Wehrkamp v. Wehrkamp

#24991-rev & rem-JKK

2009 SD 84

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

* * * *

JENECE L. WEHRKAMP, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

LARRY L. WEHRKAMP, Defendant and Appellee.

* * * *

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
PENNINGTON COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA

* * * *

HONORABLE A. P. FULLER
Judge

* * * *

JOHN K. NOONEY
AARON T. GALLOWAY of
Nooney, Solay & VanNorman, LLP Attorneys for plaintiff
Rapid City, South Dakota and appellant.

JAMES L. WAGGONER Attorney for defendant
Rapid City, South Dakota and appellee.

* * * *

CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
FEBRUARY 17, 2009
REASSIGNED 07/06/09

OPINION FILED 09/16/09
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KONENKAMP, Justice (on reassignment).

[¶1.] In a divorce stipulation, the father agreed to pay for his daughter’s

college expenses. The daughter enrolled in college when she was thirty-two years

old and married. When the father refused to pay, the mother moved the circuit

court for an order requiring the father to comply with the stipulation. The father

sought to modify the divorce decree, and both sides moved for summary judgment.

In granting summary judgment for the father, the court ruled that the claim for

college expenses was barred by the six-year limitations period for enforcement of

contracts and also by the doctrines of waiver and laches. We reverse and remand

because the twenty-year statute of limitations for enforcement of judgments applies

here and the doctrines of waiver and laches are inapplicable.

Background

[¶2.] Jenece L. Wehrkamp (Deis) and Larry L. Wehrkamp were married in

1968. One child, Denece, was born to the marriage on October 30, 1975. The

parties divorced in 1977. Their support, property settlement, and child custody

agreement was incorporated into the parties’ judgment and decree of divorce. That

stipulation provided in relevant part:

[The father] agrees to and shall pay to, for or on behalf of the
said child all costs and expenses reasonably necessary to permit
the said child to attain a four (4) year college education at a
college of [the mother’s] choice, and the reasonability of said cost
and expenses for such purposes shall be measured by and
commensurate with [the father’s] then station in life and
financial status.

[¶3.] In 1994, shortly after Denece graduated from high school, she asked

her father for $761 to enroll in a community college. According to Denece, he

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refused, saying he could not afford the expense. Denece later learned, however, that

her father took his family from a later marriage on an African Safari. Denece

decided not to enroll in the community college after her father refused to fund her

education. She had recently given birth to a child.

[¶4.] In 2000 and 2001, Denece attended college at Regis University in Fort

Collins, Colorado, as a benefit of her employment with Sun Microsystems, Inc.

Then, toward the end of 2007, at age thirty-two, Denece enrolled at Denver

University to complete a degree in construction management. She funded her

education with private and federal loans. She expects to take eight quarters to

complete her degree. She is married and the mother of two children.

[¶5.] Following Denece’s enrollment, her mother, Deis, sought an order to

show cause to enforce the parties’ stipulation. Denece’s father responded by moving

the court to modify the divorce decree to relieve him of any obligation to pay for her

college expenses. Thereafter, both parties moved for summary judgment, arguing

that the issue could be decided as a matter of law. The circuit court denied Deis’s

order to show cause and the father’s motion to modify the divorce decree. But the

court granted the father’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Deis’s

claim was barred by the expiration of the statute of limitations, as well as by the

doctrines of waiver and laches. Deis appeals on the grounds that the court erred

when it concluded that the statute of limitations expired and that the doctrines of

waiver and laches apply. 1

1. When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, “‘we decide only whether
genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the law was correctly
(continued . . .)
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Analysis and Decision

1. Statute of Limitations

[¶6.] The father argues that Deis had six years from 1994 to bring her claim

to enforce the parties’ stipulation. In particular, he contends that because the

stipulation is a contract governed by SDCL 15-2-13(1), and Denece requested that

he pay for her schooling in 1994, the cause of action accrued in 1994 and expired in

2000. The circuit court agreed, finding that Deis’s claim accrued in 1994, when

Denece first requested money for her education from her father. The court held

that the parties’ agreement was controlled by the contract-based statute of

limitations, and the claim expired six years after it accrued. The circuit court was

misled by our language in Fox v. Burden, 1999 SD 154, ¶26, 603 NW2d 916, 923,

where we mistakenly noted that because the divorce stipulation (incorporated into

the decree) was “governed by the rules of contract[,]” the contract statute of

limitations applied to enforcement of the stipulation. This was error, and to that

extent Fox is overruled.

