CourtListener 10641963•In Re Germania Farm Mutual Insurance Association v. the State of Texas
In Re Germania Farm Mutual Insurance Association v. the State of Texas
CourtListener 10641963Txctapp1322 de jul. de 2025
Texto completo
NUMBER 13-25-00093-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
IN RE GERMANIA FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE ASSOCIATION
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
OPINION
Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices West and Fonseca
Opinion by Justice West1
By petition for writ of mandamus, relator Germania Farm Mutual Insurance
Association (Germania) asserts that the trial court 2 abused its discretion by denying its
motion to compel appraisal of a property damage claim. Germania’s insurance policy
1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not
required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R.
47.1 (“The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that
addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”); id. R. 47.4 (explaining the
differences between opinions and memorandum opinions).
2 This lawsuit arises from trial court cause number C-0411-24-C in the 139th District Court of
Hidalgo County, Texas, and the respondent is the Honorable J.R. “Bobby” Flores. See id. R. 52.2.
mandates appraisal to resolve the parties’ dispute over the value of the loss, and the
insureds have not shown a basis for denying enforcement of the appraisal provision.
Accordingly, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus.
I. BACKGROUND
Real parties in interest Domingo Duran and Veronica Orozco procured a property
insurance policy from Germania. In 2023, the real parties submitted a claim on their
insurance policy for damages to their home allegedly caused by a severe weather event
that occurred on April 21, 2023. Germania’s independent adjuster inspected the property,
and the inspection found no visible storm damage to the real parties’ roof and that damage
to the siding of their home was caused by “wear and tear.” Germania thus advised the
real parties that their “loss [wa]s not covered.”
Ultimately, on January 26, 2024, the real parties filed suit against Germania for
breach of contract and various violations of the Texas Insurance Code. On February 14,
2024, Germania filed an answer to the real parties’ lawsuit, then on April 23, 2024,
Germania filed a verified motion to abate the litigation on grounds that the real parties’
insurance policy required completion of the appraisal process as a condition precedent
to suit. The insurance policy at issue provides in relevant part that:
14. Suit Against Us.
a. Before you file or proceed with suit or action against us under this
policy concerning the amount of loss payment or request
supplemental payment from an occurrence claimed by you:
....
(4) You must provide written notice of your dispute to us and
make a written demand for appraisal of the amount of loss for
the additional damage, and
2
(5) The appraisal process must be completed and a
determination of the amount of loss made as described in
Conditions, 10. Appraisal.
....
No action can be brought against us unless there has been full compliance
with all of the terms of this policy . . . .
On May 3, 2024, the real parties filed a verified response to Germania’s motion to
abate the litigation asserting, inter alia, that conditions precedent are not favored in the
law; Germania’s construction of the insurance policy as requiring appraisal was not
reasonable when Germania asserted that the real parties’ damages were not covered;
Germania breached the policy by failing to accept or deny coverage and its breach
excused the real parties’ performance under the policy; and Germania was using
abatement to shield itself from responding to their discovery requests.
On May 13, 2024, Germania filed a motion to compel appraisal, and on July 16,
2024, the real parties filed a response reiterating their earlier arguments and asserting,
among other matters, that Germania failed to timely invoke appraisal. On July 17, 2024,
after the hearing was rescheduled for various reasons, the trial court ultimately held a
hearing on Germania’s motion to compel appraisal. On August 27, 2024, the trial court
signed an order denying Germania’s motion to compel appraisal. On October 17, 2024,
Germania filed a motion for reconsideration of that order. The hearing on Germania’s
motion for reconsideration was scheduled for November 4, 2024, rescheduled to
November 12, 2024, and rescheduled yet again to February 5, 2025. On February 10,
2025, the trial court ultimately denied Germania’s motion for reconsideration.
This original proceeding ensued. Germania presents two issues, which we
construe as one, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion by denying its motion
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to compel appraisal and its motion for reconsideration of that ruling. The Court requested
and received a response to the petition for writ of mandamus from the real parties, and
Germania filed a reply thereto.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Mandamus is an extraordinary and discretionary remedy. See In re Allstate Indem.
Co., 622 S.W.3d 870, 883 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836,
840 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148
S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). The relator must show that: (1) the trial
court abused its discretion; and (2) the relator lacks an adequate remedy on appeal. In re
USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 624 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 135–36; Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833,
839–40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). “The relator bears the burden of proving these two
requirements.” In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., 492 S.W.3d 300, 302 (Tex. 2016) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam); Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840.
