James Chadleigh Schrotel v. the State of Texas

Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-24-00188-CR

James Chadleigh Schrotel,
Appellant

v.

The State of Texas,
Appellee

On appeal from the
County Court at Law No. 3 of McLennan County, Texas
Judge J. Patrick Atkins, presiding
Trial Court Cause No. 2023-0090-CR3

CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found Appellant, James Chadleigh Schrotel, guilty of the

misdemeanor offense of assault causing bodily injury. The jury assessed his

punishment at 365 days confinement and recommended probation. The trial

court sentenced Schrotel accordingly and probated the sentence for a period of

24 months. This appeal ensued.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his fifth issue, Schrotel argues that the evidence was insufficient to

find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of assault causing bodily injury

against a family member. Because this issue offers the greatest possible relief,

if sustained, we will address it first.

1. Standard of Review

The Court of Criminal Appeals has defined our standard of review of

a sufficiency issue as follows:

When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, we consider whether, after viewing all of the evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct.
2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232
(Tex. Crim. App. 2017). This standard requires the appellate court
to defer “to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve
conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson,
443 U.S. at 319. We may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute
our judgment for that of the factfinder. Williams v. State, 235
S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The court conducting a
sufficiency review must not engage in a “divide and conquer”
strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence.
Villa, 514 S.W.3d at 232. Although juries may not speculate about
the meaning of facts or evidence, juries are permitted to draw any
reasonable inferences from the facts so long as each inference is
supported by the evidence presented at trial. Cary v. State, 507
S.W.3d 750, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S.
at 319); see also Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16–17 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007). We presume that the factfinder resolved any
conflicting inferences from the evidence in favor of the verdict, and
we defer to that resolution. Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525

Schrotel v. State Page 2
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012). This is because the jurors are the exclusive
judges of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight
to be given to the testimony. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Direct evidence and circumstantial
evidence are equally probative, and circumstantial evidence alone
may be sufficient to uphold a conviction so long as the cumulative
force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support
the conviction. Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.

We measure whether the evidence presented at trial was
sufficient to support a conviction by comparing it to “the elements
of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge
for the case.” Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997). The hypothetically correct jury charge is one that
“accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does
not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or
unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and
adequately describes the particular offense for which the
defendant was tried.” Id.; see also Daugherty v. State, 387 S.W.3d
654, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The “law as authorized by the
indictment” includes the statutory elements of the offense and
those elements as modified by the indictment. Daugherty, 387
S.W.3d at 665.

Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732–33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

2. Authority

A person commits the offense of assault if the person intentionally,

knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another, including the person’s

spouse. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §22.01. Bodily injury is defined as physical

pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§1.07(a)(8). A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the

nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious

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objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. TEX. PENAL

CODE ANN. § 6.03. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect

to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably

certain to cause the result. Id. A person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with

respect to the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously

disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or

the result will occur. Id.

3. Analysis

Schrotel argues that no jury could have found him guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt of assault causing bodily injury against a family member

based on the evidence presented by the State at trial. He specifically points to

contradictions between his testimony and Jackie’s testimony and argues that

Jackie’s testimony was not reliable.

Jackie testified that she and Schrotel were married and had a child

together. She testified that, on September 2, 2022, she and Schrotel got into

an argument that became a physical altercation. She stated that Schrotel

grabbed an exercise ball and hit her with it while she was on the ground, which

caused her pain. She left the living room and went to the bedroom, but Schrotel

followed her and put his hand on her throat. She got away from him and left

the bedroom, but Schrotel continued to follow her and eventually pushed her

Schrotel v. State Page 4
down in the entryway. She stated that her knees hit the floor first, which

caused her pain. Then she felt him kick her on the back of her legs and stomp

on her leg, which also caused her pain. Jackie stated that both she and

Schrotel went outside, but she returned inside to find her phone and call her

mother. While she was on the phone with her mother, Schrotel came back

inside, so she hung up the phone and she went back outside to try to deescalate

the situation. Jackie testified that Schrotel then came back outside to his

truck, so she went back inside to their bedroom and called the police. She

stated she stayed on the phone until police arrived about 20 minutes later.