[¶7.] While we have consistently applied contract principles to the

interpretation of a divorce agreement, when it comes to the limitations period for

enforcement of the agreement, if it is incorporated into the divorce decree, such

agreement merges into the decree and becomes part of the judgment. Culhane v.

Michels, 2000 SD 101, ¶21, 615 NW2d 580, 587 (citing SDCL 15-2-6(1); Hershey v.

_________________
(. . . continued)
applied.’” Bordeaux v. Shannon County Sch., 2005 SD 117, ¶11, 707 NW2d
123, 126 (quoting Schulte v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 2005 SD 75, ¶5,
699 NW2d 437, 438 (citing Kobbeman v. Oleson, 1998 SD 20, ¶4, 574 NW2d
633, 635)).

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Hershey, 467 NW2d 484, 486 (SD 1991)). Deis’s claim for enforcement of the

stipulation is “[a]n action upon a judgment or decree[.]” See SDCL 15-2-6(1).

Therefore, it is not the six-year statute of limitations applicable to contracts, but the

twenty-year limitations period applicable to judgments that pertains to this action.

See SDCL 15-2-6(1). Deis’s suit to enforce the stipulation was timely brought

because whether the claim accrued in 1994 when Denece first sought college

funding from her father, or in 2008 when she again sought funding, either accrual

time was within the twenty-year limitations period. 2

2. Waiver

[¶8.] The circuit court found that even if the statute of limitations had not

expired, the claim for college expenses was barred by the doctrine of waiver.

“Whether a waiver has occurred is a mixed question of law and fact[,]” which is

reviewed de novo. Johnson v. Light, 2006 SD 88, ¶10, 723 NW2d 125, 127 (citations

omitted). “A waiver exists ‘where one in possession of any right, whether conferred

by law or by contract, and of full knowledge of the material facts, does or forbears

the doing of something inconsistent with the existence of the right or of his [or her]

intention to rely upon it.” Western Cas. and Sur. Co. v. American Nat’l Fire Ins.

Co., 318 NW2d 126, 128 (SD 1982) (citations omitted).

2. The parties dispute when the claim accrued for purposes of the statute of
limitations. The father argues that the claim accrued in 1994, when Denece
first requested that he pay for her college expenses. Deis argues that the
claim accrued in 2008, when Denece first enrolled in and paid for her classes.
We need not decide the question because either way the limitations period
has not expired.

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[¶9.] In finding a waiver, the circuit court reasoned that Denece and Deis

were aware in 1994 that the father had an obligation to pay under the terms of the

stipulation and they did nothing to enforce the obligation. Such inaction was, in the

court’s view, inconsistent with Denece’s right to receive funding for her college

education. “To support the defense of waiver, there must be a showing of a clear,

unequivocal and decisive act or acts showing an intention to relinquish the existing

right.” Norwest Bank South Dakota, N.A. v. Venners, 440 NW2d 774, 775 (SD

1989) (citation omitted); see also Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Hansen Housing, Inc.,

2000 SD 13, ¶30, 604 NW2d 504, 513. Despite the fourteen years that elapsed

between when Denece first requested her father to pay for her college expenses and

the current request, there was no clear, unequivocal, and decisive act to support

waiver. Denece did not attend college in 1994 after her father refused to provide

funding. Therefore, she did not relinquish her right under the agreement. By the

terms of the stipulation, Denece’s right to funding from her father was not

dependent on her attending college at a specific time or by a specific age. As the

circuit court noted, the provisions of the agreement are “clear and unambiguous.”

