In Re: The Commitment of Jeffery Regan Eddings v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-25-00523-CV
___________________________

IN RE: THE COMMITMENT OF JEFFERY REGAN EDDINGS

Original Proceeding
396th District Court of Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. D396-S-14013-18

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Walker, JJ.
Opinion by Justice Walker
OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

In 2019, after a jury found him to be a sexually violent predator,1 Appellant

Jeffery Regan Eddings was civilly committed. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.

§ 841.081. This court affirmed the final judgment and order of commitment. See In re

Commitment of Eddings, No. 02-19-00290-CV, 2020 WL 3730738, at *14 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth July 2, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.). In August 2025, the trial court

signed a biennial-review order that continued the requirements of the 2019 judgment

and commitment without modification.

Eddings, proceeding pro se, attempts to bring a restricted appeal from the trial

court’s 2025 biennial-review order. We questioned our jurisdiction over the appeal

and because the order did not appear to be a final judgment or an appealable

interlocutory order, we warned Eddings that unless he or any party desiring to

continue the appeal filed with the court a response showing grounds for continuing

the appeal, the appeal could be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App.

P. 42.3(a), 44.3. In response, Eddings requested that “his appeal be converted to a

petition for writ of mandamus for the sake of judicial economy.” See CMH Homes v.

Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 452 (Tex. 2011).

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A person is a sexually violent predator if that person “(1) is a repeat sexually
violent offender; and (2) suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes the person
likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence.” Tex. Health & Safety Code
Ann. § 841.003(a)(1), (2).

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II. CHAPTER 841 BIENNIAL REVIEWS

The trial court that civilly commits a person under Chapter 841 of the Texas

Health and Safety Code retains jurisdiction of the case while the commitment order

remains in effect and is required to review the person’s status every two years. See

Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 841.082(d), 841.101(a), (b). In this review

process, the Texas Civil Commitment Office contracts with an expert to conduct an

examination of the committed person and then provides a report of the examination

to the trial court and the person. Id. § 841.101(a), (b). The report includes

consideration of whether to modify a requirement imposed on the person and

whether to release the person from all requirements imposed on the person. Id.

The trial court then determines by a preponderance of the evidence2 at the

biennial review whether (1) a requirement imposed on the committed person should

be modified or (2) the person’s behavioral abnormality has changed to the extent that

the person is no longer likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. Id.

§ 841.102(a), (c). The person is entitled to representation by counsel during the

biennial review; however, the trial court’s preponderance-of-the-evidence

determination need not be made at a formal evidentiary hearing, and the person is not

entitled to be present. See id. § 841.102(b); In re Commitment of Richards, No. 09-14-

In 2023, Texas Health and Safety Code Section 841.102(c) was amended and
2

changed the trial court’s biennial-review burden of proof from probable cause to a
preponderance of the evidence. See id. § 841.102(c).

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00243-CV, 2014 WL 3697027, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 24, 2014, orig.

proceeding) (mem. op.) (per curiam).

If the trial court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that a

requirement imposed should be modified or that the person is no longer likely to

engage in a predatory act of sexual violence, the trial court must set a formal hearing

at which the person is “entitled to be present and to have the benefit of all

constitutional protections provided to the person at the initial civil commitment

proceeding.” Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.103(c). However, if the trial

court does not determine by a preponderance of the evidence that a requirement

should be so modified or that the person’s behavioral abnormality has so changed, the

biennial review is concluded and no hearing is held.3 See id. § 841.102(a).

III. EDDINGS’S 2025 BIENNIAL REVIEW

Pursuant to this statutory procedure, Eddings was examined by an expert

contracted by the Texas Civil Commitment Office, and a report of the examination

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We note that the procedure requiring the trial court to make a preponderance-
of-the-evidence determination every two years is not the sole means by which a
sexually violent predator might gain release from the terms of a commitment order.
For example, a case manager may authorize the filing of an authorized petition for
release if the case manager determines that the person is no longer likely to engage in
a predatory act of sexual violence. Id. § 841.121. Additionally, a committed person
may file an unauthorized petition for release with the trial court. Id. §§ 841.122,
841.123. Therefore, our review of the provisions governing release under
Chapter 841 reveals that the biennial-review procedure is not the exclusive means by
which a sexually violent predator may seek release from a condition imposed by the
commitment order.

