In the Matter of J.J.T.

Supreme Court of Texas
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No. 23-1028
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In the Matter of J.J.T.,
Respondent

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On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas
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Argued December 3, 2024

JUSTICE BLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under the Family Code, the juvenile courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over delinquency cases brought against minors.
Occasionally, however, the State does not charge a person with a felony
committed as a minor until after the person has reached adulthood. In
such cases, the State can ask the juvenile court to waive its jurisdiction
and transfer the case to adult criminal court. To grant the transfer, the
juvenile court must find that (1) the State has alleged an enumerated
felony committed while the person was a minor of the requisite age;
(2) probable cause exists to find that the person committed the offense;
and, at issue here (3) the delay in prosecution until after age eighteen
meets a statutory good cause standard. One such standard is that “for a
reason beyond the control of the state it was not practicable to proceed
in juvenile court before the 18th birthday of the person.” 1
In this case, the State charged an adult with capital murder,
alleging he was sixteen at the time he committed the offense. The
juvenile court found that it was not practicable for the State to proceed
before the adult turned eighteen because the State lacked probable
cause to arrest him at that time. The court of appeals, however, reversed
and dismissed the case, holding that because probable cause existed to
arrest him before he had turned eighteen the State had failed to
establish it was impracticable to proceed. A dissenting justice argued
that the majority failed to adhere to the ordinary meaning of
“practicable to proceed” in relying on the existence of probable cause to
dismiss the case.
Largely agreeing with the dissenting justice, we reverse.
Development of probable cause, standing alone, does not conclusively
determine whether it is “practicable to proceed” with a juvenile
prosecution before a person reaches adulthood. Other reasons beyond
the control of the State may support such a finding. However, because
the juvenile court’s findings similarly erred in conflating “practicable to
proceed” with the existence of probable cause, we remand the case to the
juvenile court for a new transfer hearing.

1 Tex. Fam. Code § 54.02(j)(4)(A).

2
I
A
Milford Gutierrez was shot and killed on October 4, 2020, when
he attempted to sell an ounce of marijuana to would-be purchasers.
Video evidence obtained shortly after the shooting showed three
perpetrators fleeing the scene. Respondent J.J.T. was sixteen years and
eight months old when the shooting happened, making him one year and
four months shy of his eighteenth birthday.
Investigating officer Deputy David Crain discovered text
messages on Gutierrez’s phone setting up the marijuana deal. Crain
connected those texts to Alfonso Tovar, J.J.T.’s friend and next-door
neighbor. The individuals depicted in the surveillance video walked
toward Tovar’s residence as they left the scene of the shooting.
Investigators visited J.J.T.’s home and questioned him about
whether he had any knowledge of the shooting. J.J.T. denied knowing
about it at first but then stated that Tovar had revealed a marijuana
deal that had ended in a shooting. J.J.T., however, denied personal
involvement. Based on the text messages and a latent fingerprint linked
to Tovar, Crain obtained an arrest warrant for Tovar on November 12.
Tovar eventually admitted that he was present during the murder, and
he implicated J.J.T. and a third person. Tovar claimed that J.J.T. had
shot Gutierrez and taken the marijuana.
In connection with Tovar’s arrest, Crain retrieved and submitted
Tovar’s password-protected cell phone for forensic decryption, using a
tool that unlocks a cell phone but may take many months to a year to
work. Waiting on those results, Crain ceased investigating, citing the

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pandemic, his workload, and his preference to avoid reinterviewing
minors before an arrest. 2
About a year later, in December 2021, Tovar met with prosecutors
and proffered evidence in connection with plea bargain negotiations.
Tovar recounted details of the crime and J.J.T.’s involvement in it. He
also turned over the password to his phone, which permitted
investigators to examine its contents. The following month, J.J.T.
turned eighteen.
In July 2022, about six months later, Crain obtained a warrant
for J.J.T.’s phone records. The records, which Crain received within ten
days, corroborated Tovar’s story that he and J.J.T. were present at the
shooting. In November, about two years after the shooting, Crain
obtained a warrant for J.J.T.’s arrest.
Upon his arrest, J.J.T. again denied his involvement. Eventually,
however, he admitted to being part of a plan to rob Gutierrez but claimed
that it was Tovar who shot Gutierrez. Crain testified that J.J.T.’s
admission of involvement with the robbery created probable cause, and
the State formally charged J.J.T. with capital murder a few days later.

