In the interest of C.Q-G.D., a child — Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Bailey

Opinion filed October 22, 2026
In The
Eleventh 	Court 	of 	Appeals
__________
No. 11-26-00130-CV
__________
IN THE INTEREST OF C.Q.-G.D., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 326th District Court
Taylor County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 11802-CX
M E M O R A N D U M 	O P I N I O N
This is an accelerated appeal from the trial court’s order terminating the
parental rights of the father to his child, C.Q.-G.D.1 in a private termination suit.
Appellant, the father, brings five issues on appeal. 	In his first, second, and third
issues, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the three
termination grounds found by the trial court. 	In his fourth issue, Appellant
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding that termination of
1To protect the identities of the child and the child’s family members, we use pseudonyms or initials
to refer to them. See TEX. R. APP . P. 9.8(b).

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his parental rights is in the child’s best interest. In his fifth issue, Appellant contends
that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request to appear remotely at
the final hearing. We affirm the trial court’s order.
Termination Findings and Standards
A party seeking to terminate one’s parental rights must clear a high bar. See
In re K.N., 741 S.W.3d 165, 178 (Tex. 2026); In re H.S., 741 S.W.3d 4, 16–17 (Tex.
2026) 	(re-emphasizing 	that 	terminating 	parental 	rights 	“‘is 	always 	the 	last
resort’ . . . permissible to protect children from serious harm . . . [and] may be
exercised only in the absence of other legitimate options.” (quoting D.V. v. Tex.
Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 722 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Tex. 2025))). To support
termination under this heightened standard, it must be established by clear and
convincing evidence that: (1) the parent has committed one of the acts listed in
Section 161.001(b)(1), and (2) termination is in the best interest of the child. 	See
T EX. FAM . CODE A NN. § 161.001(b) (West Supp. 2026). 	Clear and convincing
evidence is “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier
of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be
established.” Id. § 101.007 (West 2019).
In this case, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence
established that Appellant: (1) voluntarily left the child alone or in the possession of
another 	not 	the 	parent 	and 	expressed 	an 	intent 	not 	to 	return 	pursuant 	to
Section 161.001(b)(1)(A); (2) voluntarily left the child alone or in the possession of
another without providing adequate support of the child and remained away for a
period of at least six months pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(1)(C); and (3) failed to
support the child in accordance with his ability during a period of one year ending
within 	six 	months 	of 	the 	date 	of 	the 	filing 	of 	the 	petition 	pursuant 	to
Section 161.001(b)(1)(F). 	See FAM . § 161.001(b)(1)(A), (C), (F). 	The trial court

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further found that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the child’s best
interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2).
In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we must decide whether “a
reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding
was true.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022). Cognizant of our deference
to the factfinder, “we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
finding, assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a
reasonable factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a reasonable
factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” 	Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). “However, we may not disregard ‘undisputed facts that
do not support the finding.’” 	Id. (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex.
2002)). Because “the factfinder remains ‘the sole arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility
and demeanor’” under this standard, we may not substitute our judgment for that of
the factfinder. Id. (quoting J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021)).
In assessing whether the evidence is factually sufficient to support the finding,
we weigh the disputed evidence that is contrary to the finding against all evidence
that favors the finding. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). We give due
deference to the finding, and determine whether, based on the entire record, a
factfinder could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction about the truth
of the allegations asserted against the parent. 	In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345
(Tex. 2009); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002); In re L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d
510, 512 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet. denied).
Background and the Evidence Presented at Trial
Appellees, the mother and her husband, the child’s stepfather, filed this
private suit to terminate the parental rights of Appellant to his five-year-old son,
C.Q.-G.D. Mother and Stepfather also requested that Stepfather be allowed to adopt
the child. We note in this regard that multiple parties have standing to file a suit to

