Daniel Lee East v. the State of Texas

Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-24-00378-CR

Daniel Lee East,
Appellant

v.

The State of Texas,
Appellee

On appeal from the
19th District Court of McLennan County, Texas
Judge Thomas C. West, presiding
Trial Court Cause No. 2024-1061-C1

JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The trial court sentenced Daniel Lee East to thirteen months

confinement in state jail on his conviction for possession of methamphetamine

in an amount of less than one gram and ordered the sentence to be imposed.

See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(b). In two issues on appeal,

East asserts that we must vacate his sentence and remand for a new

punishment hearing because he was entitled to be placed on community
supervision and he did not validly waive “the right to receive mandatory

supervision.” See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.551.1 The State agrees

that we should remand for a new punishment hearing, explaining that the trial

court had no authority to impose a sentence of confinement under the

circumstances presented in this case and that East could not confer such

authority upon the trial court by waiving his rights under article 1.14 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure. See id. at art. 1.14. We affirm.

Background

East originally agreed to plead guilty to the charged offense in exchange

for the State’s recommendation of eighteen months deferred adjudication

community supervision and a $250 fine.2 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

ANN. § 481.115(b). On September 13, 2024, East pled guilty. The trial court

accepted his guilty plea but did not accept the plea agreement, deferring a

finding of guilt and decision on sentencing pending completion of a pre-

sentence investigation report. The trial court further reminded East that it

1 East cites to article 42.12, section 15(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art 42.12, § 15(a) (repealed 2015). Effective January 1, 2017, the Legislature repealed
article 42.12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and enacted Chapter 42A as part of a non-substantive
revision of community supervision laws. See Act of May 26, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S. ch. 770 §§ 1.01, 3.01,
4.01–.02 (codified at chapter 42A of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure). The former article 42.12,
section 15(a) is now codified in article 42A.551.

2 This agreement was discussed on the record at the guilty plea hearing.
Though the clerk’s record
contains a document entitled “Disclosure of Plea Recommendation” memorializing this agreement in
writing, this document was not admitted into evidence.

Daniel Lee East v. The State of Texas Page 2
was not obligated to follow the plea agreement and then recessed the

proceedings.

The clerk’s record contains a document signed by the parties entitled

“Request Concerning Bond Pending Further Proceedings Disclosure of Further

Negotiated Plea Agreement” (the “Bond Agreement”). This document was not

admitted into evidence or discussed at the guilty plea hearing. The agreement

permitted East to remain on bond pending sentencing as long as he timely

appeared whenever his presence was required, including any interviews and

meetings with the probation department. This document provided, in relevant

part:

Defendant agrees that his/her failure to so appear constitutes a
voluntary waiver under Article 1.14, Tex. Code Crim. Proc., and
he/she agrees that failure to appear authorizes the Trial Court to:

• pronounce a finding of guilt, if not previously made,
• impose a sentence within the full range of punishment, up to and
including the maximum time and fine provided by law for the
offense,
• deny any request or recommendation for community supervision
of any nature, if any, and
• refuse to allow Defendant to withdraw the plea herein entered.

The parties reconvened on November 22, 2024. After confirming that

East was the same person who previously pled guilty to the charged offense,

the trial court informed East, “You signed a document in your plea papers

saying you would participate yet you failed to participate thereby rendering

Daniel Lee East v. The State of Texas Page 3
your plea bargain null and void and now it is an open plea before the Court.”3

The trial court then sentenced East to serve thirteen months in state jail and

ordered the sentence to be executed.

Analysis

In his first issue on appeal, East contends that the trial court abused its

discretion by imposing the sentence of confinement in state jail instead of

suspending the sentence as required by law. In his second issue, East asserts

that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his “right to mandatory

community supervision” through the waiver language in the Bond Agreement.

We address these issues together.

When, as here, a defendant is convicted of a state jail felony offense

under section 481.115(b) of the Health and Safety Code that is punished under

section 12.35(a) of the Penal Code, “the judge shall suspend the imposition of

the sentence and place the defendant on community supervision” unless

certain statutory exceptions apply. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

42A.551(a) (emphasis added). In his first issue, East characterizes the trial

court’s imposition of the sentence of confinement as an abuse of discretion;

however, by the plain language of the statute, the trial court had no discretion

3 East did not object to the trial court’s actions at the hearing, and he does not challenge his guilty plea

and conviction on appeal; therefore, we limit our discussion and analysis only to his punishment and
sentencing.

Daniel Lee East v. The State of Texas Page 4
to impose the defendant’s sentence under the circumstances presented in this

case. See id. The parties submit – and we agree – that nothing in the record

indicates any of the statutory exceptions apply. The trial court therefore had

no authority to impose East’s thirteen-month sentence. To the extent that East

argues that the trial court was required to suspend his sentence and place him

on community supervision, we sustain East’s first issue.

