Davis v. Otten and Meemic Insurance

#29691-r-JMK
2022 S.D. 39

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

****
CATHERINE DAVIS, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

RICHARD OTTEN, Defendant,

and

MEEMIC INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant.

****

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
LAWRENCE COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA

****

THE HONORABLE MICHELLE K. COMER
Judge

****

EARL G. GREENE, III
SUSAN B. MEYER of
Gordon & Rees, LLP
Rapid City, South Dakota Attorneys for defendant
and appellant.

DEAN FAUST of
Moore-Faust Law Group
Rapid City, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff
and appellee.

****
ARGUED
APRIL 27, 2022
OPINION FILED 07/13/22
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KERN, Justice

[¶1.] Meemic Insurance Company (Meemic) appeals from the circuit court’s

order denying its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Meemic

contends that it lacked the necessary minimum contacts with South Dakota to

enable the court to exercise personal jurisdiction under South Dakota’s long arm

statute, SDCL 15-7-2, or under the principles of federal due process. We reverse.

Facts and Procedural History

[¶2.] On July 28, 2019, at approximately 6:18 p.m., Catherine Davis was

riding as a passenger on William Laeder’s 2009 Harley Davidson motorcycle. Davis

and Laeder, both residents of Michigan, were traveling eastbound on US Highway

14A near Sturgis in Lawrence County. At the same time, Richard Otten, a resident

of Sturgis, was traveling westbound on US Highway 14A on his 2012 Harley

Davison motorcycle. Otten was driving at an excessive speed, which other

motorcycle riders who witnessed the accident estimated to be around 55 miles per

hour on a curve with a suggested maximum speed of 35 miles per hour. Otten failed

to negotiate a turn and crossed into the oncoming traffic lane, colliding head on with

Davis and Laeder. Davis, Laeder, and Otten sustained incapacitating injuries.

Laeder and Otten were transported to Sturgis Regional Hospital while Davis was

transported to Rapid City Regional Hospital. Davis suffered serious life altering

injuries resulting in alleged medical expenses and damages exceeding $330,000.

Davis alleges she has been unable to work following the accident.

[¶3.] Prior to the accident, Meemic, a property and casualty insurance

company organized under the laws of Michigan, had issued an insurance policy to

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Davis. 1 The policy was issued in Michigan and provided Davis coverage for

uninsured and underinsured motorist claims, subject to the policy’s terms and

conditions. Meemic’s policies are offered in compliance with Michigan law with

respect to personal injury protection, property protection, residual liability

coverage, and uninsured/underinsured coverage. Meemic is not authorized to write

insurance policies in South Dakota. The policy was in effect at the time of the

accident.

[¶4.] Otten was insured through a State Farm policy with liability limits of

$25,000. State Farm offered the full amount of the $25,000 policy limits as

settlement to Davis on September 20, 2019. On October 9, 2019, Davis sent a letter

to Meemic discussing the $25,000 settlement offer provided by State Farm and

identifying medical costs for Davis in excess of $231,000 and the need for continued

treatment. The letter made claim under any and all coverages available under

Davis’s insurance policy, including underinsured coverage. On July 24, 2020,

Meemic issued a letter denying coverage, noting that the terms and conditions of

Davis’s policy do not provide coverage for accidents involving motorcycles.

[¶5.] On November 23, 2020, a Meemic representative contacted counsel for

Davis via email and voicemail offering to settle the claim for $75,000. Counsel did

not respond. Meemic repeated the offer by voicemail again on December 2, 2020, to

which counsel again did not respond. Meemic called a third time on January 20,

1. The insurance policy was not admitted into evidence and is not included in
the record.

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2021, this time speaking with a receptionist at Davis’s attorney’s firm and

requesting a return call.

[¶6.] On March 4, 2021, Davis filed a complaint against Otten and Meemic.

Davis alleged that Meemic breached its insurance contract with Davis by

neglecting, refusing, or failing to compensate Davis under the underinsured

motorist coverage and no-fault insurance terms of her policy.

