In Re ColossusBets Limited v. the State of Texas

15-25-00150-CV ACCEPTED
15-25-00150-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
9/19/2025 8:26 PM
No. 25-________ CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
CLERK
__________________________________________________________________
FILED IN
15th COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
15th Court of Appeals of Texas 9/19/2025 8:26:13 PM
__________________________________________________________________
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk

In Re ColossusBets Limited
Relator.
__________________________________________________________________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
__________________________________________________________________

Original Proceeding from
Cause No. 25-BC03A-0007
Business Court of Texas
Third Division
Austin, Texas
__________________________________________________________________

PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP

Derrick Carson (Texas Bar No. 24001847)
Charles Conrad (Texas Bar No. 24040721)
Jonathan Sink (Texas Bar No. 24099968)
Lindsey Mitchell (Texas Bar No. 24138645)
PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP
609 Main Street, Suite 2000
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 276-7600 (Telephone)
(713) 276-7673 (Facsimile)
Derrick.Carson@pillsburylaw.com
Charles.Conrad@pillsburylaw.com
Jonathan.Sink@pillsburylaw.com
Lindsey.Mitchell@pillsburylaw.com

Counsel for Relator ColossusBets Limited

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
IDENTITIES OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Relator/Defendant

ColossusBets Limited
Represented by:

Derrick Carson (Texas Bar No. 24001847) (Lead Counsel)
Charles Conrad (Texas Bar No. 24040721)
Jonathan Sink (Texas Bar No. 24099968)
Lindsey Mitchell (Texas Bar No. 24138645)
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP
609 Main Street, Suite 2000
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 276-7600 (Telephone)
(713) 276-7673 (Facsimile)
Derrick.Carson@pillsburylaw.com
Charles.Conrad@pillsburylaw.com
Jonathan.Sink@pillsburylaw.com
Lindsey.Mitchell@pillsburylaw.com

Respondent
Honorable Melissa Andrews
Judge of the Texas Business Court, Third Division
Austin, Texas

Real Parties in Interest

Plaintiff

Jerry B. Reed
Represented by:

Richard L. LaGarde (Texas Bar No. 11819550)
Mary LaGarde (Texas Bar No. 24037645)
LAGARDE LAW FIRM, P.C.
230 Westcott St., Suite 100
Houston, TX 77007
TEL: (713) 993-0660
ii
richard@lagardelaw.com
mary@lagardelaw.com

Manfred Sternberg (Texas Bar No. 19175775)
MANFRED STERNBERG & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
1700 Post Oak Blvd.
2 BLVD Place Suite 610
Houston, TX 77056
TEL: (713) 622-4300
FAX: (713) 622-9899
manfred@msternberg.com

Jeff Adams (Texas Bar No. 24006736)
THE LAW OFFICE OF JEFF ADAMS, PLLC
119 Logansport Street
Center, TX 75935
Tel: (936) 598-4900
jeff@jeffadamslaw.com

Other Defendants
Rook TX LP
Rook GP LLC
Represented by:

David E. Harrell, Jr. (Texas Bar No. 00793905) (Lead Counsel)
Mia Lorick (Texas Bar No. 24091415)
Kathleen C. Laird (Texas Bar No. 24132063)
Bradden Pippin (Texas Bar No. 24143893)
Troutman Pepper Locke LLP
600 Travis, Suite 2800
Houston, Texas 77002-3095
Telephone: (713) 226-1200
Facsimile: (713) 229-2510
David.Harrell@Troutman.com
Mia.Lorick@Troutman.com
Kathleen.Laird@Troutman.com
Bradden.Pippin@Troutman.com

iii
Qawi and Quddus, Inc.
Represented by:

Jon Michael Smith (Texas Bar No. 18630750)
3301 Northland Dr., Suite 215
Austin, Texas 78731
Tel: (512) 371-1006
Fax: (512) 476-6685
jon@jonmichaelsmith.com

Lottery Now, Inc.
Represented by:
Aimee C. Oleson (Lead Counsel) (Texas Bar No. 24036391)
Grace S. Miller (Texas Bar No. 24132499)
SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP
2200 Ross Avenue, 20th Floor
Dallas, Texas 75201
Tel. (469) 391-7400
Fax (469) 391-7401
aoleson@sheppardmullin.com
gmiller@sheppardmullin.com

Autolotto, Inc.

Represented by:

No appearance to date.

Lottery.com, Inc.

Represented by:
No appearance to date.

iv
AltX Management, LLC

Represented by:
No appearance to date.

White Swan Data Ltd.

Represented by:

No appearance to date.

Lawrence Anthony DiMatteo III
Represented by:

No appearance to date.

Ryan Dickinson
Represented by:

Ryan Dickinson
6000 Ed Bluestein Blvd, Apt 10104
Austin, TX 78723
512-645-8311
ryandickinson79@gmail.com

Bernard Marantelli
Represented by:

No appearance to date.

Zeljko Ranogajec
Represented by:

No appearance to date.

v
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..................................................................................1
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION..........................................................................3

RECORD REFERENCES .........................................................................................4

ISSUES PRESENTED...............................................................................................4

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ...............................................5
INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................6
STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................9

I. Respondent (Correctly) Determines Business Court Has Jurisdiction............9

II. Respondent (Wrongly) Reverses Course After Plaintiff Amends His
Pleading Seeking To Avoid Jurisdiction. ......................................................12

III. To Date, ColossusBets Has Only Specially Appeared. .................................16
STANDARD OF REVIEW .....................................................................................18

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...............................................................................21

ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................22
I. The Business Court’s Jurisdiction, Once Established, Cannot Be
Lost—It Is A One-Way Door Through Which Jurisdiction Remains
Proper Until Final Judgment..........................................................................22

A. The Express Language Of Several Provisions In Chapter 25A (And
Other Rules) Reflects Jurisdiction Is A One-Time Determination
That Should Be “Prompt” And “Final.” ...................................................23

B. The Federal System Is Different From The Texas System. .....................28

C. Another State With A Longer-Established Business Court Has A
One-Way Jurisdictional Door. ..................................................................32

vi
II. Respondent Abused Its Discretion When, After Determining It Had
Jurisdiction, Reversed Course Based On Forum-Shopping
Amendments By Plaintiff. .............................................................................34

PRAYER ..................................................................................................................35

VERIFICATION......................................................................................................37

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................38

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................38

vii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)
Cases
C Ten 31 LLC v. Tarbox,
2025 Tex. Bus. 1, 708 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. Bus. Ct. 2025) ...................................18
City of Ingleside v. City of Corpus Christi,
469 S.W.3d 589 (Tex. 2015) ..............................................................................18
Cont’l Coffee Products Co. v. Cazarez,
937 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. 1996) ........................................................................15, 22

