Ex Parte Frances Nwosuocha v. the State of Texas

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed June 25, 2024.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-23-00071-CR

EX PARTE FRANCES NWOSUOCHA, Appellant

On Appeal from the 185th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1157990A

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Frances Nwosuocha appeals an order denying her post-conviction
application for habeas corpus based on a claimed violation of Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Federal and state investigators discovered rampant fraudulent billings for
Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement for motorized wheelchairs in Harris
County in the early 2000s. Nwosoucha v. State, 325 S.W.3d 816, 821 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d). One of the durable medical
equipment companies under investigation was Silver-Hawk, which was owned and
controlled by Bibian and Achor Uluocha. Id. Many of Silver-Hawk’s billings
relied on Certificates of Medical Necessity (CMNs) that Appellant, who was a
nurse practitioner, had signed. Id. Medicare and Medicaid reimbursed Bibian and
Achor’s company based on twenty-three CMNs Appellant admitted signing; there
was evidence they contained falsified information. Id. at 841. The total loss to
Medicare and Medicaid for these CMNs was $113,979.56. Id.

In March 2008, Appellant was indicted for engaging in organized criminal
activity in combination with Bibian, Achor, and others. Id. at 821. In October
2008, the case proceeded to trial. Id. at 823. A jury found Appellant guilty of
engaging in organized criminal activity, namely aggregate theft by a governmental
contractor of property with a value of over one hundred thousand dollars and under
two hundred thousand dollars. Id. at 821. The jury assessed punishment at ten
years’ confinement, recommended community supervision, and assessed a $10,000
fine; the trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly. Id. This court affirmed
Appellant’s conviction in 2010. Id. at 821-44.

In January 2020, Appellant filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 11.072 1 seeking relief from
her conviction; she filed two amended applications thereafter. In her second
amended application, Appellant contended that the State (1) failed to disclose

1
Article 11.072 “establishes the procedures for an application for a writ of habeas corpus
in a felony or misdemeanor case in which the applicant seeks relief from an order or a judgment
of conviction ordering community supervision.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.072, § 1; see also
Ex parte Villanueva, 252 S.W.3d 391, 395 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Under the statute, a person
who is serving or who has completed a term of community supervision may file a habeas
application attacking the “legal validity” of (1) the conviction for which or order in which
community supervision was imposed or (2) the conditions of community supervision. Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. art. 11.072, § 2; Ex parte Villanueva, 252 S.W.3d at 395.

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material evidence favorable to her in violation of Brady, and (2) used false
testimony to secure her conviction in violation of her rights to Due Process.
Appellant incorporated a memorandum with exhibits in support of her application.

In May 2021, the trial court held a hearing on Appellant’s application. In
December 2021, the trial court signed an order denying Appellant relief; the court
also issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellant filed a timely notice
of appeal.

ANALYSIS

While Appellant lists two issues in her brief, they are indistinguishable.
Furthermore, she presents only a single argument contending the trial court
erroneously denied her relief based on her claimed Brady violation. We also note
that although Appellant cites the United States and Texas Constitutions in her issue
statements, she makes no other mention of the constitutional provisions in her
briefing. Therefore, we focus on addressing Appellant’s contention that she was
entitled to relief because the State failed to disclose material evidence in violation
of Brady.

I. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

A writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy. See Ex parte Smith,
444 S.W.3d 661, 666 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). We generally review a ruling on an
application for writ of habeas corpus for an abuse of discretion. Ex parte
Contreras, 640 S.W.3d 279, 282 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet.
ref’d); see also Ex parte Garcia, 353 S.W.3d 785, 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
We decide whether a trial court abused its discretion by determining whether the
court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles, i.e., whether the
court acted arbitrarily or unreasonably. Ex parte Contreras, 640 S.W.3d at 282; Ex

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parte Allen, 619 S.W.3d 813, 816 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet.
ref’d). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision lies outside the zone of
reasonable disagreement. Ex parte Temple, 636 S.W.3d 332, 336 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. ref’d); Ex parte Allen, 619 S.W.3d at 816.