The real parties contend that mandamus is inappropriate to review the trial court’s
“routine interlocutory ruling” denying appraisal. However, mandamus relief is appropriate
to enforce an appraisal clause because denying the appraisal would vitiate the insurer’s
right to defend its breach of contract claim. In re Universal Underwriters of Tex. Ins., 345
S.W.3d 404, 412 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding); In re Allstate Cnty. Mut. Ins., 85 S.W.3d
193, 196 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding); In re SureChoice Underwriters Reciprocal Exch.,
702 S.W.3d 876, 882 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, orig. proceeding); In re
Acceptance Indem. Ins., 562 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, orig.
proceeding); In re Allstate Vehicle & Prop. Ins., 542 S.W.3d 815, 822 (Tex. App.—
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Beaumont 2018, orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re State Farm Lloyds, 514 S.W.3d 789,
792 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, orig. proceeding).
III. ANALYSIS
As stated previously, Germania contends that the trial court abused its discretion
by denying its motion to compel appraisal and its motion to reconsider that ruling. The
real parties vociferously disagree and raise seven defenses to appraisal, which we
address in turn.
A. Applicable Law
Insurance appraisal clauses “provide a means to resolve disputes about the
amount of loss for a covered claim.” In re Universal Underwriters of Tex. Ins., 345 S.W.3d
at 407; see State Farm Lloyds v. Johnson, 290 S.W.3d 886, 888 (Tex. 2009). “Appraisals
can provide a less expensive, more efficient alternative to litigation.” In re Universal
Underwriters of Tex. Ins., 345 S.W.3d at 407. Such clauses are “generally enforceable,
absent illegality or waiver.” Id. A trial court has no discretion to ignore a valid appraisal
clause. Johnson, 290 S.W.3d at 888; In re SureChoice Underwriters Reciprocal Exch.,
702 S.W.3d at 881. Appraisals “should generally go forward without preemptive
intervention by the courts.” Johnson, 290 S.W.3d at 895.
B. Delay
The real parties first contend that Germania’s delay in filing its petition for writ of
mandamus bars relief. The trial court denied Germania’s motion to compel appraisal on
August 22, 2024, yet Germania did not seek relief in this Court until February 14, 2025,
nearly six months later, and the real parties assert that this delay was unreasonable and
caused them harm. In terms of harm, the real parties allege that Germania has obstinately
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refused to participate in the discovery process; they have “incurred substantial attorney’s
fees prosecuting their case while [Germania] postured about appraisal”; and Germania
has “treat[ed] its belated demand for appraisal as a get out of jail free card that excuses
its manifest discovery abuse.” The real parties support their contention that they have
been prejudiced by their counsel’s affidavit stating that the real parties have been
prejudiced, that Germania has produced no discovery, and that the real parties have been
“definitely harmed by the continuous bad faith acts and omissions of Germania throughout
the litigation of this case.”
“Although mandamus is not an equitable remedy, its issuance is controlled largely
by equitable principles.” In re Int’l Profit Assocs., Inc., 274 S.W.3d 672, 676 (Tex. 2009)
(orig. proceeding) (per curiam). “One such principle is that ‘[e]quity aids the diligent and
not those who slumber on their rights.’” Rivercenter Assocs. v. Rivera, 858 S.W.2d 366,
367 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Callahan v. Giles, 155 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex.
1941) (orig. proceeding)). “Thus, a relator who unduly or unreasonably delays filing a
petition for mandamus relief may waive its right to such relief unless the delay is justified.”
In re Am. Airlines, Inc., 634 S.W.3d 38, 43 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
Even a “significant” delay may be justified depending on the circumstances. Id.
To invoke the equitable doctrine of laches, the moving party ordinarily must show
an unreasonable delay by the opposing party in asserting its rights and the moving party’s
good faith and detrimental change in position because of the opposing party’s delay. In
re Laibe Corp., 307 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); Rogers
v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 772 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Tex. 1989); In re Mabray, 355 S.W.3d 16, 22
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]). Whether a party’s
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delay in asserting its rights precludes mandamus relief depends on the circumstances. In
re Oceanografia, S.A. de C.V., 494 S.W.3d 728, 730 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam). In examining this issue, we consider whether there is any justification for the
delay, whether the party seeking mandamus relief bears fault for the delay, and whether
the delay has prejudiced the opposing party. See id. at 730–31; In re Allstate Fire & Cas.