[¶7.] On April 9, 2021, Meemic filed a motion to dismiss for want of personal

jurisdiction pursuant to SDCL 15-6-12(b)(2) and failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted pursuant to SDCL 15-6-12(b)(5). In its brief in support of the

motion to dismiss, Meemic claimed it was not subject to jurisdiction under South

Dakota’s long arm statute because it did not engage in any acts enumerated in the

statute that would subject it to jurisdiction. Meemic further claimed that even if

South Dakota’s long arm statute applied, under a due process analysis, Meemic did

not have sufficient minimum contacts with the state to support a finding that

Meemic purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within

the state, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of South Dakota’s laws.

[¶8.] A hearing was held on Meemic’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction on May 18, 2021. During the hearing, Davis’s attorney first asserted

that the motion to dismiss need not be decided because “the underinsured motorist

claim” had been settled, noting that on May 5, 2021, he sent a letter on his client’s

behalf to Meemic accepting Meemic’s November 3, 2020 settlement offer of $75,000.

In response, Meemic contended that no settlement occurred because Davis’s

initiation of the lawsuit operated either as a rejection of or counteroffer to its

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previous settlement offer. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied

Meemic’s motion to dismiss. It did not address the question whether the claim had

been settled. After the circuit court entered its order denying the motion to dismiss,

Meemic filed a petition for intermediate appeal, which we granted on August 6,

2021.

Standard of Review

[¶9.] “A motion to dismiss under SDCL 15-6-12(b)(2) ‘is a challenge to the

court’s jurisdiction over the person and is a question of law that we review de novo.’”

Zhi Gang Zhang v. Rasmus, 2019 S.D. 46, ¶ 17, 932 N.W.2d 153, 159 (quoting

Kustom Cycles, Inc. v. Bowyer, 2014 S.D. 87, ¶ 8, 857 N.W.2d 401, 405). “We review

a [circuit] court’s determination regarding personal jurisdiction based on written

submissions in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Marschke v.

Wratislaw, 2007 S.D. 125, ¶ 9, 743 N.W.2d 402, 405 (citation omitted).

Analysis and Decision

[¶10.] Meemic contends that it did not engage in any of the acts enumerated

in SDCL 15-7-2, South Dakota’s long arm statute, in order to support the circuit

court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction. Meemic argues that none of the underlying

facts support personal jurisdiction under the long arm statute and that its only

involvement in the litigation in South Dakota was filing a motion to dismiss.

Further, Meemic asserts that the subject matter of Davis’s claim against Meemic

springs from a contract, not a tort, and involves an issue between two Michigan

residents, falling within the purview of Michigan law. Turning to a due process

analysis, Meemic points to International Shoe Co. v. Washington to support its view

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that even if South Dakota’s long arm statute applies, the necessary “traditional

notions of fair play and substantial justice” prong for constitutional personal

jurisdiction cannot be met. 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945)

(cleaned up). Meemic asserts that as the defendant, it did not engage in continuous

contacts with South Dakota sufficient to purposefully avail itself to the privilege of

conducting activities within the state.

[¶11.] Davis responds, first, regarding South Dakota’s long arm statute, that

while Meemic may not sell insurance policies in South Dakota, it is aware that

policyholders will travel in all states and at times be involved in collisions in states

other than where Meemic sells policies. Next, Davis argues that personal

jurisdiction is proper under the long arm statute because her claims arose from the

commission of a tort in South Dakota, making South Dakota the best forum for

determining damages. Additionally, Davis asserts that the risk of an insured being

involved in a collision with an underinsured motorist while in South Dakota was

foreseeable to Meemic at the time of contracting, bringing Meemic within the court’s

jurisdiction. Davis also contends that the requirements of federal due process are

met in this case, specifically asserting that Meemic purposefully availed itself of the

privilege of acting in South Dakota and to the benefits and protections of its laws by

selling insurance policies effective in all states, including South Dakota.

Furthermore, Davis claims that Meemic satisfies the requirement of having

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directed activities at South Dakota by selling policies that cover insureds that may

drive within the state. 2

[¶12.] For South Dakota to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident

party, two conditions must be satisfied. Kustom Cycles, Inc., 2014 S.D. 87, ¶ 9, 857

N.W.2d at 406. First, the court must determine that “the legislature granted the

court jurisdiction pursuant to South Dakota’s [l]ong [a]rm [s]tatute, SDCL 15-7-2.”

