In Re Spring Creek Ranch Community Association, Inc v. the State of Texas

Petition for Writ of Mandamus Conditionally Granted and Memorandum
Majority and Dissenting Opinions filed April 30, 2024.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-23-00283-CV

IN RE SPRING CREEK RANCH COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Relator

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
WRIT OF MANDAMUS
55th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2019-74251

MEMORANDUM MAJORITY OPINION

On April 21, 2023, relator Spring Creek Ranch Community Association, Inc.
filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this Court. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann.
§ 22.221; see also Tex. R. App. P. 52. In the petition, relator asks this Court to
compel the Honorable Latosha Lewis Payne, presiding judge of the 55th District
Court of Harris County, to vacate her order denying its motion to designate two
entities as responsible third parties and also to grant relator’s motion to designate
those entities as responsible third parties. For the reasons discussed below, we
conditionally grant the petition.

BACKGROUND

The underlying trial court proceeding is a lawsuit filed by Randy and Karen
Acree against relator and a variety of other defendants associated with the Spring
Creek Ranch subdivision. The Acrees purchased real property in the subdivision in
September 2018. Shortly after the purchase, the Acrees alleged that they noticed
their property flooding after a rain event, and they later noticed that the flooding
would repeat when other rain events occurred. They allege this flooding was
attributable to two amenity lakes on property owned by relator as well as relator’s
allowing improvements on nearby properties and failing to adhere to its own
regulations and documentation. On October 19, 2019, the Acrees filed their
original petition in the trial court proceeding, which included requests for disclosure
directed at relator and the other defendants then in the case.

On June 20, 2022, relator filed a motion for leave to designate SC Ranch LP
and Harris County as responsible third parties.1 At a hearing on that motion on
August 15, 2022, the trial court verbally instructed relator to plead additional facts
in support of the designation. Relator filed an amended motion on August 24, 2022.2
The amended motion alleged, among other things, that SC Ranch LP had begun
excavating the site of the amenity lakes no earlier than 2002, when the Harris County
Engineering Division observed those activities. In addition, the amended motion

1
The motion also sought leave to designate John Blount as a responsible third party, but relator
subsequently withdrew that request.
2
The trial court denied the original motion on September 26, 2022. We construe the mandamus
petition as seeking relief solely in association with the amended motion.
2
contended the plat for the Spring Creek Ranch subdivision, including the amenity
lakes, was signed by the Harris County Engineer on July 29, 2005 and warranted
that the subdivision complied or will comply with all court adopted drainage
requirements. An SC Ranch LP officer allegedly signed the plat on August 2, 2005.
The plat contained a note placing limits on the amount of impervious cover provided
by developments. The amended motion further alleged Harris County approved
multiple residential construction projects on the subdivision between 2005 and
October 3, 2017, which is the latest date that the motion alleges one of the two
proposed responsible third parties either committed a relevant act or omitted to
perform a relevant duty. The motion alleges that SC Ranch LP and Harris County
are, by one means or another, at least partly responsible in association with the
alleged damages the Acrees have experienced due to their property flooding.3 On
March 20, 2023, the trial court signed an order denying relator’s amended motion
for leave to designate SC Ranch LP and Harris County as responsible third parties.
This mandamus proceeding followed.

MANDAMUS STANDARD OF REVIEW

Generally, to be entitled to a writ of mandamus, the relator must show that the
trial court clearly abused its discretion, and that the relator lacks an adequate remedy
by appeal. In mandamus proceedings involving trial court denials of section
33.004(a) motions, however, normally the relator need only show an abuse of
discretion by the trial court, because the denial of such a motion leaves the relator
with no adequate appellate remedy. See In re Coppola, 535 S.W.3d 506, 510 (Tex.

3
Although the Acrees have also raised claims associated with misstatements relator and other
defendants have ostensibly made in association with their property, relator’s amended motion
appears to disclaim that SC Ranch LP and Harris County share responsibility for the alleged
misstatements.
3
2017) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Cordish Co., 617 S.W.3d 909, 913 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]). A trial court
abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without regard to guiding
legal principles or without supporting evidence. Jay & VMK, Corp. v. Lopez, 572
S.W.3d 698, 703 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (citing Bocquet v.
Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998).

ANALYSIS

The Texas proportionate responsibility statute provides a framework for
apportioning percentages of responsibility in the calculation of damages for any
cause of action based on tort in which more than one person or entity, including the
plaintiff, is alleged to have caused or contributed to causing the harm for which the
recovery of damages is sought. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§§ 33.002(a)(1), 33.003. In accordance with this framework, the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code permits defendants to designate “responsible third
parties,” which it defines as persons who are “alleged to have caused or contributed
to causing in any way the harm for which recovery of damages is sought.” Id.
§§ 33.004(a), 33.011(6). Proper designation is critical because it “enables a
defendant to introduce evidence regarding a responsible third party’s fault and to
have the jury apportion responsibility to the third party even if that person has not
been joined as a party to the lawsuit.” In re Dawson, 550 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Tex.
2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).