Grynberg v. M-I L.L.C.,
398 S.W.3d 864 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2012, pet. denied) ......................16
Gutierrez v. Cayman Islands Firm of Deloitte & Touche,
100 S.W.3d 261 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. dism’d) .........................16
Huie v. DeShazo,
922 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. 1996) ........................................................................18, 34
In re Am. Homestar of Lancaster, Inc.,
50 S.W.3d 480 (Tex. 2001).................................................................................18

In re AutoZoners, LLC,
694 S.W.3d 219 (Tex. 2024) ..............................................................................18
In re ETC Field Services, LLC,
707 S.W.3d 924 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. 2025)..................................3, 18, 19, 20
In re GlobalSanteFe Corp.,
275 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. 2008) ..............................................................................19

In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., L.P.,
492 S.W.3d 300 (Tex. 2016) ..............................................................................18
In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004) ....................................................................3, 19, 20

In re Shipman,
540 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. 2018) ........................................................................18, 34
viii
Malouf v. State
ex rels. Ellis, 694 S.W.3d 712 (Tex. 2024) ..................................................23, 24

Olds v. Olds,
No. 25CV000166-740, 2025 NCBC Order 57, 2025 NCBC LEXIS 102
(Aug. 13, 2025) .............................................................................................33, 34
Pharus Funding, LLC v. Garcia,
No. 01-20-00411-CV, 2021 WL 3556679 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] Aug. 12, 2021, pet. denied).......................................................................26

PKT1, LLC v. Vaynberg,
2022 NCBC LEXIS 72 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 5, 2022) ......................................33

Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex. v. Luminant Energy Co. LLC,
691 S.W.3d 448 (Tex. 2024) ..................................................................24, 26, 30
Royal Canin U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger,
604 U.S. 22 (2025) ......................................................... 13, 14, 15, 28, 29, 30, 32
U.S. Polyco, Inc. v. Tex. Cent. Bus. Lines Corp.,
681 S.W.3d 383 (Tex. 2023) ..............................................................................24
Constitutions

Texas Constitution
Article V, section 1 ...............................................................................................3
Article V, section 6 ...............................................................................................3

United States Constitution
Amendment IX....................................................................................................29
Article I, section 8 ...............................................................................................28
Article II, section 2 .............................................................................................28
Article III, section 2 ............................................................................................28
Statutes and Codes

United States Code
Title 28, section 1367..........................................................................................29
Title 28, section 1441(a) .....................................................................................29
Title 28, section 1447(c) .....................................................................................30

ix
North Carolina General Statutes
Section 7A-45.4(a) ..............................................................................................33
Section 7A-45.4(a)(1) .........................................................................................32
Texas Government Code Annotated
Chapter 25A ......................................................................................21, 23, 24, 28
Section 22.201(p) ..................................................................................................3
Section 22.221.......................................................................................................3
Section 25A.004..................................................................................................11
Section 25A.004(b)(2) ........................................................................6, 14, 15, 32
Section 25A.006..................................................................................................25
Section 25A.006(b) .............................................................................................25
Section 25A.006(c) .............................................................................................25
Section 25A.006(d) .................................................................................25, 30, 32
Section 25A.006(f)........................................................................................26, 32
Section 25A.006(f)(1) .........................................................................................26
Section 25A.006(l) ........................................................................................12, 27
Section 25A.007(a) ...............................................................................................3
Section 25A.0041(a) ...............................................................................24, 25, 31
Section 25A.0041(a)(3) ......................................................................................24
Section 25A.0041(b)(3) ......................................................................................31
Section 25A.0041(b)(7) ......................................................................................31
Rules and Regulations

Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 52.1 ...............................................................................................................3
Rule 52.2 ...............................................................................................................3
Rule 52.7 ...............................................................................................................4
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 355 ..............................................................................................................25
Rule 355(f)(1) .........................................................................................26, 27, 31

Other Authorities

Antonin, Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of
Legal Texts 167 (2012) .......................................................................................24

x
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case: This is a suit by Plaintiff Jerry B. Reed, an individual
resident of Texas, against an array of domestic and
international Defendants alleging that he would have won
more money in the May 2023 Lotto Texas jackpot (after
winning $7.5 million) had the Defendants not conspired to
“illegally manipulate[ ]” the lottery the month before. The
suit is still at the jurisdictional stage of litigation, although
Defendants have Rule 91a motions to dismiss pending.
This petition arises out of the Texas Business Court’s
decision to reverse course—after having denied a motion
to remand and exercising jurisdiction, it later remanded the
case to the District Court citing Plaintiff’s subsequent,
twice-amended petition that allegedly removed the
allegations that originally triggered the Business Court’s
jurisdiction.

Respondent: Honorable Melissa Andrews
Judge of the Texas Business Court, Third Division
Austin, Texas

Respondent’s Action: On August 25, 2025, Judge Andrews issued an opinion
(2025 Tex. Bus. 34) holding that the Business Court
lacked jurisdiction over the action and granted Plaintiff’s
Renewed Motion to Remand to the 353rd District Court.
That opinion came only two months after the same Court
determined it did have jurisdiction over the action,
denying Plaintiff’s previous Motion to Remand (2025
Tex. Bus. 23). Critically, the only intervening change
was Plaintiff filing Third and Fourth Amended Petitions
which supposedly “remov[ed]” the jurisdiction-triggering
allegations from his Second Amended Petition (which the
Court analyzed when originally exercising jurisdiction).
Significantly, although Plaintiff changed his claims
against the Rook Defendants who had removed the case,
the claims against Relator and the other defendants were
essentially unchanged, the same claims that the court
exercised jurisdiction over until it later found that it could
no longer do so.

2
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has exclusive and statewide intermediate appellate jurisdiction

over matters appealed from the Texas Business Court “or an original proceeding

related to an action or order of the business court.” See TEX. CONST., ART. V, § 1;

TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 22.201(p) & 25A.007(a). Texas courts of appeal generally

have the power to grant the writ of mandamus. TEX. CONST., ART. V, § 6; TEX.

GOV’T CODE § 22.221. An original appellate proceeding may be commenced in the

appropriate court of appeals by petition filed by a relator against the respondent who

took the challenged action. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.1, 52.2.

As this Court recently noted, “[m]andamus review of significant rulings in

exceptional cases would allow this Court ‘to give needed and helpful direction to the

law that would otherwise prove elusive.”’ In re ETC Field Services, LLC, 707

S.W.3d 924, 929 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. 2025) (orig. proceeding). This case

presents the type of “exceptional case” where mandamus is “essential to preserve

important substantive and procedural rights from impairment or loss.” In re

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004).

3
RECORD REFERENCES

Materials supporting this Petition have been concurrently filed as an

Appendix to this Petition in a Mandamus Record sworn to by counsel as provided

for under TEX. R. APP. P. 52.7. The Mandamus Record will be cited as “(MR __).”

ISSUES PRESENTED
1. The Business Court must remand an action removed to Business Court if, and
only if, “removal was improper.” Once the Texas Business Court determines
removal is proper and establishes jurisdiction over an action, can a plaintiff
divest the court of jurisdiction through later, forum-shopping pleading
amendments?

