is inconsistent with [its] local policies” cannot evade
the Supremacy Clause by hiding behind a jurisdictional label,
ante, at 736, because “the Supremacy Clause cannot be
evaded by formalism,” ante, at 742. Rather, a state statute
must in fact operate jurisdictionally: It must deprive the

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court of the power to hear the claim and it must not preclude
relitigation of the action in a proper forum. See supra, at
769–771. Howlett proved the point by striking down a
state-law immunity rule that bore the jurisdictional label but
operated as a defense on the merits and provided for the
dismissal of the state-court action with prejudice. See 496
U. S., at 359; supra, at 763–764.
But the majority’s axiomatic refrain about jurisdictional
labels is entirely unresponsive to the issue before the
Court—i. e., whether NYCLA § 24 operates jurisdictionally.
Unlike the Florida immunity rule in Howlett, NYCLA § 24
is not a defense to a federal claim and the dismissal it author
izes is without prejudice. See 9 N. Y. 3d 481, 490, 881
N. E. 2d 180, 186 (2007) (explaining that “the Legislature did
nothing more than exercise its prerogative to establish the
subject matter jurisdiction of state courts” and that “lit
igants like plaintiff can use the federal courts to pursue
section 1983 claims” against correction officers). For this
reason, NYCLA § 24 is not merely “denominated” as jurisdic
tional—it actually is jurisdictional. The New York courts,
therefore, have not declared a “category” of § 1983 claims to
be “ ‘frivolous’ ” or to have “ ‘no merit’ ” in order to “ ‘relieve
congestion’ ” in the state court system. See ante, at 737
(quoting Howlett, supra, at 380). These courts have simply
recognized that they lack the power to adjudicate this cate
gory of claims regardless of their merit.
The majority’s failure to grapple with the clear differences
between the immunity rule at issue in Howlett and NYCLA
§ 24 proves that its decision is untethered from precedent.
And more broadly, the majority’s failure to account for the
important role of claim preclusion in evaluating whether a
statute is jurisdictional undermines the important line
drawn by this Court’s decisions between subject-matter
jurisdiction and the merits. See Marrese v. American
Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U. S. 373, 382 (1985)
(“With respect to matters that were not decided in the state

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proceedings . . . claim preclusion generally does not apply
where ‘[t]he plaintiff was unable to . . . seek a remedy be
cause of the limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction
of the courts’ ” (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments
§ 26(1)(c) (1982))); see also Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 514–516;
Steel Co., 523 U. S., at 94.
The majority’s principal response is that NYCLA § 24 “is
effectively an immunity statute cloaked in jurisdictional
garb.” Ante, at 742. But this curious rejoinder resurrects
an argument that the majority abandons earlier in its own
opinion. See ante, at 736–737, n. 5. The majority needs to
choose. Either it should definitively commit to making the
impossible case that a statute denying state courts the power
to entertain a claim without prejudice to its reassertion in
federal court is an immunity defense in disguise, or it should
clearly explain why some other aspect of Howlett controls
the outcome of this case. This Court has required Congress
to speak clearly when it intends to “upset the usual constitu
tional balance of federal and state powers.” Gregory, 501
U. S., at 460. It should require no less of itself.
At bottom, the majority’s warning that upholding New
York’s law “would permit a State to withhold a forum for
the adjudication of any federal cause of action with which it
disagreed as long as the policy took the form of a jurisdic
tional rule” is without any basis in fact. Ante, at 742, n. 9.
This Court’s jurisdictional neutrality command already
guards against antifederal discrimination. A decision up
holding NYCLA § 24, which fully adheres to that rule, would
not “circumvent our prior decisions. ” Ibid. It simply
would adhere to them.11
11 The majority also suggests that allowing jurisdictional neutrality to
be the test “would create a blind spot in the Supremacy Clause” because
a procedural rule that too heavily burdens a federal cause of action would
be struck down as unconstitutional while “a State could express its dis
agreement with (and even open hostility to) a federal cause of action, de
clare a desire to thwart its enforcement, and achieve that goal by remov

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B
The majority also incorrectly concludes that NYCLA § 24
is not a neutral jurisdictional statute because it applies to a
“narrow class of defendants,” ante, at 736, and because New
York courts “hear the lion’s share of all other § 1983 actions,”
ante, at 741. A statute’s jurisdictional status does not turn
on its narrowness or on its breadth. See Arbaugh, supra,
at 515, n. 11. Rather, as explained above, a statute’s juris
dictional status turns on the grounds on which the state-law
dismissal rests and the consequences that follow from such
rulings. No matter how narrow the majority perceives
NYCLA § 24 to be, it easily qualifies as jurisdictional under
this established standard. Accordingly, it is immaterial that
New York has chosen to allow its courts of general jurisdic
tion to entertain § 1983 actions against certain categories of
ing the disfavored category of claims from its courts’ jurisdiction.” Ante,
at 741, n. 8. This is incorrect for at least two reasons. First, as explained
above, a State may permissibly register its hostility to federal law only
by subjecting analogous state-law claims to equally disfavored treatment.
See supra, at 760–762. Hostility to federal law is thus irrelevant under
this Court’s precedent—the Supremacy Clause is concerned only with
whether there is antifederal discrimination. Second, the majority ob
scures important differences between procedural rules, like the notice-of
claim rule at issue in Felder, and neutral jurisdictional statutes like
NYCLA § 24. Unlike a neutral jurisdictional statute, which merely pre
vents a state court from entertaining a federal claim, failure to comply
with a state procedural rule will result in dismissal of a federal claim
with prejudice. See Felder, 487 U. S., at 151 (explaining that the State’s
“outcome-determinative law must give way when a party asserts a federal
right in state court”). Contrary to the majority’s assertion, therefore, it
is not that state courts with “unconstitutionally burdensome procedural
rules did not go far enough”—it is instead that they went too far by plac
ing an insurmountable procedural hurdle in the plaintiff ’s path that led to
a judgment against him on the merits. Ante, at 741, n. 8. As a result,
the Court’s assessment of whether a state procedural rule too heavily
burdens a federal right does not have any bearing on the Court’s continued
adherence to the neutrality principle as the sole determinant in evaluating
state-law jurisdictional statutes.