Id. (citation omitted). The court must then determine that the exercise of

jurisdiction “comport[s] with federal due process requirements.” Id. (citation

omitted). “[T]he party seeking to establish the court’s personal jurisdiction over the

defendant . . . has the burden of showing a prima facie case of jurisdiction[.]” Id.

¶ 8, 857 N.W.2d at 405. 3

2. In addition, Davis contends that Meemic had an open settlement offer, which
Davis accepted, resolving the claim and all issues with Meemic. Davis
requests the Court to uphold the alleged acceptance of the settlement offer,
which would render Meemic’s appeal moot. However, in light of our
determination that South Dakota lacks personal jurisdiction over Meemic in
this case, neither this Court nor the circuit court can properly reach a
conclusion on Davis’s alleged settlement issue.

3. In the South Dakota case State v. Grand River Enterprises, Inc., we
distinguished a decision by the Ohio Court of Appeals that described a rule
under which the burden of proof regarding the question of personal
jurisdiction shifts to the defendant after the party seeking to establish
personal jurisdiction makes a prima facie case of jurisdiction. 2008 S.D. 98,
¶ 30, 757 N.W.2d 305, 316 (“the evidence, considered ‘in a light most
favorable to finding jurisdiction,’ established a prima facie case sufficient to
shift the burden to the defendant.” (quoting State v. Bulgartabac Holding
Grp., 2007 WL 4395514, ¶ 18 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007))). To clarify, however, this
rule does not reflect the state of the law in South Dakota where it is well
settled that “[t]he party asserting personal jurisdiction has the burden of
establishing a prima facie case, and the burden does not shift to the party
challenging jurisdiction.” Burke v. Roughrider, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1040,
1042 (D.S.D. 2007) (citations omitted). Thus, the correct analysis is that
(continued . . .)
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[¶13.] South Dakota’s long arm statute, SDCL 15-7-2, is to be construed

broadly when evaluating jurisdiction. Rothluebbers v. Obee, 2003 S.D. 95, ¶ 24, 668

N.W.2d 313, 322 (citation omitted). Davis argues that four subsections of South

Dakota’s long arm statute in SDCL 15-7-2 apply to Meemic’s actions:

Any person is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this
state as to any cause of action arising from the doing personally,
through any employee, through an agent or through a
subsidiary, of any of the following acts:
(1) The transaction of any business within the state;
(2) The commission of any act which results in accrual
within this state of a tort action;
...
(4) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk
located within this state at the time of contracting;
...
(11) Commencing or participating in negotiations,
mediation, arbitration, or litigation involving subject
matter located in whole or in part within the state[.]

[¶14.] Here, Meemic is not subject to personal jurisdiction in South Dakota

courts under the above subsections of SDCL 15-7-2 cited by Davis. Regarding

subsection (1), Meemic has not transacted any business within South Dakota, and

the policy with Davis was written in Michigan to Davis, a Michigan resident. As

other courts have explained, the “mere unilateral act” of an insured driving into

another state is not alone sufficient to permit a court’s exercise of the state’s long

arm statute over that insured’s out-of-state automobile insurer in a contract action.

Eagle Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez-Guzman, 21 A.D.3d 489, 491 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (a car

accident in New York involving an out-of-state resident insured by an out-of-state

________________________
(. . . continued)
included in Kustom Cycles, as expressed above, in which the burden of proof
does not shift to the defendant at any point.

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insurer did not provide the New York courts personal jurisdiction over a contract

claim by the insured against the insurer). 4

[¶15.] As to subsection (2), Meemic did not commit any act that resulted in

the accrual of a tort action in South Dakota for two reasons. First, Meemic did not

commit any acts in South Dakota resulting in a tort against Davis. See State ex rel.

