Gregory Frank Estes v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed November 14, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-24-00059-CR
__________

GREGORY FRANK ESTES, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 104th District Court
Taylor County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 24103-B

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Gregory Frank Estes, was charged with seven counts of aggravated
sexual assault of a child, a first-degree felony (Counts One through Seven); one
count of sexual assault of a child, a second-degree felony (Count Eight); and two
counts of indecency with a child by sexual contact, a second-degree felony (Counts
Nine and Ten). See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(a), (e) (West 2019),
§ 22.011(a), (f) (West Supp. 2024), § 21.11(a), (d) (West 2019). At trial, the State
proceeded on eight of the ten counts, 1 and the jury convicted Appellant on Counts
One and Five, which alleged digital penetration, but acquitted him on the remaining
counts. The jury assessed his punishment at ten years’ imprisonment for Counts
One and Five. The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly and ordered the
sentences to run consecutively.
In six issues, Appellant challenges his convictions, arguing that the trial court
abused its discretion in: (1) admitting extraneous-offense evidence involving six
different women; (2) determining that the complainant’s therapist was qualified as
a trauma expert; (3) determining that the case detective was qualified as a delayed
outcry expert; (4) excluding evidence that a grand jury had previously no-billed the
complainant’s allegations against Appellant; (5) excluding evidence during the
punishment phase; and (6) denying Appellant’s motion for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence. We affirm in part and vacate and dismiss in part.
I. General Background
The complainant, PSEUJKR,2 is Appellant’s great niece. Thirty years old at
trial, PSEUJKR testified that Appellant sexually abused her from the age of eight or
nine to the age of seventeen, recounting four specific incidents in her testimony.
PSEUJKR testified that the first incident (Counts One through Three and
Nine) occurred at her great-grandparents’ home on or about November 22, 2001,
when she was approximately nine years old. During this incident, Appellant entered
the bathroom while PSEUJKR was getting ready to change into “[a] bathing suit”
and touched her vagina, penetrated her vagina with his fingers, made her touch his

1
Counts Eight and Ten were waived by the State before the jury was empaneled and sworn.
2
To protect the identity of the complainant, we refer to her by the pseudonym given in the
indictment and refer to family members of the complainant, as well as the extraneous-offense witnesses, by
their initials. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(a)(1) (West 2022) (providing that a crime victim has “the right
to be treated . . . with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”);
see generally TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8 cmt. (“The rule does not limit an appellate court’s authority to disguise
parties’ identities in appropriate circumstances in other cases.”).
2
penis, and “had [her] perform oral sex on him.” Appellant then grabbed a nearby
hairbrush and inserted the handle into her vagina. Afterwards, Appellant told her
that if she said anything, she would get in trouble and would not “be able to be with
[her] mom anymore.”
When PSEUJKR was nine or ten years old and on a family trip to Ruidoso,
New Mexico, sometime between 2001 and 2003, Appellant again entered uninvited
when she was in the bathroom. PSEUJKR testified that she was about to shower
and was wearing only her underwear when Appellant rubbed his body against hers
before touching her vagina and telling her that “he could make [her] wet.”
Afterwards, Appellant “rubbed” his penis “on the outside of [her] vagina” and then
inserted his penis into her mouth.
On or about December 1, 2003 (Counts Four through Seven), at another
family event held at her great-grandparents’ house, Appellant entered the bathroom
while she was “on the toilet.” PSEUJKR testified that Appellant digitally and orally
penetrated her vagina, again made a comment as to “making [her] wet” and made
her perform “the same acts on him” as before.
PSEUJKR testified that the last incident occurred when PSEUJKR was
seventeen during Thanksgiving of 2010 (Counts Eight and Ten). Appellant followed
her into the kitchen, “pushed his body into [hers]” with enough force that she could
feel his erection against her, and touched her breast under her clothing. Appellant
then stuck his hand down her pants and ask her if she was “wet.” After she did not
respond, he put $200 in her waistband and left the room.
Two years later, PSEUJKR reported being sexually abused by Appellant.
PSEUJKR testified that she had not outcried sooner because she did not feel that
anyone would believe her, in part because she had wrongfully accused her former
stepfather of sexual abuse after being caught “acting out sexually” with one of her

3
siblings and being caught propositioning another student at school when she was “11
or 12.”
Detective Frank Shoemaker, with the Abilene Police Department Special
Victims Unit, investigated the case and interviewed Appellant, PSEUJKR, and
PSEUJKR’s mother (S.Y.). The case was referred to the district attorney’s office,
but it was no-billed by a grand jury in 2012.
In 2020, allegations surfaced involving Appellant and other women, which
prompted Texas Ranger Josh Burson to reopen the investigation into PSEUJKR’s
allegations. In an interview with Ranger Burson, Appellant admitted to having
sexually abused S.Y., when she was a child—something he had denied when
previously questioned by Detective Shoemaker in 2012. Ranger Burson testified
that Appellant stated it was “the one real thing that he did wrong in his life, and it
was past the statute of limitations.” While talking with Ranger Burson, Appellant
also admitted to minimized versions of his conduct involving other women who later
testified as rebuttal witnesses at trial: M.R.F. and C.S.
II. Extraneous Offenses
In his first issue, Appellant argues that “the extraneous offense evidence
introduced by the State failed to meet the standards for admissibility under
Rule 404(b) because it lacked logical relevance beyond suggesting character
conformity.” Appellant additionally avers that even if the extraneous-offense
evidence was relevant, “it should have been excluded under Rule 403 due to
its highly prejudicial impact, which far outweighed any minimal probative value.”
TEX. R. EVID. 403, 404(b).
We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse
of discretion. Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We will
uphold the trial court’s decision unless it lies outside the zone of reasonable
disagreement. Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 153–54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
4
We will uphold a trial court’s evidentiary ruling on appeal if it is correct on any
theory of law that finds support in the record. Gonzalez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 114,
125–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Dering v. State, 465 S.W.3d 668, 670 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2015, no pet.).
To be admissible at trial, evidence must be relevant. TEX. R. EVID. 402.
“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable
than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in
determining the action.” TEX. R. EVID. 401; Bluntson v. State, No. AP-77,067, 2025
WL 1322702, at *7 (Tex. Crim. App. May 7, 2025). “Evidence need not prove or
disprove a particular fact by itself to be relevant; it is sufficient if the evidence
provides a small nudge toward proving or disproving a fact of consequence.”
Bluntson, 2025 WL 1322702, at *7 (first citing Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363,
370 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); and then quoting Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 84
(Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (“Relevancy is defined to be that which conduces to the
proof of a pertinent hypothesis—a pertinent hypothesis being one which, if sustained
would logically influence the issue.”)).
A. Relevant Background
In the opening statement of Appellant’s trial counsel, he asserted that the
evidence would show PSEUJKR to be untrustworthy and “not credible,” with a
“history of making false allegations.” PSEUJKR’s lack of credibility remained the
focal point throughout Appellant’s cross-examination of the State’s witnesses. After
the State rested, Appellant called several family members to testify regarding
PSEUJKR’s reputation for dishonesty. Several defense witnesses testified to
Appellant’s “good” character, including Appellant’s stepson and stepdaughter.
The State requested a hearing outside the jury’s presence after the defense
rested, arguing that it should be permitted to present evidence of extraneous offenses
in rebuttal under the doctrine of chances and to rebut the defensive theory of
5
fabrication raised by PSEUJKR. Appellant argued that his defense was that he “was
not there at the time that [PSEUJKR] was there,” and the extraneous offenses were
too dissimilar and remote in time to be admissible. Following the hearing, the trial
court ruled that the extraneous acts would be admissible for showing Appellant’s
modus operandi and to “rebut the defensive theories of lack of opportunity,
impossibility, and inappropriate motive to testify.” We summarize the testimony of
the extraneous-offense witnesses below.
S.Y. testified that in 1983 or 1984, when she was eight or nine years old,
Appellant digitally penetrated her while she was seated on his lap in the backseat of
a vehicle with family members present. 3 When S.Y. was twelve, her family and
Appellant were members of the same church. Her family lived in the church and
Appellant lived behind the church. While she was spending the night at Appellant’s
home, Appellant took her into his bedroom and engaged in digital and penile
penetration. S.Y. testified that it had not been an isolated incident, and penile to
vaginal penetration occurred again on the same night and the subsequent evening.
Penile to vaginal penetration occurred once more in Appellant’s vehicle when he
was giving her a ride home after she babysat his children.
C.M., fifty-three years old at trial, testified that in 1984, when she was
fourteen years old, Appellant told her he “want[ed] to show [her] some things to help
protect [her].” At the time, Appellant was the principal at the private Christian
school where C.M. attended. C.M. testified that Appellant asked her to join him
inside one of the Sunday school classrooms, shut the door behind her, and “rub[bed]
up and down on [her]” with his erection. Afterwards, Appellant told her, “You’re
going to be okay. We don’t need to tell anybody about this. You can go now.”