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on an application for habeas relief, we
examine the evidence in the habeas record in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling. Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The
trial court is the sole factfinder in a post-conviction application for writ of habeas
corpus filed under article 11.072. Ex parte Torres, 483 S.W.3d 35, 42 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2016). We afford almost total deference to a trial court’s factual findings
when they are supported by the record, especially when those findings are based
upon the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor. Id. at 42. This deferential review
applies even when the findings are based on affidavits rather than live testimony.
See Ex parte Wheeler, 203 S.W.3d 317, 325-26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We apply
the same deference to review the trial court’s application of law to fact questions if
resolving those determinations rests upon an evaluation of credibility and
demeanor. Ex parte Allen, 619 S.W.3d at 816. “[W]e review de novo the trial
court’s resolution of mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on witness
credibility and its resolution of pure questions of law.” Ex parte Beck, 541 S.W.3d
846, 852 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). We will uphold a trial court’s ruling as long as
it is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. Id.

In Brady, the Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution
of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith
or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Therefore, Brady is
violated when three requirements are satisfied: (1) the State suppressed evidence;

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(2) the suppressed evidence is favorable to the defendant; and (3) the suppressed
evidence is material. Ex parte Lalonde, 570 S.W.3d 716, 724 (Tex. Crim. App.
2019); Ex parte Richardson, 70 S.W.3d 865, 870 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
“Incorporated into the third prong, materiality, is a requirement that [the] defendant
must be prejudiced by the state’s failure to disclose the favorable evidence.” Harm
v. State, 183 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (en banc).

Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that the result of
the proceeding would have been different had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense. Ex parte Lalonde, 570 S.W.3d at 724. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of a proceeding. Id.
Materiality is determined by evaluating the alleged error in the context of the entire
record and overall strength of the prosecution’s case. Id.; Harm, 183 S.W.3d at
409.

To prevail in a post-conviction application for a writ of habeas corpus, an
applicant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts
that would entitle her to relief. Ex parte Lalonde, 570 S.W.3d at 725; Ex parte
Richardson, 70 S.W.3d at 870. “‘Under Brady, an applicant bears the burden of
showing that in light of all the evidence it is reasonably probable that the outcome
of the trial would have been different had the prosecution made a timely
disclosure.’” Ex parte Lalonde, 570 S.W.3d at 725 (quoting Hampton v. State, 86
S.W.3d 603, 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). “The mere possibility that the
undisclosed information might have helped the defense or affected the trial’s
outcome does not establish materiality.” Id.

Because the State concedes that Appellant established elements one and two,
the parties address solely the third element. Thus, we also focus only on whether
the undisclosed evidence was material.

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II. Evidence and Relevant Findings of Fact

In the habeas proceeding, Appellant asserted that the financial analyst/fraud
examiner Augustine Nnadi, who testified at her 2008 trial, had been involved in a
bribery scheme with Achor in 20072 unbeknown to the prosecution. Appellant
claimed that, at her 2008 trial, there was no direct evidence she had received
money from Bibian or Achor to prove she engaged in organized criminal activity
in combination with Bibian and Achor. According to Appellant, the only evidence
from which the jury could have concluded she received money was admitted
through the State’s witness Nnadi. Nnadi testified that State’s exhibits 25G, 25H,
and 25J — three checks written by Bibian to herself — had Appellant’s name
written in the checks’ memo line.

Appellant asserted that “materiality is clear” because (1) the “evidence the
State relied upon for conviction was introduced through Nnadi [and] was the only
evidence implicating [Appellant] as having benefitted financially from the alleged
scheme”; and (2) Nnadi’s and Achor’s alleged “ongoing criminal enterprise tainted
the entire investigation” in 2007. Therefore, Appellant claimed “[t]here is a
reasonable likelihood that had the existence of a bribe between an alleged
coconspirator and the State’s agent been disclosed, the jury would not have made
any inference that checks written by the wife of the person who bribed the State’s
agent could substantiate the guilt of [Appellant].”

