Anthony Gagnon v. Kristina Gagnon

NO. 12-24-00307-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

ANTHONY GAGNON, § APPEAL FROM THE 402ND
APPELLANT
§ DISTRICT COURT
V.
§ WOOD COUNTY, TEXAS
KRISTINA GAGNON,
APPELLEE

MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM

Anthony Gagnon appeals from the denial of his motion to terminate an order appointing
receiver. 1 The Receiver, James W. Volberding, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. We grant
the motion to dismiss and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
On September 11, 2024, the trial court signed a letter order denying Gagnon’s motion to
terminate the receivership. That same day, Gagnon filed with the Wood County District Clerk a
letter to the trial court in which he sought reconsideration of the trial court’s ruling. Gagnon
filed his notice of appeal on October 21. Volberding asserts that the notice of appeal is untimely
for various reasons, including that it was filed outside the applicable timeframe. In response,
Gagnon posits that his letter requesting reconsideration extended the appellate timetable and
even if it did not, his notice of appeal was due on October 11.
However, this appeal qualifies as accelerated. A person may appeal from an
interlocutory order of a district court, county court at law, statutory probate court, or county court
that overrules a motion to vacate an order that appoints a receiver or trustee. TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(2) (West Supp. 2024). Appeals from interlocutory orders (when

1 Gagnon also sought mandamus relief from the denial of his motion.
We denied the petition for writ of
mandamus. See In re Gagnon, No. 12-24-00280-CV, 2024 WL 4481377 (Tex. App.—Tyler Oct. 11, 2024, orig.
proceeding) (mem. op.).
allowed by statute) are accelerated and must be filed within twenty days after the judgment or
order is signed. TEX. R. APP. P. 28.1(a); 26.1(b). Filing a motion for new trial, any other post-
trial motion, or a request for findings of fact will not extend the time to perfect an accelerated
appeal. TEX. R. APP. P. 28.1(b).
Here, Gagnon’s notice of appeal was due twenty days after the September 11 letter order
denying his motion to terminate the receivership, i.e., October 1. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(b).
He did not file his notice of appeal until October 21, after the time expired for seeking a motion
for extension. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.3 (appellate court may extend time to file notice of appeal
if, within 15 days after deadline for filing notice of appeal, the party filed a notice of appeal and
a compliant motion); see also Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. 1997). Accordingly,
Gagnon’s notice of appeal is untimely. For this reason, we grant the Receiver’s motion
to dismiss, and we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. All pending motions are
overruled as moot.

Opinion delivered October 31, 2024.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

2
COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

OCTOBER 31, 2024

NO. 12-24-00307-CV

ANTHONY GAGNON,
Appellant
V.
KRISTINA GAGNON,
Appellee

Appeal from the 402nd District Court
of Wood County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 2023-615)

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and the Appellee’s
motion to dismiss; and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this Court that this appeal
should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by this Court that
the appeal be, and the same is, hereby dismissed for want of jurisdiction; and that this decision
be certified to the court below for observance.

By per curiam opinion.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J. and Neeley, J