Cinco Ranch Village Square Association, LLC v. Anro Leasing, LLC

Opinion issued October 21, 2025.

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-23-00947-CV
———————————
CINCO RANCH VILLAGE SQUARE ASSOCIATION, LLC, Appellant
V.
ANRO LEASING, LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from the 270th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2021-35642

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Cinco Ranch Village Square Association, LLC (Cinco Ranch), filed this

appeal from the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of AnRo Leasing, LLC

(AnRo). AnRo cross-appealed, complaining about the trial court’s partial denial of

its request for attorneys’ fees.
Background

Appellant/cross-appellee Cinco Ranch sued appellee/cross-appellant AnRo

for declaratory relief to enforce its restriction and easement agreement for the

Cinco Ranch Village Square development in Katy, Texas (the agreement), which

Cinco Ranch claimed bound AnRo. AnRo moved for summary judgment and

dismissal, arguing that AnRo was excluded from the obligations Cinco Ranch

sought to enforce because of an amendment to the easement agreement at the time

of AnRo’s purchase of the property and that Cinco Ranch lacked standing to bring

the lawsuit because Cinco Ranch was not a legally formed entity at the time of the

agreement. Cinco Ranch moved for partial summary judgment and declaratory

relief, arguing AnRo breached obligations under the agreement to submit its

property development plans to Cinco Ranch and to provide an ingress-egress

easement across a portion of AnRo’s property. The trial court granted summary

judgment in favor of AnRo on September 26, 2023.

Cinco Ranch moved for a new trial on October 25, 2023 and filed its notice

of appeal on December 19, 2023.

AnRo filed its Opposed Motion for Attorneys’ Fees on October 24, 2023.

AnRo cited the pertinent provision of the agreement, which provides for attorney’s

fees for the prevailing party from the non-prevailing party in any dispute arising

from “any legal action or proceeding to enforce or interpret any terms” of the

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agreement. AnRo attached as exhibits to its motion the agreement, the order

granting summary judgment to AnRo, the affidavit and curricula vitae of its

attorneys, and an itemized invoice for the work performed and costs incurred

defending the suit. In response, Cinco Ranch argued that AnRo could not recover

attorney’s fees based on the same agreement AnRo successfully claimed was

unenforceable against AnRo.1 Cinco Ranch also argued that AnRo had not met its

burden to prove the attorney’s fees claimed were reasonable and necessary. The

trial court partially granted AnRo’s motion on February 29, 2024, awarding trial

attorney’s fees but not appellate attorney’s fees. AnRo filed its notice of cross-

appeal on April 11, 2024 with leave of this Court.

Cinco Ranch’s opening brief was due by March 22, 2024. The Court granted

Cinco Ranch a requested extension to May 7, 2024. On May 20, 2024, the Court

issued Cinco Ranch a late brief notice, noting that “[t]his appeal may be dismissed

for want of prosecution unless (1) appellant files a motion to extend time that states

the facts relied on to reasonably explain appellant’s failure to timely file its brief

and (2) the appellee is not significantly injured by appellant’s failure to timely file

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At the time that AnRo purchased the parcel in question, there was a pre-existing
restriction and easement agreement. AnRo and Cinco Ranch’s predecessor signed
a “Second Amendment to Restriction and Easement Agreement” that modified the
existing easement agreement to remove the provisions that Cinco Ranch sought to
enforce in this suit. However, other provisions in the original Restriction and
Easement Agreement and its First Amendment remained in force, including the
attorney’s fees provision.
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appellant’s brief.” On May 21, 2024, Cinco Ranch filed a letter stating that it did

not intend to file a brief.

On May 21, 2024, AnRo filed its opening brief in its cross-appeal. On June

4, 2024, counsel for Cinco Ranch moved to withdraw from representation, which

request this Court granted on June 18, 2024. Cinco Ranch did not file a response to

AnRo’s opening brief in its cross-appeal.

Cinco Ranch’s Appeal of the Summary Judgment

An appellate court may dismiss an appeal or affirm the appealed judgment

or order for want of prosecution of the appeal. TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(b). If an

appellant fails to comply with a requirement of the rules of appellate procedure, a

court order, or a notice from the clerk requiring a response or other action within a

specified time, an appellate court may dismiss an appeal or affirm the appealed

judgment or order. Id. R. 42.3(c).

The Court issued a late-brief notice on May 20, 2024 stating that the appeal

would be dismissed for want of prosecution if Cinco Ranch did not file a motion

for extension of time in which to file its brief within ten days. The following day,

May 21, 2024, counsel for Cinco Ranch filed a letter stating that counsel had “been

advised by [Cinco Ranch] that [Cinco Ranch] does not intend to file a brief in this

case.” Counsel for Cinco Ranch indicated in the letter that he sent a copy to the

principal of Cinco Ranch. To date, neither Cinco Ranch nor anyone on its behalf

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has filed a motion for extension of time or a brief. As such, we dismiss Cinco

Ranch’s appeal for want of prosecution and failure to comply with a notice from

the clerk. TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(b), (c).

