Christian, Antoine Leon AKA Christian, Reginald Jerome

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS

NO. WR-39,987-04

EX PARTE REGINALD JEROME CHRISTIAN
AKA ANTOINE LEON CHRISTIAN, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
CAUSE NO. 1093011-A IN THE 184th DISTRICT COURT
FROM HARRIS COUNTY

NEWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which
KELLER, P.J., HERVEY, RICHARDSON, YEARY, WALKER, SLAUGHTER and
MCCLURE, JJ., joined. KEEL, J., filed a concurring opinion.

Applicant was convicted of possession of more than one but less

than four grams of cocaine and sentenced to two years and nine months’

imprisonment pursuant to a guilty plea in 2009. 1 Former Houston Police

1
Although Applicant’s sentence has run, he alleges he is suffering from collateral
consequences including the use of this conviction as an enhancement for future charges. The
habeas court found that this conviction was used as the underlying conviction in a felon in
Christian — 2

Department Officer Gerald Goines, who has previously been found to

have provided false information and testimony in drug cases, was

involved in Applicant’s arrest. In 2019, the Harris County District

Attorney’s Office notified Applicant that Goines had been relieved of duty

and was under criminal investigation. Thereafter, Applicant filed an

application for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction on four

grounds: (1) actual innocence (2) Brady violation (3) violation of his due

process rights and (4) involuntary plea. 2 Applicant later filed an

amended application abandoning the first three grounds and alleging

only that his guilty plea was involuntary because he did not know that

Officer Goines had engaged in misconduct in other cases and would have

insisted on trial had he known. 3 The habeas court recommends relief

be granted on the claim that Applicant’s guilty plea was involuntary. We

filed and set this case for submission to determine:

(1) Was Gerald Goines’s conduct in this case the type of
misconduct that gives right to an inference of falsity under
Ex parte Mathews, 638 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022)?

possession of a firearm charge for which Applicant is currently serving a twenty-year
sentence.

2
This Court dismissed Applicant’s initial writ application without written order noting
Applicant’s sentence had been discharged.

3
After receiving the supplemental writ record from the district clerk containing Applicant’s
amended writ application and the habeas court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, this
Court reconsidered the dismissal on its own motion.
Christian — 3

(2) Assuming an inference of falsity under Mathews applies, do
the facts of this case rebut that inference of falsity?

(3) Assuming an inference of falsity applies and was not rebutted
by the facts of this case, was the false evidence provided by
Gerald Goines material to Applicant’s guilty plea?

Background
According to Applicant, on November 15, 2006, the night of his

arrest, he did not possess any drugs. 4 Applicant denies that he told

Goines that there were drugs inside of his vehicle as Goines alleged in

his offense report. Applicant maintains there were no drugs inside of

his vehicle and alleges that Goines must have planted the cocaine found

inside of Applicant’s car. Applicant theorizes that the drugs found in his

vehicle must have belonged to Goines who fabricated the events of that

night and falsified his offense report.

On July 30, 2009, Applicant pleaded guilty to possession of a

controlled substance in exchange for time served. In 2019, Applicant

received a letter from the District Attorney’s Office notifying him that

Goines was under criminal investigation. Applicant asserts that had he

been aware of Goines’s misconduct he would not have pleaded guilty,

4
These assertions are taken from Applicant’s unsworn declaration attached to his amended
application for a writ of habeas corpus.
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even upon the offer for time served, and instead would have insisted on

going to trial.

At the outset, we note that the record before the Court as to the

events of November 15, 2006, is not as thoroughly developed as it could

be and lacks clarity. Applicant’s proposed findings of fact and

conclusions of law, which were adopted by the habeas court, attach the

offense reports of only two of the officers involved in Applicant’s arrest,

Officers Goines and T.N. Castille. However, those reports both indicate

that other officers were involved in the investigation, search, and arrest

of Applicant. According to the State, for example, an Officer Francis was

the primary officer involved in Applicant’s arrest, but Officer Francis did

not write a report. The State’s briefing also refers to a report authored

by an Officer Cardoza, which is not included in the record before this

Court. 5 Applicant argues that Goines’s version of events cannot be

corroborated.

Turning to the offense reports included in the record, according to

Officer Castille’s report, at approximately 7:39 p.m. on November 15,

5
The State filed a motion to supplement the record before this Court. That motion was
granted. However, the State failed to file a supplement with this Court or the district court.
The State’s briefing refers to Officer Cardoza’s report and other materials, including, for
example, pro se Affidavits filed by Applicant before his guilty plea, which are not included in
the record.
Christian — 5

2006, he was called out to a liquor store parking lot to assist Officer

Francis with a canine vehicle search. Officer Francis advised Officer

Castille that Applicant was under arrest and that charges had been

accepted by the District Attorney’s Office. Additionally, Officer Castille’s

report sets out that Officer Francis had not searched the vehicle and

Officer Francis wanted Officer Castille to search with the canine. Officer

Castille recites that he searched Applicant’s vehicle with his canine

partner, Gale. According to the report, Gale gave the alert for the odor

of narcotics in the center console of the vehicle. However, it is unclear

from the report if Officer Castille personally recovered any narcotics

from the vehicle. Officer Castille states in his report that he notified

Officer Francis of the alert.

