KP-0537

OCR transcription; preserved printed pages are authoritative

TTORNES
HI TEXANANY

KEN PAXTON
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

September 30, 2026

The Honorable R. David Holmes
Hill County Attorney
P.O. Box 253
Hillsboro, Texas 76645

Opinion No. KP-0537

Re: Whether a Type A general law city may accept a donation of property, including
money, for municipal purposes (RQ-0613-KP)

Dear Mr. Holmes:

You ask whether a Type A general-law municipality may accept a donation of property,
including money. You say "[t]he City of Whitney is interested in accepting donations of money
for the funding of road repairs, police equipment, and other municipal purposes" and answering
this question will help "the City, as well as other local governmental units." Request Letter at 1-
2. As explained below, we believe that Type A general-law municipalities have the authority to
accept donations of money for municipal purposes.

General-law municipalities "possess only such powers and privileges as have been
expressly or impliedly conferred upon them" by the State. Payne v. Massey, 196 S.W.2d 493, 495
(Tex. 1946); Builder Recovery Servs., LLC v. Town of Westlake, 650 S.W.3d 499, 503 (Tex. 2022)
(quoting Payne, 196 S.W.2d at 495). And a general-law city's implied powers are limited to only
those that "are reasonably necessary to make effective the powers expressly granted." Town of
Lakewood Vill. v. Bizios, 493 S.W.3d 527, 536 (Tex. 2016) (quoting Tri-City Fresh Water Supply
Dist. No. 2 v. Mann, 142 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. 1940)). Thus, a general-law municipality's
authority to accept donations must be found in, or implied from, state law.

With this in mind, we begin by considering whether a Type A general-law municipality
has express power to accept donations of property. You refer us to subsection 51.015(a) of the
Local Government Code, which provides that "[t]o carry out a municipal purpose" a Type A
general-law municipality "may take, hold, purchase, lease, grant, or convey property located in or
outside the municipality." TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 51.015(a); see also id. § 51.011 (providing
that the subchapter containing section 51.015 "applies only to a Type A general-law

1 See Letter from Hon. R. David Holmes, Hill Cnty. Att'y, to Off. of the Tex. Att'y Gen., Op. Comm. at 1-2
(Sept. 16, 2025), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/request-files/request/2025/RQ0613KP.pdf
("Request Letter").

<!-- PageHeader="The Honorable R. David Holmes - Page 2" -->

municipality"). We examine the meaning of the terms "take, hold, purchase," and "property" to
address your question. Id. § 51.015(a).2

None of these four terms are defined by the statute. Id. And under these circumstances,
courts apply a term's "common, ordinary meaning unless a contrary meaning is apparent from the
statute's language." Tex. State Bd. of Exam'rs of Marriage & Fam. Therapists v. Tex. Med. Ass'n,
511 S.W.3d 28, 34 (Tex. 2017). Courts may consult dictionaries to determine that meaning, see
Morath v. Lampasas Indep. Sch. Dist., 686 S.W.3d 725, 735 (Tex. 2024), as well as the term's
construction in other contexts, and its use and definitions in other statutes, Jaster v. Comet II
Constr., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556, 563 (Tex. 2014). And if an undefined term has multiple meanings,
we apply only those that are consistent with the statutory scheme as a whole. State v. $1,760.00 in
U.S. Currency, 406 S.W.3d 177, 180-81 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam). We also consider the context
of the terms within the statute itself, see Tex. Med. Ass'n, 511 S.W.3d at 34, and "we will not give
an undefined term a meaning that is out of harmony or inconsistent with other terms in the statute."
$1,760.00 in U.S. Currency, 406 S.W.3d at 180.

