ATLANTIC SOUNDING CO., INC., et al. v. TOWNSEND

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404 OCTOBER TERM, 2008
Syllabus
ATLANTIC SOUNDING CO., INC., et al. v.
TOWNSEND
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 08–214. Argued March 2, 2009—Decided June 25, 2009
Atlantic Sounding Co. allegedly refused to pay maintenance and cure to
respondent Townsend for injuries he suffered while working on its tug
boat, and then filed this declaratory relief action regarding its obliga
tions. Townsend filed suit under the Jones Act and general maritime
law, alleging, inter alia, arbitrary and willful failure to provide mainte
nance and cure. He filed similar counterclaims in the declaratory judg
ment action, seeking punitive damages for the maintenance and cure
claim. The District Court denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss the pu
nitive damages claim, but certified the question for interlocutory appeal.
Following its precedent, the Eleventh Circuit held that punitive dam
ages may be awarded for the willful withholding of maintenance and
cure.
Held: Because punitive damages have long been an accepted remedy
under general maritime law, and because neither Miles v. Apex Marine
Corp., 498 U. S. 19, nor the Jones Act altered this understanding, puni
tive damages for the willful and wanton disregard of the maintenance
and cure obligation remain available as a matter of general maritime
law. Pp. 408–425.
(a) Settled legal principles establish three points central to this case.
Pp. 408–415.
(i) Punitive damages have long been an available remedy at com
mon law for wanton, willful, or outrageous conduct. English law during
the colonial era accorded juries the authority to award such damages
when warranted. And American courts have likewise permitted such
damages since at least 1784. This Court has also found punitive dam
ages authorized as a matter of common-law doctrine. See, e. g., Day v.
Woodworth, 13 How. 363. Pp. 409–410.
(ii) The common-law punitive damages tradition extends to claims
arising under federal maritime law. See Lake Shore & Michigan
Southern R. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101, 108. One of this Court’s first
cases so indicating involved an action for marine trespass. See The
Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. 546. And lower federal courts have found
punitive damages available in maritime actions for particularly egre
gious tortious acts. Pp. 411–412.

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(iii) Nothing in maritime law undermines this general rule’s appli
cability in the maintenance and cure context. The maintenance and
cure obligation dates back centuries as an aspect of general maritime
law, and the failure of a seaman’s employers to provide adequate medical
care was the basis for awarding punitive damages in cases decided in
the 1800’s. This Court has since registered its agreement with such
decisions and has subsequently found that in addition to wages, “mainte
nance” includes food and lodging at the ship’s expense, and “cure” refers
to medical treatment, Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U. S.
438, 441. Moreover, an owner’s failure to provide proper medical care
for seamen has provided lower courts the impetus to award damages
that appear to contain at least some punitive element. Pp. 412–414.
(iv) Under these settled legal principles, respondent is entitled to
pursue punitive damages unless Congress has enacted legislation that
departs from the common-law understanding. Pp. 414–415.
(b) The plain language of the Jones Act does not provide a basis for
overturning the common-law rule. Congress enacted the Jones Act to
overrule The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158, where the Court prohibited a sea
man or his family from recovering for injuries or death suffered due to
his employers’ negligence. To that end, the Act created a statutory
negligence cause of action, but it did not eliminate pre-existing remedies
available to seamen for the separate common-law cause of action based
on maintenance and cure. The Act bestows the right to “elect” to bring
a Jones Act claim, thereby indicating a choice of actions for seamen—
not an exclusive remedy. Because the then-accepted remedies arose
from general maritime law, it necessarily follows that Congress envi
sioned their continued availability. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515
U. S. 347, 354. Had the Jones Act been the only remaining remedy
available, there would have been no election to make. And, the only
statutory restrictions on general maritime maintenance and cure claims
were enacted long after the Jones Act’s passage and limit availability
for only two discrete classes: foreign workers on offshore oil and mineral
production facilities and sailing school students and instructors. This
indicates that “Congress knows how to” restrict the traditional mainte
nance and cure remedy “when it wants to.” Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd.
v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U. S. 97, 106. This Court has consistently
observed that the Jones Act preserves common-law causes of action such
as maintenance and cure, see, e. g., The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U. S.
110, and its case law supports the view that punitive damages awards,
in particular, continue to remain available in maintenance and cure ac
tions, see Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U. S. 527. Pp. 415–418.
(c) Contrary to petitioners’ argument, Miles does not limit recovery
to the remedies available under the Jones Act. Miles does not address

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either maintenance and cure actions in general or the availability of
punitive damages for such actions. Instead, it grappled with the en
tirely different question whether general maritime law should provide
a cause of action for wrongful death based on unseaworthiness. The
Court found that the Jones Act and the Death on the High Seas Act
(DOHSA), along with state statutes, supported recognition of a general
maritime rule for wrongful death of a seaman. However, since Con
gress had chosen to limit the damages available in the Jones Act and
DOHSA, excluding damages for loss of society or lost future earnings,
498 U. S., at 21, 31–32, its judgment must control the availability of rem
edies for wrongful-death actions brought under general maritime law,
id., at 32–36. Miles’ reasoning does not apply here. Unlike Miles’ sit
uation, both the general maritime cause of action here (maintenance and
cure) and the remedy (punitive damages) were well established before
the Jones Act’s passage. And unlike Miles’ facts, the Jones Act does
not address the general maritime cause of action here or its remedy. It
is thus possible to adhere to the traditional understanding of maritime
actions and remedies without abridging or violating the Jones Act; un
like wrongful-death actions, this traditional understanding is not a mat
ter to which “Congress has spoken directly.” See id., at 31. Moreover,
petitioners’ contrary view was directly rejected in Norfolk Shipbuild
ing & Drydock Corp. v. Garris, 532 U. S. 811, 820. If Miles presented
no barrier to the Garris Court’s endorsement of a previously unrecog
nized maritime cause of action for negligent wrongful death, there is no
legitimate basis for a contrary conclusion here. Like negligence, the
duty of maintenance and cure and the general availability of punitive
damages have been recognized “for more than a century,” 532 U. S., at
820. And because respondent does not ask this Court to alter statutory
text or “expand” the maritime tort law’s general principles, Miles does
not require eliminating the general maritime remedy of punitive dam
ages for the willful or wanton failure to comply with the duty to pay
maintenance and cure. The fact that seamen commonly seek to recover
under the Jones Act for maintenance and cure claims does not mean
that the Jones Act provides the only remedy. See Cortes v. Baltimore
Insular Line, Inc., 287 U. S. 367, 374–375. The laudable quest for uni
formity in admiralty does not require narrowing available damages to
the lowest common denominator approved by Congress for distinct
causes of action. Pp. 418–425.
496 F. 3d 1282, affirmed and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Sou
ter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Alito, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., joined,
post, p. 425.