Illinois Farmers Ins. Co. v. Koehr, 834 S.W.2d 233, 234–35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)

(when a car accident occurred in Missouri, plaintiffs’ claim that their out-of-state

insurer had committed a tort in Missouri was “a glaring non-sequitor [sic]” as the

insurer had not participated in the tortious car accident). Second, Davis’s claims

against Meemic sound in contract, not tort. When an “insured is suing its regional

insurer in a foreign state for breach of contract . . . the place of the accident is

immaterial for purposes of jurisdiction, as the action is one to enforce a contract.”

Carter v. Mississippi Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 109 P.3d 735, 741–42 (Mont.

2005).

[¶16.] Considering subsection (4), although Meemic contracted to insure the

risk that its insured, Davis, could be involved in an automobile accident with an

underinsured motorist in another state, including South Dakota, the underlying

4. See also Johns v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 2022 WL 796178 at *1 (9th Cir.
2022) (Montana court had no personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state
insurer, despite the car accident at issue occurring in Montana, when the out-
of-state “plaintiffs bought insurance policies from insurers that did no
business in Montana and sought to insure vehicles that were not located in
Montana at the time of contracting.”); Unser v. Prepared Ins. Co., 2017 WL
1347701 at *4 (W.Va. 2017) (“personal jurisdiction . . . within the
contemplation of our long-arm statute does not rise or fall with the terms of
the policies [the insurer] issues; rather, it arises only upon the purposeful
actions of the [insurer] as enumerated in the statute”).

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coverage dispute here has nothing to do with the accident having occurred in South

Dakota. As one court explained, “It is important to differentiate between a case in

which a company’s insured is sued as a result of a car accident in a foreign state,

and the case at hand, where the insured is suing its regional insurer in a foreign

state for breach of contract.” Carter, 109 P.3d at 741; see also 16A Couch on Ins.

§ 228:34 (3d ed.) (“The fact that an insurer or insurance underwriting association is

obligated to cover losses relating to an event occurring in another state is not

sufficient to support a finding of either general or specific personal jurisdiction.”).

[¶17.] Moreover, SDCL 15-7-2 requires conduct on the part of the foreign

defendant in the forum state, and the fact that an accident occurred in South

Dakota is not conduct by Meemic in South Dakota. As noted above, the policy was

written in Michigan, covering Davis, a Michigan resident, in accordance with

Michigan law. And “an insurance contract between a foreign insured and a foreign

insurer is not a contract within the forum state[.]” 16A Couch on Ins. § 228:30 (3d

ed.); see also Carter, 109 P.3d at 740 (“While a promise to provide coverage

throughout the United States may establish that an insurer has agreed to submit to

jurisdiction in any forum that has jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against its

insured, this agreement to defend and indemnify its insured in any state does not

imply an agreement to allow its insured to bring suit against it in any state”); Dix v.

Peters, 374 F. Supp. 3d 213, 226 (N.D.N.Y. 2019) (“While the accident triggering

this dispute did occur in [the forum state], the minimum contacts must arise from

action by the defendant himself, which create a substantial connection to the forum

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state” (cleaned up)). Subsection (4), therefore, does not convey jurisdiction over

Meemic under the long arm statute.

[¶18.] Finally, regarding subsection (11), Meemic has not commenced or

participated in mediation or arbitration. Although subsection (11) also includes

negotiations and Meemic made a few phone calls and sent emails attempting to

negotiate with Davis regarding her underinsured motorist tort claim, there is no

evidence in the record that Meemic’s conduct involved “subject matter located in

whole or in part within [South Dakota.]” See SDCL 15-7-2(11) (emphasis added).

Rather, the subject matter of the negotiations here is the entitlement to uninsured

motorist benefits pursuant to an insurance contract entered into by Davis and

Meemic in Michigan; thus, the subject matter involved is located in whole in

Michigan, not South Dakota. Finally, Meemic has not participated in litigation on

the merits of Davis’s claim in South Dakota, only filing a motion to dismiss for lack

of personal jurisdiction. Accord Met Life Auto and Home Ins. Co. v. Lester, 2006

S.D. 62, ¶ 11, 719 N.W.2d 385, 387 (“A person may waive a lack of personal

jurisdiction by submitting to the jurisdiction of the court and pleading on the

merits” (emphasis added)).