2 Q. Do you have a practice of re-interviewing juveniles that you suspect

for murder?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A. Juveniles, with all respect to the Court, are -- they’re -- there are a
lot of nuances to handling juveniles. And we’re very cautious in how we
approach, when we can approach; when it’s custodial, and when it’s not.
Honestly, it’s not something that I’m real comfortable with. And, so, I try and
avoid contacting juveniles as much as possible until we get to a point where we
can get the order to apprehend and get them in.

4
B
The State moved to transfer J.J.T.’s case from the juvenile court
to an adult criminal court, invoking Family Code Section 54.02(j). Under
Section 54.02(j), a juvenile court may transfer a capital murder case
involving a respondent over eighteen if the respondent was over the age
of ten at the time of the offense. 3 Relevant here, the juvenile court must
also find either (1) it was not practicable for the State to have proceeded
in juvenile court for reasons beyond its control; or (2) after due diligence,
it was not practicable to have proceeded before the juvenile reached age
eighteen because probable cause did not exist at the time and new
evidence was found, the juvenile could not be found, or an earlier
transfer order was set aside:
The juvenile court may waive its exclusive original
jurisdiction and transfer a person to the appropriate
district court or criminal district court for criminal
proceedings if:
...
(4) the juvenile court finds from a preponderance of the
evidence that:
(A) for a reason beyond the control of the state it was
not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before the
18th birthday of the person; or
(B) after due diligence of the state it was not practicable
to proceed in juvenile court before the 18th birthday of
the person because:
(i) the state did not have probable cause to proceed
in juvenile court and new evidence has been found
since the 18th birthday of the person;

3 Tex. Fam. Code § 54.02(j)(2)(A).

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(ii) the person could not be found; or
(iii) a previous transfer order was reversed by an
appellate court or set aside by a district court[.] 4
Additionally, the juvenile court must find probable cause that the
respondent committed the charged offense. 5
After a hearing, the juvenile court granted the State’s motion. But
in a fragmented fashion, the court combined elements of the two good
cause alternatives in a difficult-to-decipher manner:
The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that for
a reason beyond the control of the State it was not
practicable to proceed in juvenile court before the 18th
birthday of the Respondent [sic] the State did not have
probable cause to proceed in juvenile court and new
evidence has been found since the 18th birthday of
Respondent.
J.J.T. appealed.
The court of appeals vacated the order and dismissed the case for
want of jurisdiction. 6 It noted that the juvenile court apparently had
spliced the beginning of subsection (A) to the end of subsection (B).
Without a “due diligence” finding, as subsection (B) requires, the court
of appeals could uphold the transfer only if the State met
subsection (A)’s requirement that it was “not practicable to proceed for
a reason beyond the control of the state.” 7 The court of appeals concluded

4 Id. § 54.02(j).

5 Id. § 54.02(j)(5).

6 698 S.W.3d 320, 332 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023).

7 Id. at 330 (quoting Tex. Fam. Code § 54.02(j)(4)(A)).

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that no evidence supported the transfer order on this basis. 8 It
determined that Tovar’s statement as an accomplice witness implicated
J.J.T. and was corroborated with evidence sufficient to establish
probable cause to arrest J.J.T. before he turned eighteen. Crain’s desire
for more evidence and stated reluctance to interview minors were not
reasons for delay “beyond the control of the state.” 9
Justice Farris dissented, interpreting subsection (A) as not
conditioned on the timing of finding probable cause, unlike
subsection (B). 10 She observed that subsection (A) is better read to mean
that proceeding before the juvenile turns eighteen must be “practicable”;
thus, a juvenile court is within its discretion to consider reasons other
than probable cause in evaluating whether the State met its burden to
show that it was “not practicable” for it to proceed. 11
II
The juvenile courts have exclusive and original jurisdiction over
proceedings against a respondent who was a minor at the time the
charged offense occurred. 12 With several exceptions, including
modifications in connection with conditions of probation, “all [juvenile
court] dispositions automatically terminate” when a respondent turns
eighteen. 13

