Shawn Elizabeth Ann Bashelor v. Discover Bank

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-24-00349-CV

Shawn Elizabeth Ann Bashelor, Appellant

v.

Discover Bank, Appellee

FROM THE COUNTY COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY
NO. 23-0418-CC5, THE HONORABLE WILL WARD, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Shawn Elizabeth Ann Bashelor, appearing pro se, appeals the trial court’s final

summary judgment granted in favor of Discover Bank (Discover) on its claim for breach of

contract for delinquent payments on her credit card. Bashelor requests reversal based on her

claimed payment of the full amount and her complaints that, among other things, a

business-records affidavit contained hearsay, and the signed application was not produced.

Because Discover conclusively established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law and

Bashelor does not show any genuine issue of material fact remains, we will affirm the

summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

Undisputed summary-judgment evidence shows that Discover issued a credit card

to Bashelor in 2020, and that she incurred charges on the account. Discover sued Bashelor in
2023 for breach of contract, alleging her default by failing to make required monthly payments

and seeking the $10,880.96 outstanding balance that it alleged Bashelor owed, plus

post-judgment interest, and court costs of $441.85. Bashelor answered by filing a letter directed

to Discover’s chief executive officer.

Almost one year after suing Bashelor, Discover moved for traditional summary

judgment on its breach-of-contract claim and attached evidence that we will discuss in further

detail. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). 1 Bashelor filed no response. During the summary-judgment

hearing, Bashelor argued that she completed an online application and “did [her] signature”; she

was unable to get a copy of the contract with her signature on it; she “got behind” on her

payments; she filed certain forms with the IRS and submitted a money order “for the full amount

of $10,358.39” that was cashed; and she “paid to [her] trust.” 2 The trial court took a brief recess

for the parties to discuss the case. When the hearing resumed, Discover’s counsel stated:

Your Honor, it appears that Ms. Bashelor is not interested in discussing any
further payment as she . . . is stating that she already made payments that we have
never received. She is stating that they were made to the IRS, treasury, whoever.
We have no connection with either of those sources in terms of payment or

1 The Texas Supreme Court amended Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a, but “[o]ther
than the deadline changes, Rule 166a’s rewrite is not intended to substantively change the law.”
89 Tex. B.J. 286, 292 (2026). The amendments renumbered the rule’s provisions. Id. at
289-292. Because the amendments apply only to summary-judgment motions filed on or after
March 1, 2026, id. at 286, and the filing of Discover’s summary-judgment motion preceded the
amendments, we refer to the provisions of Rule 166a in effect at the time.
2 Bashelor did not state who the alleged money order was made payable to, when it was
allegedly sent, why that alleged amount was listed, and what relevance any “trust” payment had
to her debt. Even if these things were explained, her unsworn statements were not evidence.
Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) (“No oral testimony shall be received at the hearing.”); see Blackstock
Fed. Constructors, LLC v. Ultimate Grp., LLP, No. 06-17-00096-CV, 2018 WL 891249, at *3
n.4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Feb. 15, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (counsel’s unsworn statements
during summary-judgment hearing are not evidence).
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money . . . . And no payments have been made on the account, and no answer
has been filed to our motion for summary judgment.

The trial court signed a final summary judgment at the end of the hearing, awarding $10,880.96

to Discover on its breach-of-contract claim against Bashelor, plus post-judgment interest at the

current statutory rate, and costs of $441.85. Bashelor did not file any post-judgment motion. See

Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

No issue alleging trial-court error

The rules of appellate procedure require an appellant’s brief to include the issues

presented and concisely state all issues or points presented for review. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f).

An issue presented for appellate review is sufficient if it directs the reviewing court’s attention to

the error about which the complaint is made. See id.; Canton-Carter v. Baylor Coll. of Med.,

271 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.). None of the issues in

Bashelor’s brief allege any trial-court error, nor do they challenge Discover’s breach-of-contract

claim. 3

In addition to requiring identification of any alleged trial-court error, the rules of

appellate procedure require an appellant’s brief to contain a clear and concise argument for the

contentions made and include appropriate citations to legal authority and the appellate record.

See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). Bashelor’s brief contains no citation to the record. And her brief

Bashelor’s list of nineteen “Issues Presented” are questions directed to Discover’s
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counsel. Issues 1-6 ask whether Discover’s counsel has a contract with her and what “personal
knowledge” counsel has about Discover’s actions. Issue 7 asks whether the “alleged agreement”
involved a loan. Issues 8-10 and 14-16 ask how credit cards are funded and function. Issue 11
asks whether Discover “record[ed] an asset showing that [she] owes money” to Discover.
Lastly, issues 12-13 and 17-19 ask whether Discover follows generally accepted accounting
principles and Federal Reserve policies and whether those were violated.
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and attached affidavit reference only statutes and regulations that are irrelevant to a breach-of-

contract claim for an unpaid credit-card account. 4 Bashelor’s purported appellate issues are

inadequately briefed. See id. R. 38.1(f), (i). Her only complaints concerning the credit-card debt

are that Discover’s summary-judgment evidence relied on an affidavit containing hearsay; that

there was a lack of response to her request to inspect the original, signed application; that she

made a money-order payment to the IRS; and that Discover’s counsel could not properly serve as

a debt collector.