In support of her application, Appellant presented to the trial court: (1) the
2008 indictment and judgment of conviction; (2) documents relating to her

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Allegedly, Nnadi had informed Achor of a pending arrest warrant in 2007 for engaging
in organized criminal activity to commit Medicaid and Medicare fraud with Bibian and
Appellant; Achor fled to Nigeria after receiving that information and later met with Nnadi in
Nigeria where Achor paid Nnadi $5,000. Achor did not return to the United States until October
2013.

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community supervision and time served; (3) this court’s opinion affirming her
2008 conviction; (4) excerpts from Nnadi’s and Appellant’s 2008 trial testimony
and copies of the three checks Bibian wrote to herself; (5) a 2014 criminal
complaint and supporting affidavit alleging Nnadi accepted $6,000 in February
2014 from Achor in return for Nnadi recommending a lower amount of restitution
to the prosecutor handling Achor’s fraud case; and (6) the 2014 indictment for
bribery and Nnadi’s subsequent plea agreement.

The State asserted that (1) Appellant cannot show “that because of the
accusation [that Nnadi accepted a bribe from Achor in 2007], everything this
witness said at trial should not be trusted and therefore the State’s only connection
between the applicant and the crime could not have been made and [the State]
wouldn’t have had a case to take to trial”; and (2) Appellant failed to show “by a
preponderance of the evidence that had the accusation about Nnadi taking a
payment from a coconspirator for information had been disclosed pretrial or during
the trial, the results of the trial would have been different.”

The State presented two affidavits; the first was from attorney Joni Vollman,
in which she averred in relevant part:

I was employed by the Harris County District Attorney’s Office
from 1993 until 2012, and during that time . . . I investigated and
prosecuted hundreds of financial crimes, including many thefts
involving fraud in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. I routinely
presented bank records and used fraud examiners or analysts in trial. I
was one of two prosecutors assigned the above-numbered case
involving the defendant Frances Nwosuocha and represented the State
in trial.
At the time of trial in 2008, I was not aware of an allegation
that the financial analyst from the Texas Attorney General’s Office,
Augustine Nnadi, accepted a bribe from a co-conspirator in this case.
...

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Had I known pre-trial or during trial of the allegation against
Nnadi, the bank records would have been reassigned and reviewed by
another analyst from the Attorney General’s Office. That analyst
would have then testified in the trial and testified about the bank
records for the jury. Based on my experience investigating and
prosecuting these types of financial crimes, bank records are routinely
admitted into evidence independent of a witness as a business record
accompanied by a notarized Business Records Affidavit. Based on
my experience, any qualified fraud examiner, analyst, or investigator
is able to review the bank records and testify to the contents of the
documents. In this case, as far as I remember, nothing Nnadi testified
to from the witness stand was an opinion or conclusion, but rather
merely giving a voice to the bank records for ease of delivering the
information on the documents to the jury. This was testimony that
could have been presented by any qualified analyst.
The second affidavit was from Bryan Vaclavik, in which he averred in relevant
part:

I am currently the Chief Fraud Examiner in the Financial
Crimes Division of the Harris County District Attorney’s Office
where I have worked for twenty-five (25) years. . . . I have testified
in state and federal court in excess of two hundred (200) times and
been repeatedly certified as an expert witness. I have served as the
primary case agent on more than three hundred (300) financial crime
related cases; been involved in some capacity [in] over five hundred
(500) criminal cases.
In investigating criminal cases with financial records[,] one of
the fraud examiner’s, also called a financial analyst, roles is to
condense voluminous records into various summaries and, if needed
at trial, to narrate those records for the court and jury. Financial
records are collected during an investigation using grand jury
subpoenas. The records provided pursuant to the subpoena are
accompanied by a notarized Business Records Affidavit (BRA) for
authenticity. . . .
Bank records are static and not altered by a fraud examiner or
analyst. When testifying in court, my role is to present the summaries
while speaking to its information. . . . What I cannot do, ethically, as
a certified fraud examiner is draw any conclusions from the records

