Elizabeth Sheree Ludwig v. Adam David Ludwig

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

NO. 03-26-00120-CV

Elizabeth Sheree Ludwig, Appellant

v.

Adam David Ludwig, Appellee

FROM THE 395TH DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY
NO. 24-0873-F395, THE HONORABLE RYAN D. LARSON, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

We withdraw our opinion and judgment of May 8, 2026, and substitute today’s

opinion and judgment in their place.

Elizabeth Sheree Ludwig filed a notice of restricted appeal from the trial court’s

Agreed Final Decree of Divorce, whose rendition Elizabeth 1 had jointly requested alongside

opposing party Adam David Ludwig and which Elizabeth herself had signed, approving the agreed

decree as to both form and substance. For this Court to have jurisdiction over her attempted

restricted appeal, Elizabeth must not have “participate[d]—either in person or through counsel—

in the hearing that resulted in the judgment complained of.” See Tex. R. App. P. 30; Att’y Gen.

1 We refer to the parties by their given names because they share a surname.
v. Orr, 989 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.). Because she “participated” under

Rule 30, we must dismiss this attempted restricted appeal for want of jurisdiction.

By way of quick background, the suit was set for a hearing on the trial court’s

dismissal docket in June 2025. Elizabeth personally appeared at the dismissal-docket hearing.

That same day, the trial court ordered the case retained on the docket and set a final-hearing date

for August 2025. In July 2025, Elizabeth and Adam jointly requested that the trial court sign their

proposed Agreed Final Decree of Divorce. In August 2025, the trial court signed their proposed

agreed decree, rendering the final judgment in the suit.

Parties attempting a restricted appeal have “participated” under Rule 30 in the

following circumstances. When a suit was disposed of by agreed order, a party “participated” in

the relevant proceedings under Rule 30 when the party’s attorney signed a joint motion requesting

that the trial court sign the agreed order. See Clopton v. Chi–Suk Pak, 66 S.W.3d 513, 516 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied); see also Brooks v. Bank of N.Y. Tr. Co., N.A.,

No. 02-07-00189-CV, 2008 WL 2639240, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 3, 2008, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (per curiam) (saying of Clopton, “[A]ttendance at a dismissal hearing was unnecessary

when the attorneys for the appellants and appellees agreed on, signed, and filed a joint motion to

sever and dismiss the case”). And when a party “indicated his approval of the divorce decree by

signing the judgment prior to its entry by the trial court,” the party “participated” under Rule 30.

See Blankinship v. Blankinship, 572 S.W.2d 807, 808 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, no

writ); see also Seymour v. Seymour, No. 14-07-00280-CV, 2009 WL 442259, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 10, 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“Although Bedrije did not sign the

divorce decree, she signed an agreed motion to reinstate in which she requested that the trial court

finalize the ‘divorce decree’ proven up at the [earlier] hearing. . . . By signing the motion to

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reinstate, Bedrije indicated her approval of the terms of the divorce decree, similar to the appellant

in Blankinship, who signed the trial court’s judgment prior to its entry by the trial court.”).

Here, the record shows that Elizabeth signed the agreed decree, approving it as to

both form and substance, and that the parties filed a joint statement requesting that the trial court

sign that very decree, which the court did. We thus conclude that, in line with the authorities cited

above, Elizabeth “participated” for purposes of Rule 30.

We notified Elizabeth of our jurisdictional concern, and she has responded. Her

eight arguments do not persuade us that she did not “participate” under Rule 30.

First, she argues that the clerk’s record lacks “any standalone, signed waiver of a

court record.” This argument apparently responds to the recitation in the agreed decree that a

reporter’s record of the hearing that led to the rendition of the agreed decree was waived. We fail

to see how this argument addresses either Elizabeth’s request, jointly with Adam, that the court

sign the agreed decree or her signing the agreed decree itself, approving it as to form and substance.

Second, she argues that she was not given “any formal admonishments regarding

the rights and responsibilities of a [p]ro [s]e litigant.” But even parties proceeding pro se are

subject to the Rule 30 “participation” bar. See Starks v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Just., 153 S.W.3d 621,

623, 626 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004, no pet.); see also Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn,

573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978) (“There cannot be two sets of procedural rules, one for

litigants with counsel and the other for litigants representing themselves. Litigants who represent

themselves must comply with the applicable procedural rules, or else they would be given an unfair

advantage over litigants represented by counsel.”). And Elizabeth has cited no authorities

supporting an argument that a pro se party who has “participated” under Rule 30 is instead treated

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as not having participated when the trial court has not admonished the party about proceeding

pro se.

Third, she argues that the index of the clerk’s record provided by the district clerk

has a clerical error in it because it identifies the parties’ joint “Sworn Statement of Evidence for a

Divorce with Children” instead as “Sworn Statement of Evidence for a Divorce Without Children.”

(Emphasis added.) This has nothing to do with whether Elizabeth participated under Rule 30.

Fourth, she argues that the trial court set the suit for final hearing without her input.

This argument as well is beside the Rule 30 “participation” point. The record shows that Elizabeth

jointly requested rendition of the agreed decree that the court ultimately signed and that she herself

signed the agreed decree. And she did so even after the court set the date for the final hearing.

Thus, no matter whether the court asked Elizabeth about which dates she might prefer for the final

hearing, even after the court set a date, Elizabeth still requested rendition of, and herself signed,

the agreed decree.

Fifth, Elizabeth argues that she did not participate in the June 2025

dismissal-docket hearing despite personally appearing at the hearing and asking the court to

entertain several motions. We need not decide this issue, however, because the Rule 30

“participation” requirement is tied to “the hearing that resulted in the judgment complained of.”

When, as here, the judgment complained of is an agreed judgment, a party meets the

“participation” requirement when the party has moved for the rendition of the agreed judgment.

See Clopton, 66 S.W.3d at 516; accord Seymour, 2009 WL 442259, at *3.

Sixth, Elizabeth argues that because Adam did not comply with discovery

obligations, whether under the mandatory-disclosure rules or the trial court’s standing order

regarding discovery in SAPCRs, she could not have “meaningfully participate[d] when the

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mandatory material facts of the case remain[ed] suppressed and are absent from the official

record.” But if she believed that relevant discovery responses were missing, she should not have

signed the July 2025 joint request for rendition of the agreed decree and should not have signed

the agreed decree itself.

Seventh, Elizabeth faults the trial court for not ruling on her motions for temporary

orders and for interim attorneys’ fees. She characterizes her motions as “multiple requests for

judicial intervention.” We do not see how affirmative requests for judicial intervention can prove

that Elizabeth did not “participate” under Rule 30 in the hearing that resulted in the agreed decree.

Eighth, Elizabeth contends that the agreed decree is erroneous because it deviates

from the Standard Possession Order. This is not an argument about her participation, or not, under

Rule 30. See Ex parte E.H., 602 S.W.3d 486, 495 (Tex. 2020) (whether error is apparent on face

of record is requirement of restricted appeal separate from nonparticipation requirement).

In sum, Elizabeth’s arguments do not persuade us. Because she “participated”

under Rule 30, we lack jurisdiction and must dismiss this attempted restricted appeal.

__________________________________________
Chari L. Kelly, Justice

Before Justices Triana, Kelly, and Ellis

Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction on Motion for Rehearing

Filed: May 22, 2026

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