Jonathan Hobson, Jr. v. Commissioners Court of Palo Pinto County, Texas; County Judge Shane Long; Commissioner Gary Glover; Commissioner Mike Reed; Commissioner Mike Pierce; Commissioner Jeff Fryer; Alfred Ezell; And Kim Ezell

Opinion filed November 6, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-24-00060-CV
__________

JONATHAN HOBSON, JR., Appellant
V.
COMMISSIONERS COURT OF PALO PINTO COUNTY,
TEXAS; COUNTY JUDGE SHANE LONG; COMMISSIONER
GARY GLOVER; COMMISSIONER MIKE REED;
COMMISSIONER MIKE PIERCE; COMMISSIONER JEFF
FRYER; ALFRED EZELL; AND KIM EZELL, Appellees

On Appeal from the 29th District Court
Palo Pinto County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. C50323

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON MOTION
FOR REHEARING
On September 18, 2025, we issued an opinion in this cause and concluded
that: (1) the trial court did not err when it granted the Ezells’ motion for summary
judgment against Hobson based on limitations and denied Hobson’s motion for
summary judgment on the same basis; (2) the trial court lacked jurisdiction over
Hobson’s claims against the Commissioners; and (3) the trial court’s award of
attorney’s fees to the Ezells was supported by sufficient evidence, and that further
segregation of attorney’s fees was not required. Therefore, we affirmed the trial
court’s judgment.
Hobson has filed a motion for rehearing arguing that we must reconsider our
decision and in turn reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
the Ezells because: (1) our opinion deviates from Texas Supreme Court precedent,
which he contends holds that, under Section 16.061 of the Civil Practice and
Remedies Code, a private citizen, like Hobson, may assert the right to use a public
road; (2) we erred by affirming the trial court’s judgment that disposed of his claims
against the Commissioners; and (3) we erred by affirming the trial court’s denial of
his motion for summary judgment based on the affirmative defenses asserted by the
Ezells. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.061 (West 2015).
At the outset, we note that for decades Texas courts have held that the sole
purpose of a motion for rehearing is to allow the reviewing court to correct any errors
that it deems exist on issues that were previously presented to it. Mapco, Inc. v.
Carter, 817 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Tex. 1991); Dewey v. American Nat’l Bank, 382
S.W.2d 524, 528 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1964, writ ref’d n.r.e.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 821 (1965). Further, a motion for rehearing does not afford a party to an appeal
the opportunity to present new issues or alternative arguments after the case on
appeal has been briefed, argued, and decided on other grounds, and the issues and
other arguments initially raised by that party have been rejected by the reviewing
court. OAIC Commercial Assets, L.L.C. v. Stonegate Vill., L.P., 234 S.W.3d 726,
747 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied) (“[R]ehearing is not an opportunity to
test alternative arguments after finding other arguments unsuccessful.” (quoting ICM
Mortgage Corp. v. Jacob, 902 S.W.2d 527, 535 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1994, writ
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denied))). Thus, unless fundamental error exists, and it does not in this case, new
and unpresented issues may not be raised for the first time in a motion for rehearing.
See Mapco, 817 S.W.2d at 687; Segundo Navarro Drilling Ltd. v. San Roman Ranch
Mineral Partners, Ltd., 612 S.W.3d 489, 496 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet.
denied); In re M.T., 290 S.W.3d 908, 910 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2009, no pet.); OAIC
Commercial Assets, 234 S.W.3d at 747 (fundamental error only exists in rare
circumstances). However, new arguments that are subsumed within issues that have
been argued and are already properly before the reviewing court can be considered.
See Chen v. Razberi Technologies, Inc., 645 S.W.3d 773, 778 n.23 (Tex. 2022);
Greene v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 446 S.W.3d 761, 764 n.4 (Tex. 2014).
With this in mind, and construing Hobson’s motion liberally, we will address
the “new,” alternative arguments that he now asserts. However, it is clear that the
“new” arguments that Hobson now advances are merely a recharacterization of the
very arguments—albeit in a different form and based on case law, statutes, and
causes of action that were neither pleaded nor asserted by him, until now, and/or that
are inapplicable to the issues before us—he has asserted, litigated, and advocated
since the inception of the parties’ dispute, arguments that have been repeatedly
rejected by the trial and appellate courts that have entertained them. Despite this,
Hobson continues to contend that the conclusions espoused by these courts,
including this court, are erroneous.
In his motion for rehearing, Hobson cites to and relies on Ellis v. Jansing to
support his arguments that (1) the Ezells failed to meet their burden on their
affirmative defense of limitations, and (2) Section 16.061 applies and prohibits any
statute of limitations, including the residual limitations provision in Section 16.051
that the Ezells asserted and relied on, from barring his suit against them. 620 S.W.2d
569, 570–71 (Tex. 1981) (holding that Article 5517 prohibited a party’s claim of
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adverse possession to an alleyway); see CIV. PRAC. & REM. §§ 16.051, .061.
According to Hobson, our opinion conflicts with Ellis. Hobson is mistaken. First,
we note that Hobson did not cite to or rely on Ellis in his original briefing. Further,
his reliance on Ellis is misplaced because the supreme court’s holding there focused
on two distinct legal theories—express dedication and adverse possession—neither
of which were pleaded, asserted, or raised by either party to this appeal at any stage
of these proceedings, nor are they applicable to the matter before us. The
distinguishable circumstances in Ellis are that (1) an easement was expressly
dedicated for public use by statute, (2) the cause of action raised concerned a claim
for title by adverse possession, and (3) the provision of Article 5571 that the supreme
court addressed and relied on in its holding was subsequently codified into two
separate sections of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code: Section 16.061 and
Section 16.030(b).1 Ellis, 620 S.W.2d at 570; see also CIV. PRAC. & REM.
§ 16.030(b) (West 2025). Thus, Ellis is not controlling here.
Similarly, Hobson argues that our conclusions are contrary to our decision in
Cowan v. Worrell, 638 S.W.3d 244 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, no pet.). However,
Cowan does not support Hobson’s contention that the residual limitations statute
(Section 16.051) cannot bar his claims against the Ezells because, unlike the
landowners in Cowan, no party to this appeal has pleaded or asserted any claim for
adverse possession. See Cowan, 638 S.W.3d at 263–64 (“Nor may a person acquire