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was provided to the trial court and Eddings. The trial court reviewed the report, a

summary of Eddings’s progress in the tiered sex offender treatment program, and a

recommendation from his case manager.

In its 2025 order concluding the biennial review, the trial court found that

[a]fter considering this information, the Court does not determine by a
preponderance of the evidence that [Eddings’s] behavioral abnormality
has changed to the extent that he is no longer likely to engage in a
predatory act of sexual violence. Further, this Court does not determine
by a preponderance of the evidence that any civil commitment
requirement imposed on [Eddings] should be modified at this time.

This is the order that Eddings seeks to appeal.

IV. JURISDICTION OVER THE APPEAL

The Texas Constitution vests the courts of appeals with jurisdiction over

appeals from district and county courts, “subject to any restrictions and regulations

prescribed by law.” Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Barlow, 48 S.W.3d 174, 176 (Tex. 2001);

see Tex. Const. art. V, § 6(a); Gray v. Rankin, 594 S.W.2d 409, 409 (Tex. 1980) (per

curiam) (holding appellate jurisdiction of courts of appeals “is not unlimited or

absolute, but within constitutional limitations is subject to control by the

Legislature”).

The Legislature has limited the Constitution’s general jurisdictional grant in

civil cases to appeals from final judgments of the district or county courts in which

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the judgment or amount in controversy exceeds $250,4 Tex. Gov’t Code Ann.

§ 22.220(a); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.012, and to certain interlocutory

orders—that is, orders that are not final.

The trial court’s order concluding Eddings’s 2025 biennial review does not bear

the hallmarks of a final judgment. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 205

(Tex. 2001) (discussing finality). The biennial review was not initiated by a party’s

petition or motion; rather it is a statutorily required review. See Tex. Health & Safety

Code Ann. § 841.101(a) (requiring biennial examination). The biennial-review order

did not follow a trial or a motion for summary judgment that disposed of all claims

and parties as required for finality. See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205 (“[W]hen there has

not been a conventional trial on the merits, an order or judgment is not final for

purposes of appeal unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party or

unless it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all

parties.”); see also In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, 689 S.W.3d 916, 922 (Tex. 2024) (orig.

proceeding) (“All judgments or orders that do not follow a conventional trial on the

merits—including default judgments, summary judgments, and the like—lack the

presumption of finality.”). Rather, it followed an informal documentary review, see

Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.102(a), but it adjudicated no claims or causes

of action and disposed of no parties. And when a final judgment already exists, a

Eddings has not asserted that the amount in controversy exceeds $250. See
4

Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.220(a); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.012.

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subsequent order that has no effect except to enforce provisions of the judgment

does not qualify as another final judgment subject to appeal. See McFadin v. Broadway

Coffeehouse, LLC, 539 S.W.3d 278, 283 (Tex. 2017) (discussing supersedeas orders and

explaining that if such a post-judgment order imposes obligations in addition to or in

excess of those in the judgment, an appeal is permissible if it disposes of all pending

issues and parties). We conclude that the trial court’s order concluding Eddings’s

2025 biennial review is not a final judgment.

The trial court’s order concluding Eddings’s 2025 biennial review is also not an

appealable interlocutory order. We have appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory

orders only when the Legislature has enacted a specific statutory authorization. See,

e.g., Tex. Est. Code Ann. § 32.001(c) (authorizing appeal of final orders issued by a

probate court); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(b) (authorizing appeal of final orders

in suit affecting parent–child relationship), § 56.01(c) (specifying orders in juvenile

proceedings that are appealable), § 81.009 (providing for appeal of some protective

orders); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 574.070, 574.108 (authorizing appeal of

orders for court-ordered mental health services, orders renewing or modifying such

orders, and orders for administration of medication to patients under court order for

mental health services); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014 (authorizing

appeal of certain interlocutory orders). There is no such authorization here.