# The term "property" under subsection 51.015(a) includes money.

We first consider whether the undefined term "property" includes money under subsection
51.015(a). TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 51.015(a). The Code Construction Act, which generally
applies to each provision in the Local Government Code, id. § 1.002, defines "[p]roperty" as "real
and personal property," TEX. GOV'T CODE § 311.005(4). These terms-"real and personal
property"-are undefined, so we look to their common, ordinary meaning, guided by dictionary
definitions. See Tex. Med. Ass'n, 511 S.W.3d at 34. In the legal context, "real property" is defined
as "[l]and and anything growing on, attached to, or erected on it, excluding anything that may be
severed without injury to the land." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1234 (7th ed. 1999). "[P]ersonal
property" is defined broadly to include "[a]ny movable or intangible thing that is subject to
ownership and not classified as real property." Id. at 1233. The Texas Supreme Court has relied
on these same definitions when considering the terms "real property" and "personal property" in
various contexts. See, e.g., San Antonio Area Found. v. Lang, 35 S.W.3d 636, 640 (Tex. 2000)
(interpreting a will); Hegar v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 605 S.W.3d 35, 46 (Tex. 2020) (considering
definition of "personal property" in context of taxes); Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda,
133 S.W.3d 217, 229 (Tex. 2004) (relying on "real property" definition for purposes of tort claim).
Thus, the term "property" in subsection 51.015(a) includes, among other things, money.

# The terms "hold" and "purchase" do not grant the authority to accept property under subsection 51.015(a).

Next, to determine whether subsection 51.015(a) provides Type A general-law
municipalities with the authority to "accept a donation of property," we consider whether the terms

2 We note that you also refer us to section 51.034 of the Local Government Code, Request Letter at 1, but
because that subchapter "applies only to a Type B general-law municipality," see TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE §§ 51.031,
.034, and your question is focused on Type A general-law municipalities, we do not consider it further.

<!-- PageHeader="The Honorable R. David Holmes - Page 3" -->

"take," "hold," or "purchase" include the power to accept donations.3 Request Letter at 1. First,
"hold" means "to have possession or ownership of or have at one's disposal." MERRIAM-
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 552 (10th ed. 1997); accord BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 736
(7th ed. 1999) ("To possess by a lawful title .... "). And "purchase" means "to obtain by paying
money or its equivalent." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 948 (10th ed. 1997);
accord BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1248 (7th ed. 1999) ("The act or an instance of buying.").

In the context of property, courts have used "donation" and "gift" interchangeably. See In
re Marriage of Watson, No. 07-08-0057-CV, 2010 WL 346153, at *4 (Tex. App .- Amarillo Jan.
27, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.). Indeed, "one controlling factor in establishing a gift is the donative
intent of the grantor at the time of the conveyance." Pankhurst v. Weitinger & Tucker, 850 S.W.2d
726, 730 (Tex. App .- Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied). And this office has previously recognized
that the ordinary meaning of "gift" is "a voluntary transfer of property to another made gratuitously
and without consideration." Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. KP-0121 (2016) at 2 (quoting Magness v.
Magness, 241 S.W.3d 910, 912 (Tex. App .- Dallas 2007, pet. denied)). Knowing this, we can
eliminate the terms "hold" and "purchase" because "hold" does not involve a transfer and
"purchase" does not involve a transfer without consideration. We are then left with considering
whether the municipal power to "take . . . property" encompasses the power to accept gifts of
property.

# The term "take" grants the authority to accept property under subsection 51.015(a).

The common, ordinary meaning of the term "take" is quite broad, and it includes the ability
"to receive or accept whether willingly or reluctantly." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 1201 (10th ed. 1997) (emphases added); see also id. (further defining "take" as "to
get into one's hands or into one's possession, power, or control"). Black's Law Dictionary defines
"take" to mean "[t]o obtain possession or control" and "[t]o acquire possession by virtue of a grant
of title, the use of eminent domain, or other legal means." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1466 (7th
ed. 1999). None of these definitions would preclude acquisition through gift or donation, which
are certainly "legal means" of obtaining "title." See id. Thus, the "common, ordinary meaning,"
see Tex. Med. Ass'n, 511 S.W.3d at 34, of the term "take" in subsection 51.015(a) would include
the power to "receive or accept" donations of property. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 1201 (10th ed. 1997).