S.Y. testified during the State’s case-in-chief. The trial court held a pretrial hearing regarding the
3

extraneous offense testimony of S.Y. and ruled that it was admissible. The State offered the testimony of
the remaining extraneous-offense witnesses in rebuttal.

6
D.M., fifty-seven years old at trial, testified that in 1985, she was nineteen
years old when Appellant, her brother-in-law at the time, picked her up from the
airport. Appellant arrived in the church van and “drove around to the back side of
the airport,” where he parked, blocked her in the backseat, and began having an
“inappropriate conversation about him and his own wife” and “their sex life.” With
D.M. telling him to stop, Appellant then engaged in nonconsensual penile to vaginal
penetration while using sexually explicit language that his wife “likes it when [he
does] this” and his wife “has an orgasm every time [they] have sex.”
T.D., forty-eight years old at trial, testified that Appellant was once married
to her sister. T.D. testified that the first incident occurred when she was twelve years
old and over at Appellant’s home babysitting in 1987. According to T.D., Appellant
joined her on the couch and began talking about “pressure points” on the body and
“cupp[ed]” his hand under her armpit and in between her legs but stopped short of
touching her breasts or genitals. Then, in 1991, when T.D. was sixteen years old,
she slept over at Appellant’s home while attending a church event and was awakened
by Appellant, who was sitting on her bed, breathing heavily. Appellant stroked her
hair and told her she was pretty and how “he wished he would have waited for [her]”
instead of her sister. The next day, T.D. was in the kitchen with Appellant when he
noted her nipples were showing through her shirt. Appellant picked her up and
pulled her body to him and pressed his erection against her body.
C.S., thirty-one years old at trial, testified that she met Appellant through the
church in January 2017 while Appellant was in leadership there and she was
stationed in San Angelo. C.S. testified that she considered Appellant to be a parental
figure. C.S., who was in the military at the time, was stationed out-of-state after
June 2017. In 2019, then twenty-seven years old, C.S. returned to attend a wedding
and stayed at Appellant’s home. C.S. testified to three incidents that occurred during
her visit, two of which involved Appellant entering her bedroom uninvited. The first
7
time, Appellant sat on her bed and rubbed her knee while discussing her transition
from active-duty military. The second time, Appellant greeted her with a hug and a
kiss on the cheek and then he pulled her back in and kissed her on the lips. The third
time, Appellant came into her bedroom while C.S. was trying to sleep and began
massaging her lower back moving her pajama pants down lower and lower until C.S.
moved to the center of the bed and gathered the blankets and pillow around her. C.S.
testified that Appellant massaged her underneath her clothing, including the side of
her breast until she said, “That’s my stuff” and then she got up out of the bed facing
away from Appellant. Appellant then came up behind her and “put his hand around
[her].” She moved away and confronted him about having kissed her on the lips
previously telling him that she “only kiss[ed] people on the lips [when she was] in
an intimate relationship with them.” She did so because she “felt uncomfortable,
and there were multiple things that -- red flags that were going off in [her] head at
this point.”4
M.R.F., thirty-two years old at trial, testified that she had also met Appellant
through church. In 2020, Appellant drove with M.R.F., then twenty-eight years old,
to Abilene to find a new vehicle after her vehicle was damaged in a hailstorm.
M.R.F. recalled Appellant making “odd” comments during the drive, including “how
people should be able to get away with things without having consequences.”
Appellant’s comments became more sexually explicit, with Appellant hypothesizing
about the appearance of M.R.F.’s genitals and offering to give M.R.F. “an orgasm
that would make [her] feel paralyzed.” As M.R.F. attempted to drive, Appellant
rubbed her lower back and briefly touched her breast and genitals. M.R.F. testified

While talking with Ranger Burson, Appellant also admitted to minimized versions of his conduct:
4

Appellant confessed to an incident with C.S. to his wife. He admitted to being “too affectionate;” that while
massaging her he “got too close” and that “he had no intention of touching [her] breast.”

8
that she pushed him away at each advance, and in the end, Appellant asked her not
to say anything because it would “destroy [his] life” if she did.5
Appellant did not request an instruction during or immediately following
S.Y.’s testimony. For the remaining five extraneous-offense witnesses, the trial
court provided the following oral instruction after each testified:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the State has just offered evidence
that the defendant may have committed wrongful acts that are not
charged in the indictment. The State is offering this evidence to prove
the defendant’s modus operandi, that is, method of operating, and to
rebut defensive theories of lack of opportunity or impossibility, as well
as the alleged victim’s inappropriate motive to testify.
You are not to consider this evidence at all unless you find,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant did, in fact, commit the
wrongful acts. Those of you who believe the defendant did the
wrongful act may consider it. Even if you do find that the defendant
committed the wrongful acts, the -- you may consider this evidence
only for the purpose I have described -- the limited purpose I have
described.
You may not consider this evidence to prove that the defendant
has bad character and for this reason was likely to commit the offense
for which he is indicted. In other words, you should consider this
evidence only for the specific limited purpose I have described. To
consider this evidence for any other purpose would be improper.
The trial court’s charge also contained language instructing the jury that the jury was
not to consider evidence of any extraneous offenses—including S.Y.’s—unless they
“find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant did, in fact, commit the
offense.” The jury was further instructed that it “may not consider this evidence to
prove that the defendant is a bad person and for this reason was likely to commit the
charged offenses.”

