In the Interest of L.R., a Child v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-25-00153-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN THE INTEREST OF L.R., A CHILD

ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 5
OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices West and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Tijerina

Appellant B.F. (Mother) appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights

to her minor child, L.R.1 By one issue, Mother contends that the evidence was legally and

factually insufficient to support a finding that terminating Mother’s parental rights was in

L.R.’s best interest. We affirm.

1 We refer to the parties and the child by aliases in accordance with the rules of appellate

procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
I. BACKGROUND

Brianna Rodriguez, an investigator with appellee the Texas Department of Family

and Protective Services (the Department) testified that the Department “received a report

alleging neglectful supervision,” and “[t]here were concerns for the newborn child and

concerns of drug use.” Rodriguez met Mother at the hospital where L.R. was born and

informed Mother “of the report that [the Department] had received” concerning L.R.

Although she initially denied drug use, Mother eventually “did admit to drug usage” of

methamphetamine and marijuana one “month prior to her delivery.” Rodriguez asked

Mother to participate in services, but Mother “did not want to complete any drug screens

or hair follicle tests.”

Mother informed Rodriguez that “she was living with some friends”; however, those

friends told Rodriguez that Mother “had not been living with them for months.” Rodriguez

stated that the family members that Mother designated were not willing to help.

Specifically, Rodriguez spoke to L.R.’s maternal grandmother, “some of [Mother’s] older

children,” a father of one of Mother’s other children, and an “alleged paternal uncle and

his wife.” Rodriguez attempted to contact the man Mother claimed was L.R.’s father, J.B.,

but she was only able to speak to J.B.’s mother. Rodriguez stated, “[J.B.] never got back

with me.”2 According to Rodriguez, she was unable to determine “where [L.R.] would

have been residing,” and the Department attempted “to screen” people Mother claimed

to be living with “to see if they would have been appropriate, to see if the child could go

there.” However, the people “did not pass [the Department’s] background checks.”

2 J.B. complied with genetic testing, and it was determined that J.B. is not L.R.’s father.

2
On cross-examination, Rodriguez agreed that L.R. spent several weeks in the

hospital after his birth due to flu and respiratory issues. Rodriguez acknowledged that

Mother had shown affection for L.R. and was interested in his health. According to

Rodriguez, the Department could have recommended that L.R. not be removed from

Mother’s custody but instead recommended removal because “[t]hat has been done in

the past [with her other children] and it did not work,” and “[t]here was a risk and there

was potential danger.” Rodriguez explained that after the case was “staffed,” the

Department determined that it was not in L.R.’s best interest to allow L.R. to remain in

Mother’s custody. Removal of L.R. occurred after an adversarial hearing.

Delia Olivo, a Department caseworker, testified that initially reunification with the

parent is the goal. Olivo explained that the Department directs parents to services to help

the parent “figure out some of the new changes that need to occur to making their lives

with their child [better].” According to Olivo, the initial goal for L.R., a one-year-old child

at the time of the trial, was reunification with Mother, and “[t]he goal now is termination of

parental rights.” When asked how the goal changed, Olivo replied that “halfway” through

the case, usually about six months, the Department evaluates whether the parent is

“showing that they’ve mitigated the reasons for removal, are they participating in services,

how are they doing with visits.” According to Olivo, Mother had a history with the

Department and other children, and this was not Mother’s “first time in the conservatorship

phase.” Mother had eleven “intakes that have come into the Department” at the time of

the trial, six of which had been “ruled out,” meaning the Department had no concerns,

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and four of the intakes were “reason to believe.”3

Olivo testified that Mother was asked to complete individual counseling, mental

health counseling, parenting classes, drug and alcohol assessment and the

recommended treatments, random drug testing, a psychological evaluation, drug court

evaluation, and visitation with L.R. Olivo stated that although Mother completed the

majority of the required services, she did not complete the random drug testing, which

included urine, hair follicle, and alcohol testing. Olivo testified that Mother informed her

that “she was not going to drug test anymore. She was tired of this, and she was just not

going to do it.” Olivo encouraged Mother to get the drug testing, “and she was adamant

that she was not going to do it.” Mother failed to appear for thirteen of twenty-one

scheduled drug tests.