AnRo’s Cross-Appeal of the Partial Award of Attorney’s Fees

On cross-appeal, AnRo argues that the trial court erred in partially denying

its motion for attorney’s fees by declining to award appellate attorney’s fees. AnRo

requested an award of attorney’s fees based on the agreement’s attorney’s fee

provision. The agreement provides that, in a suit to enforce or interpret the

agreement, “the prevailing party in any such action or proceeding shall be entitled

to recover from the non-prevailing party” its attorney’s fees.

A. The Standard of Review and Law Applicable to Contract
Interpretation.

In general, whether a party is entitled to attorney’s fees under an agreement

is a question of law. Hrdy v. Second St. Prop. LLC, 649 S.W.3d 522, 560 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet. denied). Our review of the trial court’s ruling

is de novo. Id.

When construing a contract, our primary concern is to ascertain the

intentions of the parties as expressed in the document. Amedisys, Inc. v. Kingwood

Home Health Care, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 507, 514 (Tex. 2014). We begin our analysis

with the language of the contract because it is the best representation of what the

parties mutually intended. Gilbert Tex. Constr., L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s

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London, 327 S.W.3d 118, 126 (Tex. 2010). We give words and phrases their

ordinary and generally accepted meaning unless the contract shows the words were

meant in a technical or different sense. Gilbert, 327 S.W.3d at 126; Forbau v.

Aetna Life Ins. Co., 876 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Tex. 1994).

B. AnRo is Entitled to Appellate Attorney’s Fees.

Generally, in Texas, each party must pay its own attorney’s fees. Rohrmoos

Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 483 (Tex. 2019);

Ashford Partners, Ltd. v. ECO Res., Inc., 401 S.W.3d 35, 41 (Tex. 2012) (“As a

general rule, litigants in Texas are responsible for their own attorney’s fees and

expenses in litigation.”). However, fee-shifting can be authorized by statute or

contract. Rohrmoos Venture, 578 S.W.3d at 484; JCB, Inc. v. Horsburgh & Scott

Co., 597 S.W.3d 481, 491 (Tex. 2019). The party seeking a fee award must prove

that (1) the recovery of fees is legally authorized, and (2) the requested fees are

reasonable and necessary. Rohrmoos Venture, 578 S.W.3d at 483; In re Nat’l

Lloyds Ins. Co., 532 S.W.3d 794, 809 (Tex. 2017) (“When fee-shifting is

authorized, the party seeking to recover those fees bears the burden of establishing

the fees are reasonable and necessary.”).

Parties are free to contract for a fee-recovery standard that is “either looser

or stricter” than that provided by statute. Intercont’l Grp. P’ship v. KB Home Lone

Star L.P., 295 S.W.3d 650, 653 (Tex. 2009). Our primary concern in construing

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such provisions is to ascertain the parties’ true intent as expressed in the contract.

Epps, 351 S.W.3d at 865 (citing Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d

656, 662 (Tex. 2005)).

In this case, the agreement specified that:

In the event that any Person initiates or defends any legal action or
proceeding to enforce or interpret any terms of this Agreement, the
prevailing party in any such action or proceeding shall be entitled to
recover from the non-prevailing party in any such action or
proceeding its reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees (including its
reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees on any appeal). All such costs and
attorneys’ fees shall be deemed to have accrued on commencement of
any legal action or proceeding and shall be enforceable whether or not
such legal action or proceeding is prosecuted to judgment.

The agreement defined “Person” as “[i]ndividuals, partnerships, firms,

associations, corporations, limited liability companies, trusts, governmental

agencies, administrative tribunals[,] or any other form of business or legal entity.”

The contract therefore provides for the award of reasonable and necessary

appellate attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party, but without defining “prevailing

party.”

A defendant is a prevailing party with respect to contractual language

entitling a prevailing party to attorney’s fees when a plaintiff nonsuits a case with

prejudice. Epps v. Fowler, 351 S.W.3d 862, 869 (Tex. 2011). In this case, Cinco

Ranch has abandoned the direct appeal of a summary judgment entered in favor of

AnRo, thus working “a permanent, inalterable change in the parties’ legal

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relationship” similar to a nonsuit with prejudice by ensuring the finality of the

judgment without further appellate review. See id. at 868-69. Because this benefits

AnRo, AnRo is the prevailing party in this appeal. Id. at 869. The parties appear to

have intended this result in the agreement, which provides for enforcement of its

attorney’s fees provision “whether or not such legal action or proceeding is

prosecuted to judgment.”

In the trial court, AnRo’s counsel provided an affidavit, curricula vitae for

two lawyers handling the case, and her estimate of the attorneys’ fees on appeal.

Because AnRo is the prevailing party and therefore entitled to its appellate

attorney’s fees under the contract, we remand the case to the trial court for a

determination as to the award of reasonable and necessary appellate attorney’s

fees.

Conclusion

We dismiss Cinco Ranch’s appeal. We reverse the trial court’s order

awarding attorney’s fees for the trial level only and remand the case for a

determination of an award of reasonable and necessary appellate attorney’s fees.

Amparo “Amy” Guerra
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Guiney, and Johnson.

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