According to Officer Goines’s report, Officer Goines was contacted

on November 15, 2006, regarding a male who was being detained on

suspicion of possession of a crack cocaine in a liquor store parking lot

after officers were flagged down for a disturbance. Goines’s report

states that officers of the patrol division were investigating a nearby

shooting when they were flagged down by Marcus Cook. According to

the report, Cook informed patrol officers that a male, who had walked

into the liquor store, had just pulled a pistol on him during an argument.
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Applicant was detained walking out of the liquor store. According to

Goines, Cook positively identified Applicant.

The record does not definitively establish which officer first

searched Applicant’s car. As the State concedes, it is also unclear at

what point Goines arrived on scene or how many officers searched

Applicant’s vehicle. According to Goines’s report, officers searched

Applicant’s vehicle and observed a clear plastic baggie with a rock like

substance inside in the vehicle’s center console. Officers then called for

assistance from the narcotics division. This suggests, if the report is to

be believed, that an officer other than Goines discovered the contraband

and then requested Officer Castille’s assistance.

Goines’s report states that he arrived on the scene and read

Applicant his Miranda warnings at 7:55 p.m. Applicant allegedly

admitted to Goines that there were narcotics and currency inside of the

vehicle but, according to the offense report, Applicant claimed they did

not belong to him. Goines’s report also states that Goines retrieved a

plastic bag from the center console and conducted a field test on the

contraband. Goines also states that he recovered a large sum of money
Christian — 7

from the console, and, upon searching the trunk, found a pistol in plain

view. 6

The habeas court recommends that relief be granted on Applicant’s

claim that his plea was involuntary. The court also concluded that

Applicant established by a preponderance of the evidence that his

conviction was obtained through the use of false evidence. The court

found that Applicant had proven all five Coty-Mathews factors and thus

established an inference of falsity as to Goines’s version of events

surrounding Applicant’s arrest. 7 The court found the false evidence

material. 8 The habeas court concluded:

under the facts of applicant’s case, if the main investigating
officer’s misconduct in other cases could have been
established at trial, it is reasonable to believe that a jury
might have found reasonable doubt. Whether they would
have or not is not the relevant inquiry. The relevant inquiry
is whether it is reasonable to believe the applicant would
have opted for a trial instead of a guilty plea if he had been
able to reveal Goines’s other misconduct to the jury. This
Court finds that applicant’s assertion in this regard is
credible.

6
Applicant was initially charged with possession of a controlled substance and felon in
possession of a firearm but the felon in possession of a firearm charge was ultimately
dismissed.

7
Ex parte Mathews, 638 S.W.3d 685, 690-91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (concluding it is
appropriate to extend Coty to cases involving police officers who have lied to secure drug-
related convictions but reiterating that all five factors must be met to achieve the “inference
of falsity”).

8
Id. at 690 (even if the “State is unable to rebut an achieved inference of falsity, [a court]
may still preserve the integrity of just convictions in which the inference of falsity does not
ultimately prove to be material”).
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Having reviewed the record, such as it is, we determine that it

does not support the habeas court’s conclusion that an inference of

falsity has been established because the conduct at issue is not the type

of misconduct that gives rise to an inference of falsity. Unlike other

cases applying an inference of falsity to Goines’s conduct, here he was

not the only officer involved in Applicant’s arrest and the record before

the Court fails to establish that he was even the first officer to find the

contraband evidence. And because we hold that an inference of falsity

does not apply in this case, there is no need to consider the second or

third question set for submission. Therefore, we remand Applicant’s case

to the habeas court to consider Applicant’s involuntary plea claim

without applying an inference of falsity.

Standard of Review

While the habeas court is the original factfinder, this Court is the

ultimate factfinder on post-conviction review of habeas corpus

applications. 9 Further, while we generally defer to and accept the

habeas court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law when they are

supported by the record, we may exercise our authority to make

9
Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d 698, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
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contrary or alternative findings and conclusions “[w]hen our

independent review of the record reveals that the trial judge’s findings

and conclusions are not supported by the record.” 10

Involuntary Plea

A guilty plea involves the waiver of several constitutional rights

and therefore must be entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily

with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely

consequences. 11 Guilty pleas induced by threats, improper promises, or

misrepresentations are not voluntarily entered. 12 We have recognized

that false evidence may cause a defendant to be misinformed such that

the defendant’s knowledge of the relevant circumstances was

insufficient for his or her plea to have been entered voluntary. 13 The

“key factor” remains “whether a defendant has ‘sufficient awareness of

the relevant circumstances and likely consequences’ such that his plea

10
Id.

11
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).