Olivo stated that Mother’s noncompliance with court-ordered drug testing

concerned her. Olivo explained that Mother “has a history of drug usage,” and before the

Department could allow L.R. to return to Mother’s custody, the Department had to ensure

“that there is no drug usage and that [L.R.] would be safe in her care.” According to Olivo,

Mother’s visitation with L.R. was paused because Mother did not comply with drug testing,

and, per a court order, Mother’s visitation would have been reinstated had she done so.

Olivo testified that had Mother complied with drug testing as required, some of the

Department’s concerns would have been alleviated.

Olivo stated that Mother reported for a drug test in September 2024; however,

according to Olivo, the test was not considered and the circumstances caused Olivo to

3 Olivo did not explain what the Department’s concerns entailed.

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have concerns as to the other drug tests Mother submitted. Olivo was not allowed to

explain why the test was not considered or the circumstances that led to her concerns

about Mother’s other tests. Olivo also became concerned because in September 2024,

Mother shaved her head, and Mother was required to submit for hair follicle testing, “and

her hair was so shaved that [they] couldn’t get anything.” Olivo testified that three of

Mother’s other children had been removed from her custody due to concerns about

Mother’s “drug usage.”

Mother had a job and worked two days a week. Olivo testified that Mother had

transportation barriers and “through the life of this case, she did not have . . . a stable

home. So, she just kind of jumped from place to place.” However, Olivo commented that

despite these barriers, Mother “was still attending her services.” Mother told Olivo “that

she didn’t have a home so she goes to different homes and stays there.” Olivo said,

“[U]sually, we go to the homes and check the homes out, make sure that the homes are

safe and there’s not any danger in the home.” Olivo stated that if L.R. were returned to

Mother’s custody she “wouldn’t know where [Mother] would live with [him].”

Olivo relayed that Mother “loves” L.R., “and she was really good with the visitation.”

Olivo said, “She played with him. She talked to him. She rocked him to sleep. So, visits

were good.” Eventually, Mother was allowed unsupervised visits with L.R. Mother had

one unsupervised visit “at her home [on August 6, 2024].” According to Olivo an issue

occurred because when L.R.’s caregiver took him to Mother’s home “there was an

altercation . . . not with [Mother], but [between] the owner of the home, [Mother’s] ex-

boyfriend and his mother, in front of [L.R.] and the caregiver got scared along with her

daughter.” Olivo said Mother “[a]lso . . . did a Facebook posting stating that she wanted

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to kill herself,” which the Department “brought it to the Court’s attention,” which

“suspend[ed] the unsupervised visits and [gave] her visits three times a week supervised.”

In May 2024, L.R. was moved from his first foster home and placed “in a substitute

home” after Mother provided information about the family to the Department. The new

foster parents offered to adopt L.R. According to Olivo, L.R. is “doing very well” and “looks

very healthy.” Olivo stated that his foster parents “want [L.R.] to be there. They do what

they need to do to take good care of him.” Olivo noted that because he was born

premature, L.R. is “behind on his milestones. So, he’s . . . a little bit behind or delayed,”

and he has an inhaler. Olivo said that L.R. “rolls over, he responds. You know, he can

laugh and giggle, but as far as crawling and walking, we’re not there” because “his legs

were not strong enough.”

Olivo stated that the Department “would like to make sure that Mother is sober”

and “that she has a home, a safe home for her child.” Regarding what she believed would

be in L.R.’s best interest, Olivo said, “To have a safe environment where the child is safe

and he would be protected.”

S.B., L.R.’s twenty-four-year-old sister, testified that she is Mother’s oldest child,

and she has six siblings, M.M., R.F., M.R., E.F., K.R., and L.R. S.B. stated that: M.M.