Relator’s petition lays out how their motion was filed sufficiently in advance
of trial, and contained sufficient facts to entitle it to designate SC Ranch LP and
Harris County as responsible third parties, and the Acrees’ response does not dispute

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those points. Further, although the record suggests the statute of limitations for
claims against SC Ranch LP and Harris County had expired by the time relator
sought to designate them as responsible third parties,4 we conclude this does not bar
relator’s effort to designate them as responsible third parties, as the record indicates
the statute of limitations for claims against those two parties would have expired no
later than October 3, 2019, before the Acrees filed their lawsuit, let alone before
relator had any obligation to disclose they could designate those two as responsible
third parties. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.004(d). However, the
response includes several arguments why the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by denying the motion.

First, the Acrees contend that they have mooted relator’s motion altogether by
limiting their claims against relator only for relator’s actions and omissions
occurring within two years before they filed their lawsuit. We disagree. Even
assuming SC Ranch LP and Harris County could not be found liable in association
with a narrowed scope of claims against relator, they can nevertheless be found to
have “caus[ed] or contribut[ed] to cause in any way the harm for which recovery of
damages is sought.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.003(a); see also In re
Mobile Mini, Inc., 596 S.W.3d 781, 787 (Tex. 2020) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted) (“[A] defendant may designate a responsible third party even
though that party possesses a defense to liability, or cannot be formally joined as a
defendant, or both.”). This is true despite the Acrees limiting the scope of their
claims; a sufficient showing has been made that actions and omissions by SC Ranch

4
See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003(a) (setting a two-year statute of limitations for
“suit for trespass for injury to the estate”).
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LP and Harris County caused or contributed to the Acrees’ claimed harm, despite
their ostensibly occurring outside the limitations period.

Second, the Acrees contend mandamus is inappropriate as it would constitute
a ruling on a summary judgment motion relator filed advancing a statute of
limitations defense. We do not discern how concluding limitations bar claims
against SC Ranch LP and Harris County would in any way bar claims against relator.
We merely conclude that relator sufficiently showed that SC Ranch LP and Harris
County are responsible third parties, and that relator’s motion was timely and proper.
Whether relator itself has made a sufficient showing that it is entitled to summary
judgment on a statute of limitations defense is not before us. Compare Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.011(6) (encompassing as responsible third parties
“any person who is alleged to have caused or contributed to causing in any way the
harm for which recovery of damages is sought”), with KPMG Peat Marwick v.
Harrison Cnty. Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999) (“A defendant
moving for summary judgment on the affirmative defense of limitations has the
burden to conclusively establish that defense.”).

Next, the Acrees dispute the extent to which a 2005 plat referenced by
relator’s petition and SC Ranch LP ostensibly no longer existing as a legal entity are
relevant to assessing relator’s third-party-designation request, as relator highlighted
those aspects in its arguments to the trial court on this issue. We understand the
Acrees’ arguments here to solely dispute whether relator could properly advance its
motion despite claims against SC Ranch LP and Harris County being barred by a
statute of limitations. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.004(d).
However, as the record otherwise indicates claims against those two third parties
were barred by limitations at the outset of the trial court proceeding even when the
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2005 plat and SC Ranch’s ostensible nonexistence are disregarded, the Acrees’
arguments are unpersuasive. See In re WL & D Ventures, LLC, No. 14-23-00413-
CV, 2023 WL 4503851, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 13, 2023, orig.
proceeding) (mem. op.) (per curiam) (holding a motion to designate a responsible
third party was timely filed, despite the expiration of the applicable limitations
period, as “relators were not served with the [underlying] lawsuit until after
limitations had expired”).

Finally, the Acrees contend the trial court was not required to allow relator an
opportunity to replead its motion’s allegations before denying it. However, this
argument is moot as the trial court’s denial of relator’s motion was itself an abuse of
discretion; as the trial court should have instead granted relator’s motion, there was
no need for relator to be given an opportunity to amend a filing for which it could
already receive relief

CONCLUSION

We hold that relator has established the trial court abused its discretion by
denying its amended motion to designate SC Ranch LP and Harris County as
responsible third parties, and by declining to grant that motion. We conditionally
grant relator’s petition for writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to vacate its
March 20, 2023 order denying relator’s amended motion to designate SC Ranch LP
and Harris County as responsible third parties and grant the amended motion. We
are confident the trial court will act in accordance with this opinion and the writ will
issue only if the court fails to comply.

PER CURIAM

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Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Jewell and Spain (Spain, J.,
dissenting).

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