4
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Relator respectfully requests oral argument to assist the Court in considering

critical questions about the jurisdiction of the newly created Texas Business Court.

A decision in this matter will not only establish consequential precedent regarding

the scope of the Business Court’s jurisdiction, but also determine how to practically

execute the intent of the Texas Legislature in creating the Business Court. This

Court’s decision will also be critical in guiding the Business Court as well as litigants

across Texas on how pleadings may impact matters of jurisdiction between district

courts and the Texas Business Court and therefore in which court they should file

and/or proceed.

5
INTRODUCTION

Respondent was faced with an issue of first impression: having already

decided that the court had jurisdiction and that removal was proper, what effect

should be given to a blatantly forum-shopping pleading amendment that sought to

divest the court of jurisdiction? Respondent took too narrow a view of its

jurisdictional remit and wrongly decided that a plaintiff could plead his way out of

Business Court, even after a finding that the case had been properly removed.

Respondent did so despite having already analyzed the jurisdictional question,

issued a thorough opinion, found jurisdiction, and proceeded with its administrative

orders concerning trial and discovery. This about-face was an abuse of discretion. It

is especially important to correct Respondent’s error given the newness of the

Business Court, its importance within the State’s judicial system, and the first-

impression nature of the issue of that court’s jurisdiction and a remand procedure

new to Texas practice.

In its first opinion, Respondent denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand and

rightly—and thoroughly—determined that the Business Court had jurisdiction over

the “entire action,” pursuant to Gov’t Code § 25A.004(b)(2). This was because (1)

Plaintiff’s allegations “regarded” the “internal affairs” and “governance” of the

Rook Defendants, and (2) “[a]ll of [Plaintiff]’s causes of action rely on the alleged

scheme for Rook to illegally claim the April 2023 lottery, and [Plaintiff] seeks to

6
hold all defendants liable for the alleged misdeeds of the others through his

derivative claims.” MR 199 (Opinion and Order (2025 Tex. Bus. 23 [hereinafter “1st

Op.”])), ¶3. Unhappy with this decision, Plaintiff amended his petition two more

times attempting to carve away any allegations that originally warranted the exercise

of Business Court jurisdiction, only to then renew his Motion to Remand. This was

blatant forum-shopping.

Respondent should have summarily denied the Renewed Motion to Remand.

But Respondent accepted Plaintiff’s misguided premise that the Business Court’s

jurisdiction is like a revolving door (relying heavily on federal authorities). Instead,

Respondent should have seen it for what it actually is—a one-way door. This is why

the Texas statutes and rules state that remand is appropriate only “if removal was

improper” as opposed to the federal scheme that requires remand if jurisdiction is

thereafter lacking “at any time before final judgment.” Those are two very different

standards for remand and they demand different results. Indeed, other states (such

as North Carolina) that have well-established Business Courts have rightly

determined that Business Court jurisdiction is a one-way door. Texas should follow

suit.

The statutes and rules that apply to the Business Court, along with its nature

and purpose as enacted by the Texas Legislature, reflect that this State seeks to

provide a forum for thorough analysis of legal issues (hence an opinion

7
requirement), limited potential for movement of cases between the district courts

and the Business Court, and the development of a robust body of precedent on which

companies may rely in the future. All of this is aimed at incentivizing companies to

transplant their headquarters and formation to the State of Texas, under the law of

Texas, and for the good of both enterprise and ultimately the people of Texas.

Accordingly, once an “action” is within the Business Court’s jurisdiction, it

cannot be remanded based on forum-shopping pleading amendments. Plaintiffs

should not be permitted to game themselves out of the Business Court, thereby

undermining the purpose of the Court to further robust, efficient, and consistent

adjudication. Respondent condoned such behavior in its second opinion. This was

misplaced.

Accordingly, this Court should grant mandamus relief and instruct

Respondent to retain Business Court jurisdiction and proceed with the action.

8
STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. Respondent (Correctly) Determines Business Court Has Jurisdiction.

On June 18, 2025, Respondent issued an opinion holding that the Texas

Business Court had jurisdiction over Plaintiff Jerry B. Reed’s Lawsuit (“First

Decision”). 1 MR 190, ¶3. This determination was based on the allegations in

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition, which was Plaintiff’s live pleading at the time.

MR 190, ¶4 (citing MR 20). As correctly explained by Respondent, Plaintiff’s

“claims against Rook TX LP and Rook GP LLC (collectively “Rook”) (and against

all defendants through his derivative theories) concern” matters of “governance,

governing documents or internal affairs.” MR 190, ¶3. Such matters included “(a)

Rook’s formation, as effectuated by its governing documents, (b) the legitimacy of

Rook’s purpose and operations, and (c) whether Reed can recover Rook’s lottery

proceeds from Rook and/or its interest holders and other payees.” Id. Such matters

were fundamental issues, not merely “tangential or extraneous matters,” thus

warranting the exercise of the Business Court’s jurisdiction. Id. And, Respondent

rightly determined that because all of Plaintiff’s claims “center on the same factual

nexus,” the Business Court had jurisdiction over the entire case—all claims against

all defendants. MR 190–92, ¶¶3 & 5.

1
The Business Court did not rule on whether Reed pleaded viable causes of action, but rather
assumed they were viable for purposes of deciding only the jurisdictional question.

9
Respondent’s First Decision denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, which he

filed after Rook removed the case to the Business Court. In the opinion’s analysis,

Respondent properly interpreted the jurisdictional statute and determined the

following:

• “The undefined term ‘action,’ as used in [Government Code] Section
25A.004, refers to the [entire] lawsuit or judicial proceeding generally, as
opposed to only individual causes of action or theories of liability.” MR 194–
95, ¶10.

• “Regarding,” as used in that statute, is “undefined” and “can be given its
common, ordinary meaning,” which is “expansive and synonymous with
terms like ‘respecting,’ ‘concerning,’ or ‘referring to.’” Id.

• “Governance” refers to “the management and direction of [an] entity’s affairs
under its governing documents and applicable law.” MR 195, ¶11.

• So long as the amount-in-controversy requirement is met, § 25A.004(b)(2)
“gives [the Business] Court jurisdiction over a[n] [entire] lawsuit …
concerning or respecting [ ] the management and direction of an
organization’s affairs,” the “management and direction of an organization’s
affairs,” the “documents adopted to govern its formation and internal affairs,”
the “ownership or membership interests” of such organization, or “the rights,
powers, and duties of its governing persons, officers, owners, or members.
MR 196, ¶12.

Applying these principles to the allegations in Plaintiff’s Second Amended

Petition, Respondent determined that the Lawsuit “concerns the date of Rook’s

formation and whether Rook was formed for improper purposes and in furtherance

of the alleged conspiracy to enable Rook to fraudulently claim the April 2023 lottery

winnings.” MR 199, ¶18; see MR 196–99, ¶¶13–18 (detailing allegations). As a

result, “[t]he action necessarily concerns Rook’s governance, governing documents,
10
or internal affairs, and therefore falls within th[e] [Business] Court’s jurisdiction

under Section 25A.004(b)(2).” MR 199, ¶18.