8 Id. at 332.

9 Id. at 331–32 (quoting Tex. Fam. Code § 54.02(j)(4)(A)).

10 Id. at 333 (Farris, J., dissenting).

11 Id. at 334-35 (Farris, J., dissenting).

12 Tex. Fam. Code § 51.04; In re N.J.A., 997 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. 1999).

13 Tex. Fam. Code § 54.05(b).

7
For felony offenses, however, Family Code Section 54.02
authorizes a juvenile court to waive its exclusive jurisdiction and, in its
discretion, transfer the case to criminal court. Section 54.02(j) governs
the circumstances for such transfers when the State brings charges after
the juvenile turns eighteen. Section 54.02(j)’s provisions “limit the
prosecution of an adult for an act he committed as a juvenile if his case
could reasonably have been dealt with when he was still a juvenile.” 14
Section 54.02(j) contains several requirements that the State
must prove. First, the respondent must have been within the requisite
age range at the time of the alleged felony offense. 15 Second, the juvenile
court must find that no court had conducted an adjudication or hearing
concerning the alleged offense. 16 Third, the juvenile court must
determine “that there is probable cause to believe that the child before
the court committed the offense alleged.” 17 Finally, and most relevant
here, the juvenile court must find that statutory good cause justifies the
State’s failure to proceed before the respondent turned eighteen.

14 Moore v. State, 532 S.W.3d 400, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).

15 Tex. Fam. Code § 54.02(j)(2) (requiring that the respondent was
“(A) 10 years of age or older and under 17 years of age at the time the person
is alleged to have committed a capital felony or an offense under Section 19.02,
Penal Code; (B) 14 years of age or older and under 17 years of age at the time
the person is alleged to have committed an aggravated controlled substance
felony or a felony of the first degree other than an offense under Section 19.02,
Penal Code; or (C) 15 years of age or older and under 17 years of age at the
time the person is alleged to have committed a felony of the second or third
degree or a state jail felony”).
16 Id. § 54.02(j)(3).

17 Id. § 54.02(j)(5).

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As discussed, the juvenile court may find one of two good-cause
alternatives:
(A) for a reason beyond the control of the state it was not
practicable to proceed in juvenile court before the 18th
birthday of the person; or
(B) after due diligence of the state it was not practicable to
proceed in juvenile court before the 18th birthday of the
person because:
(i) the state did not have probable cause to proceed
in juvenile court and new evidence has been found
since the 18th birthday of the person;
(ii) the person could not be found; or
(iii) a previous transfer order was reversed by an
appellate court or set aside by a district court[.] 18
The State bears the burden to prove statutory good cause by a
preponderance of the evidence. 19 If the criteria to transfer the case are
not met, then the juvenile court must dismiss the case. 20
The courts of appeals review decisions of the juvenile courts using
the two-step analysis described by the Court of Criminal Appeals in
Moon v. State, examining whether sufficient evidence supports the

18 Id. § 54.02(j)(4).

19Id. (permitting transfer when “the juvenile court finds from a
preponderance of the evidence” that good cause under either (A) or (B) exists);
Moore, 532 S.W.3d at 405.
20 See N.J.A., 997 S.W.2d at 557 (“If the person is over age eighteen, and

section 54.02(j)’s criteria are not satisfied, the juvenile court’s only other option
is to dismiss the case.”). After this Court issued its opinion in N.J.A., which
concerned a respondent who turned eighteen while proceedings were pending
in the juvenile court, the Legislature enacted Section 51.0412, creating
continuing jurisdiction for proceedings begun before the respondent’s
eighteenth birthday.