12
Id.

13
Ex parte Barnaby, 475 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
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is a knowing, intelligent act.” 14 Voluntariness is determined by

considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding a guilty plea. 15

Coty-Mathews Inference of Falsity

To establish a false-evidence claim, applicants must generally

establish that evidence was false and that the false evidence was

material to the conviction or punishment. 16 In Ex parte Coty, we found

that a claim based on a lab technician’s pattern of misconduct was

“analogous” to a false evidence claim. 17 In that case, the defendant

argued that his guilty plea was obtained through the use of false

evidence but he based that claim on the fact that the state-employed

lab technician involved in his case had been found to have engaged in

“dry labbing” to falsify lab results in other un-related cases. 18 This Court

held that the proof of misconduct in other cases could establish an

inference of falsity as to the evidence in question, if an applicant could

show:

14
Id. at 322-23 (citing Brady, 397 U.S. at 748).

15
Brady, 397 U.S. at 749.

16
Barnaby, 475 S.W.3d at 323 (citing Ex parte Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d 656, 665 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2014)).

17
Ex parte Coty, 418 S.W.3d 597, 605 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

18
Id. at 598.
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(1) the technician in question is a state actor, (2) the
technician has committed multiple instances of intentional
misconduct in another case or cases, (3) the technician is the
same technician that worked on the applicant’s case, (4) the
misconduct is the type of misconduct that would have
affected the evidence in the applicant’s case, and (5) the
technician handled and processed the evidence in the
applicant’s case within roughly the same period of time as
the other misconduct. 19

Once an inference of falsity has been established, the burden shifts

to the State to offer evidence establishing that the technician at issue

did not commit intentional misconduct in the case in question. 20 Even

if the State cannot rebut the inference of falsity, the burden still remains

on the applicant to show that the evidence was material to his or her

conviction. 21 In the context of a guilty plea, the burden of materiality is

established by showing that the applicant would not have pleaded guilty

but for the falsified evidence against him. 22

In Ex parte Mathews, we considered whether the framework

established in Coty in response to a state lab-technician’s pattern of

misconduct should apply to a police officer with a proven history of

19
Id. at 605 (the Court “note[d] that the initial burden on applicants to establish an inference
of falsity is also onerous”).

20
Id.

21
Id.

22
Barnaby, 475 S.W.3d at 327 (“[T]he materiality of false evidence is measured by what
impact that false evidence had on the defendant’s decision to plead guilty.”).
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falsifying evidence in drug cases. 23 In that case, Mathews challenged

his drug conviction and argued, based on Coty, that this Court should

infer that Goines’s testimony against him was false because of Goines’s

history of misconduct in drug cases. 24 We agreed that Coty should

extend to situations in which “a police officer has demonstrably lied in

multiple instances in order to convict individuals of drug-related

offenses.” 25

Goines’s Conduct is Not the Type of Misconduct that
Gives Rise to an Inference of Falsity

In both Coty and Mathews, the state actor shown to have engaged

in malfeasance in other cases was the only witness against the

defendant. In Coty, the lab technician with a pattern of “dry labbing” in

other cases was in sole possession of the evidence against the

defendant, and he was responsible for the test results gleaned from that

evidence used to implicate the defendant. 26 In Mathews, Goines was

23
Mathews, 638 S.W.3d at 690

24
Id. at 687-88.

25
Id. at 692 (remanding for the habeas court to make an initial determination as to whether
applicant established all five Coty requirements).

26
Coty, 418 S.W.3d at 605 (“we hold that an applicant can establish that a laboratory
technician’s sole possession of a substance and testing results derived from that possession
are unreliable, and we will infer that the evidence in question is false, if the applicant shows
[the five-Coty factors]”).
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the “sole witness” to the crime allegedly committed by the defendant. 27

Goines alleged the defendant sold him a substance that later tested

positive for cocaine but there was “no other evidence in the record to

identify [the defendant] as the seller because the uniformed officers did

not witness the [undercover] sale.” 28 Goines was solely responsible for

the alleged undercover drug bust that resulted in the collection of

evidence and the defendant’s subsequent arrest. 29

The Court concluded in Mathews that it was appropriate to extend

the requirements established in Coty to establish an inference of falsity

to the circumstances presented. 30 The Court reasoned that the same

considerations that justified the adoption of the inference of falsity in

Coty “apply with as much force to cases involving police officers who

display a pattern of mendacity in obtaining drug arrests and convictions

as it does for cases involving laboratory technicians who routinely falsify

forensic test results and documentation.” 31 Those justifications were,

27
Mathews, 638 S.W.3d at 687.

28
Mathews, 638 S.W.3d at 691.

29
Id.

30
Id. at 692.

31
Id. at 690-91.
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first, that the malfeasance by the state actors was egregious. 32 Second,

we reasoned that it would be unduly “onerous” for a defendant to have

to prove the bad state actor’s actual misconduct in his or her own case

given the cost and time that such investigations would require and the

possibility that “even then, evidence of misconduct may not come to

light, even if it occurred.” 33 This makes sense given that the

investigation at issue in Mathews was instigated entirely by a state

actor, Goines, who was later shown to have propensity for falsifying

information in drug cases.