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defendants but not others (such as correction officers), or to
entertain § 1983 actions against particular defendants for
only certain types of relief.
Building on its assumption that a statute’s jurisdictional
status turns on its scope, the majority further holds that
“having made the decision to create courts of general juris
diction that regularly sit to entertain analogous suits, New
York is not at liberty to shut the courthouse door to federal
claims that it considers at odds with its local policy.” Ante,
at 740. But whether two claims are “analogous” is relevant
only for purposes of determining whether a state jurisdic
tional statute discriminates against federal law. This in
quiry necessarily requires an evaluation of the similarities
between federal- and state-law claims to assess whether
state-court jurisdiction is being denied to a federal claim
simply because of its federal character.
In contrast, the majority limits its analysis to state-law
claims, finding discrimination based solely on the fact that
state law provides jurisdiction in state court for claims
against state officials who serve in “analogous” roles to the
correction officers. See ante, at 739. The majority’s in
quiry is not probative of antifederal discrimination, which is
the concern that first led this Court in McKnett to find a
Supremacy Clause limitation on state-court jurisdictional au
tonomy. Consequently, there is no support for the majori
ty’s assertion that New York’s decision to treat police officers
differently from correction officers for purposes of civil
litigation somehow violates the Constitution. See ante, at
739–740.
Worse still, the majority concludes that § 1983 claims for
damages against “other state officials” are “sufficiently analo
gous to petitioner’s § 1983 claims” to trigger a Supremacy
Clause violation. Ante, at 740, n. 6. Under this reasoning,
if a State grants its trial courts jurisdiction to hear § 1983
claims for damages against any state official, the State’s deci
sion to deny those courts the power to entertain some nar

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rower species of § 1983 claims—even on jurisdictionally neu
tral terms—a fortiori violates the Supremacy Clause. The
majority’s assurance that its holding is applicable only to
New York’s “unique scheme” thus rings hollow. Ante,
at 741. The majority is forcing States into an all-or-nothing
choice that neither the Constitution nor this Court’s deci
sions require. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 774,
n. 4 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“It would not be open to us to insist on adjudication
in a state court of a federal claim arising beyond the jurisdic
tion of the local court” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Indeed, the majority’s novel approach breaks the promise
that the States still enjoy “ ‘great latitude . . . to establish
the structure and jurisdiction of their own courts.’ ” Ante,
at 739 (quoting Howlett, 496 U. S., at 372). It cannot be that
New York has forsaken the right to withdraw a particular
class of claims from its courts’ purview simply because it has
created courts of general jurisdiction that would otherwise
have the power to hear suits for damages against correction
officers. The Supremacy Clause does not fossilize the juris
diction of state courts in their original form. Under this
Court’s precedent, States remain free to alter the structure
of their judicial system even if that means certain federal
causes of action will no longer be heard in state court, so long
as States do so on nondiscriminatory terms. See Printz, 521
U. S., at 906, n. 1 (explaining that “the States obviously regu
late the ‘ordinary jurisdiction’ of their courts”); Johnson
v. Fankell, 520 U. S. 911, 922, n. 13 (1997) (“We have made
it quite clear that it is a matter for each State to decide
how to structure its judicial system”). Today’s decision thus
represents a dramatic and unwarranted expansion of this
Court’s precedent.
IV
“[I]n order to protect the delicate balance of power man
dated by the Constitution, the Supremacy Clause must oper
ate only in accordance with its terms.” Wyeth, 555 U. S.,

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Thomas, J., dissenting
at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). By imposing
on state courts a duty to accept subject-matter jurisdiction
over federal § 1983 actions, the Court has stretched the Su
premacy Clause beyond all reasonable bounds and upended
a compromise struck by the Framers in Article III of the
Constitution. Furthermore, by declaring unconstitutional
even those laws that divest state courts of jurisdiction over
federal claims on a nondiscriminatory basis, the majority has
silently overturned this Court’s unbroken line of decisions
upholding state statutes that are materially indistinguish
able from the New York law under review. And it has
transformed a single exception to the rule of state judicial
autonomy into a virtually ironclad obligation to entertain
federal business. I respectfully dissent.