Ins., 617 S.W.3d 635, 642 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, orig. proceeding).
We examine the relevant timeline. On August 27, 2024, the trial court denied
Germania’s motion to compel appraisal, and on October 17, 2024, Germania filed its
motion to reconsider that ruling. On October 18, 2024, the trial court signed an order
setting a hearing on the motion to reconsider to occur on November 4, 2024. On October
24, 2024, the trial court signed an agreed order resetting the hearing on Germania’s
motion to compel appraisal to occur on November 12, 2024. On January 23, 2025, the
trial court signed an order again resetting the hearing to occur on February 5, 2025. On
February 5, 2025, the trial court held its hearing on the motion. On February 10, 2025,
the trial court denied Germania’s motion for reconsideration. Germania filed this petition
for writ of mandamus on February 14, 2025.
The real parties contend that the period of delay should be measured from the date
the trial court denied Germania’s motion to compel appraisal and not from the date that
the trial court denied Germania’s motion for reconsideration. However, the real parties
acknowledge that the Texas Supreme Court has calculated the period of delay from the
date the trial court denied the relator’s motion for rehearing. See In re Laibe Corp., 307
S.W.3d at 318; see also In re First Reserve Mgmt., L.P., No. 09-24-00203-CV, 2025 WL
480807, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 13, 2025, orig. proceeding) (mem. op. per
7
curiam); In re Five Star Glob., LLC, No. 05-22-00153-CV, 2022 WL 3354136, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Aug. 15, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
In In re Laibe Corp., the relator sought mandamus relief to enforce a forum
selection clause, but “waited two months after notice of the denial of its motion [for
reconsideration] to seek mandamus relief in the court of appeals.” 307 S.W.3d at 315,
318. The supreme court stated that it did “not find this delay fatal” to the relief sought
because “[a] two-month delay in seeking mandamus relief is not necessarily
unreasonable.” Id. at 318. The real parties assert that Laibe is distinguishable because
the motion for reconsideration in that case “provid[ed] additional evidence and argument.”
Id. at 316. They contend that Germania’s motion for reconsideration did not include new
evidence, argument, or authority, and that it “is virtually identical to the motion to compel
appraisal.” The real parties thus argue that the motion for reconsideration was designed
merely to “restart the mandamus timelines” as the trial setting approached in the case.
We examine the specific circumstances of the case to determine whether
Germania’s delay in asserting its rights precludes mandamus relief. See In re
Oceanografia, S.A. de C.V., 494 S.W.3d at 729. While the period of delay from the trial
court’s initial denial of Germania’s motion to compel appraisal to the filing of this original
proceeding is relatively lengthy, Germania acted well within its rights to seek
reconsideration of that ruling. However, we note in this regard that Germania does not
explain the month and a half delay between the trial court’s initial ruling and Germania’s
filing of its motion for reconsideration of that ruling. The motion for reconsideration is
largely the same as the initial motion; however, it includes an additional six paragraphs of
argument comprising approximately two pages of the motion and includes additional
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authority. The hearing on Germania’s motion for reconsideration was rescheduled twice,
once by agreement of the parties and once at the trial court’s behest. The real parties
argue they have been prejudiced because they had to expend time and money to attend
hearings on Germania’s attempts to enforce the appraisal provision and Germania has
used appraisal to avoid responding to discovery. However, the real parties’ contentions
regarding prejudice are conclusory, and are in effect based on events that occur in the
normal course of litigation. Cf. In re Universal Underwriters of Tex. Ins., 345 S.W.3d at
412 (stating that “it is difficult to see how prejudice could ever be shown” when the policy
provides both parties with “the same opportunity to demand appraisal”). Based on our
consideration of the circumstances at issue, we conclude that Germania did not act in
bad faith in seeking to compel the real parties to comply with the appraisal provision.
Under these specific circumstances, we conclude the delay does not bar mandamus
relief.
C. Sufficient Record
Second, the real parties assert that Germania failed to present a sufficient
mandamus record to support its claim for relief. The trial court held a hearing on
Germania’s motion to compel on July 17, 2024, and a hearing on Germania’s motion for
rehearing on February 5, 2025. The real parties assert that Germania’s failure to include
the transcripts for these two hearings in their mandamus record precludes mandamus
relief.