Officer Sabrena Swanton, a police officer with the Waco Police

Department, also testified about her involvement with the case. She stated

she responded to a report of a domestic disturbance. When she arrived on

scene, she and other officers first made contact with Schrotel and asked him

what happened. After a brief discussion with Schrotel, Swanton went inside

to make contact with Jackie. Swanton stated that Jackie was “visibly

frazzled,” upset, nervous, and “crying, off and on.” Swanton said she did not

immediately observe any injuries on Jackie, but that the hallway light was off,

so it was dark. Swanton took Jackie’s statement about the incident and a

description of her injuries. Swanton noticed redness on Jackie’s leg that

“looked kind of like a semi circle, almost like the heal of a foot.” Swanton took

Schrotel v. State Page 5
photos of Jackie’s injuries. On cross-examination, Swanton was asked if Jackie

mentioned being stomped, and Swanton responded that she did not say

stomped, but that she did say Schrotel kicked her.

Schrotel also testified about the incident. He stated that he and Jackie

were married at the time of the incident and had been experiencing issues in

their relationship. While he testified that they argued, Schrotel denied hitting

Jackie with an exercise ball, pushing her, punching her, kicking her, or

stomping on her leg. He also denied any history of violence. He also stated

that he believed Jackie was “baiting” him and wanted to “use this as leverage

to scare [him] into getting a very favorable divorce.”

There are certainly contradictions between the different witnesses’

testimonies, which could lead to conflicting inferences based on the evidence.

However, we presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences

from the evidence in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that resolution.

Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d at 525. This is because the jurors are the exclusive

judges of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given

to the testimony. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

There was evidence of each element of the charged offense, and therefore, we

cannot say that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding of

guilt for the offense of assault causing bodily injury against a family member.

Schrotel v. State Page 6
Therefore, we overrule Schrotel’s fifth point of error.

B. Challenge for Cause

In his fourth issue, Schrotel argues that the trial court erred in denying

his challenge for cause to venireperson six who could not guarantee that his

bias in favor of victims of family violence would not influence his decision.

1. Standard of Review

The trial court has broad discretion over the process of selecting a jury.

Allridge v. State, 762 S.W.2d 146, 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). We review the

trial court’s overruling of a challenge for cause, under an abuse-of-discretion

standard. Buntion v. State, 482 S.W.3d 58, 84 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

2. Authority

A challenge for cause is an objection made to a particular juror, alleging

some fact which renders the juror incapable or unfit to serve on the jury. TEX.

CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 35.16. A challenge for cause may be made by either

the state or the defense on the basis that the juror has a bias or prejudice in

favor of or against the defendant. Id.

The test is whether the prospective juror’s bias or prejudice would

substantially impair the individual’s ability to carry out juror duties in

accordance with the instructions and oath. Buntion, 482 S.W.3d at 84. To

establish the propriety of the challenge for cause, the proponent of the

Schrotel v. State Page 7
challenge must show that the venireperson understood the requirements of the

law and could not overcome the individual’s prejudice well enough to follow the

law. Gonzales v. State, 353 S.W.3d 826, 832 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Before a

trial court may excuse a venireperson for cause on this ground, the court must

explain the law to the venireperson, and inquire whether the venireperson can

follow that law, regardless of the individual’s personal views. Id.

We examine the voir dire of the prospective juror as a whole to determine

whether the record demonstrates that the prospective juror’s convictions would

interfere with the prospective juror’s ability to serve as a juror and to abide by

the oath. Buntion, 482 S.W.3d at 84. In conducting this review, we afford

great deference to the trial court’s ruling “because the trial judge is present to

observe the demeanor of prospective jurors and listen to tones of voice.” Id.

We give particular deference “when the prospective juror’s answers are

vacillating, unclear, or contradictory.” Id.

To preserve error on appeal and establish harm, the defendant must

(1) use all of the defendant’s peremptory strikes, (2) ask for additional

peremptory strikes and be denied them, (3) show that the defendant was forced

to take an identified objectionable juror whom the defendant would not have

accepted had the trial court granted the defendant’s challenge for cause or

Schrotel v. State Page 8
granted the defendant additional strikes. Comeaux v. State, 445 S.W.3d 745,

749 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

3. Analysis

Initially, Schrotel asked the jury, based on a show of hands, if the nature

of the allegation had anyone “leaning towards just the victim’s side, without

even hearing anything.” Veniremember six was one of a handful of

veniremembers to raise his hand.