Appellant also admitted to minimized versions of his conduct with M.R.F. while talking with
5

Ranger Burson. He admitted to going to buy a car with M.R.F., telling her that she should “wear short
shorts when they go purchase a car so she could get a better deal” and touching her, which he stated that he
had “confessed,” but did not say to whom.
9
B. Rule 404(b)
1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Rule 404 of the Texas Rules of Evidence “regulates the admissibility of
character conformity evidence—evidence of a person’s character used to prove that
he behaved in a particular way on a given occasion.” Bluntson, 2025 WL 1322702,
at *8 (first quoting TEX. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) (evidence of person’s character “is not
admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with
the character or trait”); and then quoting TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(1) (Evidence of
extraneous acts “is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that
on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.”)).
Evidence that is solely used for the purpose of proving bad character is prohibited
under Rule 404. Id. “In separating character conformity evidence from non-
character evidence, Rule 404 incorporates the concept of relevance.” Id.
“Therefore, in the context of Rule 404, if character conformity evidence contributes
even incrementally to a permissible non-character inference, Rule 404 does not bar
its admission.” Id.; see TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(2) (“This evidence may be admissible
for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”).
Because “Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion rather than exclusion,” the rule
excludes “only that evidence that is offered (or will be used) solely for the purpose
of proving bad character and hence conduct in conformity with that bad character.”
De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (emphasis added)
(quoting United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 929 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). The
exceptions listed in Rule 404(b) are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. Id.
For example, “evidence of other crimes or wrongs may be admissible if it tends to
establish some elemental fact, such as identity, intent, or knowledge; tends to
establish some evidentiary fact, such as motive, opportunity, plan, or preparation,
10
leading inferentially to an elemental fact; or rebuts a defensive theory.” Gonzalez v.
State, 541 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (citing
Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 387–88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)). The issue
of whether extraneous-offense evidence has relevance apart from character
conformity, as required by Rule 404(b), is a question for the trial court. De La Paz,
279 S.W.3d at 343. We must affirm the trial court’s ruling if that ruling is within
the zone of reasonable disagreement. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391. When the
trial court determines that the evidence has independent relevance, the trial court
may admit the evidence and, as here, instruct the jury that the evidence is limited to
the specific purpose the proponent advocated. Gonzalez, 541 S.W.3d at 310.
2. Analysis
On appeal, Appellant maintains that while he “touch[ed] upon” PSEUJKR’s
reputation for dishonesty, his “primary defense at trial was physical impossibility.”
However, as noted above, Appellant’s opening statements introduce the proposition
that PSEUJKR was not credible, and that she was an untruthful complainant with a
“history of making false allegations.” Appellant even informed the jury that they
would be hearing from PSEUJKR’s father, who would testify that PSEUJKR
“cannot be believed.” PSEUJKR’s alleged propensity for dishonesty was also
emphasized throughout Appellant’s cross-examination of the State’s witnesses.
Appellant specifically cross-examined Detective Shoemaker regarding his recorded
interview with Appellant, wherein Appellant accused PSEUJKR of “lying” about
the allegations and stated that she “has a history of lying.” PSEUJKR was also
repeatedly cross-examined about her previous allegations of sexual abuse involving
her stepfather, which she later recanted, and a prior statement that she had made
about her childhood: “I lied about pretty much everything.” Appellant then elicited
testimony from PSEUJKR’s uncle, PSEUJKR’s father, Appellant’s sister, and
Appellant’s sister-in-law, about PSEUJKR’s reputation for dishonesty. Appellant
11
also questioned several of his witnesses regarding his own reputation as a
trustworthy individual with “good” character.
Under these facts, whether Appellant sexually abused other young women is
“at least subject to reasonable disagreement whether the extraneous-offense
evidence was admissible for the noncharacter-conformity purpose” of rebutting a
defensive theory suggesting that (1) the complainant fabricated her allegations
against him, and (2) Appellant would not or could not have engaged in the type of
conduct alleged in the indictment. See Bass v. State, 270 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008); see also Dabney v. State, 492 S.W.3d 309, 316–18 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2016). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this
extraneous-offense evidence.
C. Rule 403
1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Evidence “excludes otherwise relevant
evidence when the costs of admission outweigh its utility.” Hart v. State, 688
S.W.3d 883, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). In accordance with the rule, “[t]he [trial]
court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 403. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it has the undue
tendency to suggest an improper basis for reaching a decision. Reese v. State, 33
S.W.3d 238, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Render v. State, 347 S.W.3d 905, 921
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2011, pet. ref’d). We utilize the Montgomery factors in our
determination of whether evidence is admissible under Rule 403: “(1) the strength
of the evidence’s probative value, (2) the potential for the evidence to ‘impress the
jury in some irrational but nevertheless indelible way,’ (3) [t]he amount of time
required at trial to develop the evidence, and (4) the proponent’s need for the
12
evidence.” Hart, 688 S.W.3d at 891 (quoting Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389–90).
In any given case, “these factors may well blend together in practice.”
Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Rule 403 does not require that the balancing test be performed on the record.
Greene v. State, 287 S.W.3d 277, 284 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2009, pet. ref’d).
In overruling a Rule 403 objection, the trial court is assumed to have applied a
Rule 403 balancing test and determined that the evidence was admissible. Id.
Moreover, the balancing of these factors “is always slanted toward admission, not
exclusion, of otherwise relevant evidence.” Irsan v. State, 708 S.W.3d 584, 616
(Tex. Crim. App. 2025) (quoting De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 343); Luna v. State, 687
S.W.3d 79, 98 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, pet. ref’d) (“Rule 403 favors the
admission of relevant evidence and carries a presumption that relevant evidence will
be more probative than prejudicial.”).
2. Analysis
The first and fourth factors in the Rule 403 balancing test require that we
identify the strength of the probative value and the State’s need for the evidence,
respectively. See Hart, 688 S.W.3d at 891. At the outset, we observe that apart from
PSEUJKR, there were no witnesses to the sexual abuse alleged, and Appellant
repeatedly suggested throughout trial that PSEUJKR had fabricated her allegations.
See Espinoza v. State, No. 11-19-00232-CR, 2022 WL 3903774, at *9 (Tex. App.—
Eastland Aug. 31, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(noting, in our analysis of the Rule 403 factors, that extraneous evidence can “serve[]
to rebut the suggestion that [the complainant’s] reports were contrived”). The
extraneous-offense evidence that Appellant had previously sexually abused and
inappropriately touched others therefore serves to establish his modus operandi and
to “rebut the defense theories of lack of opportunity, impossibility, and inappropriate
motive to testify.” Further, the extraneous-offense evidence makes a fact of
13
consequence—that is, Appellant’s manner, opportunity, and propensity to sexually
abuse PSEUJKR—more likely. See TEX. R. EVID. 401(a); Hart, 688 S.W.3d at 893;
Wishert v. State, 654 S.W.3d 317, 333 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, pet. ref’d)
(noting that “[b]ecause the evidence of prior sexual abuse of children ‘[is] especially
probative of [the defendant’s] propensity to sexually assault children,’ the Rule 403
balancing test normally will not favor the exclusion of evidence of the defendant’s
prior sexual assaults of children”).
Although we acknowledge that the extraneous offenses were not committed
in an identical fashion as the charged offenses, we have previously held that offenses
“need not be completely identical to the charged offense in order to be probative,”
nor do the offenses need to have occurred recently. See Jingbo Xu v. State, No. 11-
19-00203-CR, 2021 WL 1823228, at *7 (Tex. App.—Eastland May 6, 2021, pet.
ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see also Forrest v. State, No. 11-
21-00062-CR, 2023 WL 2316363, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 2, 2023, pet.
ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (overruling appellant’s Rule 403
argument where one of the three extraneous-offense witnesses was not the same age
as the complainant at the time the sexual abuse occurred); Jimenez v. State, No. 11-
17-00065-CR, 2018 WL 3580879, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 26, 2018, no
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“The extraneous evidence, although
remote, was probative due to its similarity to the charged offense.”). Here, in every
instance, Appellant targeted individuals with whom he shared a church association,
family relationship (direct or indirect), and/or while in a position of authority and
trust. Some of the extraneous-offense witnesses were family members, including
his niece, S.Y., and his then sisters-in-law, D.M. and T.D., while others, such as
C.M., C.S., and M.R.F., became acquainted with Appellant through church—i.e.,
environments in which Appellant held positions of power, influence, or mentorship.