You also direct us to section 332.006 of the Local Government Code, which explicitly
authorizes municipalities to "accept . . . a gift or bequest of money, either principal or income, or

3 We do not consider the terms lease, grant, or convey in regard to your inquiry because they pertain to
giving rather than receiving. "[L]ease" means "to grant by lease" which is "a contract by which one conveys real
estate, equipment, or facilities for a specified term and for a specified rent." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 663 (10th ed. 1997); accord BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 900 (7th ed. 1999) ("To grant the possession
and use of (land, buildings, rooms, movable property, etc.) to another in return for rent or other consideration . . . . ").
"[G]rant" means "to bestow or transfer formally." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 507 (10th ed.
1997); accord BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 707 (7th ed. 1999) ("To give or confer (something), with or without
compensation .... "). And "convey" means "to transfer or deliver to another." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 254 (10th ed. 1997); accord BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 334 (7th ed. 1999) ("To transfer or deliver
(something, such as a right or property) to another[] . ... ").

<!-- PageHeader="The Honorable R. David Holmes - Page 4" -->

any other personal property" for public recreation facilities and programs. TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE
§ 332.006.4 Indeed, many statutory provisions explicitly authorize the municipal acceptance of
gifts for distinct purposes. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 713.003 (providing that a
municipality that is a trustee for the perpetual maintenance of a cemetery may receive gifts for the
maintenance of a grave or burial lot); TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE §§ 301.003(b) (authorizing the
governing body of a municipality to delegate authority to a recreational or cultural facility's board
of managers the power to accept gifts and bequests on behalf of the municipality if it benefits the
recreational or cultural facility), 307.022 (authorizing a municipality to "acquire by gift or
purchase any interest in privately owned land" within the municipality's borders "for use for park
purposes" in certain circumstances), 309.001(c) (allowing a municipality to "solicit grants and
donations" for the development of its arts and entertainment district), 331.002 (a municipality may
acquire by gift objects with "historical significance" to the municipality), 370.006(a) (permitting
a municipality to "request or accept" the "donation of resources" for assistance in addressing a
man-made or natural disaster); TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 311.033 (authorizing the governing body of
a Type A general-law municipality to acquire "necessary property or property rights by gift" to
establish or maintain a freeway).5

Together, these provisions demonstrate that the Legislature has provided for numerous
circumstances in which municipal governments may accept donations for authorized purposes.
When examining multiple statutory provisions, we must attempt to construe them "in a way that
harmonizes rather than conflicts." Tex. Indus. Energy Consumers v. CenterPoint Energy Hous.
Elec., LLC, 324 S.W.3d 95, 107 (Tex. 2010); In re Mem'l Hermann Hosp. Sys., 464 S.W.3d 686,
716 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding) (same). Indeed, only when two statutes are irreconcilable will
courts find that a specific provision controls over a more general provision. Carlson v. City of
Houston, 309 S.W.3d 579, 586 (Tex. App .- Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.); see also TEX.
GOV'T CODE § 311.026(b). Here, subsection 51.015(a) is not in conflict with section 332.006, nor
with any of the other specific grants of authority mentioned above.

For example, subsection 51.015(a) provides one type of government-Type A general-law
municipalities-with a broad grant of authority to accept gifts, but the property must be used for a
"municipal purpose." TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 51.015(a). Whereas section 332.006 provides a
wider group of governmental entities-municipalities and counties-with a narrower authority to
accept gifts, but only for "recreation[al] facilities and programs." Id. § 332.006. To be sure, a

4 You refer to section 332.005 but, based on the language used in your letter, we understand you to mean
section 332.006 of the Local Government Code. See Request Letter at 1; TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 332.006.

5 Numerous other statutory provisions contemplate the acceptance of gifts or donations by municipalities-
even if not directly authorizing them. See, e.g., TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 253.009(a) (authorizing a municipality to
convey "real property that has been conveyed by gift to the municipality" in certain circumstances); TEX. TRANSP.
CODE § 367.009(c) (authorizing a municipality in certain circumstances to secure bonds by using "all or part of any
grant, donation, revenue, or income" it receives); TEX. GOV'T CODE § 1508.155(c) (authorizing a municipality in
certain circumstances to secure bonds using "all or part of any grant, donation, revenue, or income" it receives); TEX.
EDUC. CODE §§ 11.1541(a) (authorizing a school district's board of trustees to use certain real property to a
municipality in certain circumstances), .156(a) (explaining that a donation for the benefit of a public school made to
"any county, municipality, or district, if not otherwise directed" is vested in the relevant trustees for that school);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 361.013(h) (explaining that when a disposal facility has donated the cost of
disposing certain waste to a "municipality, county, or other political subdivision" then a fee may not be charged for
that effort).