[¶19.] Meemic’s contacts with South Dakota are insufficient to subject

Meemic to personal jurisdiction under South Dakota’s long arm statute, SDCL 15-7-

2. Further, even if Meemic’s actions had satisfied a provision of the long arm

statute, Meemic has not had sufficient minimum contacts with South Dakota to

comport with federal due process requirements for the circuit court to exercise

personal jurisdiction over Meemic.

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[¶20.] We apply a three-step analysis for this federal due process inquiry as

articulated in Kustom Cycles:

First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the
privilege of acting in the forum state, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws. Second, the cause of action must
arise from [the] defendant’s activities directed at the forum
state. Finally, the acts of [the] defendant must have substantial
connection with the forum state to make the exercise of
jurisdiction over [the] defendant a reasonable one.

2014 S.D. 87, ¶ 10, 857 N.W.2d at 407 (citations omitted).

[¶21.] This constitutional analysis stems from International Shoe, in which

the United States Supreme Court expanded the ability of states to exercise

jurisdiction over non-resident defendants, conditioned on meeting the requirements

of federal due process. 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945). Eschewing

a rigid requirement centered on the defendant’s presence in the state, the Court

emphasized an analysis of the “quality and nature” of contacts with the forum state.

Id. at 319, 66 S. Ct. at 160. Where “minimum contacts” allow a defendant to enjoy

the “benefits and protection[s]” of the laws of a forum state, and where “traditional

notions of fair play and substantial justice” are upheld, a court may exercise

personal jurisdiction. Id. at 316–19, 66 S. Ct. at 158–60 (citations omitted). These

contacts must be substantial enough to cause a non-resident defendant to

“reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.

v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S. Ct. 559, 567, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1980) (citations

omitted). The contacts cannot be random, isolated, or fortuitous and must arise

from the defendant’s activities. Marschke, 2007 S.D. 125, ¶ 12, 743 N.W.2d at 405–

06.

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[¶22.] Where a court seeks to exercise personal jurisdiction over a party not

based within the forum state, the party must have purposefully availed itself to the

privileges and contacts within the forum state. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,

471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985). Jurisdiction

cannot be exercised on the basis of “unilateral activity of another party or a third

person,” but rather is proper:

where the defendant “deliberately” has engaged in significant
activities within a State, or has created “continuing obligations”
between himself and residents of the forum, he manifestly has
availed himself of the privilege of conducting business there, and
because his activities are shielded by “the benefits and
protections” of the forum’s laws it is presumptively not
unreasonable to require him to submit to the burdens of
litigation in that forum as well.

Id. at 475–76, 105 S. Ct. at 2183–84 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has

“consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat

personal jurisdiction” so long as the defendant’s “efforts are purposefully directed

toward residents of another State[.]” Id. at 476, 105 S. Ct. at 2184 (cleaned up). In

analyzing whether a foreign insurer has engaged in “minimum contacts” necessary

to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction in a foreign state, the court must

consider whether the insurer’s contacts were “compelled by the unilateral actions of

the insured, or were created by circumstances over which the insurer had no

control.” 16A Couch on Ins. § 228:33 (3d ed.).

[¶23.] While this Court has, under certain conditions, found the exercise of

personal jurisdiction over foreign insurers proper, the facts and circumstances in

each case are readily distinguishable from the present matter. In State v. American

Bankers Ins. Co., the State brought an action to collect premium taxes from

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American Bankers Insurance Company, a Texas-based corporation that had bought

an insurance company that was providing insurance to South Dakota residents.

374 N.W.2d 609, 611 (S.D. 1985). American Bankers was never licensed to transact

business in South Dakota, but it did not cancel the pre-existing insurance policies

issued to South Dakota residents. Id. American Bankers challenged the court’s

ability to exercise personal jurisdiction, contending that it did not have sufficient

minimum contacts with South Dakota. Id. The Court found that the exercise of

personal jurisdiction over American Bankers comported with requirements of

federal due process, noting:

[t]he subject matter of this action directly flows from the
economic consequences of American Bankers’ ongoing
commercial activities with residents of South Dakota. Inasmuch
as the insurance policies themselves are the object of the tax, we
hold that American Bankers could reasonably have foreseen
being haled into court in South Dakota to account for its
economic activity here.

