John Belmont v. Claudia Belmont

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-25-00388-CV
___________________________

JOHN BELMONT, Appellant

V.

CLAUDIA BELMONT, Appellee

On Appeal from the 233rd District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 233-768621-25

Before Bassel, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.
Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant John Belmont attempts to appeal from a “Final Protective Order”

signed on July 25, 2025. The order does not appear to be a final judgment or an

appealable interlocutory order. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 81.009(b) (“A protective

order rendered against a party in a suit for dissolution of a marriage may not be

appealed until the time the final decree of dissolution of the marriage becomes a final,

appealable order.”).

On August 4, 2025, we informed Appellant of our concern that we do not have

jurisdiction over his appeal. We stated that, unless he or another party desiring to

continue the appeal responded with grounds for continuing the appeal, it might be

dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 44.3.

In response, Appellant acknowledges Section 81.009(b) but claims that Section

81.009(a) “reflects the [Texas] Legislature’s intent to allow immediate review of

protective orders regardless of procedural context, to prevent orders with significant

personal and property restraints from evading meaningful review.” See Tex. Fam.

Code Ann. § 81.009(a) (“Except as provided by Subsections (b) and (c), a protective

order rendered under this subtitle may be appealed.”). Alternatively, Appellant states

that “[i]f this [c]ourt concludes that Texas Family Code § 81.009(b) prohibits a direct

appeal of the protective order because it was issued within the ongoing divorce under

the same cause number, Appellant respectfully requests that the [c]ourt treat this filing

as a petition for writ of mandamus.”

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This court’s appellate jurisdiction is generally limited to review of (1) final

judgments that dispose of all parties and all claims and (2) certain interlocutory orders

made appealable by statute. See, e.g., CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex.

2011). The protective order does not dispose of all parties and claims. See Lehmann v.

Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Moreover, Appellant has not

otherwise shown that the challenged protective order is appealable. Thus, we lack

jurisdiction over this appeal.

Regarding Appellant’s alternative request that we construe his appeal as a

petition for writ of mandamus, we decline to do so because his jurisdictional response

and other filings in this appeal do not meet the requirements of Texas Rule of

Appellate Procedure 52. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.3, 52.7(a); Thomas v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim.

Just.—Institutional Div., 3 S.W.3d 665, 667 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.).

Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P.

42.3(a), 43.2(f); In re F.R., No. 02-25-00314-CV, 2025 WL 2370583, at *1 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth Aug. 14, 2025, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Per Curiam

Delivered: August 29, 2025

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