Critically, Respondent further found that “[a]ll of Reed’s causes of action rely

on the alleged scheme for Rook to illegally claim the April 2023 lottery, and Reed

seeks to hold all defendants liable for the alleged misdeeds of the others through his

derivative claims.” Id. (emphases added). In other words, even though the

allegations about governance and internal affairs specifically concerned Rook, not

the other defendants, and even though Reed’s claims concerned other matters

separate from governance, the entire action is still considered to “regard” matters of

governance and therefore all claims against all defendants fall within the Business

Court’s jurisdiction. This is because “[a] lawsuit can concern more than one thing,”

and “all of these alleged matters are interwoven into a single alleged conspiracy.”

MR 202, ¶21. This feature of Reed’s Lawsuit is particularly reflected in Reed

seeking the same $95 million in damages “from all defendants under all of his causes

of action.” Id.

Summarizing its reasoning, Respondent reiterated that Section 25A.004 “does

not compel the Court to granulate each of Reed’s causes of action into every

individual factual basis for liability he alleged in support of that cause.” MR 205,

11
¶25. Rather, when the statute “bestow[s] original jurisdiction,” it bestows such

jurisdiction over the “entire action.”2 Id.

Soon after its decision, on June 24, 2025, Respondent issued a scheduling

order pursuant to applicable rules and procedures—including specifically Tex. Gov’t

Code §25A.006(l)—setting all major deadlines, selecting a trial date, and laying

venue for trial in Travis County, Texas. See MR 205 (Scheduling Order (entered

June 24, 2025)).

II. Respondent (Wrongly) Reverses Course After Plaintiff Amends His
Pleading Seeking To Avoid Jurisdiction.

Plaintiff apparently was not pleased with the Business Court exercising

jurisdiction. So, he amended his Second Amended Petition two more times, then

filed a Renewed Motion to Remand arguing that his “Fourth Amended Petition [ ]

significantly narrows the claims and removes all allegations that would require

adjudication of Defendants’ ‘governance, governing, documents, or internal

affairs.’” MR 292. According to Plaintiff, “remand [was] now required.” Id.

Plaintiff openly acknowledged his gamesmanship. Quoting from his newly

amended petition, he argued that he “disclaim[ed] any allegation, legal theory, or

request for relief that requires this Court to interpret or enforce the governance,

2
Significantly, Respondent expressly determined that it need not and was not exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over any of the claims. MR 193 n.13.

12
internal affairs, or governing documents of any Defendant entity.” MR 293. In other

words: “I have worked around your jurisdiction, Business Court. Now let me go.”

It must be noted, however, that the claims against Relator and the other non-

Rook defendants were essentially unchanged. Rook properly removed the case to

Business Court and the other Defendants went with it. As such, Respondent properly

determined that it had jurisdiction over all of Reed’s claims, including claims against

the other Defendants, for the reasons stated above. Those claims did not change in

any meaningful way between the Second and Fourth Amended Petitions.

Yet, Respondent wrongly countenanced the gamesmanship—“Reed has

successfully pleaded his way out of this Court’s jurisdiction….” MR 339 (Opinion

and Order (2025 Tex. Bus. 34 [hereinafter “2nd Op.”])), ¶2. Respondent

acknowledged the general rule in Texas that “later events generally do not divest a

court of jurisdiction once properly acquired,” id., but then went on to hold otherwise

relying almost exclusively on federal authorities addressing federal jurisdiction,

namely the United States Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Royal Canin U. S. A.,

Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22 (2025). Because Reed “drop[ped] all claims against

the Rook defendants except for ‘money had and received’ and ‘expressly

disclaim[ed] any allegation, legal theory, or request for relief that requires th[e]

[Business] Court to interpret, apply, or enforce the governance, internal affairs, or

13
governing documents of any Defendant entity,” Reed “divest[ed] th[e] [Business]

Court of jurisdiction.” MR 342-343, ¶7.

According to Respondent, Reed was able to “divest” the court of jurisdiction

because, if the court newly considered the jurisdictional question as if it was the first

time, there was no longer a basis for jurisdiction. MR 344-56, ¶¶9–24 (analyzing

supplemental qualified transaction, and trade regulation jurisdiction all in the first

instance). Respondent entirely failed to consider whether, in the first instance, the

Business Court was even permitted to revisit the jurisdictional question after having

made a first and (as Relator argues herein) final determination on the matter. Indeed,

Respondent specifically, and confusingly, punted the issue:

While the Rook defendants rely on [the general proposition about “no
later fact or event can defeat the court’s jurisdiction”] to argue
supplemental jurisdiction, they do not assert jurisdiction under Section
25A.004(b)(2). The Court thus need not determine whether the general
rule [ ] should be construed to mean that the Court’s jurisdiction under
(b)(2) was fixed at the time of removal and could not be destroyed by
subsequent filings.
MR 344, ¶9 n.27 (citing Royal Canin to suggest new complaint could divest

“depend[ing] on what the new complaint says”). Of course, if analyzed again based

on the Fourth Amended Petition, there was no longer jurisdiction under

25A.004(b)(2) as those claims had been dismissed. The real question was whether

the Respondent could disregard the “general rule” in Texas that “where jurisdiction

is once lawfully and properly acquired, no later fact or event can defeat the court’s

14
jurisdiction,” which Rook argued relying on Cont’l Coffee Products Co. v. Cazarez,

937 S.W.2d 444, 449 (Tex. 1996). But simply because Rook challenged the

Renewed Motion to Remand on the basis that Texas courts do not lose jurisdiction

once properly acquired and it framed certain other arguments in terms of

“supplemental jurisdiction” instead of arguing that the court retained Section

24A.004(b)(2) jurisdiction, Respondent disregarded the need to first consider

whether it had the authority—at all—to revisit jurisdiction. 3 What remained of

Respondent’s mention of this issue was relegated to footnotes. MR 344, ¶9 n.27; see

also MR 346, ¶12 n.35 (again citing Royal Canin and stating that when a plaintiff

amends her pleading in federal court to remove a federal question, the federal case

must be remanded to state court). Acknowledging that Rook “argue[d] that

differences in the relevant Texas and federal jurisdictional statutes justify a different

outcome here than in Royal Canin,” the Court still declined “to reach that issue,”

again, apparently because it was couched in terms of ongoing “supplemental

jurisdiction” in Rook’s briefing. MR 346, ¶12 n.35.