The relator bears the burden to provide the Court with a sufficient record to
establish his right to relief. See Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 837; In re J.A.L., 645 S.W.3d 922,
924 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, orig. proceeding); In re Schreck, 642 S.W.3d 925, 927
9
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2022, orig. proceeding). The relator’s record must include:
(1) a certified or sworn copy of every document that is material to the
relator’s claim for relief and that was filed in any underlying
proceeding; and
(2) a properly authenticated transcript of any relevant testimony from
any underlying proceeding, including any exhibits offered in
evidence, or a statement that no testimony was adduced in
connection with the matter complained.
TEX. R. APP. P. 52.7(a). “After the record is filed, relator or any other party to the
proceeding may file additional materials for inclusion in the record.” Id. R. 52.7(b).
The required contents for a record filed in support of an original proceeding depend
on what is “material” to the “claim for relief” or what is “relevant” to the “matter complained”
about in the original proceeding. See id. R. 52.7(a)(1), (2). “Thus, the required contents
for a record filed in an original proceeding vary from case-to-case.” In re Monson Law
Firm, LLC, No. 13-25-00095-CV, 2025 WL 1257701, at *4, __ S.W.3d __, __ (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 30, 2025, orig. proceeding); see TEX. R. APP. P. 52.7(a).
Here, the hearings were not evidentiary in nature, and Germania included a statement in
its certification providing that no testimony was adduced regarding appraisal at these
hearings. See id. R. 52.7(a)(1). We determine that Germania provided the Court with a
record sufficient to support its request for mandamus review.
D. Contractual Suit Limitations
Third, the real parties assert that the trial court correctly denied appraisal because
Germania failed to timely request appraisal. They assert that the policy gives them one
year after the date of loss to file a claim, and the appraisal provision requires either party
to demand appraisal within the contractual suit limitations period stated in the policy. The
real parties argue that although their loss occurred on April 21, 2023, Germania did not
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invoke appraisal until April 24, 2024, one year and three days later.
The terms of the insurance policy do not support this contention insofar as the
policy distinguishes between filing a claim and filing an action or suit. The policy provides
that “[a]ny demand for appraisal must be made within the contractual suit limitations
period stated in this policy. After that time, neither you nor we may demand an appraisal.”
Regarding filing a claim, the insurance policy provides:
You may file a claim with us not later than one year after the date of the loss
that is the [subject] of the claim. However, if you can show good cause for
not filing the claim within the above timeframe, you may file the claim after
the first anniversary date of the loss.
In terms of filing suit, however, the policy provides:
No action can be brought against us unless there has been full compliance
with all of the terms of this policy and the action is started by the earliest of
the following dates:
a. Two years from the date we accept or reject the claim; or
b. Three years from the date of the loss that is the subject of the claim.
Thus, rather than a one-year limitation on seeking appraisal, Germania was subject to a
two- or three-year limitation. Accordingly, Germania timely requested appraisal under the
policy. We reject the real parties’ contention otherwise.
E. Dispute Over the Amount of Loss
Fourth, the real parties argue that the trial court correctly denied appraisal because
it applies only when there is a dispute over the amount of loss—and in this case “there is
simply no dispute over the amount of the claimed loss” because Germania declined their
claim in its entirety. They thus allege that this is a dispute about coverage and causation,
and the appraisal clause is inapplicable. We disagree with the real parties’ assertion.
Appraisal may proceed even when an insurer denies a claim and there are
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disputed issues involving coverage. See Johnson, 290 S.W.3d at 893 (“Even if the
appraisal here turns out to involve not just damage but liability questions, that does not
mean appraisal should be prohibited as an initial matter.”); In re SureChoice Underwriters
Reciprocal Exch., 702 S.W.3d at 884 (concluding that appraisal was not precluded where
the insurance policy provided for appraisal when the parties “fail to agree on the amount
of loss” and the case presented issues involving coverage); In re Liberty Ins. Corp., 496
S.W.3d 229, 234–35 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, orig. proceeding [mand.
denied]) (concluding that the insurer’s denial of the insurance claim did not amount to a
waiver of its right to appraisal).
F. Material Breach
Fifth, the real parties assert that Germania committed a prior material breach of
the insurance policy by failing to investigate and pay their covered claims, and this breach
excuses them from complying with the remaining terms of the policy, including appraisal.