14
Second, with the exception of one incident testified to by S.Y., Appellant
consistently isolated his victims prior to committing the sexual assaults or
misconduct. This pattern was evident in multiple instances: C.M. was lured into a
classroom; D.M. and M.R.F. were in a vehicle alone with Appellant; and S.Y., C.S.,
and T.D. were in a bedroom. Likewise, PSEUJKR’s allegations involved
circumstances in which she was separated from others and under Appellant’s
control.
Finally, he frequently used sexually explicit language during the sexual
assaults, and it appears that the underlying motive for uniting all these incidents was
Appellant’s desire for nonconsensual sexual gratification. Appellant’s conduct
consistently demonstrated a sexual purpose. Thus, the testimony regarding the
extraneous offenses provided relevant, probative evidence that Appellant’s actions
toward PSEUJKR were neither accidental nor fabricated, but rather were part of a
longstanding pattern of sexually predatory behavior toward children and
significantly younger females. See Luna, 687 S.W.3d at 103; see also Boykin v.
State, No. 11-22-00126-CR, 2023 WL 5280804, at *8 (Tex. App.—Eastland
Aug. 17, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“While the
proffered evidence did not pertain to the children who were the victims of the
charged offense . . . it speaks to [a]ppellant’s desire to attain sexual gratification from
minor children and assists in contextualizing [a]ppellant’s conduct in this case.”).
Thus, these factors weigh in favor of admission.
Regarding the second factor, the phrase “unfair prejudice” in Rule 403 “refers
to a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not
necessarily, an emotional one.” Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641 (citing State v.
Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). We recognize that evidence
of a sexual nature involving children or family members is inherently inflammatory
and prejudicial. See Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 397; Newton v. State, 301 S.W.3d
15
315, 320 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009, pet. ref’d). However, the question remains
whether it is unfairly prejudicial in this case. See Wishert, 654 S.W.3d at 334.
As we have discussed, while the objected-to extraneous offenses and acts
occurred over a span of nearly four decades, and the victims’ ages at the time of the
abuse varied as did Appellant’s selected method of access to each victim, there
existed marked similarities between PSEUJKR’s testimony and each of the
extraneous-offense witnesses. Moreover, the trial court took measures to mitigate
the potential improper influence of the challenged evidence. Gaytan v. State, 331
S.W.3d 218, 228 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. ref’d); Newton, 301 S.W.3d at 320.
In this regard, the trial court instructed the jury that it was to consider evidence of
the extraneous bad acts only for the limited purpose of determining whether the
evidence tended to prove a common scheme or plan by Appellant. The trial court
further instructed the jury that any extraneous act could be considered only if proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. These instructions equipped the jury to properly weigh
the extraneous-offense evidence and minimized the risk of the jury improperly
relying on such evidence in reaching its verdict. See Herrera v. State, 676 S.W.3d
896, 909 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, no pet.). We presume that the jury followed
the trial court’s instructions in the charge. See id. (citing Thrift v. State, 176 S.W.3d
221, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). This factor weighs in favor of admission, given
the trial court’s repeated instructions.
The third factor focuses on “how much trial time was dedicated to the
development of the evidence such that its introduction caused undue delay.” Hart,
688 S.W.3d at 893 (citing Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389–90). For this factor, “the
concern is the extent to which the jury is distracted from considering the charged
offense.” Id. Consequently, “the time needed to develop the character evidence
necessarily includes any testimony introduced regarding the evidence, including
cross-examination, redirect examination, and any rebuttal offered by the defense in
16
response to the evidence.” Id. The substantial time needed to develop this objected-
to testimony was not disproportionate; accounting for a little more than a day and a
half of the nine-day trial. But the objected-to testimony was raised repeatedly
throughout the State’s closing argument. See Inthalangsy v. State, 634 S.W.3d 749,
759 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (reviewing the transcript of the State’s closing argument
in its Rule 403 analysis); Price v. State, No. 11-22-00195-CR, 2023 WL 6627127,
at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland Oct. 12, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (same). Balancing these considerations, this Rule 403 factor weighs
against admission of the extraneous offenses.
“In reviewing a trial court’s determination under Rule 403, a reviewing court
is to reverse the trial court’s judgment ‘rarely and only after a clear abuse of
discretion.’” See Espinoza, 2022 WL 3903774, at *8 (quoting Mozon v. State, 991
S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). “It is only when there is a ‘clear
disparity’ between the prejudice and the probative value of the offered evidence
that Rule 403 envisions exclusion.” Boykin, 2023 WL 5280804, at *8 (quoting
Hammer v. State, 296 S.W.3d 555, 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)). Cumulatively, no
clear disparity exists here. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the extraneous-offense evidence.
We overrule Appellant’s first issue.
III. Experts
In Appellant’s second and third issues, he argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in determining that PSEUJKR’s therapist was qualified as a trauma expert
and the Special Victims Unit detective was qualified as a delayed outcry expert.
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
An expert witness that is qualified as such by “knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the
expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of
17
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” TEX. R. EVID. 702.
Before expert testimony can be admitted, three requirements must be met: “(1) [t]he
witness qualifies as an expert by reason of his knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education; (2) the subject matter of the testimony is an appropriate one for expert
testimony; and (3) admitting the expert testimony will actually assist the fact-finder
in deciding the case.” Rhomer v. State, 569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019)
(quoting Vela v. State, 209 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). “These
conditions are commonly referred to as (1) qualification, (2) reliability, and
(3) relevance.” Id.
“The specialized knowledge that qualifies a witness to offer an expert opinion
may be derived from specialized education, practical experience, a study of technical
works or a combination of these things.” Id. To determine whether a trial court has
abused its discretion in ruling on an expert’s qualifications, an appellate court may
consider: (1) whether the field of expertise is complex; (2) whether the expert’s
opinion is conclusive; and (3) whether the area of expertise is central to the
resolution of the lawsuit. Id. 669–70 (citing Rodgers v. State, 205 S.W.3d 525, 528
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).
The reliability determination is likewise flexible and determined by the trial
court in its function as the gatekeeper. Luna, 687 S.W.3d at 95 (citing Wells v. State,
611 S.W.3d 396, 426 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020)). Relevant here, “Nenno set forth a
framework for evaluating the reliability of expert testimony in fields of study outside
the hard sciences.” Rhomer, 569 S.W.3d at 671; see Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d
549, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), overruled on other grounds by State v. Terrazas,
4 S.W.3d 720, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). When assessing expert testimony in the
“soft science” fields of behavior and psychology, courts rely on the following factors
to evaluate the reliability of such testimony: “(1) whether the field of expertise is a
legitimate one, (2) whether the subject matter of the expert’s testimony is within the
18
scope of that field, and (3) whether the expert’s testimony properly relies upon
and/or utilizes the principles involved in the field.” Luna, 687 S.W.3d at 95–96
(quoting Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 561).
A trial court’s admission of expert testimony will rarely be disturbed on appeal
because “the possible spectrum of education, skill, and training is so wide, a trial
court has great discretion in determining whether a witness possesses sufficient
qualifications to assist the jury as an expert on a specific topic in a particular case.”
Rodgers, 205 S.W.3d at 527–28 & n.9.
1. Anne Ehrhart
Before Anne Ehrhart, PSEUJKR’s therapist, testified at trial, the trial court
held a Rule 702 hearing outside the presence of the jury. See TEX. R. EVID. 702,
705(b). Ehrhart outlined her educational background and training. Ehrhart testified
that she is a licensed professional counselor and a licensed professional counselor
supervisor in Texas, has a bachelor’s degree in psychology, and has a master’s
degree in marriage and family therapy. Ehrhart testified she has been licensed since
2006, and as part of her licensure requirements, she takes between twenty-four to
thirty hours of continuing education classes every two years. Ehrhart described
certain types of behavior and characteristics of persons, including children, that have
experienced trauma, and “symptoms . . . or signs” that a person has post-traumatic
stress disorder.
Ehrhart also has held a certification in Eye Movement Desensitization and
Reprocessing (EMDR) therapy since 2016. Ehrhart explained that EMDR therapy
is a modality for trauma treatment, and she began working towards this certification
in 2010. She affirmed that she specializes in treating adults that have suffered
childhood trauma. Ehrhart further testified that she has given seven to ten EMDR
presentations throughout her career, and PSEUJKR sought her counseling services

