Disraeli Arnold, on Behalf of Father Curtis Arnold, Junior and Daughter Faith Arnold of the v. Sheriff Mike Griffis, Individually and as Head of the Ector County Sheriff's Office, Nurse Robin McCullough and Misidentified/Misnamed Nurse Shelly James

Opinion filed August 7, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
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No. 11-25-00140-CV
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DISRAELI ARNOLD, ON BEHALF OF FATHER, CURTIS
ARNOLD, JUNIOR, AND DAUGHTER, FAITH ARNOLD, OF
THE DECEASED, Appellant
V.
SHERIFF MIKE GRIFFIS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS HEAD OF
THE ECTOR COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, NURSE ROBIN
MCCULLOUGH, AND MISIDENTIFIED/MISNAMED NURSE
SHELLY JAMES, Appellees

On Appeal from the 70th District Court
Ector County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. A24101194CV

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Disraeli Arnold, filed a pro se notice of appeal from the trial court’s
order granting Appellees’ plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment.
On May 22, we issued an order requesting that Disraeli 1 respond and show grounds

1
Because the individuals involved in this appeal share the same last name, we will refer to each
individual by their first names to avoid confusion.
to continue this appeal because he was purporting to proceed “on behalf” of Curtis
and Faith, the father and daughter of the deceased, Kreasta Arnold. Appellant was
required to respond by June 2. In the order, we stated that it appeared that neither
Curtis nor Faith were parties to the proceedings below; however, we notified the
individuals that, if either individual was a party to the litigation, that the party must
file a notice of appeal or obtain counsel to file such a notice to proceed.
Disraeli timely filed two responses. Appellant states that he is the plaintiff in
the proceedings and that the phrase “on behalf of” refers to the “styling” of the case
below. 2 He also contends that representing Curtis and Faith does not constitute the
unauthorized practice of law because “some type of business arrangement is a key
component” of legal representation and “doing things for monetary gain as the
primary motive would be a significant indicator of practicing law.”
On June 4, Appellees filed a motion to dismiss. Appellees contend that we
should dismiss the appeal under Rule 42.3 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure
because “Appellants . . . failed to file” the specific response we requested and
“because the Court lacks jurisdiction.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3 (providing that an
appellate court may dismiss an appeal after ten days’ notice to the parties that it is
subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction, want of prosecution, or because the
appellant has failed to comply with the rules, a court order, or a notice from the clerk
requiring a response or other action in a specified time). Disraeli responded and
requests that we deny their motion, stating that he has complied with the order
and that he is the party that seeks to alter the trial court’s judgment. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 25.1(c).
Generally, an individual proceeding pro se may only litigate his own rights
and may not litigate the rights of others in a representative capacity. See TEX. R.

2
In his first response, Disraeli states that Curtis and Faith “affix their signatures” to his response.
2
CIV. P. 7; Steele v. McDonald, 202 S.W.3d 926, 928 (Tex. App—Waco 2006, no
pet.); Garrett Trucking, LLC v. Roscoe Collegiate Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 11-24-
00225-CV, 2024 WL 4845964, at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland Nov. 21, 2024, no pet.)
(mem. op.). In this regard, only a licensed attorney may represent other parties that
appear in the case unless certain circumstances exist. See Suday v. Suday, No. 24-
1009, 2025 WL 1774459, at *2–3 (Tex. June 27, 2025) (Generally, an executor may
not represent the estate pro se unless only the rights or the interests of the executor
are at stake in the litigation.); Paselk v. Rabun, 293 S.W.3d 600, 606 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2009, pet. denied) (“Although a layperson has the right to represent
themselves, a layperson does not have the right to represent others.”); see also TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 81.101–.102 (West 2023) (prohibiting practice of law in Texas
unless person is member of state bar); id. §§ 83.001–.006 (prohibiting unlicensed
persons from practicing law without a license). It does not appear that those
circumstances exist in this case. In his original petition, wherein he alleges claims
for “Proximate and Direct Negligence” and “Wrongful Death & Survival,” he does
not claim to be the executor or sole beneficiary of Kreasta’s estate, nor does it appear
that the suit involves claims that solely involve his interests, if any. See Suday, 2025
WL 1774459, at *2 & n.2, *3.
Moreover, only a party may file a notice of appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1;
In re Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 184 S.W.3d 718, 723 (Tex. 2006) (orig.
proceeding); Ibrahim v. Young, 253 S.W.3d 790, 800 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008,
pet. denied). It does not appear that Curtis or Faith were parties to the proceedings
below and, in any event, neither individual has filed a notice of appeal. We therefore
lack jurisdiction over the portion of the appeal that Disraeli attempts to submit on
their behalf. Paselk, 293 S.W.3d at 606.
Accordingly, we grant Appellees’ motion to dismiss to the extent that
it requests that we dismiss the appeal as to Disraeli purporting to proceed on
3
behalf of Curtis and Faith, and we dismiss that portion of the appeal. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 42.3. This appeal will proceed with only Disraeli as Appellant, the party
appealing the judgment signed by the trial court, and the named Appellees.3 All
appellate deadlines will be in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

PER CURIAM

August 7, 2025
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

3
In determining Appellees’ motion, we express no view of the underlying litigation regarding
Kreasta’s death or the merits of Disraeli’s appeal. See Suday, 2025 WL 1774459, at *3.
4