However, alleged breaches do not excuse compliance with appraisal clauses. See In re
Acceptance Indem. Ins., 562 S.W.3d 655, 663 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, orig.
proceeding) (rejecting the real party’s claim that the insurer’s alleged breach of the
insurance policy excused the real party’s compliance with the appraisal provision in the
policy); In re State Farm Lloyds, Inc., 170 S.W.3d 629, 635 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005,
orig. proceeding) (explaining that an insurer’s alleged failure to comply with some of the
policy requirements “does not evidence an intent to dispense with” the appraisal
requirements under the policy); see also In re Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins., No. 03-13-00003-CV,
2013 WL 692441, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 21, 2013, orig. proceeding [mand.
denied]) (mem. op.) (collecting cases).
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G. Condition Precedent
Sixth, the real parties assert that appraisal is not a condition precedent to suit under
the policy, and this Court should interpret the appraisal clause otherwise as a mere
covenant. However, the supreme court has expressly held that appraisal “is a condition
precedent to suit.” Johnson, 290 S.W.3d at 894; see In re SureChoice Underwriters
Reciprocal Exch., 702 S.W.3d at 885; In re Allstate Vehicle & Prop. Ins., 549 S.W.3d 881,
887 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, orig. proceeding). Accordingly, based upon established
authority, we must reject the real parties’ contention that appraisal was not a condition
precedent to suit.
H. Waiver
Seventh, and finally, the real parties contend that Germania waived its right to
appraisal because it unreasonably delayed in requesting it. “In order to establish waiver
[of an appraisal clause], a party must show that an impasse was reached, and that any
failure to demand appraisal within a reasonable time prejudiced the opposing party.” In re
Universal Underwriters of Tex. Ins., 345 S.W.3d at 412. We measure the reasonableness
of the delay from the point of impasse, which is “a mutual understanding that neither
[party] will negotiate further.” Id. at 410.
The real parties contend that the impasse between the parties occurred on June
4, 2023, 3 when Germania denied their claim, yet Germania did not request appraisal until
April 24, 2024. Germania disagrees and asserts that its June 4, 2023 letter, which
instructed the real parties to notify it if they discovered any new information or had any
3 The real parties’ identification of the “impasse” date has wavered from June 4, 2023, as argued
in this original proceeding, to August 19, 2023, as asserted in the real parties’ response to Germania’s
motion to compel appraisal.
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questions, “reflects a clear willingness to negotiate and work together to resolve this
claim.” Germania further argues that the real parties’ statutory notice letter sent on August
25, 2023, expressly provides that they are “open to good faith discussions with the insurer
and/or its counsel as to the proper value of this claim,” and they “look forward to
discussing this matter to avoid the additional time, expenses, and costs of litigation on
both sides.”
Here, Germania invoked appraisal within the time limitation contained in its
insurance policy. The real parties’ statutory notice letter of August 25, 2023, clearly
indicates that the real parties did not understand that an impasse had been reached by
that date. The real parties filed suit on January 26, 2024, Germania filed its motion to
abate for appraisal on April 23, 2024, and Germania filed its motion to compel appraisal
on May 13, 2024, less than four months later. In any event, “[w]e will not infer waiver
where neither explicit language nor conduct indicates that such was the party’s intent.”
Id. The record before us fails to include any such language or conduct. See id.
Accordingly, we conclude that Germania did not waive its right to seek appraisal through
delay. See id.
I. Summary
We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Germania’s
motion to compel appraisal, and Germania lacks an adequate remedy by appeal to
address this error. See In re Universal Underwriters of Tex. Ins., 345 S.W.3d at 412; In re
SureChoice Underwriters Reciprocal Exch., 702 S.W.3d at 882; In re Acceptance Indem.
Ins., 562 S.W.3d at 649; In re Allstate Vehicle & Prop. Ins., 542 S.W.3d at 822. We sustain
the issue presented by Germania in this original proceeding.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Court, having examined and fully considered Germania’s petition for writ of
mandamus, the real parties’ response, Germania’s reply, and the applicable law, is of the
opinion that Germania has met its burden to obtain relief. We conditionally grant the
petition for writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to: (1) vacate its August 27, 2024
order denying Germania’s motion to compel appraisal and its February 10, 2025 order
denying reconsideration of that ruling; and (2) grant Germania’s motion to compel
appraisal. Our writ will issue only if the trial court fails to comply.
JON WEST
Justice
Delivered and filed on the
22nd day of July, 2025.
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