Nothing in that agreement dictates when Denece must begin college. Thus, the

mere lapse of time does not support a waiver. The court erred when it held that

waiver precluded Deis from enforcing the stipulation.

3. Laches

[¶10.] Lastly, the court found that the doctrine of laches precluded Deis from

enforcing the stipulation. For laches to bar recovery, the father was required to

show that Deis “(1) had full knowledge of the facts upon which the action was based,

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(2) regardless of this knowledge, [she] engaged in an unreasonable delay before

seeking relief in court, and (3) that it would be prejudicial to proceed” with the

action to enforce the stipulation. See In re Administration of the C.H. Young

Revocable Living Trust, 2008 SD 43, ¶10, 751 NW2d 715, 717-18 (citing Conway v.

Conway, 487 NW2d 21, 24 (SD 1992) (citing Golden v. Oahe Enterp., Inc., 90 SD

263, 277, 240 NW2d 102, 110 (1976)) (additional citations omitted)). The circuit

court found, based on the parties’ undisputed facts, that Denece and Deis “(1) had

full knowledge of the facts [in 1994] upon which the action was based, (2) regardless

of this knowledge, they engaged in unreasonable delay before seeking relief, and (3)

it would be prejudicial to [the father] to enforce the provisions of the [s]tipulation.”

More specifically, the court found that because the cost of tuition and books

necessary to attend college had “increased exponentially[,]”as compared to the

expense for the same in 1994, the fourteen-year delay prejudiced the father.

[¶11.] We review de novo a court’s ruling on the applicability of the doctrine

of laches. Id. ¶7 (citations omitted). Laches does not apply merely because time has

elapsed. Conway, 487 NW2d at 25 (citing Golden, 90 SD at 277-78, 240 NW2d at

110). Rather, the circumstances must warrant charging the complainant with a

lack of diligence in failing to proceed more promptly. Id. Here, the parties’

stipulation does not condition the father’s obligation to pay on Denece attending

college by a certain time or age. Nor does it limit the amount the father is obligated

to expend to 1994 dollars. Rather, the only limitation set forth in the agreement is

that the father pay “all costs and expenses reasonably necessary” for Denece “to

attain a four (4) year college education” and that “the reasonability of said costs and

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expenses for such purposes shall be measured by and commensurate with [the

father’s] then station in life and financial status.” (Emphasis added.) As we wrote

in Culhane,

This is an action on a divorce judgment which may be
commenced “within twenty years after the cause of action shall
have accrued[.]” Logically, enforcing a valid judgment would
rarely invoke the application of laches, especially in a case
where the judgment requires periodic payments.

2000 SD 101, ¶15, 615 NW2d at 586 (internal citations omitted).

[¶12.] There is no evidence that Deis delayed in seeking relief under the

terms of the parties’ agreement because the agreement set no date for

commencement or completion of Denece’s college education. While Denece

requested her father to pay for her education in 1994, she never actually attended

college during the year of that request. And there is no claim in this proceeding for

the money requested in 1994. Therefore, Deis should not be charged with a lack of

diligence in enforcing Denece’s right. The court erred when it concluded that the

doctrine of laches applied.

[¶13.] Summary judgment was erroneously granted to the father and denied

to Deis. The case is remanded for the court to determine the costs and expenses

reasonably necessary for Denece’s college education “measured by and

commensurate with [the father’s] then station in life and financial status,” in accord

with the parties’ divorce stipulation. The father’s petition for appellate attorney’s

fees is denied.

[¶14.] Reversed and remanded.

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[¶15.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and ZINTER and MEIERHENRY,

Justices, and TIMM, Circuit Judge, concur.

[¶16.] TIMM, Circuit Judge, sitting for SABERS, Retired Justice,

disqualified.

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