19
after observing one of those presentations. She has had around 230 sessions with
PSEUJKR over the years.
On cross-examination, Ehrhart clarified that she is not a researcher, but rather,
a clinician, and explained the effects of EMDR on the brain:
EMDR is based on the adaptive information processing model. This is
all from Francine Shapiro’s work. And, basically, it says, when you
experience an event, your brain -- everyone’s brain has a way of
digesting the experience, making sense of it, taking what’s important,
storing it for future use. It’s biology. It’s survival. It’s how we adapt
to the world we live in. And it keeps what’s important, sloughs off
things that are not, because the brain can’t possibly keep everything that
happens.
The brain does privilege negative experiences, because it’s a
biological survival mechanism. We need to know things that have hurt
us or are disadvantageous to us so that we can try to survive. So it
might slough off positive experience.
So the brain has a negativity bias. So it holds on, kind of like
Velcro, to a negative experience. It sloughs off, kind of like Teflon,
some positive ones. So in -- in a trauma event, the process is
interrupted, and so the memory is not getting stored.
I mean, there -- there are aspects of the memory, but it’s not
necessarily fully digested and processed by the brain, by the nervous
system, and so that is why a person is symptomatic with PTSD
symptoms. It’s a raw memory still. It has not turned into a narrative
memory.
A narrative memory is where something happens to you, let’s say
something neutral, and you can talk about it with people, and it’s no big
deal, or let’s say it was a trauma memory, but you did work on it, and
it integrated appropriately into your system, and that has become a
narrative memory. So when you talk about it, your nervous system
doesn’t get hijacked. You’re not emotional. You’re not irritable.
You’re telling it more like a story.
Ehrhart also listed the training she had attended and named the various researchers
who’s work she had studied and titles of books she had read on the topic of trauma.

20
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court overruled Appellant’s objections and
allowed the State to present Ehrhart’s testimony.
Appellant does not argue that behavior of trauma victims is an illegitimate
field of expertise. See, e.g., Cohn v. State, 849 S.W.2d 817, 818 (Tex. Crim. App.
1993) (recognizing research concerning the behavioral characteristics of sexually
abused children as a legitimate field of expertise). Thus, the only questions that
remain are whether Ehrhart was qualified to speak about trauma within the scope of
her field and whether Ehrhart sufficiently showed that her testimony properly relied
upon that field’s principles. See TEX. R. EVID. 703; Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 561.
With respect to the first question, Appellant specifically takes issue with
Ehrhart’s lack of a doctoral degree, arguing that Ehrhart was without the requisite
qualifications to discuss trauma because she did not possess a medical degree or PhD
on the subject. However, a doctoral degree, though beneficial, has never been a
prerequisite for expert qualification designations. See Rodgers, 205 S.W.3d at 527–
28 (“Because the possible spectrum of education, skill, and training is so wide, a trial
court has great discretion in determining whether a witness possesses sufficient
qualifications to assist the jury as an expert on a specific topic in a particular case.”);
see also Brown v. State, No. 02-19-00238-CR, 2020 WL 6929846, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Nov. 25, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(“As one of our sister courts has explained, with regard to qualifications, there is no
litmus test, no particular license or degree that an expert must possess to qualify.”);
see, e.g., Gutierrez v. State, No. 02-17-00415-CR, 2019 WL 1388748, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Mar. 28, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(concluding that a clinical therapist with a master’s degree in social work, who has
worked at the Tarrant County Women’s Center for approximately eight years, was
qualified to testify about trauma behavior, trauma memory, and how the
complainant’s conduct was consistent with that of trauma victims); Cottrell v. State,
21
No. 11-08-00285-CR, 2010 WL 2862610, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 22, 2010,
no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that a licensed
professional counselor with only a master’s degree, who was employed at the
Children’s Rape Crisis and Children’s Advocacy Center for over five years, and who
has counseled hundreds of people possessed sufficient qualifications to testify as an
expert on the effects that sexual abuse could have on child victims).
Similarly unavailing are Appellant’s arguments that Ehrhart’s testimony was
not reliable because she “could not provide specific details or scientific support,
instead relying on vague references to a ‘body of research.’” An expert is not
required to list every study they relied upon; it is enough that Ehrhart articulated that
her opinions were based on her experiences and training, and she was able to
articulate specific publications and researchers in the forefront of her profession
from which she had learned. See Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 561; see also, e.g., Gutierrez,
2019 WL 1388748, at *2 (concluding it was sufficient to show there was a reliable
basis for an expert’s opinion where the expert “testified that her testimony was based
upon her experiences as a licensed clinical social worker at the Tarrant County
Women’s Center where she teaches trauma-related classes and exclusively counsels
crime victims” and “[h]er opinions also were based on the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Clinical Disorders and on ‘numerous medical studies’”).
Lastly, embedded within this challenge to Ehrhart’s expert witness
designation, Appellant argues that Ehrhart’s testimony only served to bolster
PSEUJKR’s credibility. “Bolstering,” as defined by the Court of Criminal Appeals,
is evidence offered for the sole purpose of “convinc[ing] the factfinder that a
particular witness or source of evidence is worthy of credit, without substantively
contributing ‘to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.’” Luna, 687 S.W.3d at 100 (quoting Rivas v. State, 275 S.W.3d 880, 886
22
(Tex. Crim. App. 2009)). However, the “bolstering” complaint is misplaced in these
determinations. Id. “Rather, ‘the key to admissibility remains the same [in] these
cases: the expert witness must be qualified in their field, use tools and methods from
their field, draw conclusions based on those qualifications and methods, and not
comment on victim credibility.’” Id. (quoting Moreno v. State, 619 S.W.3d 754, 762
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, no pet.). In this regard, an expert’s testimony that
meets the other criteria and does not directly comment on witness credibility is
unlikely to meet the threshold for undue prejudice, even if it may corroborate the
victim’s testimony and weigh against the defendant. Id.; Price v. State, 923 S.W.2d
214, 216–17 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1996, pet. ref’d).
Appellant’s brief references two instances of “bolstering”:
[EHRHART:] She seemed to me to be trying to go back to
the event and trying to stay here to listen to the question, and maybe at
times not hearing the question or asking for it to be repeated, and she
seemed like she was reliving parts of it while trying to stay present, and
she looked to me at times zoned.
....
[THE STATE:] And I want to just step back real quick to
when [PSEUJKR] is testifying and you’re saying you observed some
dissociation. Would you say that this was a safe environment for her
to retell the events of her trauma?
[EHRHART:] No.
[APPELLANT:] Object to speculation, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
[EHRHART:] No.
[THE STATE:] And why not?
[EHRHART:] Because [Appellant] is in the room.
However, as the State points out, Ehrhart specifically maintained that she was not
testifying as to the truthfulness of PSEUJKR’s allegations and Ehrhart acquiesced