3
The only other sentence to impliedly address the matter was another reference to Royal Canin
to support the proposition that “the plaintiff is the master of the complaint.” MR 338, ¶2. But
Relator does not deny that a plaintiff is the “master” of his complaint. Rather, what Relator
challenges is whether, once the “master” pleads his way into Business Court, the statutory scheme
precludes subsequent re-analysis of the issue. Infra, at 21–27. There is no doubt that the plaintiff
was initially the “master” of whether his complaint might send his case through the one-way door
to Business Court. But he does not get to “re-master” his way out given the text, structure and
purpose of the applicable statutes and procedural rules.

15
III. To Date, ColossusBets Has Only Specially Appeared.

After removal, and before the latest two pleading amendments filed by

Plaintiff Reed, ColossusBets entered only a Special Appearance in the underlying

action. MR 403 (ColossusBets’ Special Appearance); see also MR 357-395 (Rule

91a Motion and Amended Motion based on same grounds). The Special Appearance

challenges the trial court’s authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over

ColossusBets, and it remains pending. Indeed, it is through this mandamus petition

that ColossusBets seeks to have the appropriate trial court rule on the matter of

personal jurisdiction.

Accordingly, and to avoid any doubt concerning the nature of Relator’s

appearance in the underlying action in light of this Petition, Relator expressly

reserves all rights to further challenge the authority of the trial court to act, including

on grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction, consistent with and subject to its Special

Appearance in the underlying matter. See Grynberg v. M-I L.L.C., 398 S.W.3d 864,

878 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2012, pet. denied) (“Texas courts have recognized

that appearing in matters ancillary and prior to the main suit does not constitute a

general appearance in the main suit and will not waive a personal-jurisdiction

challenge.”); Gutierrez v. Cayman Islands Firm of Deloitte & Touche, 100 S.W.3d

261, 267 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. dism’d) (mandamus filing and motion

for emergency relief does not waive special appearance because “a party’s

16
appearance before an appellate court” in an independent original proceeding does

not constitute “a general appearance before the trial court”).

17
STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Mandamus relief is available if the relator establishes a clear abuse of

discretion for which there is no adequate appellate remedy.” In re AutoZoners, LLC,

694 S.W.3d 219, 223 (Tex. 2024); see also In re ETC Field Services, LLC, 707

S.W.3d 924, 926 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. 2025) (denying mandamus for reasons

different from instant case). “A trial court has no discretion to determine what the

law is or in applying the law to the facts, and, consequently, the trial court’s failure

to analyze or apply the law correctly is an abuse of discretion.” In re Am. Homestar

of Lancaster, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 480, 483 (Tex. 2001); see also In re H.E.B. Grocery

Co., L.P., 492 S.W.3d 300, 302-03 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)

(abuse of discretion where trial court “fails to correctly analyze or apply the law to

the facts.”). This is true “even when the law is unsettled.” In re Shipman, 540

S.W.3d 562, 566 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (emphasis added). Furthermore, a

trial court can abuse its discretion in resolving a legal issue even if the issue is a

matter of “first impression.” Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 927 (Tex. 1996)

(orig. proceeding).

Subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to applicable statutes is, generally, a

question of law for the court to decide. City of Ingleside v. City of Corpus Christi,

469 S.W.3d 589, 590 (Tex. 2015); see also C Ten 31 LLC v. Tarbox, 2025 Tex. Bus.

18
1, ¶9, 708 S.W.3d 223, 230 (Tex. Bus. Ct. 2025). A trial court therefore abuses its

discretion if jurisdiction is wrongly determined.

“The adequacy of an appellate remedy must be determined by balancing the

benefits of mandamus review against its detriments.” In re GlobalSanteFe Corp.,

275 S.W.3d 477, 483 (Tex. 2008). As part of that balancing test, courts consider

whether mandamus relief will safeguard important substantive and procedural rights

from impairment or loss.” Id. (cleaned up). Beyond the impairment of rights, courts

should also consider whether mandamus will “allow the appellate courts to give

needed and helpful direction to the law that would otherwise prove elusive in appeals

from final judgments.” 4 Id. Courts should also consider whether mandamus relief

will “spare private parties and the public the time and money utterly wasted enduring

eventual reversal of improperly conducted proceedings.” In re Prudential Ins. Co.

of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004). “Prudent mandamus relief is also

preferable to legislative enlargement of interlocutory appeals.” Id. at 137.

As such, mandamus is the appropriate remedy here. ETC Field Services, 707

S.W.3d at 928 (acknowledging the propriety of mandamus review in this Court and

reasoning that “[r]emoval of qualifying cases to the business court is a statutory right

that must be respected….”). As demonstrated herein, Respondent incorrectly

4
The Fifteenth Court of Appeals has already acknowledged the critical role this particular
consideration plays in the development of the newly created Business Court’s jurisprudence. ETC
Field Services, 707 S.W.3d at 929.

19
interpreted and applied applicable statutes and procedural rules concerning the

Business Court’s jurisdiction. Indeed, Respondent mostly avoided the critical issue

of whether jurisdiction can even be revisited at all following a finding that removal

was proper. Moreover, there is no adequate appellate remedy for interlocutory orders

concerning jurisdiction or the proper forum for a lawsuit. See id. at 925 (“[N]o

interlocutory appeal is available in these circumstances.”). By the time a final

judgment is issued which can be appealed, a litigant has already proceeded in the

very forum which the litigant claims is improper. In other words, the litigant’s

statutory or other rights to be heard in a particular forum have long been violated

and no remedy can then adequately correct it. Under the Prudential analysis,

mandamus is the preferable remedy, particularly given the “need” for “helpful

direction” in the jurisdictional law of the newly created Business Court.

20
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Respondent incorrectly concluded that the Business Court could revisit the

issue of its own jurisdiction despite having already fully and finally decided its

jurisdiction upon removal. Plaintiff’s attempt to game jurisdiction through artful

pleading should have had no sway for three reasons:

A. The plain text, structure, and purpose of the Chapter 25A statutory

scheme.

B. Respondent’s reliance on federal authorities concerning federal

jurisdiction was misguided given both the fundamental differences between federal

courts of limited jurisdiction under the United States Constitution as opposed to the

Texas Business Court’s concurrent jurisdiction within the state’s judicial system and

the differing standards for remand of cases removed to those courts.

C. North Carolina, a state with a long-established Business Court and

similar statutory scheme, has rightly determined that jurisdiction (called

“designation” in that state) is a once and for all determination that cannot be avoided

by later, artful pleading attempts.

21
ARGUMENT

I. The Business Court’s Jurisdiction, Once Established, Cannot Be Lost—
It Is A One-Way Door Through Which Jurisdiction Remains Proper
Until Final Judgment.

There is no disputing that the Business Court previously determined it had

jurisdiction. It did so after thorough review and consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion

to Remand, Plaintiff’s live petition, and responsive briefing from Defendants. After

all that, the Court issued an 18-page opinion setting forth its careful reasoning.

The question for this Court is whether the Texas Business Court can remand

after it has already determined that removal was proper and exercised jurisdiction.