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terminate parental rights, including a governmental entity—such as the Department
of Family and Protective Services—and the child’s other parent. 	See 	FAM .
§ 102.003(a)(1), (5), (6); In re I.M.S., 679 S.W.3d 704, 712 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.).
Mother and Stepfather were the only witnesses to testify at the final hearing.
In this regard, Appellant sought to appear remotely at the final hearing. 	He also
objected to the final hearing proceeding in his absence. 	However, the trial court
denied Appellant’s request to appear remotely, and the case proceeded to the final
hearing without his attendance.
Mother testified that Appellant is the father of the child and that she had no
reason to doubt that he was the father. She and Appellant lived together at the time
of the child’s conception and while she was pregnant. 	Mother testified that they
started living together in December 2019 and the child was born in October 2020.
She described their relationship as “kind of on and off again.” In that regard, Mother
testified that Appellant would get “very verbally abusive at times.” She testified that
Appellant lived in her house but that he did not contribute any money for her
household expenses. Mother testified that she kicked Appellant out of the house in
June 2020.
Mother testified that Appellant knew she was pregnant and that he knew the
child was born because he saw her holding a baby carrier two days after the child
was born. 	Mother testified that Appellant has never seen the child and has never
asked to see or visit the child. In that regard, Mother indicated that she had the same
phone number and that Appellant knew where she lived.
As of the time of trial, Appellant had never met the child or spoken to him.
Mother denied that she told Appellant that he could not have access to the child.
Further, Mother testified that Appellant had never provided any financial support for

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the child. 	Additionally, Mother testified that Appellant had offered to sign a
document relinquishing his parental rights if Mother paid him for it.
The trial court terminated Appellant’s parental rights and found termination
to be in the best interest of the child. See FAM . § 161.001(b)(1)(A), (C), (F), (b)(2).
This appeal followed.
Motions to Appear Remotely
In his fifth issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred by denying his
motions to appear remotely at the final hearing. He contends that the ruling deprived
him of a meaningful opportunity to be heard and probably caused the rendition of an
improper judgment.
Appellant filed numerous motions to appear remotely before the trial court.
In his initial motion filed with respect to a hearing set for July 2025, Appellant
indicated that he “had taken temporary work out of town” and would be unable to
travel back to Taylor County for the hearing. 	In his second motion filed in
connection with a hearing scheduled for August 2025, Appellant asserted that he
was unwilling to return to Taylor County for court because he was at risk of arrest
because of a “Capias Pro Fine process.” He also indicated in this motion that he had
a pending federal lawsuit against Taylor County as a result of the arrest warrant.2
Additionally, Appellant contended that he had limited financial resources and lacked
consistent transportation.
Appellant’s next motion to appear remotely was in reference to a hearing
scheduled for September 2025. 	Appellant indicated that he needed to appear
2At a subsequent hearing, Appellant explained to the trial court as follows:
I’m suing the Taylor County court because of their due process violations that I
now have a capias pro fine warrant. However, it’s a Class C misdemeanor. It’s a
burn ban violation. It wasn’t even a crime punishable by jail, yet here I am with a
capias pro fine warrant, hence the lawsuit.
See Black v. State, No. 11-22-00334-CR, 2024 WL 3056093, at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 20, 2024,
no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

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remotely for the hearing because of his indigency and his inability to arrange
“consistent transportation.” He also referenced his pending federal lawsuit against
Taylor County.
Appellant appeared remotely for a hearing that occurred on September 12,
2025. He apparently was at a library somewhere in the Dallas-Fort Worth area for
the hearing. At the end of the hearing, the trial court addressed Appellant’s request
to appear remotely with respect to the final hearing. The trial court stated as follows:
THE COURT: At this final hearing there are going to be
witnesses.
[APPELLANT]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And there is a great deal to be desired hearing
witnesses remotely. 	And so I’m not going to do that. 	I need to have
them in front of me so I can evaluate their credibility.
[APPELLANT]: Your Honor, my witnesses are in fact, present
at the court. 	However, my attendance is remote. 	Would that be
acceptable by the Court?
THE COURT: No, sir, not if you’re going to testify, and not if
you’re going to cross examine. That has to be in the courtroom.
The final hearing did not occur until April 10, 2026. 	Appellant filed two
additional motions seeking to appear remotely for the final hearing. 	In a motion
filed in January 2026, Appellant alleged that he needed to appear remotely because
of his indigency and “financial impossibility of in-person appearance.” 	He also
alleged that he had suffered a herniated disc that limited his ability to travel and sit
for long periods. Appellant’s motion also contained an objection to the final hearing
occurring in his absence.
On April 7, 2026, Appellant filed a “renewed motion to appear remotely at
final hearing.” He asserted three grounds for his motion: (1) his indigency; (2) that