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about criminal activity or speculate about what the records mean. I
can only provide testimony as to the actual financial transactions and
what information appears on the face of the documents under
questioning from both the state and the defense counsel.
Once the financial records are reviewed and summarize[d], I
may be subpoenaed to provide testimony. However, should I be
unavailable to provide such sworn testimony, another fraud examiner
or analyst can intercede, sponsoring the summaries of said financial
records. The replacement witness would need to review the same
records and summaries. Only after they reviewed and are comfortable
with all the transactions that are included, would he or she be able to
testify truthfully in court. Because of our role as a witness who
speaks on behalf of the bank documents, any fraud examiner can
review the bank records and without knowing anything about the facts
of the case on trial is able to testify as to what is in the bank records.
After considering “the application for writ of habeas corpus, including all
amendments and subsequent additions, the State’s answer and exhibits, official
court records in the above-captioned and original cause, and May 13, 2021
argument from habeas counsel and the State,” the trial court signed the following
relevant findings of fact:

6. The Court finds the November 9, 2020 affidavit of Harris
County District Attorney’s Office Chief Fraud Examiner Bryan
Vaclavik credible and the facts asserted therein to be true.
7. The Court finds the November 10, 2020 affidavit of former
Harris County Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”) Joni Vollman
credible and the facts asserted therein to be true.
10. The Court finds that the applicant fails to provide proof by a
preponderance of the evidence that in 2007, Nnadi accepted a bribe
from the applicant’s co-defendant’s husband who told federal
authorities in 2013 he paid Nnadi to tell him when an arrest warrant
was issued so he could flee the country.
14. The Court finds that the contents of bank records certified with
a business record affidavit do not change, therefore any qualified
witness is able to give voice to the records for the purposes of
presentation to a jury.

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15. The Court finds that the role of financial analyst Nnadi in the
applicant’s trial was to objectively present the information in the bank
records to the jury by giving voice to what information was included
in the documents, information the jurors could see with their own
eyes.
16. The Court finds that Nnadi’s trial testimony encompassed the
presentation of more than two-hundred (200) bank transactions, one
hundred ninety (190) exhibits, most of them checks, from eight (8)
different bank accounts, including State’s exhibits 25G, 25H, and 25J.
17. The Court finds that at no time did Nnadi provide information
about State’s exhibits 25G, 25H, and 25J beyond what appears on the
face of the checks as admitted from the bank business records.
18. The Court finds that Nnadi was not asked, nor did he offer, an
opinion or belief that the applicant was doing anything illegal or
committing any offense.
19. The Court finds that the information Nnadi provided from the
bank records for the jury’s consideration was free of any conclusions
and speculation.
20. The Court finds that even without Nnadi’s testimony, the bank
records were part of the trial record for the jury’s consideration.
21. The Court finds that Nnadi’s testimony from the bank records
accurately reflects the information contained in the bank records,
which was admitted into evidence at trial prior to the start of
testimony.
23. The Court finds that Nnadi did not opine for the jury any
information about the applicant benefitting financially from any
transaction reflected in the bank records, nor speculate about whether
the applicant received any money.
24. The Court finds that Harris County District Attorney’s Office
Fraud Examiner Shannon Hogan testified during the applicant’s trial
after Nnadi testified.
25. Hogan testified that she examined the applicant’s bank records
and sorted the transactions looking for cash transactions.
30. The Court finds that it was fraud examiner Hogan’s testimony
that provided the State’s case an inference or connection between
State’s Exhibits 25G, 25H, and 25J, and the applicant’s cash deposits

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into her personal bank account.
31. The Court finds that Nnadi’s testimony did not . . . make the
connection between State’s Exhibits 25G, 25H, and 25J, and cash
deposits into the applicant’s personal bank account.
32. The Court finds that in closing arguments, the State did not
refer to any testimony from Nnadi.
33. The Court finds that in the appellate opinion affirming the
applicant’s conviction, neither Nnadi’s name nor testimony are
mentioned.
34. The Court finds that the appellate opinion affirming the
applicant’s conviction specifically cites the connection between the
three checks (State’s Exhibit 25G, 25H, and 25J), and the subsequent
cash deposits: “[t]he evidence consisted of three checks Bibian wrote
herself on Silver-Hawk’s bank account on which she noted ‘Frances’
in the memo line and cash deposits to appellant’s bank account shortly
thereafter. From this evidence a jury could infer appellant intended to
participate in the profits of the combination.”
35. Given the limited scope of Nnadi’s testimony, and the absence
of any personal opinion, inference, or speculation during Nnadi’s
testimony, and the State’s inculpatory evidence outside of Nnadi’s
testimony, the applicant fails to establish that Nnadi’s testimony gave
the jury a false impression of the facts.
36. Given the limited and scope [sic] nature of a financial analyst’s
testimony, the Court finds that Nnadi could have been replaced with
another qualified financial analyst without any substantive change to
the testimony presented.
(citations to the habeas exhibits and original trial record omitted).