The answer is no. 5 “As a general rule, where jurisdiction is once lawfully and

properly acquired, no later fact or event can defeat the court’s jurisdiction.”6 Cont’l

Coffee Products Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 449 (Tex. 1996).

In keeping with the general rule, three sources persuade that the Business

Court should keep jurisdiction fully and finally once it has properly been established:

5
The analysis herein assumes, for sake of argument, that there is no independent basis for Business
Court jurisdiction within the Fourth Amended Petition alone, as if that petition represented the
first time a court considered the jurisdictional question. But it is not the first time. It is the second
time, and that second time came months after the Business Court already exercised jurisdiction
and after the Plaintiff amended his pleading to escape proper jurisdiction. While there may be
independent, substantive arguments for jurisdiction even based only on the Fourth Amended
pleading, mandamus relief is premised here only on the procedural question of whether
jurisdiction, once exercised, can be lost.
6
Respondent acknowledged this general rule in the Second Opinion after Rook cited this
proposition in its Response to Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion: “As the Rook defendants correctly
point out, the ‘general rule’ is that ‘where jurisdiction is once lawfully and properly acquired, no
later fact or event can defeat the court’s jurisdiction.’ ” MR 344, ¶9 (citing MR 305) (quoting
Cont’l Coffee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 449 (Tex. 1996)).

22
(A) language, structure, and purpose of Chapter 25A; (B) difference between

Chapter 25A and the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure compared to federal

jurisdictional statutes; and (C) practice followed by already well-established

Business Courts in other states.

A. The Express Language Of Several Provisions In Chapter 25A
(And Other Rules) Reflects Jurisdiction Is A One-Time
Determination That Should Be “Prompt” And “Final.”

The statutory scheme establishing Texas’s Business Court (Chapter 25A of

the Texas Government Code) sets forth various provisions regarding the importance

of a swift and final determination of the Business Court’s jurisdiction. As reflected

in these statutes, jurisdiction determinations are a one-time event. They are not an

ongoing consideration to be revisited at every stage of pleading. Otherwise, the

parties would have significant uncertainty concerning where they will proceed,

judicial efficiency will be lost with cases moving to and from the Business Court

and the district courts, and whether there will be consistent, written opinions on

substantive matters.

When interpreting statutes, Texas courts look to the text and give words their

ordinary meaning as understood from reading the statute as a whole and in context.

Malouf v. State ex rels. Ellis, 694 S.W.3d 712, 718 (Tex. 2024). “Context” refers to

“the surrounding words and structure of the operative text,” which means, in other

words, courts should look to the “framework” of the statute within its chapter and

23
strive for a “fair meaning” that “harmonizes” the relevant provisions. Id.; U.S.

Polyco, Inc. v. Tex. Cent. Bus. Lines Corp., 681 S.W.3d 383, 390 n.3 (Tex. 2023)

(per curiam); Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex. v. Luminant Energy Co. LLC, 691 S.W.3d

448, 461–62 (Tex. 2024) (relying on “whole text” canon, which “calls on the judicial

interpreter to consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and

logical relation of its many parts” (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,

Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (2012))). Putting all this

together, the court aims to “meld [the statute’s] words into a cohesive reflection of

legislative intent.” Luminant Energy, 691 S.W.3d at 461.

Front and center in Chapter 25A is the Legislature’s instruction that

procedures be established “for the prompt, efficient, and final determination of

business court jurisdiction on the filing of an action in the business court.” TEX.

GOV’T CODE § 25A.0041(a) (emphases added). The statute then lists several items

the Supreme Court should consider when establishing such rules, including the

“limited potential for the movement of an action between a district court and the

business court as it relates to issues of fundamental fairness or the preservation of

constitutionally or statutorily protected rights of the parties….” TEX. GOV’T CODE §

25A.0041(a)(3).

In addition to asking for rules from the Supreme Court, the Legislature itself

set forth controlling provisions that seek to ensure “prompt” and “final”

24
determinations of jurisdiction. Section 25A.006 prescribes the nature and timing of

jurisdictional decisions in two contexts: (1) an action directly filed in Business

Court, and (2) an action removed to Business Court. In the first scenario, there are

two steps. The Business Court is to first decide if it has jurisdiction and, if not,

transfer or dismiss the action. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25A.006(b). If jurisdiction is

established, the next step is to assign the action to the proper venue or division. TEX.

GOV’T CODE § 25A.006(c). The implication here is that once jurisdiction is

established and venue assigned, this is a final determination pursuant to the intent

expressed in § 25A.0041(a).

Relevant here is the second scenario—removal. If an action is first filed “in a

district court or county court,” but the action “is within the jurisdiction of the

business court,” a party “may remove the action to the business court.” TEX. GOV’T

CODE § 25A.006(d). Upon removal, the Business Court must make its own

determination—once and for all—whether it has jurisdiction. This is why section

25A.006(d) continues with: “[i]f the business court does not have jurisdiction of the

action, the business court shall remand the action to the court in which the action

was originally filed.” Again, this decision represents a single, “prompt” and “final”

determination of jurisdiction.

This is why Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 355, when addressing the very

same issue (i.e., removal), states that the court must remand only if it determines

25
“that removal was improper.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 355(f)(1) (emphasis added). It does

not say remand “if jurisdiction is later lacking,” but rather if “removal” was improper

at the time of removal. See Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex. v. Luminant Energy Co. LLC,

691 S.W.3d 448, 461 (Tex. 2024) (when interpreting statutes, courts “presum[es] the

Legislature included words that it intended to include and omitted words it intended

to omit.”); see also Pharus Funding, LLC v. Garcia, No. 01-20-00411-CV, 2021

WL 3556679, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 12, 2021, pet. denied)

(“The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure have the same force and effect as statutes.”).

Subsection (f) further suggests the importance of a one-time, prompt and final

determination. If an action is to be removed absent agreement of all parties, a party

must do so within 30 days of being served with process or discovering the facts

establishing the business court’s jurisdiction. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25A.006(f)(1).

The reason for this requirement is obvious—the parties need to know as soon as

practicable in what court they will proceed, whether that court is to be the Business

Court, and in what venue the case will be tried. This prevents months of uncertainty

that might otherwise persist and the resulting judicial inefficiency of cases being

litigated for months in one forum only to be bounced to another. 7

7
The parties can of course agree to removal “at any time during the pendency of the action.” Tex.
Gov’t. Code § 25A.006(f). But removal in that instance does not raise the same policy concerns—
no one is being compelled into a court that they did not choose or upon timing that they did not
agree in that instance.

26
Putting all of this together, and considering the entire framework of the

statutory scheme for the Business Court, when a case is removed, it must be removed

within 30 days. At that time, the Business Court considers its jurisdiction—i.e.,

whether removal was “proper.” Then, when it makes its determination, that decision

is a “prompt” and “final” decision about jurisdiction on which the parties may rely

to begin preparing their case. Indeed, “[t]he business court judge on establishment

of jurisdiction and venue over an action shall by order declare the county in which

any jury trial for the action will be held….” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25A.006(l).