Id. at 613 (emphasis added). Thus, in American Bankers, the foreign insurer held

policies of South Dakota residents, establishing minimum contacts sufficient for a

finding of personal jurisdiction. Conversely, in the instant case, Meemic, a

Michigan insurer, provided an insurance policy for Davis, a Michigan resident. It is

by virtue of Davis’s unilateral acts that Meemic was compelled to have contact with

South Dakota—a circumstance over which Meemic had no control.

[¶24.] In Rothluebbers v. Obee, the Rothluebbers, German residents, brought

action against a German tour company, Agrar, and a German tour director, Obee, in

Pennington County, South Dakota, for injuries and damages sustained in a one-

vehicle accident in Pennington County. 2003 S.D. 95, ¶¶ 2–4, 668 N.W.2d at 315–

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16. Obee, the driver of the Agrar van, had allegedly committed the tort in South

Dakota that gave rise to the wrongful death and personal injury actions. Id. This

Court reasoned that because Obee and Agrar were experienced tour operators who

purposefully chose to conduct tours in South Dakota, the possibility of being “hauled

into court” in South Dakota was foreseeable. Id. ¶ 29, 668 N.W.2d at 323. To that

end, the defendants had purposefully availed themselves to the privilege of

conducting activities within the state. Conversely, in the present matter, Meemic

was not directly engaged in conduct in South Dakota. Furthermore, Meemic bore

no involvement in or responsibility for the accident that took place in South Dakota

that gave rise to Davis’s tort injuries and damages.

[¶25.] In Klenz v. AVI International, the mother of a German foreign

exchange student residing with a South Dakota host family brought an action

against the student’s foreign insurance broker, AVI International, to recover legal

expenses incurred in a wrongful death suit. 2002 S.D. 72, ¶¶ 1–5, 647 N.W.2d 734,

735–36. AVI filed a motion to dismiss, asserting a lack of personal jurisdiction,

which the circuit court denied. Id. ¶ 5, 647 N.W.2d at 735–36. On appeal, AVI

contended that it lacked sufficient minimum contacts with South Dakota to warrant

the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 11, 647 N.W.2d at 736. Further, AVI

asserted that because it was merely an insurance broker, it could not have

anticipated being haled into court in South Dakota. Id. This Court noted that

“[w]hile AVI may not [have been] the primary insurer, it did issue a ‘Security

Pass’Port’” to the exchange student, which operated as an insurance policy. Id. ¶

13, 647 N.W.2d at 737. This Court concluded that because the student, on exchange

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with a host family in South Dakota, had been covered by the provisions of AVI’s

“Security Pass’Port” when he was killed in an accident that occurred in South

Dakota, AVI could have foreseen being haled into court in South Dakota. Id. ¶ 15,

647 N.W.2d at 737. As such, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over AVI

comported with federal due process considerations.

[¶26.] As in Klenz, the accident giving rise to Davis’s claims in this case

occurred in South Dakota and was caused by a South Dakota resident. However, in

Klenz, AVI knowingly issued a policy to a student temporarily residing in the state

with a South Dakota host family. The insurer thus knew that the policy was

intended to provide continuous coverage in South Dakota—far from a random,

isolated, or fortuitous event or act. In the present matter, Davis’s unilateral actions

compelled Meemic’s alleged contact with South Dakota. Therefore, the minimum

contacts required to warrant a finding of jurisdiction are not met.

Conclusion

[¶27.] A South Dakota court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Meemic

under these circumstances is improper under SDCL 15-7-2. Moreover, a court faced

with the facts presented here cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-

resident insurer on the basis of a breach of contract claim between a non-resident

insured and non-resident insurer who has not engaged in significant activities

within the state. As such, the minimum contacts necessary to support the exercise

of personal jurisdiction in accordance with due process requirements are not

satisfied. We reverse the circuit court’s denial of Meemic’s motion to dismiss and

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remand to the circuit court for entry of an order dismissing Davis’s claim against

Meemic for lack of personal jurisdiction.

[¶28.] JENSEN, Chief Justice, and SALTER, DEVANEY, and MYREN,

Justices, concur.

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