Francisco Chua Solis v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________

No. 02-25-00279-CR
___________________________

FRANCISCO CHUA SOLIS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 4
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1876746

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Birdwell and Bassel, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth
MEMORANDUM OPINION

After a jury convicted Appellant Francisco Chua Solis of aggravated

kidnapping, he was sentenced to 15 years confinement. On appeal Appellant raises

one issue: that the “trial court erred in admitting State’s Exhibit Three over

Appellant’s objections.”1

We begin by addressing the elephant in the room—the State’s contention that

Appellant’s complaint on appeal is inadequately briefed. Because we agree with the

State that Appellant’s Brief is inadequate—and woefully so—we will affirm.

Appellant’s Brief is lacking in several respects. First, its Statement of Facts

contains sixteen sentences describing the basic facts of the case, yet of those sixteen,

only three are supported by record references. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(g) (“The

statement [of facts] must be supported by record references.”).

The Statement of Facts is followed by a Background section, the entirety of

which consists of one cut-and-pasted excerpt from the reporter’s record spanning six

pages with no further comment or elucidation.2

1
At trial, Appellant argued that his due process rights were violated by the
introduction of State’s Exhibit 3 over his best-evidence objection. He also lodged a
relevance and a hearsay objection.
2
The excerpt begins with Appellant’s trial counsel’s objections to State’s
Exhibit 3, which is at issue on appeal. But the excerpt curiously ends with a request
by counsel to take a bathroom break and permission granted by the trial court to do
so, neither of which appear to have any bearing on issues germane to this appeal.

2
Following the Background section is the Standard of Review section, which

meets minimum standards.

Moving on to the Discussion section, Appellant reiterates the best-evidence

objection that his trial counsel made to the trial court regarding State’s Exhibit 3;

provides a brief, generalized explanation of the rule itself; and concludes with another

cut-and-pasted excerpt from the reporter’s record, with no reference to the location in

the reporter’s record where the passage can be found. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). But

most notably missing from the so-called Discussion section is any discussion or

analysis whatsoever of the interplay between the application of the best-evidence

rule—or, for that matter, any other objection lodged at trial—and State’s Exhibit 3.

See id.

The next section, Due Process and a Fair Trial, contains the only arguable

analysis in the entire brief. In it, Appellant offers a somewhat syllogistical argument,

as follows: (1) to preserve error, trial counsel must make a timely objection at trial;

(2) here, trial counsel made a timely objection, thus preserving error; (3) “[e]rgo, the

trial court’s overruling the objections to the admission of State’s Exhibit Three was

error.” Appellant’s argument—that simply because trial counsel lodged an objection

and error was preserved, error, in fact, occurred—is a bold proposition wholly

unsupported by logic or citation to any authority. See id. Indeed, this proposition so

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contradicts such well-established principles in the law that this court will not waste its

time in search of authority to support it.3

Appellant’s Brief in this matter is wholly inadequate, falling well short of the

standards that should be expected of an attorney practicing appellate law in this state.4

Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant has forfeited his sole issue due to inadequate

briefing.5 See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1, 38.9.

In its Brief, the State confirms that it found no legal support for this
3

proposition.

See Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Conduct R. 1.01(a) (“A lawyer shall not
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accept or continue employment in a legal matter which the lawyer knows or should
know is beyond the lawyer’s competence . . . .”), & cmt. 1 (“Competence is
defined . . . as possession of the legal knowledge, skill, and training reasonably
necessary for the representation. Competent representation contemplates appropriate
application by the lawyer of that legal knowledge, skill and training, [and] reasonable
thoroughness in the study and analysis of the law and facts . . . .”).

Even if we were to address what we perceive to be the gist of Appellant’s
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argument on appeal, it would fail. Appellant’s best-evidence objection is a dubious
one, but even assuming that the video recording was not an original, as defined by
Texas Rule of Evidence 1001(d), it was admissible under Rule 1004(b) as “other
evidence” because the original “[could ]not be obtained by any available judicial
process.” Tex. R. Evid. 1004(b).

Here, the video recording at issue was a collection of footage—obtained from
multiple cameras throughout an apartment complex—that depicted a particular
vehicle as it moved through the complex’s parking area during a limited time period.
The recording was compiled by a video-editing company for the property manager,
who testified at trial that the original footage from all of the cameras was likely
destroyed prior to trial. The State explained to the trial court that the “raw video”
footage was no longer available because after having made the compilation video, the
video-editing company did not keep the raw footage. Because the original raw
footage was no longer available—and had never been in the State’s possession—the

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Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue on appeal, we affirm.

/s/ Bonnie Sudderth

Bonnie Sudderth
Chief Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: June 4, 2026

trial court would not have abused its discretion by admitting the evidence under Rule
1004(b). See id.

And, as to Appellant’s contention that his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to due process were violated by the admission of State’s Exhibit 3,
such contention is premised upon the assumption that the trial court erred by
overruling his best-evidence objection. Because, as explained above, the trial court
did not err by admitting State’s Exhibit 3, the due process challenge fails. Moreover,
Appellant’s due process objection at trial lacked sufficient specificity as to which due
process rights were violated by the admission of the video. See Tex. R. App. P.
33.1(a)(1). Furthermore, from what we can glean as Appellant’s contention on appeal,
it does not mirror the objection made at trial. For these additional reasons,
Appellant’s due process complaints have been forfeited. See Pena v. State, 285 S.W.3d
459, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (holding that a party’s particular appellate complaint
is not preserved if it fails to comport with the complaint made at trial).

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