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Opinion of the Court
David W. McCreadie argued the cause for petitioners.
With him on the briefs were Eddie G. Godwin and Steven
L. Brannock.
Gerard Joseph Sullivan, Jr., argued the cause and filed a
brief for respondent.*
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented by this case is whether an injured
seaman may recover punitive damages for his employer’s
willful failure to pay maintenance and cure. Petitioners
argue that under Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U. S. 19
(1990), seamen may recover only those damages available
under the Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. § 30104. We disagree. His
torically, punitive damages have been available and awarded
in general maritime actions, including some in mainte
nance and cure. We find that nothing in Miles or the Jones
Act eliminates that availability.
I
Respondent Edgar L. Townsend was a crew member of
the Motor Tug Thomas. After falling on the steel deck of
the tugboat and injuring his arm and shoulder, respondent
claimed that petitioner Atlantic Sounding,1 the owner of the
tugboat, advised him that it would not provide maintenance
and cure. See 496 F. 3d 1282, 1283 (CA11 2007). “A claim
for maintenance and cure concerns the vessel owner’s obliga
*Lawrence W. Kaye, Edward C. Walton, and Andre´ M. Picciurro filed
a brief for the Cruise Lines International Association as amicus curiae
urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American
Association for Justice by David W. Robertson and Leslie Frank Weis
brod; and for the Sailors’ Union of the Pacific by John R. Hillsman and
Lyle C. Cavin, Jr.
A brief of amicus curiae was filed for Port Ministries International by
Tonya J. Meister and Charles R. Lipcon.
1 Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc., is a wholly owned subsidiary of Weeks
Marine, Inc., the other petitioner in this case.

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tion to provide food, lodging, and medical services to a sea
man injured while serving the ship.” Lewis v. Lewis &
Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U. S. 438, 441 (2001).
Petitioners thereafter filed an action for declaratory relief
regarding their obligations with respect to maintenance and
cure. Respondent filed his own suit under the Jones Act and
general maritime law, alleging negligence, unseaworthiness,
arbitrary and willful failure to pay maintenance and cure,
and wrongful termination. In addition, respondent filed
similar counterclaims in the declaratory judgment action,
seeking punitive damages for the denial of maintenance and
cure. The District Court consolidated the cases. See 496
F. 3d, at 1283–1284.
Petitioners moved to dismiss respondent’s punitive dam
ages claim. The District Court denied the motion, holding
that it was bound by the determination in Hines v. J. A.
LaPorte, Inc., 820 F. 2d 1187, 1189 (CA11 1987) (per curiam),
that punitive damages were available in an action for mainte
nance and cure. The court, however, agreed to certify the
question for interlocutory appeal. See 496 F. 3d, at 1284.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
agreed with the District Court that Hines controlled and
held that respondent could pursue his punitive damages
claim for the willful withholding of maintenance and cure.
496 F. 3d, at 1285–1286. The decision conflicted with those
of other Courts of Appeals, see, e. g., Guevara v. Maritime
Overseas Corp., 59 F. 3d 1496 (CA5 1995) (en banc); Glynn v.
Roy Al Boat Management Corp., 57 F. 3d 1495 (CA9 1995),
and we granted certiorari, 555 U. S. 993 (2008).
II
Respondent claims that he is entitled to seek punitive dam
ages as a result of petitioners’ alleged breach of their “main
tenance and cure” duty under general maritime law. We
find no legal obstacle to his doing so.

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A
Punitive damages have long been an available remedy at
common law for wanton, willful, or outrageous conduct.
Under English law during the colonial era, juries were ac
corded broad discretion to award damages as they saw fit.
See, e. g., Lord Townsend v. Hughes, 2 Mod. 150, 86 Eng.
Rep. 994 (C. P. 1676) (“[I]n civil actions the plaintiff is to
recover by way of compensation for the damages he hath
sustained, and the jury are the proper judges thereof ” (em
phasis in original)); 1 T. Sedgwick, Measure of Damages
§ 349, p. 688 (9th ed. 1912) (hereinafter Sedgwick) (“Until
comparatively recent times juries were as arbitrary judges
of the amount of damages as of the facts”). The common
law view “was that ‘in cases where the amount of damages
was uncertain[,] their assessment was a matter so peculiarly
within the province of the jury that the Court should not
alter it.’ ” Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.,
523 U. S. 340, 353 (1998) (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S.
474, 480 (1935); alteration in original).
The jury’s broad discretion to set damages included the
authority to award punitive damages when the circum
stances of the case warranted. Just before the ratification
of the Constitution, Lord Chief Justice Pratt explained:
“[A] jury ha[s] it in [its] power to give damages for more than
the injury received. Damages are designed not only as a
satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a punish
ment to the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the
future, and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the
action itself.” Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft 1, 18–19, 98 Eng. Rep.
489, 498–499 (C. P. 1763); see also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Haslip, 499 U. S. 1, 25 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment) (“[P]unitive or ‘exemplary’ damages have long
been a part of Anglo-American law”); Huckle v. Money, 2
Wils. 205, 207, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (C. P. 1763) (declining
to grant a new trial because the jury “ha[s] done right in
giving exemplary damages”).

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American courts have likewise permitted punitive dam
ages awards in appropriate cases since at least 1784. See,
e. g., Genay v. Norris, 1 S. C. L. 6, 7 (C. P. and Gen. Sess.
1784) (approving award of “very exemplary damages” be
cause spiking wine represented a “very wanton outrage”);
Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N. J. L. 77 (1791) (concluding that a
breach of promise of marriage was “of the most atrocious
and dishonourable nature” and supported “damages for ex
ample’s sake, to prevent such offences in future” (emphasis
in original)). Although some States elected not to allow ju
ries to make such awards, the vast majority permitted them.
See 1 Sedgwick §§ 352, 354, at 694, 700. By the middle of
the 19th century, “punitive damages were undoubtedly an
established part of the American common law of torts [and]
no particular procedures were deemed necessary to circum
scribe a jury’s discretion regarding the award of such dam
ages, or their amount.” Haslip, supra, at 26–27 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment).
This Court has also found the award of punitive damages
to be authorized as a matter of common-law doctrine. In
Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363 (1852), for example, the
Court recognized the “well-established principle of the com
mon law, that in actions of trespass and all actions on the
case for torts, a jury may inflict what are called exemplary,
punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defendant . . . .” Id.,
at 371; see also Philadelphia, W., & B. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21
How. 202, 214 (1859) (“Whenever the injury complained of
has been inflicted maliciously or wantonly, and with circum
stances of contumely or indignity, the jury are not limited to
the ascertainment of a simple compensation for the wrong
committed against the aggrieved person”); Barry v. Ed
munds, 116 U. S. 550, 562 (1886) (“[A]ccording to the settled
law of this court, [a plaintiff] might show himself, by proof
of the circumstances, to be entitled to exemplary damages
calculated to vindicate his right and protect it against future
similar invasions”).