III. Materiality of Evidence

Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it found that
undisclosed evidence of Nnadi’s alleged acceptance of a bribe from Achor in 2007
was not material to her conviction. In that respect, Appellant claims the “entire
investigation was tainted by the fact that Nnadi was actively providing information
to the Uluochas.” She claims that evidence of the alleged bribery “would have

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destroyed any probative value the ‘circumstantial evidence’ of the checks written
by Bibian to herself” had, and it “would have destroyed the only evidence linking
[Appellant] to any financial gain” and wrongdoing. We disagree.

The record does not support Appellant’s contention that evidence of the
alleged bribe “would have destroyed any probative value the ‘circumstantial
evidence’ of the [three] checks written by Bibian to herself” had, and it “would
have destroyed the only evidence linking [Appellant] to any financial gain” and
wrongdoing. In that regard, the trial court found that (1) because the bank records,
including the three checks (exhibits 25G, 25H, 25J), had already been admitted
with a business record affidavit prior to the start of testimony, they were a part of
the trial record for the jury to consider and the content of bank records certified
with such an affidavit does not change so that any qualified fraud examiner is able
to give a voice to the records; (2) Nnadi’s role in Appellant’s trial was limited “to
objectively present[ing] the information in the bank records to the jury by giving
voice to what information was included in the documents, information the jurors
could see with their own eyes,” and Nnadi fulfilled his limited role with accurate
testimony about the information contained in the bank records; (3) Nnadi provided
no information at trial about the three checks “beyond what appears on the face of
the checks as admitted from the bank business records”; (4) Nnadi was not asked
nor did he offer an opinion or speculate whether Appellant did anything illegal,
committed any offense, benefitted financially from any transaction reflected in the
bank records, or received any money; and (5) considering the limited nature of
Nnadi’s testimony, it “could have been removed from the trial, and . . . the
evidence against the applicant would have remained the same and allowed the jury
to reach the same verdict.”

Moreover, the trial court found that fraud examiner Hogan, who testified

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after Nnadi, was the one who provided the connection between the three checks
(exhibits 25G, 25H, 25J) and Appellant’s financial gain and wrongdoing. It found
Hogan testified that (1) she examined Appellant’s bank records and sorted the
transactions looking for cash transactions; (2) “Exhibit 25G was a check for $4,000
that was cashed by a co-defendant, and that six days later, the applicant deposited a
similar amount of cash into her own account;” (3) “Exhibit 25H was a $950 check
written by a co-defendant and cashed, and that two days later the applicant
deposited $970 cash into her own account;” and (4) “Exhibit 25J was an $800
check written and cashed by a co-defendant, and that four days later, the applicant
deposited $1,400 cash into her own account.” The court also found that in closing
arguments, “the State argued the connection between [the three checks], and the
temporal proximity between the checks and the cash deposits into the applicant’s
personal bank account as proof that the applicant shared in the proceeds of the
criminal activity.” Again, Appellant does not challenge or disagree with these
court findings.

Additionally, the State presented evidence from various sources showing
Appellant’s involvement in the Medicare and Medicaid fraud scheme with Bibian
and Achor, and we thus noted in our opinion on direct appeal that “[t]here was also
substantial evidence appellant participated in combination with Achor and Bibian
in their Silver-Hawk operation.” See Nwosoucha, 325 S.W.3d at 833. Detailing
the evidence in our opinion, we stated, among other things, that (1) a Silver-Hawk
runner testified she saw Appellant answering telephones at Silver-Hawk and
Bibian introduced them; (2) Appellant admitted she traveled with Bibian to
Palestine, Texas three times; (3) Appellant signed seventeen CMNs in two days for
identical equipment for persons she saw in groups in Palestine; (4) Medicare and
Medicaid reimbursed Bibian and Achor’s company based on twenty-three CMNs,

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which Appellant admitted signing and for which there was evidence they contained
falsified information; and (5) Bibian wrote three checks to herself on Silver-
Hawk’s bank account noting “Frances” in the memo line, and Appellant deposited
large amounts of cash to her bank account shortly after Bibian wrote these checks.
Id. at 833-41.