1
See Bowen v. Ingram, 896 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, no writ) (noting that the
provision of Article 5517 relied on by the supreme court in Ellis was codified into Section 16.030(b) of the
Civil Practice and Remedies Code); Boyle v. Burk, 749 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1988,
writ denied) (noting that Section 16.030 codified Article 5517 and that “[a]lthough the wording in
[S]ection 16.030 is shorter than [A]rticle 5517, [S]ection 1.001(a) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code
specifically provides that the codification was not a substantive change in the law”); see also Johnson v.
City of Ft. Worth, 774 S.W.2d 653, 655 (Tex. 1989) (stating that Section 16.061 was also intended as a
non-substantive revision of Article 5517).

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through adverse possession any right or title to real property dedicated to public
use.”) (emphasis added) (citing CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 16.030(b)). As such, because
Hobson cannot avoid the consequences of Section 16.051, he now shifts his reliance
to Ellis and Cowan, cases which allude to Section 16.030(b) and its predecessor
(Article 5517). Nevertheless, this change in strategy cannot save him because he
banks on a limitations statute—Section 16.030(b)—and case law that are unique
only to adverse possession disputes, a theory, as we have said, that neither party has
pleaded, asserted, or relied on in this case, until now.
Hobson further argues that we incorrectly stated each party’s burden of proof
as to the applicability of the affirmative defense of limitations. As the Texas
Supreme Court explained in Gill v. Hill:
[T]here are two types of defenses against limitations with differing
burdens of proof. Affirmative defenses like unsound-mind tolling that
argue that certain days within the limitations period should not be
counted place the burden of proof on the movant. But affirmative
defenses that concede the limitations period expired yet argue
limitations should not bar the suit place the burden of proof on the
nonmovant. Ultimately, the distinction Draughon draws is between
defenses that avoid the statute of limitations entirely and those that toll
certain days.
688 S.W.3d 863, 870 (Tex. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 274 (2024) (internal
citations omitted). Therefore, once the Ezells established the accrual date of
Hobson’s cause of action and that no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding
that date, Hobson—as the nonmovant—had the burden to show that the residual
statute of limitations (Section 16.051) did not bar his suit even if the limitations
period had in fact expired. See id. at 868. As we have said before, this he failed to
do. Instead, Hobson broadly argued in his pleadings and briefing that “limitations
do not bar claims for interference with public roads,” and in support he cited to case

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law that discussed the application of limitations under Article 5517,2 and to
circumstances whereby a party sought an abatement based on a public nuisance—
once again a theory that neither party has pleaded, asserted, or relied on.
Hobson has consistently maintained that no statute of limitations bars the
complaints that he has asserted against the Ezells, and because no limitations bar
applies, he is not prohibited from seeking, at any time, the relief that he has pursued
in the Texas courts since 2017. To subscribe to this view, and we do not, would
allow Hobson or a similarly-situated litigant to advance and litigate complaints of
this nature without fear of any time bar, and in turn negate, and require that we
ignore, the established purpose and intent of any applicable statute of limitations
defense. We decline to do so. As before, Hobson’s now recharacterized arguments
fail. See OAIC Commercial Assets, 234 S.W.3d at 747 (citing Jacob, 902 S.W.2d at
535) (It is inappropriate to recast previously argued and rejected arguments in a
motion for rehearing.).
There is no error in our decision, as Hobson suggests. Accordingly, we deny
Hobson’s motion for rehearing.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE
November 6, 2025
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

2
Until now, Hobson repeatedly referenced and cited to Section 16.061 and argued that Article 5517
(which he referred to as Section 16.061 in his briefing, pleadings, and motion for rehearing) foreclosed the
application of limitations to his suit against the Ezells.

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