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B
The general rule that punitive damages were available at
common law extended to claims arising under federal mari
time law. See Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R. Co. v.
Prentice, 147 U. S. 101, 108 (1893) (“[C]ourts of admiralty . . .
proceed, in cases of tort, upon the same principles as courts
of common law, in allowing exemplary damages . . . ”). One
of this Court’s first cases indicating that punitive damages
were available involved an action for marine trespass. See
The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. 546 (1818). In the course of
deciding whether to uphold the jury’s award, Justice Story,
writing for the Court, recognized that punitive damages are
an available maritime remedy under the proper circum
stances. Although the Court found that the particular facts
of the case did not warrant such an award against the named
defendants, it explained that “if this were a suit against the
original wrong-doers, it might be proper to . . . visit upon
them in the shape of exemplary damages, the proper punish
ment which belongs to such lawless misconduct.” Id., at
558; see also Barry, supra, at 563 (“In The Amiable Nancy,
which was the case of a marine tort, Mr. Justice Story spoke
of exemplary damages as ‘the proper punishment which be
longs to . . . lawless misconduct’ ” (citation omitted)).
The lower federal courts followed suit, finding that puni
tive damages were available in maritime actions for tortious
acts of a particularly egregious nature. See, e. g., McGuire
v. The Golden Gate, 16 F. Cas. 141, 143 (No. 8,815) (CC ND
Cal. 1856) (“In an action against the perpetrator of the
wrong, the aggrieved party would be entitled to recover not
only actual damages but exemplary,—such as would vindi
cate his wrongs, and teach the tort feasor the necessity of
reform”); Ralston v. The State Rights, 20 F. Cas. 201, 210
(No. 11,540) (DC ED Pa. 1836) (“[I]t is not legally correct . . .
to say that a court cannot give exemplary damages, in a case
like the present, against the owners of a vessel”); Boston
Mfg. Co. v. Fiske, 3 F. Cas. 957 (No. 1,681) (CC Mass. 1820)

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(Story, J.) (“In cases of marine torts, or illegal captures, it is
far from being uncommon in the admiralty to allow costs
and expences, and to mulct the offending parties, even in
exemplary damages, where the nature of the case requires
it”). In short, prior to enactment of the Jones Act in 1920,
“maritime jurisprudence was replete with judicial state
ments approving punitive damages, especially on behalf of
passengers and seamen.” Robertson, Punitive Damages in
American Maritime Law, 28 J. Mar. L. & Comm. 73, 115
(1997) (hereinafter Robertson); see also 2 Sedgwick § 599b,
at 1156 (“Exemplary damages are awarded in Admiralty, as
in other jurisdictions”); 2 J. Sutherland, Law of Damages
§ 392, p. 1272 (4th ed. 1916) (“As a rule a court of equity will
not award [punitive] damages, but courts of admiralty
will . . . ” (footnote omitted)).2
C
Nothing in maritime law undermines the applicability of
this general rule in the maintenance and cure context. See
G. Gilmore & C. Black, Law of Admiralty § 6–13, p. 312 (2d
ed. 1975) (hereinafter Gilmore & Black) (explaining that a
seaman denied maintenance and cure “has a free option to
claim damages (including punitive damages) under a general
maritime law count”); Robertson 163 (concluding that breach
of maintenance and cure is one of the particular torts for
which general maritime law would most likely permit the
2 Although punitive damages awards were rarely upheld on judicial re
view, but see Roza v. Smith, 65 F. 592, 596–597 (DC ND Cal. 1895); Gal
lagher v. The Yankee, 9 F. Cas. 1091, 1093 (No. 5,196) (DC ND Cal. 1859),
that fact does not draw into question the basic understanding that punitive
damages were considered an available maritime remedy. Indeed, in sev
eral cases in which a judgment awarding punitive damages was over
turned on appeal, the reversal was based on unrelated grounds. See, e. g.,
The Margharita, 140 F. 820, 824 (CA5 1905); Pacific Packing & Nav. Co.
v. Fielding, 136 F. 577, 580 (CA9 1905); Latchtimacker v. Jacksonville
Towing & Wrecking Co., 181 F. 276, 278 (CC SD Fla. 1910).

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awarding of punitive damages “assuming . . . the requisite
level of blameworthiness”). Indeed, the legal obligation to
provide maintenance and cure dates back centuries as an as
pect of general maritime law, and the failure of a seaman’s
employers to provide him with adequate medical care was
the basis for awarding punitive damages in cases decided as
early as the 1800’s.
The right to receive maintenance and cure was first recog
nized in this country in two lower court decisions authored
by Justice Story. See Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480
(No. 6,047) (CC Me. 1823); Reed v. Canfield, 20 F. Cas. 426
(No. 11,641) (CC Mass. 1832). According to Justice Story,
this common-law obligation to seamen was justified on hu
manitarian and economic grounds: “If some provision be not
made for [seamen] in sickness at the expense of the ship, they
must often in foreign ports suffer the accumulated evils of
disease, and poverty, and sometimes perish from the want of
suitable nourishment. . . . [T]he merchant himself derives an
ultimate benefit [because i]t encourages seamen to engage in
perilous voyages with more promptitude, and at lower
wages.” Harden, supra, at 483; see also Reed, supra, at 429
(“The seaman is to be cured at the expense of the ship, of
the sickness or injury sustained in the ship’s service”).
This Court has since registered its agreement with these
decisions. “Upon a full review . . . of English and American
authorities,” the Court concluded that “the vessel and her
owners are liable, in case a seaman falls sick, or is wounded,
in the service of the ship, to the extent of his maintenance
and cure, and to his wages, at least so long as the voyage is
continued.” The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158, 175 (1903). Deci
sions following The Osceola have explained that in addition
to wages, “maintenance” includes food and lodging at the ex
pense of their ship, and “cure” refers to medical treatment.
Lewis, 531 U. S., at 441; see also Gilmore & Black § 6–12,
at 305–306 (describing “maintenance and cure” as including
medical expenses, a living allowance, and unearned wages).