Appellant also claims the State acknowledged that evidence of the alleged
2007 bribe was material because the “State explained, in an interoffice memo in
2014, that Nnadi’s actions were part of the decisional process to dismiss the [fraud]
case against Achor” and, therefore, the same evidence the State cited as a reason
why a prosecution against Achor would not be successful is material in Appellant’s
case.

The July 10, 2014 interoffice memorandum Appellant points to provides:

Uluocha was charged with 1st degree Engaging in Organized Criminal
Activity to commit Medicaid and Medicare Fraud alongside his wife
Bibian Uluocha and Frances Nwoshuocha. This case was originally
filed in 2007 and covered criminal activity from March 2002 to June
2003. Uluocha was submitting billings for motorized wheelchairs and
providing less expensive scooters to recipients. The total theft as
alleged in the indictment was approximately $150,000.
Prior to indictment in 2007[,] Uluocha left the US and returned to his
native Nigeria. His wife Bibian remained and pled guilty receiving
probation. Nwoshuocha was convicted at trial in 2009 of signing false
certificates of medical necessity.
Uluocha returned to the US in October 2013. Unfortunately between
the original indictment and 2013, at least 26 of the witnesses, many of
who testified in the trial against Nwoshuocha had passed away.
Several more have become incapacitated or not locatable. Included in
this group was unindicted co-conspirator Lewis Gottlieb, a former
doctor convicted on federal charges, who testified against
Nwoshuocha. Without these witnesses, prosecution was no longer
feasible.
Additionally, the original auditor on this case, Augustine Nnadi pled
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guilty to the federal charge of accepting a bribe and was sentenced in
July 2014. Uluocha provided the information and assistance to the
FBI that led to the arrest and conviction.
We note that the memorandum states Nnadi pled guilty to the federal charge of
accepting a bribe in 2014 — not in 2007. In fact, the memorandum does not
mention any allegation that Nnadi accepted a bribe in 2007 nor is there evidence
that Nnadi acknowledged any guilt regarding the alleged 2007 bribe as was the
case when he pled guilty to accepting a bribe in 2014.

Further, the memorandum expressly states that prosecution of Achor “was
no longer feasible” because many witnesses have passed away, have become
incapacitated, or could not be located. The trial court considered the memorandum
and found that “the State’s dismissal memo regarding co-defendant Achor Uluocha
is not dispositive on the issue of Nnadi’s materiality to the State’s case, and cites
the death of twenty-six (26) witnesses in the case as a barrier to prosecution.”

We are not persuaded by Appellant’s contention that there is “a reasonable
likelihood that had the existence of a bribe between an alleged coconspirator and
the State’s agent been disclosed, the jury would not have made any inference that
checks written by the wife of the person who bribed the State’s agent could
substantiate the guilt of Nwosuocha.”

As we stated, evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability
that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense. Ex parte Lalonde, 570 S.W.3d at 724. But here, Nnadi’s
testimony was limited to giving a voice to the content of the already admitted bank
records, which any other qualified financial analyst could have done without any
substantive change to the testimony presented. Nnadi’s testimony did not provide
the connection between the three checks and Appellant’s participation in the fraud
scheme nor did he testify that Appellant benefitted financially from these checks or
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was involved in any illegal activity.

Based on the record, we cannot conclude that evidence of Nnadi allegedly
accepting a bribe from Achor was material because there is not a reasonable
probability the result of Appellant’s trial would have been different had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense. We conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in (1) determining Appellant failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the undisclosed evidence was material, and (2)
denying Appellant post-conviction habeas relief.

Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s issues.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s order.

/s/ Meagan Hassan
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Hassan, Poissant, and Wilson.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

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