“grew up” with Mother “here and there”; R.F. left Mother’s custody in 2014 at the age of

fifteen to live with her father; M.R. did not stay with Mother either and now lives with her

grandmother; E.F. lives with his father; and S.B. has custody of K.R. Mother’s parental

rights to K.R. were not terminated; however, S.B. had been appointed K.R.’s permanent

managing conservator when S.B. was a baby.

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S.B. was “removed” from Mother’s custody in 2015 when she was fifteen years

old. S.B. explained that Mother had been a “good mom,” but after she was divorced,

“[e]verything just started falling apart.” The Department asked, “Today, if the Court were

to release [L.R.] to [Mother], would you have any concerns?” S.B. replied, “Yes. Plenty.”

S.B. explained, “No home. Her health. Her mental state. Things that she does. I . . . can’t

say I trust her with [K.R.].” S.B. reiterated that she had concerns about Mother’s “mental

health” and “[s]moking.” S.B. testified that Mother “bounces from house to house,” and

she has “dropped her off two different places.” Regarding her contact with Mother, S.B.

said that she has “tried, but at this point, I’m done.” S.B. testified that Mother’s family has

“tried” to help and support her, but “she didn’t want it.”

S.B. testified that she had allowed Mother to have visitation with K.R., who was in

“pre-K” at the time of the trial. S.B. said, “I tried for four years. I did it, took it away, did it,

took it away.” The Department asked why S.B. stopped allowing discretionary visitation.

S.B. responded:

Her attitude, demeanor. The way she would tell [K.R.] I’m not her real mom,
and that was a problem to me. I sat here and raised that little girl since she
was a baby. I provided everything for her. You know, to me, that’s not okay.
I . . . was 19. Working, going to school. I stepped up and took that baby and
I didn’t have to.

S.B. clarified that Mother still had supervised visitation with K.R., and she merely ended

the discretionary visitations.

When asked why she had appeared to testify, S.B. said, “I want the best for [L.R.],

and I don’t think it’s with her.” When asked how she felt about L.R.’s current caregivers,

S.B. stated, “Amazing. They’re . . . fine. I’ve grown up [knowing] their family . . . before

me and my sister getting removed [from Mother].” S.B. had no concerns about L.R. being

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in the current caregivers’ custody indefinitely. S.B. believed that L.R. would be “safe” with

the current caregivers and wanted them to continue having custody of L.R.

Chester Jones, Mother’s therapist, testified that he provided individual counseling

to Mother, which began in September 2024. Jones stated that Mother suffered from “post-

traumatic stress disorder with concurrent disorder of substance abuse,” and she has

anger issues. Mother’s last session with Jones was on January 7, 2025. Jones believed

that he and Mother had a “great rapport” and stated, “She was engaged. Just the only

difficulty was the instability and the lack of accountability for some of the choices she was

making.” Jones clarified that Mother had instability in “[h]ousing.” The Department asked,

“To this day, do you know what [Mother’s] housing situation is like?” Jones replied, “No.”

Jones agreed that it is “important” for someone “who has a substance abuse

disorder . . . to continue drug testing” and that it “[w]ould be concerning . . . if that person

did not continue drug testing.”

Jones believed that Mother had been compliant and that with assistance, she could

“conquer these very strong feelings that she has.” Jones said, “But when I met with her

on the 7th, she was compliant. She was engaged. She was willing to listen to the

interventions that was provided as far as the coping skills so she did well there.” Jones

testified that Mother “made some progress” but needed “a longer duration of counseling.”

According to Jones, with proper therapy, Mother had the potential of “becoming a good

parent for” L.R. Jones did not believe termination was in L.R.’s best interest.

Jones testified that he met with Mother in September 2024 one time, October 2024

three times, did not meet with Mother in November and December 2024, and met once

with Mother in January 2025. Jones acknowledged that he did not believe that Mother

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had shown accountability. He explained:

So, based on our sessions, [Mother] did explain that she has multiple kids
that she doesn’t have guardianship over. So, the most recent child, the
baby, she’s blaming the State for taking away her children and . . . she’s not
seeing . . . her own choices and her own behavior of why is that so. And
she . . . did allow me to educate her on how the system works. I did explain
to her that the State is not here to take away your children. She’s having a
hard time dealing with that. So, that’s what I mean about accountability.