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he was subject to an active arrest warrant issued in Taylor County; and (3) he lacked
reliable transportation. 	Appellant attempted to verify the motion pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1746 by stating “I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true
and correct.”3 However, his attempt at verification lacked a jurat as required by
Section 132.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code in that it did not
specify the location where Appellant executed it. See T EX. CIV. P RAC. & REM . CODE
A NN. § 132.001 (West 2019); 	In re Alarid, No. 06-26-00097-CV, 2026 WL
2559981, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Aug. 31, 2026) (orig. proceeding) (mem.
op.).
On appeal, Appellant relies on his claim that he had an outstanding arrest
warrant in Taylor County as well as his financial and transportation limitations. He
further contends that his remote participation had already proven to be feasible. In
this regard, Appellant asserts that “[t]he question is not whether Appellant could
theoretically have appeared in person. 	The question is whether the trial court
reasonably 	denied 	a 	feasible 	means 	of 	participation 	where 	the 	foreseeable
consequence was an entirely one-sided termination trial.”
Rule 21d of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, “[u]nless
the notice of court proceeding states otherwise, a person who participates in a
court proceeding does so by physical presence in the courtroom.” 	T EX. R.
CIV. P. 21d(b)(1). However, upon appropriate notice by a party, “a court may allow
or require a participant to appear at a court proceeding by videoconference,
teleconference, or other available electronic means.” 	Id. (emphasis added); see
Ballard v. Durham-Hunt, No. 15-26-00060-CV, 2026 WL 2407976, at *3 (Tex.
App. [15th Dist.] Aug. 18, 2026) (mem. op.); Bento v. Green, No. 14-23-00587-CV,
2025 WL 1765510, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 26, 2025, no pet.)
328 U.S.C. § 1746 is inapplicable to state court proceedings. McMillan v. State, 769 S.W.2d 675,
676 n.1 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, pet. ref’d).

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(mem. op.) (“Nothing in Rule 21d . . . requires a court to allow a participant to appear
at a court proceeding by videoconference or other electronic means.”).
“[W]e review a trial court’s decision requiring in-person or remote attendance
under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” In re A.C., No. 09-22-00439-CV, 2025 WL
271635, at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Jan. 23, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). “A trial
court abuses its discretion when it acts without reference to any guiding rules and
principles such that its ruling was ‘arbitrary or unreasonable.’” 	In re Newkirk
Logistics, Inc., 718 S.W.3d 240, 246 (Tex. 2025) (quoting Cire v. Cummings, 134
S.W.3d 835, 839 (Tex. 2004)).
In determining whether a party had good cause for objecting to a method of
appearance, a court should consider the following factors:
(1) case type;
(2) court proceeding type;
(3) the number of parties and witnesses;
(4) the complexity of the legal and factual issues;
(5) the type of evidence to be submitted, if any;
(6) 	technological restrictions such as lack of access to or proficiency
in necessary technology;
(7) travel restrictions such as lack of transportation, distance, or
inability to take off work;
(8) whether a method of appearance is best suited to provide necessary
language access services for a person with limited English proficiency
or accommodations for a person with a disability; and
(9) any previous abuse of a method of appearance.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 21d(e): see Ballard, 2026 WL 2407976, at *4.
In-person appearance is the default procedure established by Rule 21d, and
remote appearance is an exception to the rule. T EX. R. CIV. P. 21d. Further, Rule 611
of the Rules of Evidence gives a trial court broad discretion in controlling the mode