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juvenile court’s findings and, if so, whether the decision to transfer was
an abuse of discretion. 21 We, too, apply these relevant legal standards to
ultimately decide whether the juvenile court abused its discretion.
A
Originally enacted in 1975, the predecessor version of
Section 54.02(j) required the State to prove that (1) probable cause was
lacking to charge the minor before the minor turned eighteen and new
evidence has been found or (2) the minor could not be found. 22
Section 54.02(j)’s statutory framework has evolved to broaden a juvenile
court’s authority to transfer cases, gradually expanding the age range of

21 451 S.W.3d 28, 47 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), overruled in part by Ex

parte Thomas, 623 S.W.3d 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Moon interpreted
Section 54.02(h) as requiring factually supported, case-specific findings to
support the factors enumerated in Section 54.02(f). The courts of appeals have
adopted Moon’s standard of review for transfers of adult respondents under
Section 54.02(j). E.g., In re A.M., 577 S.W.3d 653, 658–59 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied). The Court of Criminal Appeals overruled Moon’s
requirement of detailed findings within the transfer order in 2021. Thomas,
623 S.W.3d at 377. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals declined to declare
a different standard of review, acknowledging that the Legislature had since
assigned review of discretionary transfer orders to this Court via an
interlocutory appeal. Id. at 382–83. The courts of appeals continue to apply the
Moon standard of review. E.g., Bell v. State, 649 S.W.3d 867, 887 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet. ref’d); In re J.A.G., 697 S.W.3d 386, 393 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2024, no pet.). The parties do not advance a different standard,
and thus we also apply it, save that we review a challenge to a factual
sufficiency analysis merely to ensure that the court of appeals applied the
correct standard. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 6 (providing that the decisions of the
courts of appeals “shall be conclusive on all questions of fact brought before
them on appeal or error”).
22 Act of May 19, 1975, 64th Leg., R.S., ch. 693, § 16, 1975 Tex. Gen.

Laws 2152, 2156.

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respondents eligible for transfer depending on the seriousness of the
alleged offense. 23
In 1995, the Legislature added a new statutory good-cause ground
not directly linked to probable cause: good cause exists when “for a
reason beyond the control of the state it was not practicable to proceed
in juvenile court before the 18th birthday of the person.” 24 This ground,
now in subsection (A), focuses on the practicality of proceeding, whereas
the ground in subsection (B) requires the State to show diligence and
either (1) a lack of probable cause before the respondent turned eighteen
plus new evidence establishing it, (2) an inability to find the respondent,
or (3) a court had set aside an earlier transfer order. 25
Under the two alternatives, the path to transfer diverges based
on the development of probable cause. If probable cause develops after
the respondent’s eighteenth birthday, then under subsection (B)(i), the
state must show that it acted with diligence and that it was not

23 Compare id. (permitting transfer for respondents who were between

the ages of fifteen and seventeen at the time of the alleged felony offense), with
Tex. Fam. Code § 54.02(j)(2) (permitting transfer for respondents who were
between the ages of ten and seventeen at the time of the alleged capital felony
or murder; or between the ages of fourteen and seventeen at the time of the
alleged aggravated controlled substance felony or other first-degree felony; or
between the ages of fifteen and seventeen at the time of the alleged
second-degree, third-degree, or state-jail felony).
24 Act of May 25, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 262, § 34, 1995 Tex. Gen.

Laws 2517, 2534 (codified at Tex. Fam. Code § 54.02(j)(4)(A)).
25 Compare Tex. Fam. Code § 54.02(j)(4)(A), with id. § 54.02(j)(4)(B).

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practicable to proceed until it discovered new evidence. 26 If probable
cause develops before the respondent’s eighteenth birthday, however,
then subsection (A) governs, and the State must show that a reason
beyond the State’s control made it not practicable to proceed with
prosecuting the minor before the minor turned eighteen.
Though the possible grounds for transfer are different depending
on whether probable cause developed before or after the respondent’s
eighteenth birthday, the State may assert both as a basis for transfer.
Should the juvenile court reject the State’s position that probable cause
developed after the juvenile turned eighteen but nonetheless conclude
under subsection (A) that it was impracticable for the State to proceed
for reasons beyond its control, then the court may exercise its discretion
to transfer the case. By moving for a transfer under both subsections, as
it did here, the State preserves its grounds for a transfer under either.
B
The court of appeals concluded that a probable cause
determination is dispositive of whether it is “practicable to proceed”
under subsection (A). 27 Subsection (A)’s text, however, contains no such
probable-cause parameter. The court of appeals thus erred in its
conclusion that, if probable cause exists before a minor reaches eighteen,
then the State’s motion to transfer under (A) fails.