The Department asked, “If the Court today were to release [L.R.] to [Mother’s] care, do

you think that she has the ability to care for herself and for [L.R.] at this time?” Jones

replied, “No.” Jones clarified as followed:

When I met with [Mother] on the 7th, she was staying at her mother’s mobile
home and . . . it wasn’t a place of stability. She wasn’t really sure she was
even going to stay there long enough. Also, from a financial standpoint. She
is working some hours here and there, but as far as her income standpoint,
just being in a position to be able to provide for the child financially, as well,
is a concern also. Once again, dealing with the accountability. Not being
accountable. Still working on some anger. There’s some concerns there, as
well, mentally.

According to Mother, for approximately one or two months prior to the trial, she

had “stay[ed] between [a] house [owned by T.A., a woman she calls her adoptive mother,]

and a [house owned by a] friend . . . named Jared.” Mother clarified she alternates

between the two homes “[a]bout every other week. It’s like a week on, week off, like I’m

staying with my parents basically. But I stay a week with my mom and then a week at

Jared’s.” Mother stated that she also stayed with her “biological mother and [S.B.] when

[she] would visit [K.R.] off and on.” Mother testified that prior to the current arrangement,

she has “always stayed back and forth with Jared.” She said that she “helps him with

some of his household necessities and stuff like that.”

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Mother does not permanently stay with Jared “[p]artly because” she does not “want

to invade in his space.” Mother said, “I’m not going to live under anybody’s roof where I

either feel disrespected or I feel like I have to put out . . . not that I have to put out with

Jared in any kind of way, but he has female friends that come over that will just be a big

disturbed [sic] problem for myself if I was to stay there constantly.” Regarding Jared’s

female friends, Mother stated that she has her own bedroom in the house, and she was

not concerned about his personal life.

Mother explained the reason she does not live permanently with T.A. as follows:

Mental health between herself and myself, but it’s more on myself. Triggers
that I have of a memory or I, like, get a certain feeling because of her tone
or how she acts. Not saying that that’s how it is, but my assumption or my
judgment of before I even talk to her or ask, I just take off.

Later Mother testified that if L.R. were returned to her, she would stay with T.A. despite

the mental health issues, stating: “[T.A.] has the same struggle that I do as we’re working

together to fix those areas.” Mother was aware that T.A. had a criminal history but was

not aware of “exactly the charge.” Mother was aware that T.A. had a past problem with

drug usage, which according to Mother, T.A. overcame.

Mother began working at a local convention center approximately two months or

“a little longer” before the trial. Mother agreed that she has had “stability issues” and that

she was “still working on that today.” Mother testified that although she had been

“accepted into housing,” she could not “come up with the deposit at that time and the

Department” could not help her “secure the apartment.” Mother explained that she could

not find a place to live “on her own” with her salary.

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Mother has been put on a waiting list for an apartment in Flour Bluff, Texas. Mother

clarified however that she planned to continue moving back and forth from T.A.’s house

to Jared’s house if L.R. were returned to her. Mother explained that it is her responsibility

to take care of L.R., and she would not place that responsibility on T.A. or Jared.

Mother denied telling Rodriguez that she used methamphetamine while pregnant

and claimed that she told Rodriguez that she only used marijuana “a month prior to” L.R.’s

birth. The Department asked, “You didn’t tell her that you used methamphetamines?”

Mother replied, “Amphetamines was a past usage. That if there was usage of the

methamphetamines, I was not sure about it, but all I did was smoke a joint prior to the

month of me having [L.R.].”

Mother acknowledged that she had “previous Child Protective Services cases” and

that “[s]ome of [those cases] resulted in removals in which the children were no longer in

[her] care, although [her] rights weren’t terminated.” Mother agreed that in one of the

cases, drug use had been an issue and said, “The other cases, no. It’s more defiance.”