In his second issue, East asserts that he did not knowingly and

voluntarily waive his “right” to mandatory community supervision by

executing the Bond Agreement. Article 1.14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

allows a defendant to “waive any rights secured him by law[.]” See id. at art.

1.14. We recognize that the Bond Agreement, citing to article 1.14, included

waiver language purporting to grant permission for the trial court to “impose

a sentence within the full range of punishment, up to and including the

maximum time and fine provided by law for the offense” and “to deny any

request or recommendation for community supervision of any nature, if any.”

However, article 42A.551 does not create a “right” that the litigants may waive

or forfeit. See Jordan v. State, 979 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998),

aff’d, 36 S.W.3d 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (discussing article 42.12, § 15(a),

the predecessor statute to article 42A.551).4 Rather, it defines the scope of the

4 The applicable text in article 42.12, section 15(a) analyzed in Jordan provided:

Daniel Lee East v. The State of Texas Page 5
trial court’s authority to impose or suspend a sentence in certain state jail

felonies. See id. We agree with the State that to whatever extent the Bond

Agreement may function as a waiver of East’s rights under article 1.14, such

waiver could not confer authority upon the trial court to impose a sentence of

confinement when such authority was not granted by the Legislature in these

circumstances. See id. at 76-78; see and compare Ex parte McJunkins, 954

S.W.2d 39, 40-41 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (contrasting the waivable right to

concurrent sentences under section 3.03 of the Penal Code with the restriction

on the trial court’s authority to grant community supervision in certain

circumstances under former article 42.12, section 3g(a) of the Code of Criminal

Procedure). The trial court had no authority to impose East’s thirteen-month

sentence based on his article 1.14 waiver of rights. We overrule East’s second

issue.

East contends that the proper remedy is to vacate his sentence and

remand for a new punishment hearing. Based on the specific circumstances

presented in this case, we disagree. We have no legal reason to vacate the

On conviction of a state jail felony punished under Section 12.35(a), Penal Code, the
judge shall suspend the imposition of the sentence of confinement and place the
defendant on community supervision, unless the defendant has been previously
convicted of a felony, in which event the judge may suspend the imposition of the
sentence and place the defendant or community supervision or may order the sentence
to be executed[...].

See id. at 77.

Daniel Lee East v. The State of Texas Page 6
sentence. The sentence itself is not illegal, as the thirteen-month term of

confinement assessed by the trial court lies squarely within the permissible

statutory range for state jail felonies. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.35(a).

As noted above, the trial court’s error was in ordering the sentence to be

imposed instead of suspended. Faced with a similar circumstance, at least one

other court has reversed the portion of the judgment imposing sentence and

remanded to the trial court with the instruction to enter a community

supervision order. See Jordan, 979 S.W.2d at 77-78. However, unlike the

appellant in Jordan, it appears from the record before us that East has already

served his state jail sentence in full. A trial court does not have the authority

to suspend a defendant’s sentence once that sentence has been served. See Ex

parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 174, 21 L.Ed. 872 (1874); Turner v. State, 31 S.W.2d

809, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1930) (holding that double jeopardy principles forbid

any increase in a defendant’s sentence once that sentence has been served or

executed); see also Vejar v. State, No. 07-12-00520-CR, 2014 WL 6765764, at

*2-3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 1, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication).

We have not found controlling authority discussing the applicable

remedy to East’s specific circumstance. Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2 lists

the specific types of judgments that courts of appeals may render. See TEX. R.

Daniel Lee East v. The State of Texas Page 7
APP. P. 43.2. In this case, we cannot reverse the trial court’s judgment and

remand for further proceedings, because the trial court no longer has the

authority to suspend East’s sentence as required by law. See id. at (d). For

the same reason, we cannot reverse and render the judgment that should have

been rendered in the trial court. See id. at (c). Modifying the judgment to

delete the portion imposing the sentence would also be inappropriate, as the

judgment would show a thirteen-month sentence with no indication of whether

it was executed or suspended, creating ambiguity in the judgment. See id. at

(b). Finally, subsections (e) and (f) do not apply because we are unaware of any

legal reason to vacate the judgment and dismiss the case or to dismiss the

appeal. See id. at (e), (f). Considering the caselaw discussed above, along with

Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2, we are left with no choice but to affirm the

judgment of the trial court. See id. at (a).

Conclusion

Having sustained East’s first issue on appeal and overruled his second

issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

STEVE SMITH
Justice

Daniel Lee East v. The State of Texas Page 8
OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: January 29, 2026
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Smith, and
Justice Harris
Affirmed
Do not publish
CR25

Daniel Lee East v. The State of Texas Page 9