Instead, in Chapter 841 of the Texas Health and Safety Code, the Legislature

authorized an appeal of a factfinder’s determination after a trial of whether, beyond a

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reasonable doubt, a person is a sexually violent predator. Tex. Health & Safety Code

Ann. § 841.062(a); see In re Commitment of Richards, 395 S.W.3d 905, 908 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont 2013, pet. denied). The Legislature did not, however, specifically authorize

an appeal from a trial court’s preponderance-of-the-evidence determination in a

biennial review. See Richards, 395 S.W.3d at 908.

Further, our sister courts addressing appeals of orders under Chapter 841 have

generally determined that—with the exception of initial commitment orders—such

orders are interlocutory and not appealable. See In re Commitment of Welsh, 661 S.W.3d

861, 867 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2022, pet. denied) (discussing that “orders resulting

from biennial review hearings are not appealable”); In re Commitment of Dunsmore,

No. 01-21-00151-CV, 2022 WL 904441, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

Mar. 29, 2022, no pet.) (stating that orders resulting from biennial review hearings

“are not ones for which an interlocutory appeal is statutorily authorized, either by

Chapter 841 or by Section 51.014”); In re Commitment of Black, 594 S.W.3d 590, 593

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019, no pet.) (holding that “trial court’s order finding no

probable cause in the context of a Chapter 841 biennial review is not appealable”); In

re Graves, No. 09-17-00287-CV, 2017 WL 4319886, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont

Sept. 28, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that “a biennial[-]review order continuing

a person’s civil commitment is not an appealable order”); Richards, 395 S.W.3d at 909–

10 (holding that trial court’s determination in biennial review finding no probable

cause is not appealable); see also In re Commitment of Adams, 408 S.W.3d 906, 909 (Tex.

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App.—Beaumont 2013, no pet.) (dismissing appeal of Chapter 841 modification order

as interlocutory and not appealable); In re Commitment of Cortez, 405 S.W.3d 929, 932,

936 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, no pet.) (dismissing appeal of Chapter 841

modification order because statute does not provide for appeal, order contains no

finality language, and further holding that appellant had not shown himself entitled to

mandamus relief). We find their reasoning persuasive and hold that that a trial court’s

order in the context of a Chapter 841 biennial review is not appealable.5 Accordingly,

we lack appellate jurisdiction to review the trial court’s order concluding Eddings’s

2025 biennial review.

V. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

In his response to our jurisdiction inquiry, Eddings requested that we treat his

appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus if we determined that the trial court’s

biennial-review order is not directly appealable.

In certain circumstances, we may exercise our mandamus jurisdiction when an

appellant specifically requests that we treat his attempted appeal as a petition for writ

of mandamus. See CMH Homes, 340 S.W.3d at 452 (construing impermissible

5
With respect to any due process concerns, in light of the other statutory
avenue that Eddings could use to obtain a trial on the merits—whether his behavioral
abnormality has changed to the extent that he is no longer likely to engage in a
predatory act of sexual violence—the trial court does not have unfettered discretion
to continue his commitment. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 841.121–.123.

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interlocutory appeal as mandamus proceeding upon appellant’s request and

remanding to court of appeals for consideration as such).

Here, in the interest of judicial economy and to the extent that mandamus relief

may be an appropriate remedy, we will consider the documents filed in this attempted

restricted appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus. See Rylander v. Archer Sys. LLC,

No. 01-25-00185-CV, 2025 WL 1460733, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May

22, 2025, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (dismissing appeal for want of

jurisdiction and considering appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus at appellant’s

request). Treating this appeal as a mandamus proceeding, the court has considered

Eddings’s petition for writ of mandamus and is of the opinion that relief should be

denied.

VI. CONCLUSION

Because the trial court’s August 2025 biennial-review order from which

Eddings attempts a restricted appeal is neither a final judgment nor an appealable

interlocutory order, we lack appellate jurisdiction over it. Treating the attempted

restricted appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus, as requested by Eddings, we

deny his petition. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a), (d).

/s/ Brian Walker

Brian Walker
Justice

Delivered: December 11, 2025

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