23
that there could be other reasons for PSEUJKR’s “zoned” appearance at trial. Thus,
we find no merit in Appellant’s “bolstering” complaint. See Chavez v. State, 324
S.W.3d 785, 789 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, no pet.) (finding no abuse of discretion
where the expert did not offer a direct opinion that the complainant was truthful in
her initial outcry of sexual abuse or that the complainant belonged to a class of
persons that was truthful or worthy of belief); Davis v. State, No. 11-14-00177-CR,
2016 WL 3382539, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 16, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication) (“Although the jury could have applied Hallas’s
testimony to the complainant’s outcry statement in its determination of whether to
believe the complainant, Hallas did not directly testify that, in his opinion, the
complainant was truthful.”); see also Jernigan v. State, No. 11-07-00028-CR, 2008
WL 3845457, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 14, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (“Expert testimony, by nature, may tend to show whether
another is telling the truth. This alone will not render that testimony inadmissible.”).
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing
Ehrhart to testify as an expert witness. See Rodgers, 205 S.W.3d at 527–28. We
overrule Appellant’s second issue.
2. Detective Frank Shoemaker
Special Victims Unit Detective Shoemaker estimated at trial that he has
worked with “around 2000 cases” involving child abuse in his thirteen-year period
as a detective in the Special Victims Unit, and that he attends training every two
years as part of his licensure requirements. Appellant objected and requested a
hearing outside of the jury’s presence when the State inquired as to whether, through
Detective Shoemaker’s training and experience, he would be familiar with reasons
why a victim may make a delayed outcry.
On voir dire examination, Detective Shoemaker explained that delayed
outcries were common in his experience and training, and that the reasons why
24
children do not immediately outcry varied but included being afraid of the offender
or fearing that they would be disbelieved. Detective Shoemaker denied relying on
any articles to give his opinion and could not recall precisely why PSEUJKR stated
that she had delayed reporting the abuse. Appellant’s objections to Detective
Shoemaker as an expert witness were overruled.
We address Appellant’s contention that Detective Shoemaker was not
qualified to testify as an expert in conjunction with Appellant’s claim that Detective
Shoemaker’s testimony was unreliable and not relevant. The record shows that
Detective Shoemaker’s specialized knowledge was derived from his training and
practical experience having specifically handled “around 2000 cases of child abuse”
over his more than decade-long tenure as a detective. See Rhomer, 569 S.W.3d at
669 (providing that specialized knowledge that qualifies witness to offer expert
opinion may be derived from specialized education, practical experience, study of
technical works, or combination of these things). Although Appellant cites to
several cases where a detective was deemed not to be an expert in a specific field,
none of these cases involved the designation of a detective as an expert in delayed
outcries, which at least one of our sister courts has held to be permissible. See, e.g.,
Bellard v. State, No. 05-21-00633-CR, 2023 WL 1097769, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Jan. 30, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding
detective was qualified to testify as an expert on delayed outcries); Pinales v. State,
No. 05-01-00765-CR, 2002 WL 77256, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 22, 2002, no
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same); cf. Cox v. State, No. 11-22-
00188-CR, 2024 WL 1098830, at *10–11 (Tex. App.—Eastland March 14, 2024, no
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (police chief who provided expert
testimony regarding victims underreporting sex crimes was qualified by experience
and training including the investigation of at least two hundred abuse cases).
Moreover, Detective Shoemaker’s background was tailored to the area of expertise
25
covered by his intended testimony, i.e., child abuse investigations and the types of
issues that are commonly seen in those types of investigations. See Rhomer, 569
S.W.3d at 669.
Next, Appellant challenges the relevancy of Detective Shoemaker’s
testimony. To be relevant, expert testimony must relate to the pertinent facts of the
case. Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). A material
issue for the jury’s determination was whether PSEUJKR was sexually abused.
Because the jury’s determination of this issue could have been affected by several
factors, including the existence of a delayed outcry, the trial court could have
reasonably concluded that Detective Shoemaker’s testimony regarding outcries in
general—irrespective of whether he had obtained PSEUJKR’s reason for a delayed
outcry—was relevant to the jury’s assessment of whether she was, in fact, sexually
abused by Appellant. Netterville v. State, No. 07-23-00448-CR, 2024 WL 5195296,
at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 20, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (concluding expert testimony about how children may act following
sexual assault, variations in the outcry process, and protocols for treatment was
relevant and admissible); Brucia v. State, No. 05-11-00866-CR, 2012 WL 2926203,
at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 19, 2012, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication)
(concluding the same where expert testified “mostly in generalities about how
sexually abused children behave”); Bickems v. State, No. 05-01-01167-CR, 2002
WL 1741684, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 29, 2002, pet. ref’d) (not designated for
publication) (concluding expert testimony about “the dynamics of sexual abuse,
delayed outcry, and the process of disclosure” was relevant to assist the jurors in
understanding why a child such as the victim would not initially report sexual abuse).
Additionally, courts have repeatedly held that such expert testimony is
relevant in cases involving child abuse where, as here, the victim’s credibility was
at issue. See Vasquez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 932, 935 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
26
Edinburg 1991, pet. ref’d) (concluding expert’s testimony regarding symptoms of
child abuse victims in general, including frequent existence of delayed outcry, was
relevant in trial for aggravated sexual assault of a child where credibility was at
issue); Fletcher v. State, No. 08-09-00122-CR, 2010 WL 3783946, at *5 (Tex.
App.—El Paso Sept. 29, 2010, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication)
(concluding that “expert testimony regarding patterns of disclosure was relevant to
explain the various reasons why children delay making a report of sexual abuse”).
We conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow
Detective Shoemaker to testify as an expert witness on delayed outcries. See
Rodgers, 205 S.W.3d at 527–28. We overrule Appellant’s third issue.
IV. Evidence of a Previous Grand Jury’s No-Bill
In Appellant’s fourth issue, he argues that the trial court violated his
constitutional rights by excluding evidence that a grand jury had no-billed the same
accusations in 2012.
A. Relevant Background
As previously discussed, PSEUJKR contacted law enforcement in 2012 to
report Appellant’s sexual abuse against her. Following an investigation by Detective
Shoemaker, the case was presented to a grand jury, and the charges were no-billed.
Ranger Burson reopened the investigation after allegations arose involving other
complainants.
During trial, the State played a recording of Appellant’s interview with
Detective Shoemaker in 2012, and Appellant took issue with the following exchange
that occurred at the end of the interview:
[DETECTIVE SHOEMAKER:] I take the information,
okay? And what I have found is that if things seem to make sense,
okay? If I’m getting told by several people that everything is pointing
in one direction, okay, more than likely it’s the truth or at least partial
of the truth.