26 Subsection (B) also permits, with a showing of diligence, the State to

demonstrate that the respondent could not be found or that an earlier transfer
had been granted but later set aside. Id. § 54.02(j)(4)(B)(ii), (iii).
27 698 S.W.3d at 331.

12
Instead, “practicable to proceed” under subsection (A) focuses on
a reason or reasons beyond the control of the State, not on the timing of
the development of probable cause. Subsection (B) authorizes a transfer
when probable cause develops after the minor turns eighteen, which
provides context to show that subsection (A) may apply to those cases
that do not meet subsection (B)’s criteria of later development of
probable cause and the discovery of new evidence.
We then are left with the language of subsection (A), which makes
no reference to probable cause but instead focuses on what is practicable
to accomplish. We generally give undefined terms in statutes their
ordinary meaning. 28 “Practicable” means “reasonably capable of being
accomplished; feasible in a particular situation.” 29 Under subsection (A),
a juvenile court, in the exercise of its discretion, may credit a valid
reason or reasons “beyond the control of the state” making it infeasible
for the State to proceed before the juvenile turned eighteen.
The Court of Criminal Appeals interpreted subsection (A)
similarly in Moore v. State. 30 As in this case, the State had charged an
adult for an offense alleged to have occurred when he was a minor. 31 The
investigation into the offense began when Moore was sixteen, but law
enforcement failed to forward the case to the district attorney for more
than two years, citing the investigating detective’s heavy caseload and

28 Tex. Health & Hum. Servs. Comm’n v. Est. of Burt, 689 S.W.3d 274,

280 (Tex. 2024).
29 Practicable, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

30 532 S.W.3d 400 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).

31 Id. at 401.

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belief, in error, that Moore had not reached age eighteen. 32 Without
relying on the development of probable cause, the Court of Criminal
Appeals held that investigative delays are chargeable to the State in
considering whether it was practicable for the State to proceed. 33 And it
concluded that the State did not meet its burden where the delays were
attributed to a heavy caseload and an error regarding the respondent’s
age. 34
The courts of appeals have wrestled with whether specific reasons
for delay are “beyond the control of the state,” to differing results. 35 On
balance, these cases reveal that such a determination is highly
fact-specific. The timing of the outcry or crime must be considered

32Id. at 402. Moore pleaded guilty and was placed on
deferred-adjudication community supervision. Id. He challenged the juvenile
court’s transfer order on appeal from the criminal district court, and thus his
appeal reached the Court of Criminal Appeals. In the interim, the Legislature
authorized an appeal from the juvenile court’s order as a continuation of the
civil proceeding, with appellate jurisdiction carried forward to this Court. Act
of May 12, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 74, § 3, 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws 1065, 1065
(codified at Tex. Fam. Code § 56.01(c)(1)(A)) (“An appeal may be taken . . . by
or on behalf of a child from an order entered under . . . Section 54.02 respecting
transfer of the child for prosecution as an adult . . . .”). See Tex. Fam. Code
§ 56.01(a) (“Except as provided . . . an appeal from an order of a juvenile court
is to a court of appeals and the case may be carried to the Texas Supreme Court
by writ of error or upon certificate, as in civil cases generally.”).
33 Moore, 532 S.W.3d at 405.

34 Id.

35 Compare, e.g., A.M., 577 S.W.3d at 670–72 (investigators’ desire for

more corroborating physical evidence not a reason for delay beyond the control
of the state), with In re E.B., No. 12-22-00162-CV, 2022 WL 17074849, at *4
(Tex. App.—Tyler Nov. 17, 2022, no pet.) (investigators’ desire for more
corroborating physical evidence showed it was not practicable to proceed).