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In addition, the failure of a vessel owner to provide proper
medical care for seamen has provided the impetus for dam
ages awards that appear to contain at least some punitive
element. For example, in The City of Carlisle, 39 F. 807
(DC Ore. 1889), the court added $1,000 to its damages award
to compensate an apprentice seaman for “gross neglect and
cruel maltreatment of the [seaman] since his injury.” Id., at
809, 817. The court reviewed the indignities to which the
apprentice had been subjected as he recovered without any
serious medical attention, see id., at 810–812, and explained
that “if owners do not wish to be mulct in damages for such
misconduct, they should be careful to select men worthy to
command their vessels and fit to be trusted with the safety
and welfare of their crews, and particularly apprentice
boys.” Id., at 817; see also The Troop, 118 F. 769, 770–771,
773 (DC Wash. 1902) (explaining that $4,000 was a reasonable
award because the captain’s “failure to observe the dictates
of humanity” and obtain prompt medical care for an injured
seaman constituted a “monstrous wrong”).3
D
The settled legal principles discussed above establish
three points central to resolving this case. First, punitive
damages have long been available at common law. Second,
the common-law tradition of punitive damages extends to
maritime claims.4 And third, there is no evidence that
3 Although these cases do not refer to “punitive” or “exemplary” dam
ages, scholars have characterized the awards authorized by these decisions
as such. See Robertson 103–105; Edelman, Guevara v. Maritime Over
seas Corp.: Opposing the Decision, 20 Tulane Mar. L. J. 349, 351, and
n. 22 (1996).
4 The dissent correctly notes that the handful of early cases involving
maintenance and cure, by themselves, do not definitively resolve the ques
tion of punitive damages availability in such cases. See post, at 429–431
(opinion of Alito, J.). However, it neglects to acknowledge that the
general common-law rule made punitive damages available in maritime
actions. See supra, at 411–412. Nor does the dissent explain why main

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claims for maintenance and cure were excluded from this
general admiralty rule. Instead, the pre-Jones Act evidence
indicates that punitive damages remain available for such
claims under the appropriate factual circumstances. As a
result, respondent is entitled to pursue punitive damages un
less Congress has enacted legislation departing from this
common-law understanding. As explained below, it has not.
III
A
The only statute that could serve as a basis for overturn
ing the common-law rule in this case is the Jones Act. Con
gress enacted the Jones Act primarily to overrule The Osce
ola, supra, in which this Court prohibited a seaman or his
family from recovering for injuries or death suffered due to
his employers’ negligence. To this end, the statute provides
in relevant part:
“A seaman injured in the course of employment or, if the
seaman dies from the injury, the personal representative
of the seaman may elect to bring a civil action at law,
with the right of trial by jury, against the employer.
Laws of the United States regulating recovery for per
sonal injury to, or death of, a railway employee apply
to an action under this section.” 46 U. S. C. § 30104(a)
(incorporating the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45
U. S. C. §§ 51–60).
The Jones Act thus created a statutory cause of action for
negligence, but it did not eliminate pre-existing remedies
available to seamen for the separate common-law cause of
tenance and cure actions should be excepted from this general rule. It is
because of this rule, and the fact that these early cases support—rather
than refute—its application to maintenance and cure actions, see supra,
at 413–414, that the pre-Jones Act evidence supports the conclusion that
punitive damages were available at common law where the denial of main
tenance and cure involved wanton, willful, or outrageous conduct.

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action based on a seaman’s right to maintenance and cure.
Section 30104 bestows upon the injured seaman the right to
“elect” to bring a Jones Act claim, thereby indicating a choice
of actions for seamen—not an exclusive remedy. See
Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English
Language 798 (1913) (defining “elect” as “[t]o make choice
of ”); 1 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 979 (8th ed. 1914) (defin
ing “election” as “[c]hoice; selection”). Because the then
accepted remedies for injured seamen arose from general
maritime law, see The Osceola, 189 U. S., at 175, it necessar
ily follows that Congress was envisioning the continued
availability of those common-law causes of action. See
Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U. S. 347, 354 (1995) (“Congress
enacted the Jones Act in 1920 to remove the bar to suit for
negligence articulated in The Osceola, thereby completing
the trilogy of heightened legal protections [including main
tenance and cure] that seamen receive because of their
exposure to the perils of the sea” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U. S. 481, 487
(2005) (describing the Jones Act as “remov[ing] this bar to
negligence suits by seamen”). If the Jones Act had been the
only remaining remedy available to injured seamen, there
would have been no election to make.
In addition, the only statutory restrictions expressly ad
dressing general maritime claims for maintenance and cure
were enacted long after the passage of the Jones Act. They
limit its availability for two discrete classes of people: foreign
workers on offshore oil and mineral production facilities, see
§ 503(a)(2), 96 Stat. 1955, codified at 46 U. S. C. § 30105(b), and
sailing school students and instructors, § 204, 96 Stat. 1589,
codified at 46 U. S. C. § 50504(b). These provisions indicate
that “Congress knows how to” restrict the traditional rem
edy of maintenance and cure “when it wants to.” Omni
Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U. S. 97, 106
(1987). Thus, nothing in the statutory scheme for maritime

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recovery restricts the availability of punitive damages for
maintenance and cure for those, like respondent, who are not
precluded from asserting the general maritime claim.
Further supporting this interpretation of the Jones Act,
this Court has consistently recognized that the Act “was re
medial, for the benefit and protection of seamen who are pe
culiarly the wards of admiralty. Its purpose was to enlarge
that protection, not to narrow it.” The Arizona v. Anelich,
298 U. S. 110, 123 (1936); see also American Export Lines,
Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U. S. 274, 282 (1980) (plurality opinion) (de
clining to “read the Jones Act as sweeping aside general mar
itime law remedies”); O’Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock Co., 318 U. S. 36, 43 (1943) (“It follows that the Jones
Act, in extending a right of recovery to the seaman injured
while in the service of his vessel by negligence, has done
no more than supplement the remedy of maintenance and
cure . . . ”); Pacific S. S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U. S. 130, 134,
138–139 (1928) (holding that the Jones Act “was not intended
to restrict in any way the long-established right of a seaman
to maintenance, cure and wages”).
Not only have our decisions repeatedly observed that the
Jones Act preserves common-law causes of action such as
maintenance and cure, but our case law also supports the
view that punitive damages awards, in particular, remain
available in maintenance and cure actions after the Act’s pas
sage. In Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U. S. 527 (1962), for ex
ample, the Court permitted the recovery of attorney’s fees
for the “callous” and “willful and persistent” refusal to pay
maintenance and cure. Id., at 529–531. In fact, even the
Vaughan dissenters, who believed that such fees were gener
ally unavailable, agreed that a seaman “would be entitled to
exemplary damages in accord with traditional concepts of the
law of damages” where a “shipowner’s refusal to pay mainte
nance stemmed from a wanton and intentional disregard of
the legal rights of the seaman.” Id., at 540 (opinion of Stew
art, J.); see also Fiske, 3 F. Cas., at 957 (Story, J.) (arguing