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and order of interrogation of witnesses and presentation of evidence. Dang v. State,
154 S.W.3d 616, 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Appellant has addressed some of the
factors listed in Rule 21d(e), primarily the nature of the proceedings and his alleged
travel restrictions. 	However, the existence of an arrest warrant is not a basis listed
in Rule 21d(e) for appearing at a court hearing by remote means.
Appellant also contends that it was technologically feasible for him to appear
remotely. 	He bases this assertion on the September 2025 hearing. 	However, the
record from that hearing does not support his contention. 	The reporter’s record
reveals 	no 	less 	than 	three 	times 	during 	a 	fifty-page 	hearing 	that 	Appellant
experienced technological difficulties.
Here, the trial court gave Appellant at least six months’ notice that he would
be required to appear in person for the final hearing. 	This period of notice gave
Appellant 	an 	opportunity 	to 	make 	alternative 	arrangements 	for 	his 	personal
appearance at trial as well as for resolving his capias issue in Taylor County.
Further, the trial court explained its reason for denying Appellant’s request to appear
remotely. 	That reason included the trial court’s desire for personal appearance to
fulfill its role as the factfinder to determine credibility of the witnesses. 	As
previously noted, the one hearing where Appellant appeared remotely was plagued
by technological problems. 	Thus, the record does not demonstrate an abuse of
discretion by the trial court in denying Appellant’s request to appear remotely. We
overrule Appellant’s fifth issue.
Termination Grounds
Subject to an exception for the grounds listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and
(E), “[t]o affirm a termination judgment on appeal, a court need uphold only one
termination ground—in addition to upholding a challenged best interest finding—
even if the trial court based the termination on more than one ground.” 	Interest of

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N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 232 (Tex. 2019). 	Because this appeal does not involve
subsections (D) and (E), the requirement of In re N.G. is inapplicable to this case.
Section 161.001(b)(1)(C) – Voluntary Abandonment
In his second issue, Appellant challenges the trial court’s affirmative finding
of voluntary abandonment under subsection (C). 	Subsection (C) is known as “the
abandonment ground.” 	In re J.R., 319 S.W.3d 773, 776–77 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2010, no pet.) (citing In re A.T.C., No. 07-08-00258-CV, 2008 WL 5204747, at *3
(Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 12, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re K.A.H., 195 S.W.3d
840, 841 n.2 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.)). The elements of this ground are
that the parent voluntarily left the child alone or in the possession of another, that
the parent failed to provide adequate support for the child, and that the parent
remained away for a period of at least six months. F AM . § 161.001(b)(1)(C).
Appellant contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to
establish that he voluntarily left the child with Mother. 	He asserts that prolonged
absence, standing alone, does not satisfy subsection (C). 	Appellant argues that
Mother’s own evidence established the lack of voluntary abandonment. Appellant
essentially asserts that because he never possessed the child, he could not have
voluntarily abandoned it. 	He additionally contends that he did not voluntarily
abandon the child because Mother excluded him from having a relationship with the
child prior to the child’s birth.
Appellees assert that this case is analogous to the circumstances that were
present in In re B.G.O., No. 11-19-00151-CV, 2020 WL 762629 (Tex. App.—
Eastland Feb. 14, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). 	In that case, the appellant had never
seen the child or attempted to initiate any contact with the child. Id. at *1.4 However,
4In re K.M.B. involved similar facts of a father voluntarily leaving the child’s mother prior to the
child’s birth. 91 S.W.3d 18, 26 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).