14
against the time remaining until the juvenile’s eighteenth birthday. 36
Reasons for delay beyond the state’s control may overcome delays
attributable to the state. For example, one court of appeals affirmed a
transfer order after weighing the State’s two hearing resets before the
respondent turned eighteen against the continuances the respondent’s
counsel sought and ongoing court delays attributable to the pandemic. 37
Ultimately, such fact-intensive determinations rest with the
juvenile court. As the factfinder, the juvenile court determines the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight to accord their testimony. 38
The State has considerable discretion in the manner and means of
conducting its investigation. Under Section 54.02(j)(4)(A), the juvenile
court is charged with examining whether the exercise of this discretion
devolved into unreasonable delay.
C
Having concluded that the court of appeals erred in its analysis
of the statute, we turn to the disposition of the case. A reviewing court
must defer to the findings of a reasonable factfinder, but a juvenile court

36 In re B.C.B., No. 05-16-00207-CV, 2016 WL 3165595, at *5–6 (Tex.

App.—Dallas June 7, 2016, pet. denied) (affirming transfer order where state
had only twenty-five days between outcry and juvenile’s eighteenth birthday);
In re L.M.B., No. 11-16-00241-CV, 2017 WL 253654, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Eastland Jan. 6, 2017, no pet.) (affirming transfer order where juvenile court
considered “the timing of the outcry, the court’s calendar, the attorneys’
calendars, the motion for continuance, and ‘the time it takes to get [a social]
evaluation done’”).
37 In re N.J.T., No. 13-21-00089-CR, 2021 WL 4202165, at *5–7 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Sept. 21, 2021, no pet.).
38 In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 279 n.50 (Tex. 2024).

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has no discretion to misapply the law. 39 The juvenile court did not find
that the State exercised diligence in connection with its finding that “the
State did not have probable cause to proceed in juvenile court” before
J.J.T.’s eighteenth birthday. The parties agree that, without a diligence
finding, the juvenile court had no basis to transfer the case under
subsection (B).
Under subsection (A), the appropriate analysis must include an
evaluation of whether reasons beyond the control of the State made it
impracticable to proceed with J.J.T.’s prosecution before he reached
adulthood. The record reflects such delays, like the timing of Tovar’s
proffer and the inability to quickly decrypt Tovar’s phone. In addition,
the time between the commission of the offense and J.J.T.’s eighteenth
birthday was relatively short, a year and four months, and dovetailed
with the pandemic. As the court of appeals observed, however, the record
also reflects delays attributable to the State, such as Crain’s workload,
his preference not to interview juveniles, and his decision not to seek
J.J.T.’s phone records until after J.J.T. turned eighteen.
The juvenile court relied on an engrafted finding from
subsection (B) that probable cause developed after J.J.T. turned
eighteen in ordering the transfer, rather than focusing on a reason or
reasons beyond the control of the State that made it not practicable for
the State to proceed before the juvenile turned eighteen. The juvenile
court’s findings, to the extent they rely on the later development of

39 See HouseCanary, Inc. v. Title Source, Inc., 622 S.W.3d 254, 259 (Tex.

2021) (“[F]ailure to analyze or apply the law correctly is an abuse of
discretion.”).

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probable cause and new evidence—rather than the reason or reasons for
the delay in proceeding before J.J.T. turned eighteen beyond the control
of the State—are inconsistent with the text of subsection (A). We decline
to attempt to harmonize the juvenile court’s findings to assume a correct
legal basis for its ruling or to substitute ourselves as the factfinder.
Having clarified the law, we remand the case to the juvenile court for a
new transfer hearing.
* * *
The juvenile court and court of appeals erred in tethering
“practicable to proceed” to the development of probable cause in
evaluating whether the State proved good cause to delay prosecution
under Family Code Section 54.02(j)(4)(A). Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to the juvenile
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Jane N. Bland
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: March 28, 2025

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