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that counsel fees are awardable in “[c]ourts of admiralty . . .
not technically as costs, but upon the same principles, as they
are often allowed damages in cases of torts, by courts of
common law, as a recompense for injuries sustained, as ex
emplary damages, or as a remuneration for expences in
curred, or losses sustained, by the misconduct of the other
party”).5
Nothing in the text of the Jones Act or this Court’s deci
sions issued in the wake of its enactment undermines the
continued existence of the common-law cause of action pro
viding recovery for the delayed or improper provision of
maintenance and cure. Petitioners do not deny the avail
ability of punitive damages in general maritime law, or
identify any cases establishing that such damages were his
torically unavailable for breach of the duty of maintenance
and cure. The plain language of the Jones Act, then, does
not provide the punitive damages bar that petitioners seek.
B
Petitioners nonetheless argue that the availability of puni
tive damages in this case is controlled by the Jones Act be
cause of this Court’s decision in Miles, 498 U. S. 19; see also
post, at 428–429 (opinion of Alito, J.). In Miles, petitioners
argue, the Court limited recovery in maritime cases involv
ing death or personal injury to the remedies available under
the Jones Act and the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA),
5 In the wake of Vaughan, a number of lower courts expressly held that
punitive damages can be recovered for the denial of maintenance and cure.
See, e. g., Hines v. J. A. Laporte, Inc., 820 F. 2d 1187, 1189 (CA11 1987)
(per curiam) (upholding punitive damages award of $5,000 for an “arbi
trary and bad faith breach of the duty to furnish maintenance and cure”);
Robinson v. Pocahontas, Inc., 477 F. 2d 1048, 1049–1052 (CA1 1973) (af
firming punitive damages award of $10,000 which was based, in part, on
the defendant’s initial withholding of maintenance and cure on the pretext
that the seaman had been fired for cause).

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46 U. S. C. §§ 30301–30306.6 Petitioners’ reading of Miles is
far too broad.
Miles does not address either maintenance and cure ac
tions in general or the availability of punitive damages for
such actions. The decision instead grapples with the en
tirely different question whether general maritime law
should provide a cause of action for wrongful death based
on unseaworthiness. By providing a remedy for wrongful
death suffered on the high seas or in territorial waters, the
Jones Act and DOHSA displaced a general maritime rule
that denied any recovery for wrongful death. See 498 U. S.,
at 23–34. This Court, therefore, was called upon in Miles
to decide whether these new statutes supported an expan
sion of the relief available under pre-existing general mari
time law to harmonize it with a cause of action created by
statute.
The Court in Miles first concluded that the “unanimous
legislative judgment behind the Jones Act, DOHSA, and the
many state statutes” authorizing maritime wrongful-death
actions supported the recognition of a general maritime ac
tion for wrongful death of a seaman. Id., at 24 (discussing
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U. S. 375 (1970),
which overruled The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199 (1886)).
Congress had chosen to limit, however, the damages avail
able for wrongful-death actions under the Jones Act and
DOHSA, such that damages were not statutorily available
for loss of society or lost future earnings. See Miles, 498
U. S., at 21, 31–32. The Court thus concluded that Congress’
judgment must control the availability of remedies for
wrongful-death actions brought under general maritime law,
id., at 32–36.
6 DOHSA applies only to individuals killed (not merely injured) by con
duct on the high seas. See 46 U. S. C. § 30302. Because this case involves
injuries to a seaman, and not death on the high seas, DOHSA is not
relevant.

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The reasoning of Miles remains sound. As the Court in
that case explained, “[w]e no longer live in an era when sea
men and their loved ones must look primarily to the courts
as a source of substantive legal protection from injury and
death; Congress and the States have legislated extensively
in these areas.” Id., at 27. Furthermore, it was only be
cause of congressional action that a general federal cause of
action for wrongful death on the high seas and in territorial
waters even existed; until then, there was no general
common-law doctrine providing for such an action. As a
result, to determine the remedies available under the
common-law wrongful-death action, “an admiralty court
should look primarily to these legislative enactments for pol
icy guidance.” Ibid. It would have been illegitimate to
create common-law remedies that exceeded those remedies
statutorily available under the Jones Act and DOHSA. See
id., at 36 (“We will not create, under our admiralty powers,
a remedy . . . that goes well beyond the limits of Congress’
ordered system of recovery for seamen’s injury and death”).
But application of that principle here does not lead to the
outcome suggested by petitioners or the dissent. See post,
at 425–426. Unlike the situation presented in Miles, both the
general maritime cause of action (maintenance and cure) and
the remedy (punitive damages) were well established before
the passage of the Jones Act. See supra, at 409–414. Also
unlike the facts presented by Miles, the Jones Act does not
address maintenance and cure or its remedy.7 It is there
fore possible to adhere to the traditional understanding of
maritime actions and remedies without abridging or violat
ing the Jones Act; unlike wrongful-death actions, this tradi
tional understanding is not a matter to which “Congress has
7 Respondent’s claim is not affected by the statutory amendments to the
Jones Act that limit maintenance and cure recovery in cases involving
foreign workers on offshore oil and mineral production facilities, see 46
U. S. C. § 30105, or sailing school students and instructors, § 50504. See
supra, at 416–417.

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spoken directly.” See Miles, supra, at 31 (citing Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U. S. 618, 625 (1978)). Indeed,
the Miles Court itself acknowledged that “[t]he Jones Act
evinces no general hostility to recovery under maritime law,”
498 U. S., at 29, and noted that statutory remedy limitations
“would not necessarily deter us, if recovery . . . were more
consistent with the general principles of maritime tort law,”
id., at 35. The availability of punitive damages for mainte
nance and cure actions is entirely faithful to these “general
principles of maritime tort law,” and no statute casts doubt
on their availability under general maritime law.
Moreover, petitioners’ contention that Miles precludes any
action or remedy for personal injury beyond that made avail
able under the Jones Act was directly rejected by this Court
in Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris, 532
U. S. 811, 818 (2001). That case involved the death of a har
bor worker. Ibid. There, the Court recognized a maritime
cause of action for wrongful death attributable to negligence
although neither the Jones Act (which applies only to sea
men) nor DOHSA (which does not cover territorial waters)
provided such a remedy. Id., at 817–818. The Court ac
knowledged that “it will be the better course, in many cases
that assert new claims beyond what those statutes have seen
fit to allow, to leave further development to Congress.” Id.,
at 820. But the Court concluded that the cause of action at
issue there was “new only in the most technical sense” be
cause “[t]he general maritime law has recognized the tort of
negligence for more than a century, and it has been clear
since Moragne that breaches of a maritime duty are action
able when they cause death, as when they cause injury.”
Ibid. The Court thus found that “Congress’s occupation of
this field is not yet so extensive as to preclude us from recog
nizing what is already logically compelled by our prece
dents.” Ibid.
Because Miles presented no barrier to this endorsement
of a previously unrecognized maritime cause of action for

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Opinion of the Court
negligent wrongful death, we see no legitimate basis for a
contrary conclusion in the present case. Like negligence,
“[t]he general maritime law has recognized . . . for more than
a century” the duty of maintenance and cure and the general
availability of punitive damages. See Garris, supra, at 820;
see also supra, at 409–414. And because respondent does
not ask this Court to alter statutory text or “expand” the
general principles of maritime tort law, Miles does not re
quire us to eliminate the general maritime remedy of puni
tive damages for the willful or wanton failure to comply with
the duty to pay maintenance and cure. “We assume that
Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation,”
Miles, supra, at 32, and the available history suggests that
punitive damages were an established part of the maritime
law in 1920, see supra, at 411–414.8
It remains true, of course, that “[a]dmiralty is not created
in a vacuum; legislation has always served as an impor
tant source of both common law and admiralty principles.”
Miles, supra, at 24. And it also is true that the negligent
denial of maintenance and cure may also be the subject of
a Jones Act claim. See Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line,
Inc., 287 U. S. 367 (1932).9 But the fact that seamen com
monly seek to recover under the Jones Act for the wrongful
withholding of maintenance and cure does not mean that the
8 In light of the Court’s decision in Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock
Corp. v. Garris, 532 U. S. 811, 818 (2001), our reading of Miles cannot,
as the dissent contends, represent an “abrup[t]” change of course. See
post, at 425.
9 For those maintenance and cure claims that do not involve personal
injury (and thus cannot be asserted under the Jones Act), the dissent ar
gues that punitive damages should be barred because such claims are
based in contract, not tort. See post, at 431–432. But the right of main
tenance and cure “was firmly established in the maritime law long before
recognition of the distinction between tort and contract.” O’Donnell v.
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U. S. 36, 42 (1943). Although the
right has been described as incident to contract, it cannot be modified or
waived. See Cortes, 287 U. S., at 372.

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Jones Act provides the only remedy for maintenance and
cure claims. Indeed, contrary to petitioners’ view that the
Jones Act replaced in their entirety the remedies available
at common law for maintenance and cure, the Cortes decision
explicitly acknowledged a seaman’s right to choose among
overlapping statutory and common-law remedies for injuries
sustained by the denial of maintenance and cure. See id., at
374–375 (A seaman’s “cause of action for personal injury cre
ated by the statute may have overlapped his cause of action
for breach of the maritime duty of maintenance and cure . . . .
In such circumstances it was his privilege, in so far as the
causes of action covered the same ground, to sue indiffer
ently on any one of them”).10
As this Court has repeatedly explained, “remedies for neg
ligence, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure have
different origins and may on occasion call for application of
slightly different principles and procedures.” Fitzgerald v.
United States Lines Co., 374 U. S. 16, 18 (1963); see also Pe
terson, 278 U. S., at 138, 139 (emphasizing that a seaman’s
action for maintenance and cure is “independent” and “cumu
lative” from other claims such as negligence and that the
maintenance and cure right is “in no sense inconsistent with,
or an alternative of, the right to recover compensatory dam
ages [under the Jones Act]”). See also Gilmore & Black § 6–
10 The fact that, in some cases, a violation of the duty of maintenance
and cure may also give rise to a Jones Act claim, see post, at 426–427
(opinion of Alito, J.), is significant only in that it requires admiralty courts
to ensure against double recovery. See Fitzgerald v. United States Lines
Co., 374 U. S. 16, 18–19 (1963) (authorizing a jury trial when a maintenance
and cure claim is joined with a Jones Act claim because “[r]equiring a
seaman to split up his lawsuit, submitting part of it to a jury and part to
a judge . . . can easily result in too much or too little recovery”). Thus, a
court may take steps to ensure that any award of damages for lost wages
in a Jones Act negligence claim is offset by the amount of lost wages
awarded as part of a recovery of maintenance and cure. See, e. g., Peti
tion of Oskar Tiedemann & Co., 367 F. 2d 498, 505, n. 6 (CA3 1966); Crooks
v. United States, 459 F. 2d 631, 633 (CA9 1972).

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Opinion of the Court
23, at 342 (“It is unquestioned law that both the Jones Act
and the unseaworthiness remedies are additional to mainte
nance and cure: the seaman may have maintenance and cure
and also one of the other two”). The laudable quest for uni
formity in admiralty does not require the narrowing of avail
able damages to the lowest common denominator approved
by Congress for distinct causes of action.11 Although “Con
gress . . . is free to say this much and no more,” Miles, 498
U. S., at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted), we will not
attribute words to Congress that it has not written.
IV
Because punitive damages have long been an accepted
remedy under general maritime law, and because nothing in
the Jones Act altered this understanding, such damages for
the willful and wanton disregard of the maintenance and cure
obligation should remain available in the appropriate case as
a matter of general maritime law.12 Limiting recovery for
maintenance and cure to whatever is permitted by the Jones
Act would give greater pre-emptive effect to the Act than is
required by its text, Miles, or any of this Court’s other deci
11 Although this Court has recognized that it may change maritime law
in its operation as an admiralty court, see Edmonds v. Compagnie Gener
ale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 271 (1979), petitioners have not asked
the Court to do so in this case or pointed to any serious anomalies, with
respect to the Jones Act or otherwise, that our holding may create. Nor
have petitioners argued that the size of punitive damages awards in main
tenance and cure cases necessitates a recovery cap, which the Court has
elsewhere imposed. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U. S. 471, 514–
515 (2008) (imposing a punitive-to-compensatory ratio of 1:1). We do not
decide these issues.
12 Because we hold that Miles does not render the Jones Act’s damages
provision determinative of respondent’s remedies, we do not address the
dissent’s argument that the Jones Act, by incorporating the provisions of
the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, see 46 U. S. C. § 30104(a), prohibits
the recovery of punitive damages in actions under that statute. See post,
at 427–428.

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Alito, J., dissenting
sions interpreting the statute. For these reasons, we affirm
the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Alito, with whom The Chief Justice, Justice
Scalia, and Justice Kennedy join, dissenting.
In Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U. S. 19 (1990), this
Court provided a workable framework for analyzing the re
lief available on claims under general maritime law. Today,
the Court abruptly changes course. I would apply the ana
lytical framework adopted in Miles, and I therefore respect
fully dissent.
I
In order to understand our decision in Miles, it is neces
sary to appreciate the nature of the authority that the Miles
Court was exercising. The Constitution, by extending the
judicial power of the United States to admiralty and mari
time cases, impliedly empowered this Court to continue the
development of maritime law “in the manner of a common
law court.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U. S. 471,
489–490 (2008); see also Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U. S. 354, 360–361 (1959). In Miles, this
Court explained how that authority should be exercised in
an era in which statutory law has become dominant.
Miles presented two questions regarding the scope of re
lief permitted under general maritime law, the first of which
was whether damages for loss of society may be recovered
on a general maritime law wrongful-death claim. In order
to answer this question, the Court looked to the Death on
the High Seas Act, 46 U. S. C. § 30301 et seq., and the Jones
Act, 46 U. S. C. § 30101 et seq., both of which created new
statutory wrongful-death claims. Because the relief avail
able on these statutory claims does not include damages for

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loss of society, the Court concluded that it should not permit
such damages on a wrongful-death claim brought under gen
eral maritime law. The Court explained:
“We no longer live in an era when seamen and their
loved ones must look primarily to the courts as a source
of substantive legal protection from injury and death;
Congress and the States have legislated extensively in
these areas. In this era, an admiralty court should
look primarily to these legislative enactments for pol
icy guidance.” 498 U. S., at 27 (emphasis added).
The Court took a similar approach in answering the second
question in Miles—whether damages for loss of future in
come should be available in a general maritime law survival
action. The Court noted that “[t]here are indeed strong pol
icy arguments for allowing such recovery” and that “admi
ralty courts have always shown a special solicitude for the
welfare of seamen and their families.” Id., at 35–36. But
because the Jones Act survival provision “limits recovery to
losses suffered during the decedent’s lifetime,” the Court
held that a similar limitation should apply under general
maritime law. Id., at 36.
Miles thus instructs that, in exercising our authority to
develop general maritime law, we should be guided primarily
by the policy choices reflected in statutes creating closely
related claims. Endorsing what has been termed a principle
of uniformity, Miles teaches that if a form of relief is not
available on a statutory claim, we should be reluctant to per
mit such relief on a similar claim brought under general
maritime law.
II
A
The type of maintenance and cure claim that is most likely
to include a request for punitive damages is a claim that a
seaman suffered personal injury as a result of the willful
refusal to provide maintenance and cure. Such a claim may

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Alito, J., dissenting
be brought under general maritime law. See Cortes v. Bal
timore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U. S. 367, 374 (1932) (recogniz
ing that a seaman may sue under general maritime law to
recover for personal injury resulting from the denial of main
tenance and cure). And a similar claim may also be main
tained under the Jones Act. See, e. g., Guevara v. Maritime
Overseas Corp., 59 F. 3d 1496, 1499–1500 (CA5 1995) (en
banc); G. Gilmore & C. Black, Law of Admiralty § 6–13, p. 311
(2d ed. 1975). To be sure, a seaman asserting a Jones Act
claim must show that his employer was negligent, ibid.,
while a seaman proceeding under general maritime law may
recover compensatory damages without establishing fault,
id., at 310. But because the prevailing rule in American
courts does not permit punitive damages without a showing
of fault, see Exxon Shipping, supra, at 493, it appears that
any personal injury maintenance and cure claim in which pu
nitive damages might be awarded could be brought equally
under either general maritime law or the Jones Act. The
Miles uniformity therefore weighs strongly in favor of a rule
that applies uniformly under general maritime law and the
Jones Act. I therefore turn to the question whether puni
tive damages may be awarded under the Jones Act.
B
Enacted in 1920, the Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. §§ 30104–
30105(b), makes applicable to seamen the substantive recov
ery provisions of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act
(FELA), 45 U. S. C. § 51 et seq., which became law in 1908.
FELA, in turn, “recites only that employers shall be liable
in ‘damages’ for the injury or death of one protected under
the Act.” Miles, supra, at 32 (citing 45 U. S. C. § 51).
Prior to the enactment of the Jones Act, however, this
Court had decided several cases that explored the damages
allowed under FELA. In Michigan Central R. Co. v. Vree
land, 227 U. S. 59 (1913), the Court dealt primarily with the
damages that may be recovered under FELA’s wrongful

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death provision, but the Court also discussed the damages
available in the case of injury. The Court noted that if the
worker in that case had not died from his injuries, “he might
have recovered such damages as would have compensated
him for his expense, loss of time, suffering and diminished
earning power.” Id., at 65. Two years later, in St. Louis,
I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Craft, 237 U. S. 648 (1915), the Court
reiterated that an injured worker may recover only compen
satory damages. Addressing the damages available to a
party bringing a survival claim, the Court explained that the
party may recover only those damages that had accrued to
the worker at the time of his death and was thus limited to
“such damages as will be reasonably compensatory for the
loss and suffering of the injured person while he lived.” Id.,
at 658. See also ibid. (damages “confined to the [worker’s]
personal loss and suffering before he died”); Miller v. Ameri
can President Lines, Ltd., 989 F. 2d 1450, 1457 (CA6), cert.
denied, 510 U. S. 915 (1993) (“It has been the unanimous
judgment of the courts since before the enactment of the
Jones Act that punitive damages are not recoverable under
[FELA]”).
When Congress incorporated FELA unaltered into the
Jones Act, Congress must have intended to incorporate
FELA’s limitation on damages as well. Miles, 498 U. S.,
at 32. “We assume that Congress is aware of existing law
when it passes legislation.” Ibid. (citing Cannon v. Univer
sity of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 696–697 (1979)). It is there
fore reasonable to assume that only compensatory damages
may be recovered under the Jones Act. See Pacific S. S.
Co. v. Peterson, 278 U. S. 130, 136–139 (1928) (under the Jones
Act, a seaman may “recover compensatory damages for inju
ries caused by the negligence”). And under Miles’ reason
ing—at least in the absence of some exceptionally strong
countervailing considerations—the rule should be the same
when a seaman sues under general maritime law for personal
injury resulting from the denial of maintenance and cure.