<!-- PageHeader="The Honorable R. David Holmes - Page 5" -->

donation that is acceptable under section 332.006 could also satisfy subsection 51.015(a), but two
statutes are not irreconcilably in conflict merely because both might apply in the same situation.
See Lomax v. State, 233 S.W.3d 302, 312 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ("Two statutes irreconcilably
conflict when only one of them can apply to a particular situation."); Dyer v. Tex. Comm'n on
Env't Quality, 646 S.W.3d 498, 511 (Tex. 2022) ("[W]e favor concurrent operation of overlapping
statutes[] . . . . ").

Moreover, the operation of subsection 51.015(a) does not render section 332.006
superfluous. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 174 (2012) (discussing the surplusage canon). Under subsection
51.015(a), a Type A general-law municipality would need to show that its use of the donated
property was for a "municipal purpose," see TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 51.015(a), whereas section
332.006 carves out instances when a municipality need not establish a municipal purpose-when
it uses the property "for the establishment, operation, or support of public recreation facilities and
programs," id. § 332.006.6 The same applies to the numerous other specific grants of municipal
authority to accept gifts that are described above. See supra pp. 3-4. Thus, these statutes are not
"irreconcilable." See Hancock v. Championx, LLC, No. 15-24-00111-CV, 2026 WL 692439, at *5
(Tex. App .- Dallas Mar. 12, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.). Instead, these "overlapping provisions of
two different statutes can concurrently operate," so we construe them to do so. In re Miller, 641
S.W.3d 924, 928 (Tex. App .- Fort Worth 2022, orig. proceeding) (citing In re Mem'l Hermann
Hosp. Sys., 464 S.W.3d at 716).

In sum, subsection 51.015(a) grants Type A general-law municipalities the authority to
accept gifts of property, including money, if it is for a "municipal purpose." 7 TEX. Loc. GOV'T
CODE § 51.015(a).8

6 Indeed, if we were to conclude that section 332.006 is rendered redundant by subsection 51.015(a), the
same result would follow for home-rule municipalities under subsection 51.076(a). That provision authorizes home-
rule municipalities to accept gifts of property. TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 51.076(a). Thus, if subsection 51.076(a)
does not render section 332.006 redundant, then neither does subsection 51.015(a).

7 You also raise Texas Attorney General Opinion GA-0562. Request Letter at 1 (citing Tex. Att'y Gen. Op.
No. GA-0562 (2007)). There, this office concluded that "prosecuting attorneys do not have the authority to accept
gifts or grants except as expressly provided by statute." Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0562 (2007) at 2. Because we
have established that subsection 51.015(a)'s language provides express power to accept donations of property,
including money, we find no conflict here with GA-0562.

8 Your letter mentions that the City of Whitney wishes to accept "donations of money for the funding of
road repairs, police equipment, and other municipal purposes" under subsection 51.015(a). Request Letter at 1. Of
course, determining whether the acceptance of a particular donation for a particular purpose satisfies subsection
51.015(a)'s requirements will depend on the facts, which cannot be resolved in an Attorney General opinion. See
Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. KP-0387 (2021) at 4. But we advise that a "municipal purpose," TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE
§ 51.015(a), is one that "promotes the comfort, convenience, safety, and happiness of the citizens of the municipality
rather than the welfare of the general public," Gardner v. City of Hamilton, 536 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Tex. App .- Waco
1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

<!-- PageHeader="The Honorable R. David Holmes - Page 6" -->

# SUMMARY

Subsection 51.015(a) provides Type A general-law
municipalities with the authority to accept donations of property,
including money, so long as it is done for a municipal purpose.

Very truly yours,
Ken Paxton

KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas

BRENT WEBSTER
First Assistant Attorney General

RALPH MOLINA
Deputy First Assistant Attorney General

D. FORREST BRUMBAUGH
Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel

MICHAEL C. COTTON
Chair, Opinion Committee

LEONEL V. MATA
Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee