In Re State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and Lindsey Nicole Dessart

Supreme Court of Texas
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No. 23-0755
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In re State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
and Lindsey Nicole Dessart,
Relators

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On Petition for Writ of Mandamus
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Argued October 3, 2024

JUSTICE DEVINE delivered the opinion of the Court.

JUSTICE SULLIVAN filed a concurring opinion, in which
Chief Justice Blacklock, Justice Devine, and Justice Young joined.

Underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage protects insureds when
damages from a vehicle collision exceed an at-fault motorist’s liability
policy limits. Unlike most first-party insurance policies, UIM policies
condition benefits on the legal entitlement to recover from the other
motorist under applicable tort law. In allowing insureds to sue their
own insurer to recover UIM benefits without taking legal action against
the tortfeasor, our case law has constructed a distinctive procedure for
UIM litigation. A “car crash” trial typically determines the third-party
motorist’s liability and the insured’s damages, and the insured must
obtain a favorable judgment as a condition precedent to UIM coverage.
These judicial determinations are also necessary predicates to recover
damages on extracontractual Insurance Code claims, such as bad-faith
claims, that flow from the insured’s right to UIM benefits. As a result,
such extracontractual claims are usually litigated after the car-crash
trial in a bifurcated proceeding or severed and abated while that initial
action is pending.
The issues in this original proceeding are whether, in the first
part of a bifurcated UIM proceeding, an insured is entitled to conduct
discovery on her extracontractual claims and depose the insurer’s
corporate representative. We hold that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying the insurer’s motions to abate the
extracontractual claims and to quash the noticed deposition while the
insured’s declaratory-judgment car-crash claims are pending. Inquiry
into extracontractual matters is improper before an insured has
established her entitlement to UIM benefits. Because the outcome of
the car-crash trial may moot those claims, an insurer has a substantial
right to defer discovery and litigation costs in the interim. And when,
as here, a UIM insurer with no personal knowledge about the underlying
car-crash issues has produced all nonprivileged claim documents and
substantiated, with evidence, its proportionality complaints as to a
noticed deposition, the deposition notice must be quashed. Because
there is no adequate remedy by appeal, we conditionally grant the
insurer’s petition for writ of mandamus. 1

1 The insurer also seeks mandamus relief on two other issues, asserting

that the trial court abused its discretion by not quashing the deposition notice
of the insurer’s claims adjuster and by limiting discovery into the insured’s

2
I. Background
Mara Lindsey alleges that Carlos Pantoja negligently rear-ended
her vehicle while she was stopped at a red light, causing her personal
injuries. Among other damages, she seeks compensation for $56,751.55
in past medical expenses and an estimated $263,691.15 in future
medical expenses. After accepting a settlement offer from Pantoja’s
insurer for his $50,000 policy limit, Lindsey submitted a claim to her
own insurer, State Farm, to recover under her UIM policy, which has a
$100,000 limit. 2 Dissatisfied with State Farm’s offer of $689.58 to settle
the claim, Lindsey sued State Farm under the Uniform Declaratory

medical records. As to the former, the claims adjuster is a named defendant
only as to the extracontractual claims, and it is undisputed that this deposition
seeks information relevant only to those claims, which we have determined
must be abated. See In re USAA Gen. Indem. Co. (USAA II), 624 S.W.3d 782,
791 (Tex. 2021) (holding that a plaintiff may not obtain discovery on abated
extracontractual claims under the guise of investigating a claim for benefits).
As to the latter, the insured’s counsel represents that because In re Liberty
County Mutual Insurance Co., 679 S.W.3d 170 (Tex. 2023), addressed similar
arguments, the insured has withdrawn her objections to the insurer’s
medical-records request, “which renders that issue moot.” The insurer points
out that the order is still in effect and requests that we instruct the trial court
to vacate it. We are confident that the trial court will provide the relief the
insurer seeks on these two matters; a writ will issue only if it does not.
2 As is common, Lindsey’s UIM policy includes a “settlement without

consent” exclusion clause and requires an insured to obtain consent before
accepting a settlement offer from the other motorist’s insurer, which State
Farm provided. See Hernandez v. Gulf Grp. Lloyds, 875 S.W.2d 691, 692-93
(Tex. 1994) (holding that a settlement-without-consent exclusion may allow an
insurer to escape UIM liability when the insured’s settlement with the
tortfeasor prejudices the insurer). However, a settlement with the alleged
tortfeasor does not establish UIM coverage “because a jury could find that the
other motorist was not at fault or award damages that do not exceed the
tortfeasor’s liability insurance.” Brainard v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 216
S.W.3d 809, 818 (Tex. 2006).

3
Judgments Act (UDJA). 3 Lindsey sought declarations regarding
Pantoja’s liability as an underinsured motorist, the amount of her
covered damages, the applicability of her UIM policy, and her
entitlement to benefits under that policy. Lindsey also sued State Farm
and its claims adjuster for Insurance Code violations, alleging they
failed to attempt a good-faith settlement of her UIM claim, among other
statutory violations. 4
State Farm moved to segregate the extracontractual Insurance
Code claims—either through separate trials in the same cause or by
severance 5—and to abate those claims until the UDJA claims are
resolved. In its motion, State Farm argued that (1) segregation is
necessary because litigating the extracontractual claims would require
“the injection” of privileged matters—settlement offers, investigative
claim files, and advice of counsel—that would be highly prejudicial to its
position on the UDJA claims and (2) limited judicial and party resources
would be potentially wasted in conducting discovery and litigating
extracontractual claims that could be rendered moot by the outcome of
the car-crash trial. In response, Lindsey agreed that the claims should
be tried separately. She argued, however, that (1) our recent decision in
In re State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 6 requires bifurcation

3 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 37.001–.011.

4 See TEX. INS. CODE §§ 541.060(a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(7), 542.003(b)(3)–(b)(5),

.057(a).
5 Although the motion is titled “Motion for Severance and Abatement,”

State Farm sought segregation of the claims under either Rule 41 or
Rule 174(b). See TEX. R. CIV. P. 41 (severance), 174(b) (separate trials).
6 629 S.W.3d 866 (Tex. 2021).

4
when the plaintiff does not bring a breach-of-contract claim and (2) a
“bifurcated trial” is a single trial conducted in two phases before the
same jury. 7
Around the same time, Lindsey served a notice of intent to take
the oral deposition of a State Farm corporate representative. The notice
identified the following topics: (1) whether Pantoja was an underinsured
motorist, (2) the amount and basis for State Farm’s valuation of
Lindsey’s damages, and (3) State Farm’s claims, defenses, and legal and
factual contentions regarding the collision’s cause, the nature and
extent of Lindsey’s alleged injuries and damages, and other causes for
Lindsey’s asserted injuries and damages. After State Farm produced
1,188 pages of responsive documents, including all nonprivileged
documents in its claim file, the insurer raised proportionality complaints
in a motion to quash the deposition notice under Rule 192.4. 8 Shortly
before the hearing on the motion, State Farm submitted an unsworn
declaration from its claim specialist, Todd Dauper. In his declaration,
Dauper discussed the burden of the proposed deposition and, to narrow
the disputed issues, stipulated on State Farm’s behalf that (1) Lindsey’s
UIM policy with up to $100,000 in bodily injury benefits was in full force
and effect at the time of the collision and (2) under that policy, Lindsey

7 See id. at 877 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 174(b)); In re USAA Gen. Indem.

Co. (USAA I), 629 S.W.3d 878, 887 (Tex. 2021) (“A bifurcated trial is one trial
in which one jury decides multiple questions in different phases.”).
8 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4 (providing that a court should limit discovery

methods if (1) “the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative,
or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive,” or (2) “the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit”).

5
is a covered person, Pantoja is an underinsured motorist, 9 and the
collision constitutes an accident. Lindsey did not file a response to the
declaration, but at the hearing, she argued that she is entitled to depose
the named defendant and that the deposition is proportionate because
it is limited “only to the claims and defenses that [State Farm is] going
to assert at trial.”
The trial court denied State Farm’s motions to quash and to
segregate and abate the claims, stating in its order that “the case will
proceed as outlined by the Texas Supreme Court in In re State Farm.”
The court of appeals denied State Farm’s mandamus petitions without
substantive explanation. 10 Now, State Farm petitions this Court for
mandamus relief ordering the trial court to abate Lindsey’s
extracontractual claims and quash the deposition notice of its corporate
representative.
II. Discussion
Mandamus relief is an extraordinary remedy that will issue only
if the trial court clearly abused its discretion and the relator has no
adequate remedy by appeal. 11 A trial court has no discretion to
determine what the law is, even when the law is unsettled, and abuses
its discretion when its rulings are arbitrary, unreasonable, or made

9At the hearing, State Farm’s counsel clarified that Pantoja was
“underinsured to an extent.”
10 708 S.W.3d 277 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 30, 2023) (motion to quash);

698 S.W.3d 588 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 30, 2023) (motion to abate following
severance or bifurcation).
11 State Farm, 629 S.W.3d at 872.

6
without reference to guiding legal principles. 12 To determine whether
an appellate remedy is adequate, we balance “the benefits of mandamus
review against the detriments.” 13 We conclude that, here, State Farm
has met this rigorous standard.
A. The Distinctive Nature of UIM Litigation
To provide context to the parties’ dispute, we begin with a brief
discussion of the UIM framework and how our precedent has developed
around “the distinctive nature of UIM litigation.” 14 By statute:
[UIM] coverage must provide for payment to the insured of
all amounts that the insured is legally entitled to recover as
damages from owners or operators of underinsured motor
vehicles because of bodily injury or property damage, not
to exceed the limit specified in the insurance policy, and
reduced by the amount recovered or recoverable from the
insurer of the underinsured motor vehicle. 15
In this provision, “legally entitled to recover” is a term of art, 16 and UIM
policies—including the one here—commonly track this statutory
language. 17

12 See In re Kappmeyer, 668 S.W.3d 651, 655 (Tex. 2023); In re State

Farm Lloyds, 520 S.W.3d 595, 604 (Tex. 2017).
13 In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. 2008).

14 USAA I, 629 S.W.3d at 886 n.27.

15 TEX. INS. CODE § 1952.106 (emphasis added).

16 USAA I, 629 S.W.3d at 884.

17 See, e.g., State Farm, 629 S.W.3d at 875 (noting that “[t]he policies at

issue here employ similar ‘legally entitled to recover’ language”); Brainard, 216
S.W.3d at 812 (describing how the language of the UIM policy closely tracked
the statutory language).

7
In Brainard v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co., we construed
“legally entitled to recover” to mean that “the UIM insurer is under no
contractual duty to pay benefits until the insured obtains a judgment
establishing the liability and [UIM] status of the other motorist,”
“utiliz[ing] tort law” to make those determinations. 18 To obtain the
predicate judgment, the insured may sue the insurer directly without
suing the motorist. 19 If this direct action establishes that the at-fault
motorist’s insurance policy is insufficient to cover the insured’s
damages, the insurer’s contractual duty to pay UIM benefits arises. 20
No contractual duty to pay exists until the trial court signs the requisite
judgment, so unlike a typical contract case in which the judgment
determines a prior contractual obligation, it is the UIM judgment that
triggers the payment obligation. 21

18 216 S.W.3d at 818. By requiring an insured to obtain a judgment,
Brainard clarified and expanded on our earlier construction of the statutory
phrase as meaning “no obligation to pay the [UIM] claim existed until the jury
established [the third party’s] liability.” Henson v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins.
Co., 17 S.W.3d 652, 654 (Tex. 2000) (emphasis added); see USAA I, 629 S.W.3d
at 885 (“[T]he judgment—not the verdict—establishes the amount an insured
is ‘legally entitled to recover’ for purposes of calculating UIM benefits.”).
19 USAA I, 629 S.W.3d at 880. Alternatively, the insured can sue the
underinsured motorist. If the insured obtains the insurer’s written consent,
the negligence judgment would be binding on the insurer for purposes of the
insurer’s liability under the UIM policy; but without such consent, the insured
would have to relitigate the issues of liability and damages in a direct action
against the UIM insurer. Id.
20 USAA II, 624 S.W.3d at 788.

21 Brainard, 216 S.W.3d at 818; see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Irwin, 627 S.W.3d

263, 270 (Tex. 2021) (“A judgment establishing liability and the underinsured
status of the other motorist are thus conditions precedent to UIM coverage
under Brainard.”). In a post-submission letter, Lindsey cites a recent

8
By effectively foreclosing an actionable breach-of-contract claim
before an insured has secured the predicate judgment, 22 Brainard has
left UIM litigants uncertain about how to establish their legal
entitlement to recover damages from a third-party motorist.
Post-Brainard, many have still sued their insurer for breach of contract
while others have brought UDJA, extracontractual, or some
combination of these claims. 23 Courts of appeals responded to Brainard
by routinely ordering trial courts to sever extracontractual claims from
breach-of-contract claims and abate the former when the insurer had
offered to settle the insured’s UIM claim. 24

concurring opinion from the Second Court of Appeals inviting the Court to
revisit Brainard. See In re Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co.,
No. 02-25-00039-CV, 2025 WL 450707, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 10,
2025, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (Birdwell, J., concurring) (op. filed
Mar. 20, 2025). We decline the invitation to do so here because (1) Lindsey did
not request in either her briefing or at oral argument that we overrule
Brainard and (2) her letter fails to address any of the considerations relevant
to overruling precedent. See Mitschke v. Borromeo, 645 S.W.3d 251, 263
(Tex. 2022) (noting that departures from precedent should be rare and must be
carefully considered in light of the precedent’s correctness and the underlying
purposes of stare decisis: efficiency, fairness, and legitimacy).
22See Brainard, 216 S.W.3d at 818 (“[T]he insurer’s contractual
obligation to pay benefits does not arise until liability and damages are
determined.”).
See, e.g., Irwin, 627 S.W.3d at 266 (UDJA claim); USAA II, 624
23

S.W.3d at 785 (UDJA and contract claims); State Farm, 629 S.W.3d at 870
(extracontractual claims).
24 See State Farm, 629 S.W.3d at 875-77 & n.4 (collecting cases); see also

USAA II, 624 S.W.3d at 786 n.1 (noting that when extracontractual claims are
asserted, “they are typically severed and abated pending resolution of the
contractual claims”).

9
In 2021, we decided a quartet of cases that helped to clarify
confusion regarding the litigation process in a direct action against a
UIM insurer. First, State Farm addressed the procedure for when an
insured brings only extracontractual claims with no other claim to
support severance and abatement. 25 We held that “although the
procedural machinations may be slightly different,” “the logic of the
commonly applied sever-and-abate rule” controls and requires
bifurcation of the issues. 26 In other words, the insured must still succeed
in an initial UIM-coverage trial before litigating the merits of the
extracontractual claims. 27 Next, In re USAA General Indemnity Co.
(USAA I) elucidated the meaning of “bifurcation.” 28 In that case, an
insured sued both the other motorist and the UIM insurer, and the trial
court ordered the claims against the insurer to be “abated and
bifurcated.” 29 The general term “bifurcate,” we observed, contemplates
different types of bifurcation within the same lawsuit: for example, a
“bifurcated trial” would be “one trial in which one jury decides multiple

25 629 S.W.3d at 870, 877 (noting the insureds’ argument that “there is

no breach-of-contract claim to ‘sever’ and no claim to ‘abate’”); see TEX. R. CIV.
P. 41 (allowing for severance); infra note 37.
26 State Farm, 629 S.W.3d at 877-78; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 174(b)
(authorizing a separate trial of “any separate issue”).
27 State Farm, 629 S.W.3d at 870, 877 (“Just as an initial ‘car crash’ trial

is typically required to determine the underinsured motorist’s liability and the
amount of damages when the insured brings both breach-of-contract and
Insurance Code claims, insureds who bring only Insurance Code claims
seeking policy benefits as damages must also succeed in an initial ‘car crash’
trial in order to lay the predicate for their statutory claims.”).
28 629 S.W.3d at 887.

29 Id. at 881.

10
questions in different phases” while “bifurcated trials” are “separate
trials . . . involv[ing] a separate jury.” 30 Looking to the trial court’s
order, we held that it “did not separate the case into two trial phases
before the same jury”; rather, it ordered two trials with separate juries. 31
After that, Allstate Insurance Co. v. Irwin recognized the UDJA as a
procedural vehicle for an insured to obtain a judgment directly against
a UIM insurer on the other motorist’s liability and the insured’s
damages. 32 In doing so, we clarified what was implicit in Brainard: a
breach-of-contract claim for failure to pay UIM benefits is not actionable
until the insured obtains a judgment establishing coverage. 33 Finally,
In re USAA General Indemnity Co. (USAA II) considered whether an
insurer was entitled to quash a corporate representative’s noticed
deposition in a UIM-coverage UDJA action when the insurer lacks
personal knowledge of the relevant car-crash facts. 34 We held that these
relevance considerations narrow the permissible scope of questioning

30 Id. at 887 & n.29 (“The general definition of ‘bifurcate’ . . .
contemplates any type of bifurcation: ‘To separate into two parts, esp[ecially]
for convenience . . . . Multiple aspects of litigation, such as discovery, motions,
defenses, trial, and jury deliberations, may be bifurcated to save time, reduce
jury confusion, or achieve other benefits, with or without the same jury hearing
both bifurcated parts.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Bifurcate, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019))).
31 Id. at 882 & n.2.

32 627 S.W.3d at 265-66.

33 Id. at 271 (holding that under Brainard, “the insurance carrier’s
failure to pay is not an actionable breach of contract until the carrier is bound
by an appropriate judgment”).
34 624 S.W.3d at 785.

11
but do not categorically foreclose a representative’s deposition. 35 We
nevertheless intimated that, if the insurer’s motion to quash had been
supported by evidence, proportionality concerns might have foreclosed
the deposition in the coverage action. 36
With this legal background in mind, we now address the parties’
dispute.
B. Abatement
We first consider whether State Farm is entitled to an abatement
of Lindsey’s extracontractual claims while her UDJA claims are
determined in the first phase of the bifurcated proceeding. The parties
agree that (1) the trial court had discretion to try the claims separately
within the same lawsuit rather than severing the extracontractual
claims 37 and (2) the predicate UDJA claims should be tried first to avoid

35 Id. at 790-91.

36 Id. at 792-93.

37 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 174(b) (“The court in furtherance of convenience or

to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim . . . .”); Clanton v.
Clark, 639 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. 1982) (noting that a trial court has wide
discretion in managing its docket to comply with its “duty to schedule its cases
in such a manner as to expeditiously dispose of them”). As we have explained,
“[a] severance divides the lawsuit into two or more separate and independent
causes” while “[a]n order for a separate trial leaves the lawsuit intact but
enables the court to hear and determine one or more issues without trying all
controverted issues at the same hearing.” Hall v. City of Austin, 450 S.W.2d
836, 837-38 (Tex. 1970). A severance is proper when “(1) the controversy
involves more than one cause of action, (2) the severed claim is one that would
be the proper subject of an independently asserted lawsuit, and (3) the severed
claim is not so interwoven with the remaining action that [they] involve the
same facts and issues.” State v. Morello, 547 S.W.3d 881, 889 (Tex. 2018).
Thus, severance of a single cause of action into two parts is improper, as is
severance of two or more causes of action involving the same facts and issues.

12
prejudice. 38 But they part company regarding abatement of the
extracontractual claims. State Farm argues that abatement is a
straightforward extrapolation from State Farm’s conclusion that “the
logic of the commonly applied sever-and-abate rule” necessitates a
bifurcated UIM proceeding when only extracontractual claims are
brought. 39 We agree that the same logic entails that such claims must
be abated when predicate UDJA claims are to be tried first. As we
explained in State Farm, in a suit for UIM benefits, the rationale for
abating extracontractual claims is, in part, to avoid needlessly incurring
expenses to litigate issues that may ultimately be rendered moot. 40
We are unpersuaded by Lindsey’s various arguments for why the
“abate” aspect of the rule’s logic should not apply. First, Lindsey
interprets State Farm as requiring a bifurcated trial with a single jury,
which would make abatement infeasible given the inadequate time to
conduct discovery while holding the same jury for the second phase. But

Sealy Emergency Room, L.L.C. v. Free Standing Emergency Room Managers of
Am., L.L.C., 685 S.W.3d 816, 822 (Tex. 2024).
38 See State Farm, 629 S.W.3d at 877 (“Requiring State Farm to litigate

its liability for UIM policy benefits alongside its liability for extracontractual
claims would unduly prejudice the insurer and amounts to an abuse of
discretion by the trial court” because “‘[a]bsent [bifurcation], an insurer is
presented with a ‘Catch-22’ in that its decision to admit or exclude evidence of
a settlement offer jeopardizes the successful defense of the other [issue].’”
(alteration in original) (quoting In re State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 395
S.W.3d 229, 234 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, orig. proceeding))); cf. Liberty Nat’l
Fire Ins. Co. v. Akin, 927 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. 1996) (concurring with
decisions requiring severance in bad-faith cases when the insurer made “a
settlement offer on the entire contract claim”).
39 629 S.W.3d at 877.

40 Id. at 876.

13
this misconstrues our opinion, which contemplated two separate trials
under Rule 174(b), not a single bifurcated trial. 41 The question pointedly
posed in that case was whether the insurer “is entitled to bifurcated
trials, which would consist of (1) initial ‘car crash’ trials” and, “if the
insureds succeed at the initial trials, (2) trials of the insurance code
claims.” 42 By concluding that the insurer was entitled to these separate
trials, we implied that this bifurcation usually would involve different
juries, thereby allowing an adequate time for discovery on
extracontractual matters if an insured is successful in the initial
car-crash trial. 43 Notably, one of the main rationales for requiring
bifurcation would be nugatory if, as Lindsey proposes, the same jury
would hear both claims in two phases of a single trial: the insurer would
then be “required to put forth the effort and expense of conducting
discovery, preparing for trial, and conducting voir dire on . . .

41 Rule
174(b) uses the term “separate trials” and does not mention
bifurcation. TEX. R. CIV. P. 174(b). We first discussed a single bifurcated trial
when we described, but declined to adopt, a Wyoming process for
punitive-damages cases. Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1988);
see id. at 474-75 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (describing the “bifurcated trial
procedure”). Six years later, we reversed course and adopted a bifurcated-trial
process under Rule 174(b) with the same jury deciding both liability and
punitive damages, which was later enacted into statute. Transp. Ins. Co. v.
Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 29-30 (Tex. 1994); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 41.009. At oral argument, Lindsey’s counsel acknowledged that Moriel’s
concerns about requiring the same jury to hear both liability and
punitive-damages issues do not apply to Lindsey’s distinct UDJA and
extracontractual claims.
42 State Farm, 629 S.W.3d at 875 (emphasis added).

43 See id. at 878; see also USAA I, 629 S.W.3d at 887 (“Whether termed

as bifurcated trials or as separate trials, the trial court ordered two trials, each
of which would involve a separate jury[.]”).

14
extra-contractual claims that could be rendered moot by the portion of
the trial relating to breach of contract for [UIM] benefits.” 44 We
explained that, in the UIM context, trial courts should protect the
insurer’s “substantial right not to undergo the expense of litigating and
conducting discovery on issues that ultimately may be unnecessary
because of the result of the underlying tort case.” 45
Lindsey next attempts to cabin the rule’s application by asserting
that courts of appeals have historically invoked the “commonly applied

44 State Farm, 629 S.W.3d at 876 (quoting In re Germania Ins. Co.,

No. 13-18-00102-CV, 2018 WL 1904911, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg Apr. 23, 2018, orig. proceeding)); see id. (“[B]ifurcation tends to
preserve judicial resources. . . . The insureds’ statutory claims need not be
considered at all if State Farm has no duty to pay under their policies.”).
45 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting In re Colonial Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co.,
No. 01-19-00391-CV, 2019 WL 5699735, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
Nov. 5, 2019, orig. proceeding)). In State Farm, abatement of the
extracontractual claims would not protect the insurer’s “substantial right”
because the insureds raised no other claims. Id. at 877 (noting that the
insureds contend there is “no claim to ‘abate’”); see Speer v. Stover, 685 S.W.2d
22, 23 (Tex. 1985) (“[S]ustaining a plea in abatement requires that the claim
be abated until removal of some impediment.” (emphasis added)); Tex.
Highway Dep’t v. Jarrell, 418 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. 1967) (“[A] plea in
abatement, if sustained, would require an abatement of the claim or cause of
action until some obstacle to its further prosecution was removed.” (emphasis
added)). Although a trial court has the power to limit discovery based on the
needs and circumstances of the case, see TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4 & cmt. 7, the
parties in that case did not join issue on limiting discovery through other
means. And after our State Farm decision, the underlying trial courts had no
need to do so because the insureds added UDJA claims, consistent with Irwin,
and then agreed to have their extracontractual claims abated until after the
initial car crash trials. See Dodds v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
No. CC-19-01423-C (Dall. Cnty. Ct. at Law No. 3, Tex. Oct. 11, 2021) (Order to
Abate Extra Contractual Claims); Nicastro v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
No. CC-17-05914-D (Dall. Cnty. Ct. at Law No. 4, Tex. July 23, 2021) (Order
Granting Abatement and Separate Trials).

15
sever-and-abate rule” only when the insured brought breach-of-contract
claims, not UDJA claims. Rejecting this same argument in State Farm,
we recognized that the rule’s logic applies even though “the procedural
machinations may be slightly different.” 46 Although a UDJA claim is a
different procedural vehicle than a breach-of-contract claim, it is not
materially different for purposes of applying the rule’s logic in this
context. 47 A declaratory judgment under the UDJA “is simply the
remedy for resolving this [UIM] contractual dispute.” 48

46 629 S.W.3d at 877 (rejecting the insureds’ argument that “their cases

should be treated differently because they brought only Insurance Code
claims” and “all the court of appeals cases cited [as applying the
sever-and-abate rule] ar[o]se from cases involving both breach-of-contract
claims and Insurance Code claims”).
47 See id. at 870, 877 (“[A]lthough the plaintiffs’ claims in these cases

are not labeled breach of contract, they nevertheless must establish State
Farm’s liability under their insurance policies as a prerequisite to recovery on
their Insurance Code claims. . . . While [the insureds] pleaded their cases
unlike past UIM plaintiffs, the showings they must make in order to recover
are the same showings required of other UIM plaintiffs who pleaded both
breach-of-contract and statutory claims[.]”).
48 Irwin, 627 S.W.3d at 270. Lindsey’s argument also ignores the
historical fact that, in 2021, Irwin authorized the UDJA as a proper vehicle to
obtain the requisite judicial determinations; before then, the standard practice
was to bring breach-of-contract claims. Since State Farm and Irwin, our courts
of appeals and federal district courts have applied the sever-and-abate rule to
abate extracontractual claims while UDJA claims are pending. See Pak v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 02-23-00485-CV, 2024 WL 191226, at *1
n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 18, 2024, no pet.); In re Allstate Fire & Cas.
Ins. Co., No. 03-21-00515-CV, 2022 WL 120263, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin
Jan. 12, 2022, orig. proceeding); see also Fluegal v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins.
Co., No. 1:22-CV-00908-SH, 2024 WL 2852506, at *2 (W.D. Tex. June 4, 2024);
Houston v. United Fin. Cas. Co., No. 3:21-CV-00367, 2023 WL 4198872, at *2
(S.D. Tex. June 27, 2023); Sotello v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., No.
5:20-CV-1303-OLG, 2021 WL 8055630, at *3 (W.D. Tex. May 27, 2021).

16
Finally, Lindsey asserts that a sever-and-abate or
bifurcate-and-abate rule in the UIM context runs afoul of our 1996
opinion in Liberty National Fire Insurance Co. v. Akin. 49 In that case,
which concerned a homeowner’s insurance policy, not a UIM policy, we
declined to endorse a similar “special rule” for all first-party bad-faith
insurance cases and instead left the decision to sever and abate
bad-faith claims to the trial court’s discretion. 50 State Farm, on the
other hand, implicitly recognized that the “unique” character of UIM
litigation is conducive to a sever- or bifurcate-and-abate rule for
extracontractual claims. 51 This follows from our reasoning that unless
the insured alleges independent damages resulting from the insurer’s
violations of the Insurance Code, the insured “does not suffer legally
cognizable damages” for those claims until she “was actually owed
benefits under the policy.” 52 For most first-party insurance policies,

49 927 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1996).

50 Compare id. at 628, 630 (noting that “the dissent urges an inflexible

rule that would deny the trial court all discretion and which would require
severance in every case, regardless of the likelihood of prejudice” and “would
carve out a special rule for bad faith insurance cases”), with id. at 631
(Abbott, J., dissenting) (“[T]he better rule would be to require a trial court to
segregate breach of contract claims and bad faith claims in every case in which
a party requests that the claims not be tried together.”).
51 See 629 S.W.3d at 875, 877.

52 Id. at 874-75 & n.3. We left open the possibility that the refusal to
settle in violation of the Insurance Code could cause damages independent of
an insured’s entitlement to policy benefits, which Lindsey does not allege. Id.;
see USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 500 (Tex. 2018)
(recognizing that “a successful independent-injury claim would be rare, and we
in fact have yet to encounter one”). We also did not resolve whether a UIM
insurer’s liability could become “reasonably clear” to trigger its statutory

17
including the one considered in Akin, the policy alone dictates when the
insured was actually owed benefits. 53 For a UIM policy, in contrast, the
insured is actually owed benefits only when she obtains the requisite
judgment. Thus, a sever- or bifurcate-and-abate rule for the distinctive
UIM context is consistent with Akin.
Of course, litigants are “entitled to full, fair discovery within a
reasonable period of time.” 54 A sever- or bifurcate-and-abate rule will
inevitably result in some delay while an insured pursues a judgment in
the car-crash trial. But the ensuing delay is not unreasonable given that
(1) a favorable judgment for the insured is a condition precedent to UIM
coverage and a necessary predicate for recovery on extracontractual
claims, (2) the result of the initial trial may moot those claims, and
(3) judicial and party resources may be preserved that would otherwise
be unnecessarily expended. 55
We acknowledge Lindsey’s dismay that if an insured must wait
until all appeals from the initial car-crash trial are exhausted, years
“may have passed before a trial court can begin to consider the
extracontractual claims.” But that concern is unfounded. In a

good-faith settlement obligations before an insured obtains a judgment
establishing UIM coverage. State Farm, 629 S.W.3d at 875 n.3. As this
question is not presented here, we once again leave it for another day.
53 See Brainard, 216 S.W.3d at 818 (“Unlike many first-party insurance

contracts, in which the policy alone dictates coverage, UIM insurance utilizes
tort law to determine coverage.”).
54 Able Supply Co. v. Moye, 898 S.W.2d 766, 773 (Tex. 1995); see TEX. R.

CIV. P. 192.3(a) (describing the general right to discovery).
55 See State Farm, 629 S.W.3d at 876.

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bifurcated proceeding, the judicial determination on the initial trial is
interlocutory and not appealable as of right before a successful insured
may proceed to litigate her extracontractual claims. 56 And if the trial
court exercises its discretion to sever instead of bifurcate the claims,
Akin instructs that a trial court need not abate the extracontractual
claims until all appeals on the policy-coverage claims are exhausted
because “a trial court judgment is final despite the pendency of an
appeal” for the purposes of issue or claim preclusion. 57

56 See Van Dyke v. Boswell, O’Toole, Davis & Pickering, 697 S.W.2d 381,

383 (Tex. 1985) (“In contrast to a severance, separate trials are interlocutory,
and are not final and appealable until all the separated claims and issues in
the suit have been litigated.”); Hall, 450 S.W.2d at 838 (“The order entered at
the conclusion of a separate trial is often interlocutory, because no final and
appealable judgment can properly be rendered until all of the controlling issues
have been tried and decided.”). The Legislature has authorized permissive
appeals from certain interlocutory orders that are “not otherwise appealable.”
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(d).
57 See 927 S.W.2d at 631 (concluding that the “same rule” adopted in

Scurlock should apply to extracontractual bad-faith lawsuits severed from an
insurance-coverage claim); Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 724 S.W.2d 1, 6
(Tex. 1986) (adopting and quoting Section 13 of the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments in holding that “a judgment is final for the purposes of issue and
claim preclusion ‘despite the taking of an appeal unless what is called an
appeal actually consists of a trial de novo’”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 13 & cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1982) (describing a “final judgment”
for issue-preclusion purposes to include “any prior adjudication of an issue in
another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded
conclusive effect” and commenting that “when a judgment in one action is to
be carried over to a second action and given a conclusive effect there,” “the
judgment must ordinarily be a firm and stable one, the ‘last word’ of the
rendering court—a ‘final judgment’”); see also Sanders v. Boeing Co., 680
S.W.3d 340, 352 (Tex. 2023) (discussing different meanings of the term “final”
as applied to judgments). The Akin dissent also agreed. 927 S.W.2d at 631
(Abbott, J., dissenting) (“The trial on the bad faith claim could proceed after
the jury verdict on the breach of contract claim; thus, a trial court would not

19
We therefore hold that the trial court clearly abused its discretion
in denying State Farm’s motion to abate Lindsey’s extracontractual
claims while her UDJA claims are pending in the trial court. To grant
relief by extraordinary writ, we must consider the adequacy of an
appellate remedy. A trial court’s failure to grant a motion to abate
usually is an incidental ruling not subject to mandamus. 58 In this
unique context, however, no appellate remedy adequately protects the
insurer’s “substantial right” not to undergo costly discovery and
litigation expenses on extracontractual issues that may be wholly

have to wait for a party to exhaust its appellate remedies before commencing
the trial on the bad faith claim.”). Of course, “[a] judgment in a second case
based on the preclusive effects of a prior judgment should not stand if the first
judgment is reversed.” Scurlock, 724 S.W.2d at 6. And “under particular facts,
a trial court might in some instances have the authority to abate such a suit
until all appeals are exhausted” to “advance the ends of justice.” Street v. Hon.
Second Ct. of Appeals, 756 S.W.2d 299, 300, 302 (Tex. 1988) (holding that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to abate the insured’s Stowers
action while the underlying tort action was pending on appeal); see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 16 cmt. b (stating that it may “be
advisable for the court that is being asked to apply the judgment as res judicata
to stay its own proceedings to await the ultimate disposition of the judgment”
on appeal “if the disposition will not be long delayed and especially if there is
substantial doubt whether the judgment will be upheld”).
58 See, e.g., In re Universal Underwriters of Tex. Ins. Co., 345 S.W.3d

404, 412 n.5 (Tex. 2011) (noting that a trial court’s failure to grant a motion to
abate generally is not subject to mandamus); see also In re Prudential Ins. Co.
of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004) (“Mandamus review of incidental,
interlocutory rulings by the trial courts unduly interferes with trial court
proceedings, distracts appellate court attention to issues that are unimportant
both to the ultimate disposition of the case at hand and to the uniform
development of the law, and adds unproductively to the expense and delay of
civil litigation.”). Even so, in determining the adequacy of a remedy by appeal,
we are “guided by analysis of principles,” not “simple rules that treat cases as
categories.” In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 464 (Tex. 2008).

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unnecessary depending on the outcome of the UIM-coverage trial. 59 In
addition to protecting substantial rights from impairment or loss,
mandamus review may be proper “in select cases to afford appropriate
guidance to the law.” 60 In this Court, multiple petitions for mandamus
relief are pending that raise this same or a similar legal issue. 61 Our
opinion today provides guidance for these and future cases by
establishing an easily administrable sever- or bifurcate-and-abate rule
in the UIM context that will promote greater uniformity and
predictability. 62 While we are ever mindful that mandamus review
must not be overused, we conclude that in this instance, the benefits
outweigh the detriments.

59 State Farm, 629 S.W.3d at 876, 878; see Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at

136 (noting that mandamus review “may be essential to preserve important
substantive and procedural rights from impairment or loss”); In re Van Waters
& Rogers, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 203, 211 (Tex. 2004) (describing an appellate
remedy as inadequate when “parties are in danger of permanently losing
substantial rights” and “the appellate court would not be able to cure the
error”).
60 Liberty Cnty., 679 S.W.3d at 177; see Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136

(explaining that mandamus review may “allow the appellate courts to give
needed and helpful direction to the law that would otherwise prove elusive in
appeals from final judgments”).
61 See Nos. 23-0945, In re State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.; 23-0973, In re

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.; 23-0975, In re State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.;
23-0977, In re State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.; 24-0172, In re State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co.; 24-0215, In re State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.; 24-0658, In re
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.; 24-0972, In re State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.;
24-1032, In re USAA Ins. Agency, Inc.; 25-0126, In re Progressive Cnty. Mut.
Ins. Co.
62 See United Rentals N. Am., Inc. v. Evans, 668 S.W.3d 627, 637
(Tex. 2023) (“We should strive throughout the law for easily administrable
bright-line rules, which can be followed by parties with confidence and applied
by judges with predictability.”).

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C. Proportionality
We now turn to State Farm’s proportionality complaints.
Generally, a party to a suit has the right to depose the opposing party. 63
State Farm does not contest Lindsey’s entitlement to depose its
representative on the extracontractual matters after obtaining a
favorable judgment on her UDJA claims. But it argues that at this
stage, the deposition would provide little benefit, if any, in relation to its
cost because State Farm has produced the nonprivileged information it
possesses relating to Lindsey’s car crash and injuries and submitted
evidence supporting both its lack of personal knowledge and the burden
of the proposed discovery. On this record, we agree.
In evaluating the likely benefit of the proposed deposition in
relation to its burden or expense, we first look to the proper scope of
discovery. As a general rule, a party may obtain discovery regarding
any unprivileged matter that is relevant to the subject matter of the
pending action. 64 But discovery “may not exceed the bounds of the
claims at issue.” 65 Because we have determined that the
extracontractual claims must be abated, Lindsey may not obtain
discovery on these claims “under the guise of investigating a claim for
benefits.” 66 And through its stipulations, State Farm has narrowed the

63 USAA II, 624 S.W.3d at 790.

64 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a).
This includes information that “will be
inadmissible at trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Id.
65 USAA II, 624 S.W.3d at 791.

66 Id.

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disputed UDJA issues to Pantoja’s liability and the existence and
amount of Lindsey’s damages. 67 That said, a party’s “legal contentions
and the factual bases for those contentions” are discoverable, 68 although
this “does not require more than a basic statement of those contentions
and does not require a marshaling of evidence.” 69 And when insurers
“investigate their insureds’ claims, they uncover, or at least may
uncover, information relevant to those claims and the [insurer]’s own
defenses.” 70
“[T]he simple fact that requested information is discoverable,”
however, “does not mean that discovery must be had.” 71 Even when
discovery seeks relevant and nonprivileged information, courts should
“make an effort to impose reasonable discovery limits.” 72 In that vein,

67 See id. at 788 (“And where, as here, the UIM carrier stipulates that

the plaintiff was insured for UIM benefits and the accident was a covered
occurrence under the policy, the coverage trial resembles a ‘typical car wreck’
case involving the other motorist’s liability for the underlying car accident and
the existence and amount of the insured’s damages.”). State Farm’s motion to
quash also states that it “is not currently contending that Plaintiff was at fault
in the accident, or that she has recovered $50,000 on her third-party claim
against the other driver.”
68 TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(j).

69 Id. cmt. 5.

70 USAA II, 624 S.W.3d at 789; see id. at 791 (“Presumably, [the insurer]

is in possession of information that supports its position on those issues, even
if gleaned second-hand.”).
71 State Farm Lloyds, 520 S.W.3d at 605 (quoting Nicholas v. Wyndham

Int’l, Inc., 373 F.3d 537, 543 (4th Cir. 2004)).
72 Id. at 604 (quoting In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003)).

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our rules subject discovery to a “proportionality overlay.” 73 As
Rule 192.4 instructs, discovery methods “should” be limited if (1) “the
discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is
obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive” or (2) “the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” 74 These proportionality
complaints are determined on a case-by-case basis and must be
supported with evidence, not conclusory allegations. 75
In USAA II, we provided a roadmap for how a UIM insurer could
support its proportionality concerns in moving to quash a
corporate-representative deposition notice:
[The insurer] could have disclosed documents, or
referenced previously disclosed documents, providing the
information in its possession regarding the liability and
damages issues in the case. That information, combined
with [the insurer]’s lack of personal knowledge of any
relevant facts, could show that a corporate representative’s
deposition would provide little if any additional benefit in
relation to the cost. 76

73 Id. at 599.

74 TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4.

75 USAA II, 624 S.W.3d at 792.

76 Id. at 792-93.
After our decision, two courts of appeals have held that
the trial court abused its discretion in failing to quash the
corporate-representative deposition notice of a UIM insurer when the insurer
followed this roadmap. See In re Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., No. 01-22-00926-CV,
2023 WL 4565997, at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 18, 2023, orig.
proceeding); In re Home State Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 05-21-00873-CV,
2022 WL 1467984, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 10, 2022, orig. proceeding
[mand. denied]).

24
State Farm did precisely that, producing over a thousand pages from its
nonprivileged claim file, including a certified copy of the insurance
policy, correspondence between the parties, and Lindsey’s medical
records and bills. In an unsworn declaration under penalty of perjury, 77
State Farm’s claim specialist, Dauper, verified that the production
consisted of the “entire, unprivileged claim file.” 78 As to State Farm’s
personal knowledge of the issues, Dauper averred that State Farm had
neither witnessed the vehicle accident nor treated Lindsey’s alleged
injuries.
To demonstrate the burden and cost of the proposed deposition,
Dauper detailed what would be required for a corporate representative

77 “[B]y statute, ‘an unsworn declaration may be used in lieu of a written

sworn declaration, verification, certification, oath, or affidavit required by
statute or required by a rule, order, or requirement adopted as provided by law’
as long as it is ‘subscribed . . . as true under penalty of perjury.’” Tex. Dep’t of
Pub. Safety v. Caruana, 363 S.W.3d 558, 564 (Tex. 2012) (quoting TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 132.001(a), (c)(2)).
78 In his declaration, Dauper stated that the withheld information “is

privileged pursuant to the attorney-client, work-product, and consulting expert
privileges.” See TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.3(a) (providing that privileges may be
asserted in a separate document for the purpose of withholding privileged
material). Lindsey complains that State Farm did not produce a privilege log
and that no court has determined whether the withheld documents in the
claims file are privileged. But our rules place the burden on the party seeking
discovery to request a privilege log, and any party may request a hearing for
the court to determine the validity of a privilege claim. See TEX. R. CIV.
P. 193.3(b) (“After receiving a response indicating that material or information
has been withheld from production, a party seeking discovery may serve a
written request that the withholding party identify the information and
material withheld.”), 193.4(a) (“Any party may at any reasonable time request
a hearing on an objection or claim of privilege asserted under this rule.”),
199.2(b)(5) (“When the witness is a party or subject to the control of a party,
document requests under this subdivision [relating to the procedure for
noticing oral deposition] are governed by Rules 193 and 196.”).

25
to prepare for and speak on State Farm’s behalf. 79 The representative
would need to (1) review voluminous documents in consultation with
experts to opine on Lindsey’s damages, (2) meet with State Farm’s
counsel to be prepared to discuss State Farm’s legal theories and
defenses, and (3) forgo worktime to prepare, sit for the deposition, and
review and correct the deposition transcript. Based on his personal
experience, Dauper estimated that the proposed deposition would
burden State Farm with a loss of “18 additional [employee]-hours” and
cost “approximately $4,000 in attorneys’ fees.” 80
Consistent with the USAA II roadmap, we conclude here that
(1) much of the information Lindsey seeks by deposition would be
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative of the documents already
produced, including the entire nonprivileged case file, and (2) given
State Farm’s lack of personal knowledge on the narrowed issues, any
likely benefit of the proposed deposition is outweighed by the
demonstrated burden and expense of the proposed discovery. 81
Although the burden rests with the party opposing discovery to support
proportionality complaints with evidence, we have also said that “the
party seeking discovery must comply with proportionality limits on

79 Dauper also discussed the time-consuming process of selecting a
corporate representative that “involves internal discussions and meetings,
review of claim information and lawsuit information, review of [the] document
production . . . and discussions with counsel.”
80 To provide these estimates, Dauper relied on his personal knowledge

as a claim specialist who has reviewed the documents and pleadings in this
case and served as a corporate representative in a UIM-related lawsuit in the
past.
81 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4.

26
discovery requests and ‘may well need to . . . make its own showing of
many or all of the proportionality factors.’” 82 Lindsey’s primary
argument is that she needs to know State Farm’s legal and factual
contentions regarding the extracontractual claims before a single
bifurcated trial, a theory we have already rejected. Alternatively,
Lindsey asserts that State Farm did not address “the portion of the
deposition notice that seeks information concerning ‘the amount and
basis for its valuation of Lindsey’s damages.’” But Dauper directly
discussed this issue, explaining:
• State Farm did not “treat [Lindsey]’s alleged injuries” and
“will rely on medical experts to provide testimony and opinions
concerning the nature, extent, and causation as to [Lindsey]’s
injuries and damages” based on “documents obtained from
third-parties,” which have already been produced;
• any information State Farm currently possesses on this topic
that has not been produced “is privileged pursuant to the
attorney-client, work-product, and consulting expert
privileges”;
• “[t]o be able to speak to and bind [State Farm],” the
representative would need to review “hundreds of pages of
medical records about which any corporate representative
would need to consult with a medical expert to understand”;
and

82 State Farm Lloyds, 520 S.W.3d at 614 (quoting Carr v. State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 312 F.R.D. 459, 468-69 (N.D. Tex. 2015)). These factors
consist of (1) the likely benefit of the requested discovery, (2) the needs of the
case, (3) the amount in controversy, (4) the parties’ resources, (5) the
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, (6) the importance of the
proposed discovery in resolving the litigation, and (7) any other articulable
factor bearing on proportionality. Id. at 608-12; TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4(b).

27
• deposing State Farm’s designated medical experts would be a
better source of this information. 83
Put another way, to the extent information regarding the amount and
basis of State Farm’s damages valuation is not privileged, this discovery
“is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive.” 84
In sum, the proposed deposition is not proportional to the needs
and circumstances of the case at this stage of the proceeding. We
therefore hold that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
quash the deposition notice while Lindsey’s UDJA claims are pending.
Because the trial court allowed discovery that exceeds the permissible
scope under Rule 192.4, State Farm lacks an adequate appellate remedy
and is entitled to mandamus relief. 85
III. Conclusion
In the distinctive UIM context, a party to the suit may invoke the
sever- or bifurcate-and-abate rule described above and is entitled to its
application when the insurer had offered to settle the insured’s claim for
UIM benefits, the insured has not yet obtained a judgment establishing
UIM coverage, and the insured’s extracontractual claims seek damages
that are dependent on the right to receive UIM benefits. After applying

83 At the hearing on its motion to quash, State Farm’s counsel stated

that it has “made those experts available for deposition.”
84 TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4(b).

85 USAA II, 624 S.W.3d at 787 (holding that a party lacks an adequate

appellate remedy when a “discovery order authorizes a deposition that exceeds
the permissible scope” of our rules); In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins. Co., 507 S.W.3d 219,
223 (Tex. 2016) (holding that mandamus relief is the proper remedy when a
discovery order compels production beyond the rules of procedure).

28
that rule, a trial court should grant an insurer’s motion to quash the
deposition notice of its corporate representative during the
UIM-coverage portion of the action if the insurer has stipulated to the
matters within its personal knowledge, produced the nonprivileged
documents in its possession that relate to the insured’s car crash and
damages, and submitted evidence supporting its proportionality
complaints and lack of personal knowledge regarding the disputed
issues for the initial car-crash trial. Because State Farm has done so
here, we conditionally grant its petition for writ of mandamus and order
the trial court to (1) vacate its orders denying State Farm’s motions to
abate the extracontractual claims and to quash the
corporate-representative deposition notice and (2) grant those motions.
Our writ will issue only if the trial court fails to comply.

John P. Devine
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: April 25, 2025

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