In Re the Estate of Bartholow

#24041-dis-PER CURIAM
2006 SD 107

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

* * * *

IN THE MATTER OF
THE ESTATE OF ROBERT F. BARTHOLOW,
Deceased.

* * * *

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
LYMAN COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA

* * * *

HONORABLE MAX A. GORS
Judge

* * * *

ROBERT R. SCHAUB and
HERB C. SUNDALL of Attorneys for plaintiff
Larson, Sundall, Larson, Schaub & Fox and appellant, Estate of
Chamberlain, South Dakota Robert F. Bartholow.

* * * *

CONSIDERED ON BRIEF
ON OCTOBER 2, 2006

OPINION FILED 11/29/06
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PER CURIAM

[¶1.] The Estate of Bartholow (Estate) appeals the circuit court order

interpreting and reforming the trust provisions contained in Robert F. Bartholow's

will. We dismiss the appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

[¶2.] Bartholow passed away on February 1, 2005. On February 22, 2005, a

petition to probate his will was filed. An order admitting the will to probate and

appointing Betty Isburg as personal representative was entered on March 29, 2005.

On December 14, 2005, a "petition for nunc pro tunc order interpreting and

reforming the trust provisions of Robert F. Bartholow's will" was filed with the

circuit court. That petition sought reformations to the will to obtain favorable

charitable tax treatment. The trust provision of the will provided for the

educational benefit of children seeking secondary education in South Dakota. The

requested revisions would purportedly bring the trust into compliance with Internal

Revenue provisions to create an exempt organization. A notice of hearing on this

request was sent to the interested parties, the United States Attorney, Attorney

General and Internal Revenue Service. No objection was noted by any of these

parties.

[¶3.] The circuit court entered an order nunc pro tunc interpreting and

reforming the trust provisions effective January 6, 1964. That order directed that

the trust be interpreted as including the Internal Revenue provisions requested to

achieve favorable tax status. The order conformed precisely to the requested

provisions sought by Estate. Notice of entry of that order was served on the

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previously mentioned parties. No objection or notice of appearance was entered.

Nevertheless, Estate filed a notice of appeal to this Court from the order entered

below. In its brief, the issue stated for review is as follows:

Should this Court summarily affirm the trial court's
decision thereby giving it finality and assuring that the
estate has an estate tax charitable deduction and that the
trust created by decedent's will be exempt from federal
income taxes?

The Attorney General's office and the Department of Justice Tax Division

submitted letters indicating they will not be filing a response or taking a position in

the appeal. Because this Court has no jurisdiction to consider this appeal as there

is no aggrieved party, we dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION

[¶4.] This Court is "required to take notice of jurisdictional questions,

whether presented by the parties or not." Wold Family Farms, Inc. v. Heartland

Organic Foods, Inc., 2003 SD 45, ¶12, 661 NW2d 719, 723. In this unusual

situation, Estate is appealing from an entirely favorable order entered by the circuit

court. In fact, the circuit court entered Estate's requested relief verbatim. There

are no other parties involved in this appeal and no one has objected to any action

taken by the circuit court. 1

1. Estate contends that a judgment is required by this Court to bind the
Internal Revenue Service to the circuit court's ruling. In support of that
position it generally cites Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 US 456, 87
SCt 1776, 18 LEd2d 886 (1967). The discussion in Bosch relates to the degree
of deference federal courts should give state courts in interpreting their own
law. Nothing in that decision can be construed to suggest this Court should
ignore general rules of appellate procedure to provide a rubber stamp
affirmance for the benefit of a victorious party.
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[¶5.] "As a general rule, an appellant must not only have an interest in the

subject matter in controversy, but must also be prejudiced or aggrieved by the

decision from which he appeals." Carlson v. West River Oil Co., 75 SD 333, 335, 64

NW2d 294, 295 (1954). "The right of appeal is limited to aggrieved parties and

when a judgment is rendered in a party's favor, that person cannot be an aggrieved

party unless the adjudication is, in some way, prejudicial to that party." Quinn v.

Mouw-Quinn, 1996 SD 103, ¶20, 552 NW2d 843, 847. While an exception to this

rule has been recognized in certain cases where the prevailing party may

nevertheless be prejudiced by the adjudication, that exception is inapplicable here.

See Jones v. Dappen, 359 NW2d 894, 895 (SD 1984); Miller v. Scholten, 273 NW2d

757, 760-62 (SD 1979)(tracing the history of the aggrieved party requirement in

South Dakota jurisprudence). The adjudication entered in this matter can not be

characterized as prejudicial to Estate. In the absence of an aggrieved party it is

appropriate to dismiss the attempted appeal. See e.g., Jones, 359 NW2d at 895;

Bottum v. Herr, 83 SD 542, 549, 162 NW2d 880, 884 (1968); Carlson, 75 SD at 335,

64 NW2d at 295 (dismissing attempted appeals from non-aggrieved parties).

[¶6.] The facts of this case are closely analogous to those in Massengill v.

Massengill, 255 SW2d 1018 (TennCtApp 1953). In that case, appellant conceded

that the decree entered below was in her favor and no assignments of error were

made concerning the trial court's ruling interpreting a trust agreement. Id. at

1018. Rather, the appellant maintained that "it is necessary at this time, under the

Federal law, to procure an appellate determination of the interpretation of this

Trust Agreement in aid of the administration of this Trust, and in order that the

rights of the beneficiaries thereunder shall not be prejudiced." Id. at 1019. In
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denying the attempted appeal, the court noted "it is not within the province of the

appellate courts to decide abstract, hypothetical, or moot questions, disconnected

from the granting of actual relief, however important and however simple they may

be." Id.

[¶7.] In denying the petition for rehearing in that same opinion, the court

stated "[o]nly a party dissatisfied with the judgment or decree of the [lower court]

may appeal to the Supreme or Appeals Court and have a re-examination, in that

court, of the whole matter of law and fact appearing in the record." Id. at 1020.

The court also noted:

Apparently the petitioner has overlooked the fact that the
[lower court], a court of record in this State, assumed
jurisdiction of the cause and, as admitted by petitioner,
decided the issues involved therein satisfactorily to her,
and a decree of that court is as final and as binding on the
parties and issues involved as would be a decision of this
court.

Id. This rationale is equally applicable in this situation. The circuit court has

assumed jurisdiction and modified the trust documents precisely as Estate

petitioned. There having been no appeal from a party aggrieved by that decision,

this Court has no jurisdiction to proceed on the merits in a review of the circuit

court's decision. According to this Court's well-settled jurisprudence, this appeal is

dismissed.

[¶8.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and SABERS, KONENKAMP, ZINTER

and MEIERHENRY, Justices, participating.

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