Once “removal” is proper, jurisdiction is established for the rest of the life of

the case. Remand is appropriate only if the “removal” was “improper.” TEX. R. CIV.

P. 355(f)(1). The determination of whether removal was proper must be made based

on the live pleadings at the time of removal; a proper removal cannot retroactively

become improper because a plaintiff later changes his claims.

All of these procedures were appropriately followed in the removal process

here. Rook removed within 30 days; Respondent determined it had jurisdiction,

which was “prompt” and (should have been) “final”; and Respondent issued its

administrative order setting a trial date and laying venue in Travis County. See MR

208 (Scheduling Order entered June 24, 2025).

27
That should have been the end of the jurisdictional story. Respondent’s later

decision to reverse course based on Plaintiff’s gamesmanship and his pleading

amendments violated the structure, intent, and express words of Chapter 25A.

B. The Federal System Is Different From The Texas System.

Somewhat understandably (given the lack of established precedent

concerning the newly formed Business Court’s jurisdiction), Respondent heavily

relied on federal case law (namely Royal Canin) and the way that removal

jurisdiction is handled in federal court to reach its decision about what should happen

in Texas Business Court. However, the two systems are different in purpose,

structure, and implementation and therefore the federal authorities do not control the

outcome here.

The American judicial system, just like the American government more

broadly, is founded on the idea of limited federal power. As a result, federal courts,

like the federal executive and legislature, can exercise power only where given the

authority to do so by the people through the United States Constitution. See Art. III,

s. 2 (detailing types of cases and controversies within “judicial Power”); Art. I, s. 8

(listing out various areas for which legislature has the “power” to enact laws); Art.

II, s. 2 (executive has power to command U.S. military, make treaties, etc.). In

contrast, each state is a sovereign having general police power over their people and

may enact any law that does not violate a federal or state constitutional right.

28
Accordingly, state courts are equipped and expected to hear any case or controversy

regarding any claim or legal right, including federal issues.

Implementing these principles, the United States Congress established limited

jurisdiction for federal courts and squarely instructed that they be divested of

jurisdiction if and when circumstances change. This is because of the throughline

in American jurisprudence that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by

the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States

respectively, or to the people.” U.S. Const., Amendment IX. In other words, federal

courts should not hear cases unless they have, and fully retain, the power to do so

throughout the life of the case; otherwise, they may violate the very structure of the

federal-state divide enumerated in the Constitution.

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1367 to codify the rule that federal courts could

exercise “supplemental jurisdiction” over state law claims, but only if the claims

“aris[e] from the same facts.” Royal Canin U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S.

22, 27 (2025). Congress also granted defendants the right to remove their cases to

federal court if there was federal jurisdiction and the plaintiff originally filed in state

court. Id. at 27–28 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)). Most critically here, Congress

expressly stated in the federal scheme that federal jurisdiction was not a one-way

door:

If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.

29
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court continued, “to return to

where we started, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction: When they do not

have (or no longer have) authorization to resolve a suit, they must hand it over.”

Royal Canin, 604 U.S. at 22. Hence the result in Royal Canin.

Those six emphasized words (above) make all the difference between the

Texas Business Court and federal court jurisdictional schemes and illuminate why

Respondent was wrong to read these words into the Texas statute from which they

are conspicuously absent. Luminant Energy, 691 S.W.3d at 461 (Court “presume[es]

the Legislature included words that it intended to include and omitted words it

intended to omit.”). The Texas legislature is presumed to be well aware of the federal

jurisdictional statutes. Just as much, the legislature is presumed to have intentionally

omitted words of which it is aware and of which it declined to include in the relevant

statute.

As already articulated, the text of the relevant Texas statutes and rules

specifically identify removal to be followed by a jurisdictional determination at the

time of removal with remand possible only at that time if removal was improper.8

This is why Section 25A.006(d) mentions that the Business Court “shall remand”

8
There are two inquiries for the court to make upon removal of a case to Business Court: (1) was
the removal timely and (2) does the court have jurisdiction. Once the court is satisfied that both
of those requirements are met, as Respondent did here, there is no legitimate reason for the court
to disturb that decision.

30
“[i]f the business court does not have jurisdiction of the action” right after conferring

the right of removal. This means that a party can remove an action that is “within

the jurisdiction of the business court,” but the Business Court, upon removal, must

remand if it determines it does not have jurisdiction. Supporting this reading, Rule

355(f)(1) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure states that the Court must remand if,

and only if, it determines “that removal was improper.” (emphasis added). It does

not say remand “if jurisdiction is later lacking,” but rather if “removal” was improper

at the time of removal. Indeed this rule allowing remand only if the removal is

improper is entirely consistent with the Texas Legislature’s mandate to the Texas

Supreme Court regarding the purpose of the procedural rules the Court was

instructed to draft and adopt:

• “establish procedures for the prompt, efficient, and final determination
of business court jurisdiction on the filing of an action in the business
court.” § 25A.0041(a) (emphasis added).

• “establish limited periods during which [jurisdictional] issues or rights
must be asserted, considered agreed to, or waived;” § 25A.0041(b)(3)
(emphasis added); and

• “provide for any other procedures necessary for the prompt, efficient,
and final determination of business court jurisdiction.” §
25A.0041(b)(7) (emphasis added).

Given this clear legislative mandate, it is no surprise that none of these statutes

or rules approximate the text governing the federal-scheme: “if at any time before

final judgment.” Even more, the Texas legislature demonstrated that it knew exactly
31
how to use such a phrase when—within the very same section as the statute at issue

here—it provided that parties may remove an action, by agreement, “at any time

during the pendency of the action.” See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25A.006(f). Yet, the

phrase is conspicuously absent in the prior subsection (d).

All of this means that Royal Canin and the federal removal and remand

scheme has no bearing on whether jurisdiction in the Texas Business Court is a one-

way door or not. The federal scheme is different and the federal removal and remand

statute is different. The Texas Legislature and Supreme Court could have enacted a

similar scheme using similar language, but they deliberately did not.

C. Another State With A Longer-Established Business Court Has A
One-Way Jurisdictional Door.
Like Texas, North Carolina has a special Business Court within its state

judicial system. North Carolina’s Business Court has been around since 1996 and

was created in an effort to build out a body of case law concerning legal issues

important to corporations, much like those for which Delaware had become known.

In North Carolina, the business court adjudicates cases that must involve at least one

of a series of legal issues or questions, most of which mirror the bases for the Texas

Business Court’s jurisdiction. Compare, e.g., N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a)(1) (business

court jurisdiction is proper if action involves a material issue related to “[d]isputes

involving the law governing corporations….”, with TEX. GOV’T CODE §

25A.004(b)(2) (business court has jurisdiction over “an action regarding the

32
governance, governing documents, or internal affairs of an organization.”). Given

its long-standing existence, North Carolina’s business court has already had the

opportunity to address the nature of its jurisdiction and whether jurisdiction can ever

be lost by pleading amendments. The answer is an emphatic “no.”