Mother explained, “Just I’m not going to do their safety or service plans. They don’t like it

when [I] tell them no.” Mother said she stopped drug testing because she had not wanted

“to do services.” Mother understood that the services were court-ordered and that “one of

the grounds for termination of [her] parental rights” is her failure to complete the services.

Mother decided to stop the drug testing despite knowing that her parental rights would be

terminated.

According to Mother, she did not complete the urinalysis test on September 13,

2024, because she “could not pee.” Mother explained that she went to take the test and

was waiting, and “the ladies were weird that day, and [she] felt like all eyes . . . it was just

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not comfortable.” Mother said, “So, no, I could not pee that day. I told them I can come

back later on this afternoon. They said, no, once you leave, that’s it.” That was the last

time Mother went to take a drug test.

Mother testified that she would like L.R. returned to her. Mother stated, “I have not

had a chance to be a mom to him. I’ve been robbed of that . . . [b]ecause they had no

grounds to actually have this case open.”

Mother stated that when she was given unsupervised visitation with L.R. in August

2024, she posted a message on Facebook because she was “down that day.” Mother

said, “I wouldn’t say my mental health . . . it was a diary, in a sense. If I was to have a

diary, that would probably have been what it said.” The trial court admitted a copy of the

Facebook message, which states, in relevant part,

I wish my life would just end already in [sic] sick and tiered [sic] of doing
doing doing and trying to never let situations and challenges change why
and how [I] am but I’m literally just don’t want to exist anymore[.] I’m tiered
[sic] of trying to life life and my my [sic] own Choices.

The Department asked, “Well, in regards to this one post, you mentioned self harm, right?”

Mother replied, “No, I did not mention self harm. I just said I wish my life was . . . like, poor

choices of words, but I don’t remember putting in there that I wish I was dead or that I

wish I was harming myself. I just wish that it would end.” The Department asked whether

Mother believed that her Facebook “post had anything to do with” the termination of her

unsupervised visits with L.R. Mother said, “I mean, they say that it did and I can

understand why, but it’s about a power control with them a lot of times.”

Mother agreed that she had not raised her other children until their eighteenth

birthday. Mother explained that S.B. and her other siblings had been “removed.” The

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Department asked, “What about the other five children?” Mother replied,

No, my mom handed my second one over when she was an adult. I didn’t
have a choice in that one because by the time my mom handed her over to
her dad, I didn’t get to go pick her up or get her back because the dad knew
his rights and exercised them. So, I did not get to see that child again until
she was five. After that one, [R.F.], well, they were taken by the Department.
Her and [S.B.]. They stayed with my ex-husband, which, at the time, was
just a boyfriend for approximately two to three years. In that third year, I
exercised my rights and I came up with money and I hired a lawyer and I
got them back.

The Department asked, “Do you visit your other children?” Mother said,

Yes, I do. [M.M. is] the only one I have not visited. [R.F.] does not want to
talk to me and I’m not going to push the issue because, I’m sorry, I’m going
to try to be a respectful mom and honor her wishes. When she’s ready,
she’ll find a way to reach out to me. That’s all I can say. As much as it hurts.
She’ll reach out to me when she’s ready.

And as far as my son, I visit him and talk to him almost every other
day, every couple weeks. It all depends on what he has going on at school
and what he’s doing because, again, I’m not a pushover mom. I’m not going
to tell them you have to contact me. You have to do this, you have to do
that. It gets you nowhere.

M.D., L.R.’s foster mother, testified that L.R. had been in her home since May

2024, and that he is “doing absolutely amazing.” M.D. stated that she loves L.R. and

would adopt him if Mother’s parental rights are terminated. M.D. lives with her husband,

her four-year-old daughter, and L.R. Because M.D. works, L.R. “goes to daycare Monday

through Friday [from 7:30 until 5:00] and then on the weekends, [M.D.’s] husband takes

care of him.” M.D. testified that she has “bonded with him.”