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III
In reaching the opposite conclusion, the Court reasons:
Punitive damages were available on maintenance and cure
claims prior to the enactment of the Jones Act and that the
Jones Act was not intended to trim the relief available on
such general maritime law claims. This reasoning is flawed.
A
First, the Court proceeds as if the question here were
whether the Jones Act was meant to preclude general mari
time law claims and remedies. See ante, at 415 (Jones Act
does not “overtur[n]” or “eliminate pre-existing remedies
available to seamen”); ante, at 417 (Jones Act “preserves
common-law causes of action”); ante, at 421 (Miles does not
“preclud[e]” all claims and remedies beyond that made avail
able under the Jones Act). Miles explicitly rejected that
argument. See 498 U. S., at 29. But just because the Jones
Act was not meant to preclude general maritime claims or
remedies, it does not follow that the Jones Act was meant to
stop the development of general maritime law by the courts.
The Jones Act is significant because it created a statutory
claim that is indistinguishable for present purposes from a
general maritime law maintenance and cure claim based on
personal injury and because this statutory claim does not
permit the recovery of punitive damages. “Congress, in the
exercise of its legislative powers, is free to say ‘this much
and no more,’ ” and “an admiralty court should look primarily
to these legislative enactments for policy guidance.” Miles,
supra, at 24, 27. This policy embodied in the Jones Act thus
constitutes a powerful argument in favor of the development
of a similar rule under general maritime law.
B
That brings me to the Court’s claim that the availability
of punitive damages was established before the Jones Act
was passed. If punitive damages were a widely recognized

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and regularly employed feature of maintenance and cure
claims during the pre-Jones Act era, I would not rule out the
possibility that this history might be sufficient to outweigh
the Miles uniformity principle. But a search for cases in
which punitive damages were awarded for the willful denial
of maintenance and cure—in an era when seamen were often
treated with shocking callousness—yields very little. Al
though American courts have entertained maintenance and
cure suits since the early 19th century, the Court points to
only two reported cases—The City of Carlisle, 39 F. 807 (DC
Ore. 1889), and The Troop, 118 F. 769 (DC Wash. 1902)—that,
as the Court carefully puts it, “appear to contain at least
some punitive element.” Ante, at 414.
The Court’s choice of words is well advised, for it is not
even clear that punitive damages were recovered in these
two obscure cases. In The City of Carlisle, a 16-year-old
apprentice suffered a fractured skull. The captain refused
to put ashore. Given little care, the apprentice spent the
next six or seven weeks in his bunk, wracked with pain, and
was then compelled to work 12 hours a day for the remaining
three months of the voyage. Upon landing, the captain
made no arrangements for care and did not pay for the ap
prentice’s brain surgery. The apprentice received an award
of $1,000; that may include some “punitive element,” but it
seems likely that much if not all of that sum represented
compensation for the apprentice’s months of agony and the
lingering effects of his injury.
The Court’s second case, The Troop, supra, involved simi
larly brutal treatment. The seaman fell from a mast and
fractured an arm and a leg while his ship was six miles from
its port of departure. Refusing to return to port, the cap
tain subjected the seaman to maltreatment for the remainder
of the 36-day voyage. As a result, he was required to un
dergo painful surgery, and his injuries permanently pre
vented him from returning to work as a mariner. He
received an undifferentiated award of $4,000, and while the

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431 Cite as: 557 U. S. 404 (2009)
Alito, J., dissenting
court was sharply critical of the captain’s conduct, it is far
from clear that the award did not consist entirely of compen
satory damages for medical expenses, lost future income, and
pain and suffering.
In addition to the two cases cited by the Court, respondent
and an amicus claim that punitive damages were awarded in
a few additional cases. See Brief for Respondent 13; Brief
for American Association for Justice as Amicus Curiae 10–
11. Of these cases, The Margharita, 140 F. 820 (CA5 1905),
is perhaps the most supportive. There, the court explained
that its award of $1,500 would not only “compensate the sea
man for his unnecessary and unmerited suffering” but would
“emphasize the importance of humane and correct judgment
under the circumstances on the part of the master.” Id., at
828. While the court’s reference to the message that the
award embodied suggests that the award was in part puni
tive, it is also possible that the reference simply represented
a restatement of one of the traditional rationales for mainte
nance and cure, i. e., that it served the economic interests of
shipowners and the general interests of the country by mak
ing service as a seaman more attractive. See Harden v.
Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 485 (No. 6,047) (CC Me. 1823).
The remaining cases contain harsh criticism of the sea
men’s treatment but do not identify any portion of the award
as punitive. See The Rolph, 293 F. 269 (ND Cal. 1923), aff ’d,
299 F. 52 (CA9 1924) (undifferentiated award of $10,000 for a
seaman rendered blind in both eyes); Tomlinson v. Hewett,
24 F. Cas. 29, 32 (No. 14,087) (DC Cal. 1872).
In sum, the search for maintenance and cure cases in which
punitive damages were awarded yields strikingly slim re
sults. The cases found are insufficient in number, clarity,
and prominence to justify departure from the Miles uniform
ity principle.
IV
There is one remaining question in this case, namely,
whether punitive damages are permitted when a seaman as

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432 ATLANTIC SOUNDING CO. v. TOWNSEND
Alito, J., dissenting
serts a general maritime law maintenance and cure claim
that is not based on personal injury. In Cortes, 287 U. S., at
371, the Court explained that the duty to furnish mainte
nance and cure is “one annexed to the employment. . . .
Contractual it is in the sense that it has its source in a rela
tion which is contractual in origin, but given the relation, no
agreement is competent to abrogate the incident.” The
duty is thus essentially quasi-contractual, and therefore, in
those instances in which the seaman does not suffer personal
injury, recovery should be governed by the law of quasi
contract. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 4, Com
ment b, p. 15, §12, Comment f, p. 32 (1979); Restatement of
Restitution §§ 113–114 (1936); 1 D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies
§ 4.2(3), p. 580 (2d ed. 1993). Thus, an award of punitive
damages is not appropriate. See also Guevara, 59 F. 3d, at
1513.
* * *
For these reasons, I would hold that punitive damages are
not available in a case such as this, and I would therefore
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.