In a recent opinion, the North Carolina business court summarized its

jurisdictional precedents. The business court’s jurisdiction (in North Carolina, it is

called a “designation”) is exercised if “the pleading upon which [jurisdiction] is

based [ ] raise[s] a material issue that falls within one of the categories specified in

section 7A-45.4.” Olds v. Olds, No. 25CV000166-740, 2025 NCBC Order 57, 2025

NCBC LEXIS 102, ¶9 (Aug. 13, 2025) (included in record at MR 396). So long as

that is the case, the action, once designated as proper for business court jurisdiction,

cannot be remanded: “As this Court has previously held, neither N.C.G.S. § 7A-

45.4(a) nor any other statute permits designation, once ordered, to be withdrawn or

revoked.” Id., ¶11 (cleaned up) (citing PKT1, LLC v. Vaynberg, 2022 NCBC LEXIS

72, at *2 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 5, 2022). “Once a designation order has issued,

designation to the Business Court is not affected by subsequent filings or court

action.” Id. (collecting additional cases). Even more on the nose:

Simply put, once a case has been properly designated to the Business
Court, a party cannot divest the Court of its authority to hear the case
by using gamesmanship—in this case, voluntarily dismissing the claim
that was the basis for designation— in an effort to get out of the
Business Court.”

33
Olds, 2025 NCBC Order 57, ¶12.

Just like here, the plaintiff in Olds, tried to amend his pleading less than a

month after the business court exercised jurisdiction. He voluntarily dismissed one

of his claims, specifically the one for “judicial dissolution,” which qualified the case

for business court jurisdiction. Id., ¶¶4–5. The Business Court flatly rejected this

attempt at “gamesmanship.” This Court should follow similar reasoning to ensure

that Texas Business Court jurisdiction does not start out on the wrong foot and allow

such gamesmanship.

II. Respondent Abused Its Discretion When, After Determining It Had
Jurisdiction, Reversed Course Based On Forum-Shopping Amendments
By Plaintiff.
As the above demonstrates, Respondent abused its discretion when

concluding that the Business Court had been “divested” of jurisdiction. Respondent

interpreted and applied the law incorrectly. That the issue may be one that is of “first

impression” or “unsettled” makes no difference. Shipman, 540 S.W.3d at 566; Huie,

922 S.W.2d at 927.

Mandamus relief is appropriate for all the reasons articulated supra, at 21–33.

The jurisdiction of the Business Court presents an important issue in this State for

which litigants and the Business Court need guidance and for which there is no

opportunity for interlocutory appeal. To proceed without mandamus review would

deprive defendants in this case of their right to proceed in the appropriate forum

34
given the legislature’s recent creation of the Business Court and enactment of its

jurisdictional framework, all while countenancing Plaintiff’s jurisdictional

gamesmanship.

PRAYER
For these reasons, Relator ColossusBets Limited prays this Court grant a writ

of mandamus and direct Respondent to (1) vacate its August 25, 2025, order

remanding the Lawsuit to the District Court, (2) reinstate its administrative and

scheduling orders, and (3) exercise jurisdiction over, and proceed with, the Lawsuit

in the Texas Business Court.

Relator also requests any further relief to which it may be justly entitled.

Dated: September 19, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP

Derrick Carson (Texas Bar No. 24001847)
(Lead Counsel)
Charles Conrad (Texas Bar No. 24040721)
Jonathan Sink (Texas Bar No. 24099968)
Lindsey Mitchell (Texas Bar No. 24138645)
PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP
609 Main Street, Suite 2000
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 276-7600 (Telephone)

35
(713) 276-7673 (Facsimile)
Derrick.Carson@pillsburylaw.com
Charles.Conrad@pillsburylaw.com
Jonathan.Sink@pillsburylaw.com
Lindsey.Mitchell@pillsburylaw.com

Counsel for Relator ColossusBets Limited

36
VERIFICATION

THE STATE OF TEXAS §
§
COUNTY OF HARRIS §

Before me, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared Derrick

Carson, counsel for Relator ColossusBets Limited in the above cause, known to me

to be the person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument, and stated

that the factual statements in this petition for writ of mandamus are supported by

competent evidence included in the Relator’s Mandamus Record.

/s/ Derrick Carson
Derrick Carson

37
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on September 19, 2025, a true and correct copy of the foregoing

document was served via electronic transmission on counsel of record.

/s/ Derrick Carson
Derrick Carson

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
This brief complies with the length limitations of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(2)(B)

because this brief consists of 7,254 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted

by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1).

/s/ Derrick Carson
Derrick Carson

38
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Samantha Guajardo on behalf of Derrick Carson
Bar No. 24001847
samantha.guajardo@pillsburylaw.com
Envelope ID: 105864280
Filing Code Description: Original Proceeding Petition
Filing Description: Petition for Writ of Mandamus
Status as of 9/22/2025 7:20 AM CST

Case Contacts

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Honorable Melissa Andrews bcdivision3a@txcourts.gov 9/19/2025 8:26:13 PM SENT

Grace Miller 24132499 gmiller@sheppardmullin.com 9/19/2025 8:26:13 PM SENT

Aimee Oleson 24036391 aoleson@sheppardmullin.com 9/19/2025 8:26:13 PM SENT

Jon Smith 18630750 jon@jonmichaelsmith.com 9/19/2025 8:26:13 PM SENT

Bradden Pippin 24143893 bradden.pippin@troutman.com 9/19/2025 8:26:13 PM SENT

Kathleen Laird Kathleen.Laird@Troutman.com 9/19/2025 8:26:13 PM SENT

Mia Lorick 24091415 Mia.Lorick@troutman.com 9/19/2025 8:26:13 PM SENT

David Harrell 793905 david.harrell@troutman.com 9/19/2025 8:26:13 PM SENT

Jeffrey Adams 24006736 jeff@jeffadamslaw.com 9/19/2025 8:26:13 PM SENT

Manfred Sternberg 19175775 manfred@msternberg.com 9/19/2025 8:26:13 PM SENT

Mary Lagarde 24037645 mary@lagardelaw.com 9/19/2025 8:26:13 PM SENT

Richard Lagarde 11819550 richard@lagardelaw.com 9/19/2025 8:26:13 PM SENT

Lindsey Mitchell lindsey.mitchell@pillsburylaw.com 9/19/2025 8:26:13 PM SENT

Jon Sink jonathan.sink@pillsburylaw.com 9/19/2025 8:26:13 PM SENT

Charles Conrad charles.conrad@pillsburylaw.com 9/19/2025 8:26:13 PM SENT

Derrick Carson Derrick.carson@pillsburylaw.com 9/19/2025 8:26:13 PM SENT

Ryan Dickinson ryandickinson79@gmail.com 9/19/2025 8:26:13 PM SENT