27
[APPELLANT:] Yeah, well, there’s no truth to me doing
something to [PSEUJKR] so that’s not the right direction.
[DETECTIVE SHOEMAKER:] Okay, well, all I’m saying
is I take the information, and I send that to the district attorney, and he
takes a look at it and says, ‘Well, we do have enough—yeah, a crime
appears like a crime has been committed.’ Okay? So then the district
attorney will take it to the grand jury—
[APPELLANT:] Right.
[DETECTIVE SHOEMAKER:] —And the grand jury is
going to decide, “Yes, we need to try this person” or “No, we better not.
There’s not enough evidence, or that’d be a hard one to prove,”
something like that.
Appellant argued that, by the admission of this evidence, the State had created a false
impression that a grand jury had true-billed the case, opening the door to evidence
of the 2012 grand jury’s no-bill. The trial court overruled Appellant’s request to
develop evidence relating to the grand jury’s no-bill.
B. Applicable Law
“A grand jury has the duty to determine whether evidence exists to formally
charge a person with an offense.” Harris v. State, 572 S.W.3d 325, 335 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2019, no pet.) (citing Rachal v. State, 917 S.W.2d 799, 807 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996)); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 20A.051 (West 2022). “A no-bill from
a grand jury is merely a finding that the specific evidence brought before that
particular grand jury did not convince them to formally charge the accused with the
offense alleged.” Id. (first citing Rachal, 917 S.W.2d at 807; and then citing Elam v.
State, 47 S.W.2d 279, 279–80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1932) (admission of no-bill for a
prior altercation between the victim and the defendant improperly presented the jury
with the grand jury’s opinion as to the merits of disputed issues)).
Significantly, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “[a] prior ‘no
bill’ by the grand jury is not material in any way to the defense of a case.” Smith v.

28
State, 474 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971). In 2020, this court applied
Smith in a revocation proceeding and held that, because “a prior no-bill for the
charged offense is not material in any way to the defense of a case . . . evidence of a
grand jury’s once having no-billed the charged offense was properly excluded.”
Dickerson v. State, No. 11-18-00268-CR, 2020 WL 6373274, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Eastland Oct. 30, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We
reasoned that a grand jury’s “return of a no-bill has no evidentiary value because
there is no way to determine what specific evidence was brought before the grand
jury.” Id.
Our sister courts have applied Smith in similar circumstances, holding that a
trial court does not abuse its discretion in excluding a grand jury’s prior no-bill. See,
e.g., Perry v. State, No. 06-06-00163-CR, 2007 WL 845560, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana Mar. 21, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); cf.
Meeks v. State, No. 03-03-00509-CR, 2005 WL 1489593, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin
June 23, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Evidence of a
prior ‘no-bill’ does not address the issue of guilt, and was properly excluded because
it was not material in any way to the defense of the case.”).
C. Analysis
On appeal, Appellant contends that the “trial court’s erroneous exclusion of
relevant evidence rose to the level of a constitutional violation by precluding the
defense from presenting a defense.” Appellant further argues that the State had
created a false impression for the jury that “concealed the fact that a previous grand
jury had already determined [PSEUJKR’s] allegations did not warrant a trial.”
Appellant’s brief includes no mention of cases concerning the exclusion of no-bill
evidence.
It is unclear how Appellant can prevail in his argument that the trial court’s
exclusion of evidence of a prior no-bill rose to the level of a constitutional violation
29
and was necessary for his defense given the holding in Smith. Smith, 474 S.W.2d at
489; see Shumake v. State, 502 S.W.2d 758, 760 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). We further
disagree that the aforementioned exchange opened the door6 to the admission of this
evidence when, at the time of Detective Shoemaker’s statements, the case had yet to
be presented to the grand jury and Detective Shoemaker was, at most, describing
what the next steps and the possible outcomes could be. The trial court did not abuse
its discretion in excluding evidence of the no-bill. See Smith, 474 S.W.2d at 489.
We overrule Appellant’s fourth issue.
V. Punishment Evidence
Appellant argues in his fifth issue that the trial court erred by excluding
evidence discovered during the punishment phase.
A. Relevant Background
During a break in the punishment phase, Appellant’s trial counsel informed
the trial court that he had been contacted by a family member with new impeachment
evidence. Trial counsel stated that Dinsel Evans, Appellant’s uncle, told him that in
2012, shortly after Appellant had been arrested, Dinsel confronted PSEUJKR and
asked, “Why are you doing this to [Appellant]? He did not do anything to you.”
Dinsel told counsel that PSEUJKR replied, “I am going to make him pay for what
he has done to my mother,” and PSEUJKR “did not respond in any way to his
assertion that [Appellant] had not done anything to her.” Counsel sought to
introduce this evidence during punishment, arguing that this evidence was relevant
as it “shows a lack of impact on the alleged victim in this case.” The State countered
that this evidence was a “collateral attack on what the jury has already decided,” the
guilt of Appellant, and that such evidence might be an appropriate basis for a motion
for new trial—but not punishment. Dinsel was not present to testify during the

6
We note that Appellant, in his opening statement, told the jury that a grand jury had previously
no-billed allegations against him by the complainant.
30
hearing, and no affidavit or other proffer was admitted in lieu of his testimony. The
trial court excluded the evidence.
B. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
The trial court has wide discretion to determine the admissibility of
evidence at the punishment phase. Trejo v. State, 683 S.W.3d 815, 819 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2023, no pet.); Lopez v. State, No. 11-23-00251-CR, 2025 WL 920046,
at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 27, 2025, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication). The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure governs the admissibility of
evidence during the punishment stage of a non-capital criminal trial. CRIM. PROC.
art. 37.07 § 3(a)(1) (West Supp. 2024). Article 37.07 authorizes the trial court to
admit evidence during the punishment phase “as to any matter the court deems
relevant to sentencing.” Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that generally,
“evidence is ‘relevant to sentencing,’ within the meaning of the statute, if it is
‘helpful to the jury in determining the appropriate sentence for a particular defendant
in a particular case.’” Beham v. State, 559 S.W.3d 474, 479 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)
(quoting McGee v. State, 233 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). Significant
here, “at the punishment stage of a criminal trial, evidence is not admissible for the
purpose of relitigating the defendant’s guilt.” McGee, 233 S.W.3d at 318.
C. Analysis
Appellant specifically argues that Dinsel’s testimony was “probative for
reasons outside of relitigating guilt/innocence because it directly rebutted the
testimony of [PSEUJKR] and her personal counselor who testified as an expert that
[PSEUJKR] had in fact been victimized,” and by excluding this evidence, the trial
court violated his right to “compulsory process” of witnesses under the Sixth
Amendment.
Although Appellant argues that this testimony was probative outside of
relitigating guilt/innocence, his stated reason for its admission goes to a question of
31
Appellant’s guilt—i.e., whether “[PSEUJKR] had in fact been victimized”—such
evidence is improper in the punishment phase. See McGee, 233 S.W.3d at 318;
see, also e.g., Alvarez-Rodriguez v. State, 678 S.W.3d 317, 323 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2023, no pet.) (rejecting the appellant’s argument that the “testimony
of the complainant concerning his feelings toward the sexual assault for which
[a]ppellant was convicted was clearly relevant to [a]ppellant’s punishment” because
a reiteration of an alleged recantation “would not have assisted the jury in
determining an appropriate sentence”). Accordingly, the trial court acted within its
discretion in excluding this evidence. See Baird v. State, 379 S.W.3d 353, 359 (Tex.
App.—Waco 2012), aff’d, 398 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“Section 3(a)
of Article 37.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure grants trial courts broad
discretion to admit evidence during the punishment phase.”). We conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding such evidence. We overrule
Appellant’s fifth issue.
VI. Motion for New Trial
In his sixth issue, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying Appellant’s motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence—the
testimony provided by Dinsel at the hearing on the motion.
A. Relevant Background
In a hearing on Appellant’s motion for new trial, Dinsel testified that although
he “[b]arely” recognized PSEUJKR’s name, “[doesn’t] know her very well,” and
had only seen her “but two or three times” in his life, he had heard about allegations
involving Appellant “[t]hrough the grapevine.” Dinsel, however, denied knowing
about any allegations involving Appellant and PSEUJKR:
I don’t know of any of the allegations, probably what this case is about.
. . . But I’ve known [PSEUJKR’s] mother, and -- and I’ve heard a few
things there. And that’s what -- I thought I heard from her that that’s