Bashelor is not treated differently as a pro se litigant but is held to the same

standards as a licensed attorney and must comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure.

See Litsinger v. Litsinger, No. 03-25-00106-CV, 2025 WL 3533270, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin

Dec. 10, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). Nevertheless, when a plaintiff moves for summary judgment

on its own claim, as Discover did here, it must conclusively establish each element of that claim.

Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); MMP, Ltd. v. Jones, 710 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex. 1986). Because summary

judgments must stand on their own merits, a trial court may not grant a plaintiff’s

4 Bashelor points to sections of the United States Code and the Uniform Commercial
Code that concern bank reporting, government debt, credit unions, sale-of-goods transactions,
and negotiable instruments—not credit cards. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831n(a) (concerning reports
that federally insured depository institutions must file with federal banking agencies); 31
U.S.C.S. § 3123 (discussing United States government’s financial obligations and Treasury
Secretary’s responsibility to pay interest on such “public debt”); 12 C.F.R. § 741.0 (stating that
regulations in part 741 of code apply to federal credit unions); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §§ 2.102
(stating that Texas UCC chapter 2 applies to transactions involving sale of goods), 3.102 (stating
that Texas UCC chapter 3 applies to negotiable instruments), 3.104 (stating that negotiable
instruments include checks, notes, drafts, and certificates of deposit). Neither the credit card
contract nor the liabilities that arise between the card issuer and the cardholder is a “sale of
goods,” even though the credit card is used in connection with a sale of goods. 4B Lary
Lawrence, Lawrence’s Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-275:34 (3d. ed. 2025).
Credit cards do not purport to be things of value and are not given in payment for goods or
merchandise but are only a written indication that the named owner is entitled to buy on credit.
5A Lawrence’s Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code § 3-104:29. Likewise, credit card
sales slips are not “negotiable instruments” as defined in UCC chapter 3. Id.
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summary-judgment motion by default based on the defendant’s failure to file a response.

Hinojosa Auto Body & Paint, Inc. v. FinishMaster, Inc., No. 03-08-00361-CV,

2008 WL 5210871, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 12, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). In this

instance, rather than striking Bashelor’s brief and dismissing the cause, we construe her brief as

presenting a single issue: whether the summary-judgment evidence was legally sufficient to

establish all elements of Discover’s breach-of-contract claim as a matter of law.

Summary judgment on breach-of-contract claim

We review summary-judgment rulings de novo, viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the nonmovant, crediting evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors

could and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. Zive v. Sandberg,

644 S.W.3d 169, 173 (Tex. 2022). When a party with the burden of proof moves for traditional

summary judgment, that party bears the burden to conclusively establish its entitlement to

judgment as a matter of law, notwithstanding the nonmovant’s response or lack thereof. B.C.

v. Steak N Shake Operations, Inc., 598 S.W.3d 256, 258-59 (Tex. 2020) (citing Tex. R. Civ. P.

166a(c)). A matter is conclusively established when reasonable people could not differ in their

conclusions. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 816 (Tex. 2005). When the trial court

does not specify the grounds for its ruling, we will affirm the summary judgment if any of the

grounds on which judgment is sought are meritorious. Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc.,

407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013).

Summary judgment is proper in a breach-of-contract suit seeking recovery on a

credit-card-account debt when the plaintiff establishes: (1) the existence of a valid contract;

(2) performance or tendered performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach of the contract by the

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defendant; and (4) damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the breach. Taylor

v. Discover Bank, No. 03-17-00677-CV, 2018 WL 4016611, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 23,

2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Winchek v. American Express Travel Related Servs. Co.,

232 S.W.3d 197, 202 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.)).

Bashelor complains generally about “things that were written in an alleged

hearsay affidavit,” which we construe as a challenge to the summary-judgment evidence. That

complaint would implicate only an alleged defect in form, and she failed to preserve that

complaint by not objecting to the affidavit in writing before the trial court. See Tex. R. Civ. P.

166a(f) (stating that defects in form of affidavits will not be grounds for reversal unless

specifically pointed out by objection); Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a) (requiring objection and ruling for

error preservation).

Second, Bashelor complains about Discover’s lack of response to her request to

“inspect the original application I signed front and back” and “to see the signature.” This

complaint shows that Bashelor does not deny signing the credit-card application. But even if she

did deny signing it, the Cardmember Agreement attached to the business-records affidavit

included in the summary-judgment evidence specifies that by using the credit card that Discover

issued to her, she accepted the agreement. And in the absence of any evidence from Bashelor

showing that she did not use the card when she accrued an outstanding balance, or any other

facts showing non-acceptance, Discover’s evidence demonstrates that she accepted Discover’s

offer of credit and the terms of the Cardmember Agreement. See Taylor, 2018 WL 4016611, at

*3 (noting that cardmember agreement explicitly stated that by using credit card, cardholder

accepted cardmember agreement, and statements in summary-judgment evidence showed that

Taylor had used her card).