Considering the Coty factors, in Mathews, the Court found Goines

is clearly a state actor that “has a proven history” of providing false

testimony and falsifying government documents in at least one drug-

related set of cases (the Mallet cases in 2008). 34 In the Mallet cases,

Goines testified that, while working in an undercover capacity, he paid

Steven Mallet for drugs that Steven then obtained from his brother, Otis

Mallet. 35 In both of those cases, this Court determined that the

32
Id. at 690 (citing Coty, 418 S.W.3d at 605).

33
Id.

34
Id. at 691.

35
Ex parte Steven Mallet, 620 S.W.3d 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (Richardson, J.,
concurring); see also Ex parte Otis Mallet, Nos. WR-90,980-01 & 02, 2020 WL 3582438 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2020) (not designated for publication); Ex parte Otis Mallet, 602 S.W.3d 922 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2020) (Richardson, J., concurring).
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defendants were actually innocent of the charges brought against them

by Goines. 36 Goines was the sole witness against the Mallet brothers,

and expense reports belied Goines’s allegation that he had used police

money for the alleged undercover transaction. 37 The Court noted that

Goines’s previous misconduct was of a kind that would affect the

evidence in Mathews, another case in which Goines was the sole witness

against the defendant . 38 The type of misconduct that has given rise to

an inference of falsity in cases involving Goines has generally been

understood to involve Goines acting as the sole fact witness or as a but-

for cause of the defendant’s arrest.

Here, while the record is not entirely clear, it is indisputable that

there were multiple officers involved in Applicant’s arrest. The record

does not establish that Goines was the only, or even the primary, officer

involved in Applicant’s arrest. Unlike Mathews, Goines was not the sole

source of the allegations against Applicant. Officer Castille reported that

36
Mallet, 620 S.W.3d at 798; Mallet, 2020 WL 3582438 at *1.

37
Mallet, 602 S.W.3d at 925 (Richardson, J., concurring) (“Applicant has proven that the sole
witness to the crime is a police officer who willfully and knowingly perjured himself in order
to secure Applicant’s conviction”); Mallet, 620 S.W.3d at 800 (Richardson, J., concurring)
(noting Goines was “the State’s sole fact witness at trial and the only witness who said he
saw a drug deal”).

38
Mathews, 638 S.W.3d at 691-692 (ultimately the Court remanded to the convicting court
to determine whether all five Coty requirements had been established).
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he was called to the scene by Officer Francis who informed him that

Applicant was already under arrest. Officer Castille performed a search

of the vehicle and his K9 unit alerted to the vehicle’s center console

where the drugs were found. 39 Officer Goines was not the reason

Applicant was detained nor did he instigate the investigation. Applicant

was detained by other officers for his suspected involvement in a

disturbance in the parking lot and possibly a nearby shooting. Unlike

the Mallet and Mathews cases, Applicant was not arrested on the sole

word of Goines acting alone in an undercover capacity.

Admittedly, the record is unclear about whether Goines was the

first officer to find the contraband in the center console, although, a

reasonable inference could be drawn to the contrary. But to the extent

Applicant now asserts that Goines alone had the opportunity to plant

the drugs recovered in his vehicle, he has not met his burden to

establish the same. 40 Given the involvement of other officers both in

the origination of the investigation involving Applicant and his

subsequent arrest, this is not the type of case in which it would be

39
While we only have Goines’s report in the record in this case to suggest that Officer Castille
discovered the narcotics first, it was incumbent upon Applicant to establish the actual
sequence of events.

40
See Mathews, 638 S.W.3d at 689 (noting under Coty the Applicant has the burden to
establish the necessary predicate facts to apply an inference of falsity).
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appropriate to apply an inference of falsity. Therefore, we conclude that

Applicant’s involuntary plea claim should be reviewed without the

consideration of an inference of falsity.

Conclusion

Applicant has failed to establish the applicability of the inference

of falsity under Mathews because Applicant’s case does not involve the

type of misconduct that gives rise to an inference of falsity. Therefore,

we remand to the habeas court to consider Applicant’s involuntary plea

claim without reference to an inference of falsity regarding Goines’s

conduct in Applicant’s case.

Delivered: September 25, 2024

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