L.R. had respiratory issues when he was first placed in M.D.’s home, and “he has

asthma.” According to M.D., those issues have been alleviated. L.R. is healthy; however,

he is unable to stand up fully by himself as he has “delays” due to his premature birth.

L.R. appears to be happy.

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M.D. has known Mother for seven years. M.D. would allow Mother visitation with

L.R. if “she were to be clean” because M.D. is concerned about Mother’s drug usage.

M.D. preferred that any visitation take place “in a public setting.” M.D. agreed that she is

willing to help L.R. maintain a relationship with his siblings. M.D. believes that it is in L.R.’s

best interest that Mother’s parental rights are terminated.

Jennifer Del Bosque, an examiner and drug tester with Precision DNA, testified

that she monitored Mother take a drug test on September 13, 2024, when another

employee asked her to assist with Mother’s drug screening. Del Bosque explained that

because Mother’s tests were supposed to be observed, “[t]he door has to be open” and

she had to “look” at Mother “while [she was] using the restroom.”

Another employee gave Mother an open cup to collect her urine, Mother took the

cup, Del Bosque observed Mother sit on the toilet, “she placed both hands underneath

herself and, at that moment, when she placed her hands underneath, [Del Bosque]

hear[d], like a popping sound,” and the cup fell. Del Bosque did not see or hear Mother

urinate. Del Bosque said, “So, when the cup fell, [Mother] kind of, like freaked out

and . . . she cussed and she was just like I can’t wait, I can’t wait, I can’t wait.” Del Bosque

told Mother, “[W]ell, if you leave, we’re going to have to put you as a refusal.”

Del Bosque testified that Mother left so fast that she was not able to provide “a

copy of the paper that said that . . . it was a refusal because she just took off straight out

the door.” Del Bosque also observed the cup with some urine in the toilet. She collected

the cup, and “there wasn’t a temperature reading.” Del Bosque explained that the cup has

“a strip on there [that have] little bubbles . . . [that will] tell you the temperature . . . when

somebody urinates in the cup, it’ll give you that reading.” Del Bosque said, “If . . . the

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bubbles aren’t within that reading, then that means that the urine that was brought in was

already cold or it was super hot.” Del Bosque clarified that even when a cup falls into the

toilet, the temperature “is not going to change.”

After collecting the cup, Del Bosque flushed the toilet, and she “observed that there

was . . . some kind of plastic inside the toilet, but at that moment, [she] was already

flushing the toilet . . . but [she] couldn’t grab it.” Del Bosque reported the incident to the

Department, and she found the incident abnormal and insinuated that Mother was trying

to provide a fake sample of urine. Del Bosque opined, “So, as far as, you know, why is

somebody in a rush like that, in my past experience, it’s always been because they bring

in something that they’re not supposed to have whenever it comes to drug testing.”

On March 7, 2025, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights on the basis

that Mother violated § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (O), and (P) of the Texas Family Code and that

termination was in L.R.’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (O),

and (P), § 161.001(b)(2). This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Involuntary termination of parental rights involves fundamental constitutional rights

and divests the parent and child of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and powers normally

existing between them, except for the child’s right to inherit from the parent. Holick v.

Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985); see In re D.S.P., 210 S.W.3d 776, 778 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2006, no pet.). Therefore, termination of the parent-child

relationship must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d

79, 84 (Tex. 2005); In re D.S.P., 210 S.W.3d at 778. Before terminating the parent-child

relationship, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the parent

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committed one of the acts or omissions prohibited by § 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family

Code. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1); In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d at 84. The trial court

must also find by clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is in

the children’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2); see id. § 153.002 (“The

best interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration of the court in

determining the issues of conservatorship and possession of and access to the child.”).

The “clear and convincing” standard falls between the preponderance of the

evidence standard and the reasonable doubt standard. In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847

(Tex. 1980); Porter v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 105 S.W.3d 52, 57 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.). Clear and convincing evidence is “the

measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or

conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN. § 101.007.