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the appellant in B.G.O. did not challenge the element of voluntary abandonment. Id.
at *3.
We disagree with Appellant’s contentions that he could not have voluntarily
abandoned the child if he never had possession of the child or if Mother excluded
from having any participation in the childbirth and thereby the child’s life. 	These
arguments ignore the statutory mechanisms provided by the Family Code for a
parent to obtain access to their child.
The evidence establishes that Appellant knew that Mother was carrying his
child as well as the approximate due date for the child’s birth, yet he sat idly by
making no attempt to either visit the child or support the child for several years.
Appellant made no attempt to establish a relationship with the child until Appellees
instituted this suit when the child was approximately four years old. As such, there
is clear and convincing evidence that Appellant voluntarily left the child in
the possession of another, that he failed to provide adequate support for the child,
and that he remained away for a period of at least six months. 	See 	F AM .
§ 161.001(b)(1)(C).
We overrule Appellant’s second issue. 	Because of our disposition of
Appellant’s second issue, we need not consider Appellant’s first or third issues nor
the trial court’s affirmative findings under subsections (A) and (F).
Best Interest of the Child
In his fourth issue, Appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of
the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights
was in the child’s best interest. 	“‘[B]est interest’ is a term of art encompassing a
much broader, facts-and-circumstances based evaluation that is accorded significant
discretion.” In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. 2013) (quoting Holley v. Adams,
544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976)). The trial court, as the factfinder in this case,
was the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility. 	J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312.

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Therefore, 	we 	will 	not 	disturb 	its 	determinations 	so 	long 	as 	they 	are 	not
unreasonable. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). Giving the requisite
due deference to the trier of fact, we hold that, based on the evidence in the record
and the application of the Holley factors, the trial court could have formed a firm
belief or conviction that termination of father’s parental rights was in the best interest
of the child. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
The best interest analysis evaluates the best interest of the child, not the parent.
In re J.S., 687 S.W.3d 541, 548 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.). While the best
interest determination does not restrict the proof to any specific factor or factors,
courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis. Id. at 547;
see Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. 	These include, but are not limited to: (1) the
desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the
future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future;
(4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs
available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the
plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the
stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent
that may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and
(9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–
72.
In some circumstances, evidence of only one factor will suffice. 	C.H., 89
S.W.3d at 27; In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 473 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no
pet.). Additionally, the same evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for
termination may also constitute sufficient, probative evidence illustrating that
termination is in the child’s best interest. 	C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; J.S., 687 S.W.3d
at 547–48; see also H.S., 741 S.W.3d at 23 (Evidence that supports a finding under

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subsection (b)(1) “may also be, and indeed often is, relevant to best interest under
[s]ubsection (b)(2).”).
In this regard, the factfinder may measure a parent’s future conduct by his or
her past conduct in determining whether termination of a parent’s parental rights is
in the child’s best interest. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re Z.R.M., 665 S.W.3d 825,
829 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, pet. denied). 	The factfinder may infer that a
parent’s past conduct that endangered the safety and well-being of the child may
recur in the future if the child is returned to the possession of the parent. 	Moreover,
the factfinder may infer from a parent’s past inability to meet the child’s physical
and emotional needs an inability or unwillingness to meet the child’s physical and
emotional needs in the future. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105,
118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
Here, there is no evidence of Appellant’s relationship with the child. As noted
previously, he has never seen or spoken to the child. 	Additionally, the evidence
offered at trial established that he has never financially supported the child.
However, there is evidence of Appellant’s relationship with Mother and others.
Mother testified that Appellant was verbally abusive to her when they were together.
She elaborated that he would pick at her over her and her daughter’s appearance,
often saying “nit-picky ugly things.” The child was six or seven at the time.
When Mother kicked Appellant out in June 2020, she testified that he told her
that he “was going to make [her] life a living hell and that he was going to ruin [her]
life.” She testified that he repeatedly called her workplace to harass her and that he
tried to get her fired from her job as a nurse. 	Mother also testified that Appellant
would follow her around town tailgating her vehicle and he would show up in
random places. 	Two days after the child was born, Appellant showed up in the
parking lot of a softball field where Mother’s daughter was playing softball.