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Lastly, Bashelor complains that she made a money-order payment and contends

that Discover’s counsel could not properly serve as a debt collector. She alleges that she “did a

lawful tender with value and consideration with instructions [on] how to handle the money

order,” that she submitted IRS paperwork, and that she considers Discover in “breach of contract

of their duties.” She also asks, “Who is the Holder in Due Course, where is the Validation of the

debt[,] and where is the attorney’s certificate to do business as a debt collector in the STATE OF

TEXAS from the Secretary of [ ] State’s office?” But Bashelor did not file a summary-judgment

response nor did she file any counterclaims. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) (“Issues not expressly

presented to the trial court by written motion, answer or other response shall not be considered

on appeal as grounds for reversal.”); Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678

(Tex. 1979). Thus, she failed to preserve for review her complaints raised for the first time here.

See McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 343 (Tex. 1993) (stating that

nonmovant must expressly present to trial court any reasons for avoiding movant’s right to

summary judgment).

Discover’s uncontroverted evidence conclusively established its entitlement to

summary judgment as a matter of law. See Taylor, 2018 WL 4016611, at *4; Winchek,

232 S.W.3d at 206. In support of its summary-judgment motion, Discover presented a

business-records affidavit from Maranda Harris. Harris averred that she is a litigation support

coordinator for Discover Products, Inc., a Discover servicing affiliate that, among other things,

maintains Discover card account records. See Tex. R. Evid. 902(10)(B). Harris also averred that

exhibits attached to her affidavit included true and accurate copies of the terms and conditions in

the Cardmember Agreement applicable to Bashelor’s account and the last periodic statement that

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Discover Products, Inc. sent to Bashelor. Harris further averred that Bashelor’s account is in

default for nonpayment of the amounts due and owing to Discover. 5

The Cardmember Agreement specifies that the agreement is accepted if the

cardmember does not cancel the account within thirty days after receiving a card and if the

cardmember uses the account. Further, the Cardmember Agreement states that the cardmember

must pay for all amounts due on the account; that each billing period the cardmember must pay

at least the minimum payment by the due date shown on the billing statement; that a late fee

would be charged the second time that the minimum payment was not timely made; that interest

charges are imposed until the total amount owed is paid; that the cardmember is in default if the

cardmember fails to make a required payment when due; and that if the cardmember is in

default, the entire balance of the account may be declared immediately due and payable.

The last periodic statement, which was sent to Bashelor at the address where she

was later successfully served with citation and Discover’s petition, shows that Bashelor used the

card for purchases, that her unpaid balance included interest and late fees calculated and assessed

in accordance with the Cardmember Agreement, and that as of December 2022, Bashelor owed

Discover $10,880.96. Thus, Discover established as a matter of law that a contract existed and

that it performed under the contract. See Taylor, 2018 WL 4016611, at *3. Discover also

established as a matter of law that the contract was breached and that Discover sustained

damages from the breach: the summary-judgment evidence showed that Bashelor had an unpaid

account balance of $10,880.96 incurred after her acceptance and use of the credit card. Once

Discover established its breach-of-contract claim as a matter of law, the burden shifted to

5 Harris also averred that according to the United States Department of Defense’s
records, Bashelor is not engaged in any of the United States military services.
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Bashelor to bring forward summary-judgment evidence sufficient to raise a fact issue. See

Mosaic Baybrook One, L.P. v. Simien, 674 S.W.3d 234, 252 (Tex. 2023). But Bashelor did not

file a response to the summary-judgment motion. And her arguments at the summary-judgment

hearing were not evidence.

In her brief on appeal, Bashelor makes requests for injunctive relief and damages

and incorporates an affidavit that was not presented to the trial court. We may not consider

them. When a nonmovant fails to file a response to a traditional motion for summary judgment

but on appeal contends that summary judgment was improper, the only issue the reviewing court

may consider on appeal is whether the grounds expressly presented to the trial court in the

movant’s motion are sufficient as a matter of law to support the summary judgment. Barrientos

v. Barrientos, 675 S.W.3d 399, 413–14 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet. denied); Geister

v. Discover Bank, No. 03-15-00471-CV, 2016 WL 1756489, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 27,

2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that party who failed to file response in trial court could

not rely on claims or defenses raised for first time on appeal to challenge summary judgment).

Because Discover’s uncontroverted evidence conclusively established its

entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law on its breach-of-contract claim, the trial

court did not err by granting the summary judgment. See Taylor, 2018 WL 4016611, at *4;

Winchek, 232 S.W.3d at 206.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s final summary judgment.

__________________________________________
Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice

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Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Kelly and Ellis

Affirmed

Filed: May 21, 2026

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