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting parental termination,

we must “look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine

whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its

finding was true.” In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d at 85 (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266

(Tex. 2002)); In re D.S.P., 210 S.W.3d at 778. We must assume that the trier of fact

resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if it was reasonable to do so. In re J.L., 163

S.W.3d at 85 (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266). Under a factual sufficiency

standard, we consider whether the

disputed evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could not have
resolved the disputed evidence in favor of its finding. If, in light of the entire
record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable fact finder could not have

16
credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a fact finder could not
reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is
factually insufficient.

In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.

III. APPLICABLE LAW

In Holley v. Adams, the Texas Supreme Court provided the following nonexclusive

list of factors for the trier of fact in a termination case to use in determining the best interest

of the child: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child

now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the

future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs

available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans

for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the

home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate

that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the

acts or omissions of the parent. 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976).

IV. DISCUSSION

There is evidence that during the pendency of the case, Mother did not tend to her

own mental health needs and was unable to visit with L.R. while he was not in her custody

because she refused to take the required drug tests. See In re C.A.J., 122 S.W.3d 888,

893 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (providing that the trial court may consider the

parent’s inability to provide adequate care, lack of parenting skills, and poor judgment in

best-interest analysis). Mother admitted that she used methamphetamines and marijuana

while knowing that she was pregnant with L.R. “A mother’s use of illegal drugs during

pregnancy endangers the physical wellbeing of her unborn child.” In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d

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595, 608 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied); In re C.A.J., 122 S.W.3d at

893 (explaining that a mother’s drug use during pregnancy is a factor to consider in a

best-interest analysis); see In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 749 (Tex. 2022) (“Mother’s use

of controlled substances while pregnant created a dangerous environment for J.W.”); see

also In re K.N., No. 02-13-00062-CV, 2013 WL 3325104, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

June 27, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (considering mother’s drug use during pregnancy in

best-interest determination). Furthermore, “[a] continuing pattern of illegal drug

use . . . implicates most of the Holley factors and will support a finding that termination of

parental rights is in a child’s best interest.” In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d at 607. Here, the

evidence supports a finding that Mother has exhibited a continuing pattern of drug use in

this case and in the past, which resulted in her losing custody to some of her children.

See id.; see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(8) (providing that the fact finder may

consider a parent’s history of substance abuse in best-interest determination); In re

A.M.O., No. 04-17-00798-CV, 2018 WL 2222207, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, May

16, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A parent’s illegal drug use supports a finding that

termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interest of the child.”).

Moreover, “a fact finder reasonably can infer that a parent’s failure to submit to

court-ordered drug tests indicates the parent is avoiding testing because they were using

illegal drugs.” In re E.R.W., 528 S.W.3d 251, 265 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017,

no pet.). Therefore, the fact finder was free to infer that Mother continued to use illegal

drugs during the pendency of the case. See id. Evidence that Mother used illegal drugs,

failed to comply with drug testing, and refused a urine drug test knowing that she would

not be allowed to visit L.R. supports a finding that returning L.R. to Mother is not in L.R.’s

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best interest. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72; see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 263.307(b)(8); In re A.M.O., 2018 WL 2222207, at *2; In re K.N., No. 02-13-00062-CV,

2013 WL 3325104, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 27, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(considering mother’s drug use during pregnancy in best-interest determination). This is

because “drug use can destabilize the home and expose children to physical and

emotional harm if not resolved.” In re A.L.S., 660 S.W.3d 257, 275–76 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 2022, pet. denied). Fact finders may give “great weight” to evidence of Mother’s

drug-related conduct. See In re L.G.R., 498 S.W.3d 195, 204 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re K.N., 2013 WL

3325104, at *6; In re A.M.O., 2018 WL 2222207, at *2.

Additionally, “[a] fact finder may infer from a parent’s failure to take the initiative to

complete the services required to regain possession of his child that he does not have

the ability to motivate himself to seek out available resources needed now or in the future.”