14
Mother testified about an occasion when Stepfather and her daughter were
shopping at Walmart, Appellant got near them and stated so that they could hear him
that “he had the gun in the car and he would take care of it right now.” 	On other
occasions, Appellant would show up at Mother’s home and attempt to come inside.
Mother also testified that Appellant would often use threats of suicide or self-harm
to try to reunite with Mother and manipulate her. Mother testified that she was afraid
of Appellant and that she tried to stay away from him. 	Mother also testified that
Appellant has older children, and that they are fearful of Appellant.
Conversely, Mother testified that Stepfather has been there to help her since
the child was born. 	She further testified that Stepfather is essentially the child’s
“dad,” and that the child does not know anything different. The amicus attorney for
the child clarified with Mother that the child thinks that Stepfather is his biological
father. 	Mother also testified that the child and Stepfather did “normal dad stuff”
together.
Mother testified that termination of Appellant’s rights and adoption by
Stepfather was in the child’s best interest. She opined that these steps would solidify
what 	already 	exists 	in 	the 	child’s 	life. 	Stepfather 	also 	opined 	that
termination/adoption was in the child’s best interest. 	Additionally, Appellees
offered into evidence a home study that supported the child’s adoption by Stepfather.
Appellant’s acts and omissions with respect to the child indicate parental
indifference on his part for the first several years of the child’s life. 	As recently
noted by the First Court of Appeals:
Parental indifference to one’s offspring supports a finding that
termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interest under every
one of the Holley factors. Those who are unwilling to devote the time,
effort, and resources required to raise and care for a child cannot meet
that 	child’s 	emotional 	needs 	now 	or in 	the 	future. 	Indeed, 	an
uninterested parent poses an emotional and physical danger to the child.
Parental indifference evinces either a lack of parental ability or, worse,

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an unwillingness to apply one’s abilities for the benefit of the child’s
welfare. 	Whatever programs may be available to assist in promoting
the child’s best interest, a parent who lacks the motivation to fulfill his
or her parental duties is unlikely to utilize or benefit from these
programs. Nor is an indifferent parent likely to have meaningful plans
for the child or give the attention to childrearing necessary to ensure the
child has a safe and stable home. 	Parental indifference strongly
indicates the existing parent–child relationship is not a proper one and
that the sole excuses for the parent’s shortcomings are unfavorable
ones, namely, apathy or heedlessness. . . .
In sum, indifference is inimical to the parent–child relationship.
Hence, significant evidence of parental indifference weighs heavily in
favor of a factfinder’s finding that termination is in a child’s best
interest. . . .
Put simply, when the evidence shows that a parent has declined to
participate in childrearing due to his or her lack of interest, the parent–
child bond is fundamentally broken, and termination of the parent’s
rights is in the best interest of the child.
In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d 813, 823–24 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no
pet.). “Parental absence or lack of involvement is especially telling with respect to
the best interest of very young children, like babies and toddlers, due to their inherent
vulnerability and particular need for parental attention and nurturing.” Id. at 824.
The evidence with respect to Appellant’s relationships with other family
members is not helpful to his case. 	In that regard, Mother testified that he was
verbally abusive with her and her daughter, and that he frequently threatened suicide
and self-harm in an effort to manipulate the mother. Further, there is no evidence of
Appellant’s capacity to provide a stable and nurturing environment for the child. As
noted previously, the evidence shows that Appellant has never supported the child
financially and there is no evidence of his ability to provide for the child in the future.
Conversely, the child’s current living arrangement is stable and Stepfather is
the only father figure that the child has ever known. Having considered the evidence
as it relates to Appellant’s actions and inactions, the emotional and physical needs

16
of the child now and in the future, and Appellant’s lack of demonstrable parental
abilities and stability, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to
support the trial court’s finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was
in the child’s best interest. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s fourth issue.
This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the order of the trial court.
JOHN M. BAILEY
CHIEF JUSTICE
October 22, 2026
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.