32
what this case is about. I don’t even know really what this case is about,
to tell you the truth.
Dinsel said the “one time” he spoke with PSEUJKR was after church approximately
ten years prior, when PSEUJKR was college aged. Dinsel initially could not recall
“how . . . [Appellant’s] name c[a]me up” or what he said to prompt PSEUJKR’s
response, but testified:
[PSEUJKR] said something like, “[Appellant] is going to end up having
to pay for what he’s done to his [sic] mother.” And that’s all she said.
She got -- I’ll put it this way. She got pissed because I -- I said that to
her, and she cut it off. That’s the way it was. And that’s all I’ve got to
say.
Dinsel then clarified that he had heard that PSEUJKR had been “harassing”
Appellant for reasons unknown, which is what prompted him to tell PSEUJKR, “It’s
time for you to leave him alone.” Dinsel explained that he was “just trying to tell
[the trial court] to the best of [his] knowledge.” The trial court denied Appellant’s
motion for new trial.
B. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
“We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial under an abuse of
discretion standard.” Gonzales v. State, 680 S.W.3d 358, 394 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2023, pet. ref’d) (quoting McQuarrie v. State, 380 S.W.3d 145, 150 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2012)). We do not substitute our judgment for the trial court’s judgment but,
instead, determine whether the trial court’s decision was arbitrary or unreasonable.
Id.; see Colyer v. State, 428 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). We view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and presume that all
reasonable factual findings that could have been made were made. State v. Thomas,
428 S.W.3d 99, 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). When denying a motion for a new
trial, a trial court abuses its discretion only if no reasonable view of the record could
support the ruling. Id.

33
The Code of Criminal Procedure gives an accused a right to a new trial “where
material evidence favorable to the accused has been discovered since trial.” See
CRIM. PROC. art. 40.001 (West 2018). To meet the statutory requirement for
materiality, a defendant must satisfy the following four-part test: (1) the newly
discovered evidence was unknown or unavailable to the defendant at the time of his
trial; (2) the defendant’s failure to discover or obtain the evidence was not due to a
lack of diligence; (3) the new evidence is admissible and is not merely cumulative,
corroborative, collateral, or impeaching; and (4) the new evidence is probably true
and will probably bring about a different result in another trial. State v. Arizmendi,
519 S.W.3d 143, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (citing Carsner v. State, 444 S.W.3d
1, 2–3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)); see also Pinson v. State, No. 11-17-00003-CR, 2018
WL 6722294, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Eastland Dec. 21, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication) (applying Carsner factors). The failure to establish
any of the requirements for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence warrants
the trial court’s denial of the motion. Jones v. State, 234 S.W.3d 151, 157 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.); Pinson, 2018 WL 6722294, at *6; Perez v. State,
No. 11-11-00247-CR, 2013 WL 5512834, at *10 (Tex. App.—Eastland Sept. 30,
2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“If an appellant fails to
establish any one of these prongs, he fails to establish an abuse of discretion by the
trial court in denying the motion for new trial.”).
C. Analysis
We only address the third and fourth prongs of the Carsner test as they are
dispositive. In Appellant’s motion for new trial, Appellant argued as he now does
on appeal: this newly discovered evidence is impeachment evidence and bears
directly upon the credibility of PSEUJKR’s testimony, which was of significant
importance at trial. However, Dinsel did not state that PSEUJKR had in any way
recanted her allegations against Appellant; Dinsel explained that he was unaware of
34
what the allegations between PSEUJKR and Appellant entailed. Therefore, at most,
Dinsel’s testimony established that PSEUJKR wanted Appellant to be held
accountable for sexually abusing her mother. 7
Even accepting Dinsel’s statements as credible and accepting his cautions that
he was doing his best to remember the conversation, PSEUJKR’s expressed desire
that Appellant “pay for what he did” to her mother does not establish that she
fabricated her allegations against him. And Dinsel did not testify to any such
implication. See Sanchez v. State, No. 11-05-00043-CR, 2006 WL 998181, at *6
(Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 13, 2006, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (“If the newly discovered evidence is of questionable weight and
credibility and would probably not bring about a different result upon a new trial,
the trial court does not abuse its discretion in refusing a new trial.”). Thus, the trial
court could have reasonably concluded that the testimony was not of such weight
that it would probably bring about a different result in a new trial. See Arizmendi,
519 S.W.3d at 149; Brown v. State, No. 11-03-00137-CR, 2004 WL 1403807, at *4
(Tex. App.—Eastland June 24, 2004, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication).
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied Appellant’s motion for new trial based on Dinsel’s testimony. We overrule
Appellant’s sixth issue.
VII. The Trial Court’s Judgments of Acquittal by Jury in Counts Eight and Ten
We note that the record contains error that requires us to vacate two of the
trial court’s judgments of acquittal. As discussed above, the State waived Counts
Eight and Ten before the jury was empaneled and sworn. The State informed the
trial court that it was “able to pinpoint the alleged acts that were in Count [Eight]
and Count [Ten]” during a pretrial interview with PSEUJKR, which indicated that

7
PSEUJKR testified that she was aware that her mother had been sexually abused by Appellant,
but there was no testimony elicited from PSEUJKR at trial regarding the effect of this knowledge on her.
35
the offenses occurred when PSEUJKR was seventeen years old. The State notified
the trial court that Counts Eight and Ten would be waived on that basis, and the trial
court confirmed that it understood that “[t]he State’s waiving Count [Eight] and
Count [Ten].” The State did not file a motion to dismiss. See CRIM. PROC. art. 32.02
(West 2006). Instead, the trial court signed a “Judgment of Acquittal by Jury” for
each count.
Because the jury did not acquit Appellant of these two counts, and because
the State waived these counts given PSEUJKR’s age at the time of the offenses, 8 we
must vacate the trial court’s judgments of acquittal by jury in Counts Eight and Ten
and dismiss those counts. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(e); see Hughitt v. State, 539 S.W.3d
531, 537 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2018), aff’d, 583 S.W.3d 623 (Tex. Crim. App.
2019).
VIII. This Court’s Ruling
We vacate the trial court’s judgments of acquittal for Count Eight and Count
Ten, and those counts are dismissed. We affirm the judgments of the trial court for
the remaining counts.

W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
JUSTICE

November 14, 2025
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

8
We assume without deciding that the statute of limitations for the offenses charged in each count,
if committed against an adult, would have expired prior to the State’s indictment. See PENAL § 22.01(a)(3),
(c), § 22.011(a)(1); CRIM. PROC. arts. 12.01(2)(E), 12.02(a)(2).
36