Quentin Lamar McClure v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-24-00619-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

QUENTIN LAMAR MCCLURE, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 148TH DISTRICT COURT
OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Silva, Peña, and Cron
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Cron

Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant Quentin Lamar McClure pleaded guilty to

the offense of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit a felony other than theft, a

first-degree felony, and the trial court placed him on deferred adjudication community

supervision for a period of four years. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(d). The State
later moved to revoke McClure’s supervision, alleging that he violated three separate

conditions of his supervision. After a contested hearing, the trial court found two of the

allegations “true,” revoked McClure’s supervision, adjudicated him guilty of the underlying

offense, and sentenced him to seven years’ incarceration. By a single issue, McClure

argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that

he violated the terms of his supervision. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

McClure’s estranged wife, Janell Jackson, is the complainant in the underlying

offense. McClure was accused of breaking a window at Jackson’s house and threatening

to shoot her because she would not let him see their three children. The record reflects

that Jackson does not allow McClure to see their children because she has serious

concerns about his mental health.

Jackson attended the plea hearing, and the State represented to the trial court that

the plea agreement reflected Jackson’s wishes. The State also represented to the trial

court that the conditions of McClure’s community supervision were specifically bargained

for. One of those conditions required McClure to complete a mental health evaluation,

and if deemed “appropriate,” participate in the mental health specialized caseload or any

other mental health service, whether inpatient or outpatient, as directed.

The State alleged in its motion that McClure violated this condition because he

“failed to participate in mental health treatment as directed.” McClure pleaded “not true”

to this allegation. He acknowledged during his testimony that, pursuant to his mental

health evaluation at the Nueces Center for Mental Health and Intellectual Disabilities

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(MHID), he was placed in “Service Package 1,” and a psychiatrist had prescribed him

certain medication. However, he told the psychiatrist that he “did not want to take the

medication,” preferring not to put “chemicals in [his] body that don’t come from nature.” In

making this choice, McClure said he appreciated that he would not be allowed to

“participate with the case management” because he was “not compliant with medication.”

In fact, McClure suggested that he was uniquely familiar with MHID’s policies because he

previously worked as “a caseworker at MHID.” McClure acknowledged that MHID “closed

out [his] case” because of his election to not take the prescribed medication.

Denisha Deases, who was not McClure’s probation officer but testified as “the

custodian of the file,” testified similarly. When asked whether McClure participated in the

mental health caseload, she testified as follows:

So he did go do a mental health evaluation on March the 27th of 2024. He
signed some paperwork with MHID stating that he would be in Level I care
where he would see a psychiatrist, do routine case management, it’s where
he sees a caseworker, ha[s] visits with the psychiatrist to ensure the
medication is working, and do[es] . . . some kind of skills training. This is the
last paperwork from March the 27th that we have from MHID. They did not
have any paperwork after that, after March of ’24, of him going back to
MHID.

Deases agreed that this sequence of events meant that McClure had not participated in

the mental health caseload as required by the terms of his supervision. The “paperwork”

Dease referred to in her testimony was not admitted into evidence.

The trial court found this allegation “true” and disposed of McClure’s case as

described above. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW

We review a trial court’s decision to revoke a defendant’s community supervision

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for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Waters, 560 S.W.3d 651, 661 (Tex. Crim. App.

2018) (“[A] trial judge has broad discretion in ruling on a revocation motion.”). “To convict

a defendant of a crime, the State must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but to

revoke probation (whether it be regular probation or deferred adjudication), the State need

prove the violation of a condition of probation only by a preponderance of the evidence.”

Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 864–65 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). In other words, the

State need only show that the greater weight of the credible evidence creates a

reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition of his probation. Rickels v.

State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763–64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Only one sufficient ground is

necessary to support a trial court’s decision to revoke community supervision. Smith v.

State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Conversely, a trial court abuses its

discretion by revoking community supervision when the State has failed to meet its

burden of proof. Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). We

examine the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Jones v. State,

112 S.W.3d 266, 268 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.).

III. ANALYSIS

It is undisputed that McClure complied with the requirement that he submit to a

mental health evaluation. McClure argues that the State failed to prove that he “was

deemed ‘appropriate’ for services or was ever given the order of which mental health

service to attend.” Describing her testimony as “general,” McClure notes that Deases was

not his probation officer and only testified as “the custodian of [his] file.” He also points

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out that none of the “paperwork” she based her testimony on was admitted into evidence. 1

But in solely focusing on the perceived weaknesses in Deases’s testimony,

McClure fails to contend with his own testimony. McClure himself testified that after taking

his mental health evaluation at MHID, he was placed in “Service Package 1” and

prescribed certain medication. He further testified that he refused to take the medication

knowing that he would not be allowed to “participate with the case management” because

he was “not compliant with medication” and that MHID “closed out [his] case” after he

informed the psychiatrist of his decision. Deases’s testimony merely corroborated

McClure’s admission that he effectively chose not to participate in mental health services

that were deemed “appropriate” by MHID. As Deases explained, “Level 1 care” includes

meeting with a caseworker, follow up visits with a psychiatrist “to ensure the medication

is working,” and participating in skills training.

Viewing the forgoing evidence in the proper light, see Jones, 112 S.W.3d at 268,

1 To the extent that McClure also complains on appeal that Deases’s testimony was inadmissible

because it violated some unidentified rule of evidence, we conclude that he failed to preserve any such
argument in the trial court. The formal rules of evidence apply in revocation proceedings. Ex parte Doan,
369 S.W.3d 205, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citing TEX. R. EVID. 101(b), (d)(1)). This means that appellate
complaints about the admissibility of evidence in a revocation proceeding must be preserved in the trial
court with a timely objection. Flores v. State, 129 S.W.3d 169, 173 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg
2004, no pet.); see TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(1); TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). Here, Deases testified without objection,
and thus, there is no evidentiary complaint for us to review. See Flores, 129 S.W.3d at 173; TEX. R. EVID.
103(a)(1); TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). In any event, when conducting a legal sufficiency review, we consider
all admitted evidence, including evidence that may have been improperly admitted. Moff v. State, 131
S.W.3d 485, 489–90 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

We also note that McClure does not argue that MHID’s compliant-with-medication policy—which
apparently prevented him from participating in mental health services—was capricious or unrelated to the
purposes of community supervision. See Leonard v. State, 385 S.W.3d 570, 576–77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)
(explaining that when the State alleges that a defendant violated a condition of supervision by failing to
successfully complete or participate in a program or service provided by a third-party, and that third-party
exercised its discretion in discharging the defendant from the program or service, due process requires
appellate courts to “examine the third-party’s use of its discretion to ensure that it was used on a basis that
was rational and connected to the purposes of community supervision”).

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we conclude that the greater weight of the credible evidence was sufficient to create a

reasonable belief that McClure “failed to participate in mental health treatment as

directed.” See Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763–64. Having determined that the evidence was

legally sufficient to establish that McClure violated at least one condition of his community

supervision, we overrule McClure’s issue. 2 See Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 342.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

JENNY CRON
Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the
14th day of August, 2025.

2 McClure also argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the trial court’s finding

that he violated a no-contact condition of his supervision. Given our holding, we do not reach this sub-issue.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (“The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as
practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”).
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