In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 270 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).

Here, Mother admitted that although she knew she would not have visitation with L.R.

and potentially lose her parental rights by not submitting to drug testing, she refused to

do so and in fact shaved her head, which prevented hair follicle testing from being done.

See id. There is also evidence that Mother attempted to provide a false urine sample for

drug testing. See id. These acts support a reasonable inference that returning L.R. to

Mother is not in his best interest. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72; see also TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(8); In re A.M.O., 2018 WL 2222207, at *2.

Mother testified that she refused to take the required drug tests although she knew

that she would not be allowed to visit L.R. because she was tired and frustrated with the

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Department’s requests. However, the evidence showed that Mother stopped complying

with the drug tests after she apparently attempted to alter the results of the urine test. The

fact finder could have disbelieved Mother’s testimony and reasonably found that she

stopped complying with the tests because she would not pass them. In re C.A.B., 289

S.W.3d 874, 885 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“A factfinder reasonably

could infer that Aja’s failure to submit to the court-ordered drug screening indicated she

was avoiding testing because she was using drugs.”); In re O.L.W., No. 04-24-00208-CV,

2024 WL 3588395, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 31, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.)

(“Like illegal drug use, failure to submit to drug testing—through which the trial court could

infer illegal drug abuse—is relevant to multiple best-interest considerations.”). Thus, the

fact finder could have reasonably concluded that Mother’s non-compliance with the

Department and failure to visit with L.R. showed a lack of interest in retaining her parental

rights. See In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d at 270; see also In re C.J.P., No. 04-24-00458-CV,

2024 WL 5195302, at *12 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 23, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.).

This evidence supports the best interest finding. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex.

2002) (providing that the same evidence of acts or omissions used to establish grounds

for termination under § 161.001(b)(1) may be probative in determining the best interests

of the child); Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 312 S.W.3d 608, 619 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (noting that the parent lacked parental

abilities and showed no interest in caring for the children, which supported a finding that

termination was in the children’s best interest); In re C.E.K., 214 S.W.3d 492, 498 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (setting out that parents need to maintain stability for the

children); see also In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 362 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

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2014, pet. denied) (“Failure to maintain stability endangers the child’s physical and

emotional well-being.”).

It is a compelling state interest to establish a stable and permanent home for L.R.,

and the Department has shown that Mother has been unable to do so. See In re S.R.,

452 S.W.3d at 367 (“Lack of stability, including a stable home, supports a finding that the

parent is unable to provide for a child’s emotional and physical needs.”). Whether L.R.

has achieved permanency with his foster family is an important factor to consider in a

best interest analysis. See In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 747 (“Importantly, given the child-

centered focus of the best-interest inquiry, we may not discount or minimize the level of

permanence J.W. has achieved with his foster family, with whom he has lived since he

was a month old.”). The foster parents intend to adopt L.R., and several of the witnesses

testified that it would be in L.R.’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights. See

In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 470 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.)

(“[W]e . . . presume that prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe

environment is in the child’s best interest.”). Moreover, Mother has not established a

stable home environment for L.R. as she has moved several times during the pendency

of the case from one home to another. See In re C.E.K., 214 S.W.3d at 498; Doyle v. Tex.

Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 16 S.W.3d 390, 398 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, pet.

denied) (concluding that termination is in the child’s best interest when there is evidence

that the parent failed to provide a stable home and provide for a child’s needs); see also

In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d at 362.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, we

conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that

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that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in L.R.’s best interest. See In re J.L., 163

S.W.3d at 85; In re D.S.P., 210 S.W.3d at 778. Moreover, in light of all of the evidence,

the fact finder could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of

Mother’s parental rights was in L.R.’s best interest. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support

the trial court’s finding that termination is in L.R.’s best interest. We overrule Mother’s sole

issue.

V. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

JAIME TIJERINA
Chief Justice

Delivered and filed on the
7th day of August, 2025.

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