Following voir dire, the trial court requested each side to make their

strikes for cause. Schrotel requested to strike multiple veniremembers,

including veniremember six. The State objected that the veniremembers “were

not asked could they not uphold the law” and asked that each veniremember

be brought back in for additional questioning.

When veniremember six was brought back in, both the State and

Schrotel asked him follow-up questions. In response to the State’s questions,

veniremember six confirmed that he “might lean towards the victim before

even hearing the evidence” but also stated he would hear all the evidence

before he made a decision. In response to Schrotel’s questioning,

veniremember six stated that he feels “very strongly about men touching

women” due to a family member’s experience with domestic violence. Schrotel

continued by asking veniremember six whether he “would feel comfortable

Schrotel v. State Page 9
having someone like you as your juror” if he were accused. Veniremember six

responded:

I understand, sir. Yeah, I definitely think going into a situation

that I’d probably feel one way or another about it, but at the same

time, this is seriousness [sic] too. I wouldn’t just jump to

conclusions. I would weigh all the evidence. I would wait to hear

everything and see how it’s presented and make my judgment at

that time.

Schrotel then asked if veniremember six had any bias, to which he responded

that he did and agreed he would probably make a better juror on another type

of case. The State then asked again whether veniremember six could wait until

he heard all the evidence to decide whether Schrotel was guilty, and

veniremember six stated, “I would hear all the evidence before I came to

absolute conclusion.” Schrotel followed up once again with the following

exchange:

[DEFENSE TRIAL COUNSEL]: Even after hearing all that

evidence, you can’t assure this Court nor us that that bias wouldn’t

affect you in some way even evaluating that evidence, isn’t that

correct?

Schrotel v. State Page 10
[VENIREMEMBER SIX]: Sir -- I can’t, I mean, bias, I mean, it sits

in the back of our mind. I mean, I would hate to say that that’s an

absolute but, again, I would do my very, very best to sit here and

hear everything that was presented and not allow bias to come into

play. But, you know, bias is just something that happens from past

experience, who we are, it sits in the back of our mind. If we had

that much control over it, it’d be easy in life, but we don’t.

[DEFENSE TRIAL COUNSEL]: I agree with you one hundred

percent. And so there’s no guarantee that it wouldn’t affect you,

isn’t that correct?

[VENIREMEMBER SIX]: I would agree with that. I would –

[DEFENSE TRIAL COUNSEL]: I appreciate your honesty so

much. I really do.

Following the additional questioning of the other veniremembers, the trial

court overruled Schrotel’s request to strike veniremember six. Before

exercising peremptory strikes, Schrotel renewed his request to veniremember

six, which the trial court again denied. Schrotel then requested an additional

peremptory strike to use on an objectionable veniremember because he would

have to use one on veniremember six. The trial court denied the request for an

Schrotel v. State Page 11
additional peremptory strike, and the objectionable veniremember was seated

on the jury.

A review of the entire voir dire record of veniremember six reflects that,

while he stated that he would try to wait until all the evidence was presented,

he ultimately said he would be biased in this type of case and could not

guarantee that this bias would not affect him as a juror. Cf. Buntion, 482

S.W.3d at 84. Therefore, the trial court erroneously denied Schrotel’s challenge

for cause.

To establish harm for an erroneous denial of a challenge for cause, the

defendant must show on the record that “(1) he asserted a clear and specific

challenge for cause; (2) he used a peremptory challenge on the complained-of

veniremember; (3) his peremptory challenges were exhausted; (4) his request

for additional strikes was denied; and (5) an objectionable juror sat on the

jury.” Comeaux, 445 S.W.3d at 749. The record shows Schrotel complied with

these steps and therefore established harm for the erroneous denial of his

challenge for cause.

Therefore, we sustain Schrotel’s fourth issue.

C. Issues One, Two, and Three

Having sustained Schrotel’s fourth issue, we need not address his

remaining issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

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D. Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, we reverse the trial court’s judgment, and this

cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

MATT JOHNSON
Chief Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: April 16, 2026
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Smith, and
Justice Harris
Reversed and remanded
Do Not Publish
CR25

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