Oliver Eugene Evans, Jr. v. the State of Texas

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-24-00331-CR

Oliver Eugene EVANS, Jr.,
Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,
Appellee

From the 365th Judicial District Court, Maverick County, Texas
Trial Court No. 23-04-08523-MCRAJA
Honorable Amado J. Abascal III, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
Lori Massey Brissette, Justice
Adrian A. Spears II, Justice

Delivered and Filed: March 4, 2026

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

Appellant Oliver Eugene Evans, Jr., was convicted of one count of smuggling of persons

with intent to obtain a pecuniary benefit under Texas Penal Code section 20.05(a)(1)(A) 1.

Following a jury trial, Evans was convicted and sentenced to sixty-six months’ imprisonment. In

his first issue on appeal, Evans argues section 20.05(a)(1)(A) facially violates the First

1
The judgment signed by the trial court recites that the jury found Evans guilty of smuggling with intent to obtain a
pecuniary benefit but incorrectly cites the statute for this offense as Texas Penal Code section 20.05(a)(1)(C).
04-24-00331-CR

Amendment. In his second and third issues, Evans argues the statute is field and conflict preempted

by federal law as applied to his prosecution. In his fourth issue, Evans argues the trial court erred

in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm Evans’s conviction, but sua sponte reform the trial

court’s judgment to conform with the jury’s verdict.

BACKGROUND

While conducting surveillance in Maverick County as part of Operation Lone Star,

Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) Special Agent Matthew Ruiz observed four individuals

emerge from the brush adjacent to a shopping center parking lot and enter a mid-size sport-utility

vehicle (“SUV”). Because the area where he observed the vehicle “loading up” was very active

with illegal migrant crossings, Agent Ruiz, who was in an unmarked vehicle, requested that DPS

Trooper Jesus Leanos conduct a traffic stop to investigate a potential human-smuggling incident.

Based on Agent Ruiz’s description of the vehicle and potential criminal activity, Trooper Leanos

initiated the stop of Evans’s vehicle. The SUV’s tinted windows prevented Trooper Leanos from

determining how many occupants were in the vehicle. The vehicle contained six occupants: Evans,

who was the driver, a female in the front passenger seat, three individuals in the back passenger

seat, and one other individual, later identified as Saul Canales Flores, who was eventually

discovered in the cargo area of the SUV. Flores and two of the individuals in the back seat

presented Trooper Leanos with Honduran identification cards and were later transferred to U.S.

Border Patrol custody for an immigration determination. The other backseat passenger fled the

scene and was never located. Evans told Trooper Leanos he was “picking up some friends for

friends” and he was going to get three-hundred dollars for transporting these individuals.

Evans was arrested and later indicted for one count of smuggling of persons with intent to

obtain a pecuniary gain under Texas Penal Code section 20.05(a)(1)(A). Prior to trial, Evans filed

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a motion to suppress arguing Trooper Leanos did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop.

The trial court denied the motion. Evans was convicted following a jury trial. After conviction,

Evans filed a motion for new trial. The trial court denied Evans’s motion and he timely appealed.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

In his first three issues on appeal, Evans argues that 20.05(a)(1)(A) facially violates the First

Amendment of the United States Constitution and that the statute is field and conflict preempted

by federal law as applied to his prosecution. We review Evans’s constitutional challenges de novo.

See Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. PHI Air Med., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 839, 846 (Tex. 2020); Ex parte Lo, 424

S.W.3d 10, 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); State v. Flores, 679 S.W.3d 232, 243 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 2023, pet. ref’d).

Evans’s fourth issue argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. “In

reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, appellate courts must view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.” Johnson v. State, 414 S.W.3d 184, 192 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2013) (quoting State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)).

In doing so, we apply a bifurcated standard under which we grant almost total deference, when

supported by the record, to a trial judge’s “determinations of historical facts and mixed questions

of law and fact that rely on credibility” but review the ruling de novo “when mixed questions of

law and fact do not depend on the evaluation of credibility and demeanor[.]” Id. (internal citations

omitted). “When a trial court makes explicit fact findings, the appellate court determines whether

the evidence (viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling) supports these fact

findings.” Id. (quoting State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). We limit our

review to the evidence introduced at the motion to suppress hearing. See Arguellez v. State, 409

S.W.3d 657, 662 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

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FIRST AMENDMENT

Evans, in his brief, argues that section 20.05(a)(1)(A) facially violates the First Amendment

to the United States Constitution. From our review, the arguments in this case are substantively

the same as those in Roberts v. State, in which this Court rejected a First Amendment facial

challenge and concluded that any unconstitutional applications of section 20.05(a)(1)(A) are not

substantial in comparison to the constitutional ones. No. 04-24-00485-CR, 2026 WL 290378, at

*4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 4, 2026, no pet. h). Accordingly, we overrule Evans’s First

Amendment facial challenge.

AS-APPLIED PREEMPTION

In his second and third issues, Evans argues that section 20.05(a)(1)(A) is field and conflict

preempted by federal law as applied to his prosecution.

A. Applicable Law

This court analyzed a similar as-applied field and conflict preemption challenge to section

20.05(a)(1)(A) in Roberts, 2026 WL 290378, at *5–9. As such, while we will address the facts

specific to Evans’s case for his as-applied challenge, the legal principles discussed in Roberts

control our analysis here.

B. Analysis

As we stated in Roberts, “unlike the instances where courts have found state statutes to be

field preempted, section 20.05(a)(1)(A) does not require prosecutors to prove a noncitizen’s illegal

presence in the United States.” Id. at *7. Here, Evans’s conviction did not turn on immigration

status. The evidence presented at trial focused on his intent to conceal an individual from all law

enforcement. DPS Agents saw four individuals, in groups of two, come out of the brush and get

into an SUV. Evans’s windows were tinted so dark that Trooper Leanos testified he could not see

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how many people were inside the vehicle. In fact, Trooper Leanos did not find Flores until he

opened the trunk of the SUV. Further, when questioned about his relationship to the passengers,

Evans stated that he was just “picking up some friends for friends.” The State did not need to prove

Flores had unlawful immigration status or that Evans knew his actual status. Therefore, because

Evans was prosecuted under a neutral statute, and his conduct was criminal regardless of Flores’s

immigration status, we hold that Evans’s prosecution was not as-applied field preempted. See Id.

at *8; Kansas v. Garcia, 589 U.S. 191, 208–09 (2020); State v. Flores, 679 S.W.3d 232, 245 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 2023, pet. ref’d). See also Gutierrez v. State, 721 S.W.3d 639, 655 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2025, pet. filed) (holding section 20.05(a)(1)(A) was not as-

applied field preempted where the evidence showed Appellant “was not convicted merely because

of the citizenship status of the back seat passengers, but because she intended to conceal those

individuals from law enforcement”).

As to Evans’s third point of error, as we established in Roberts, “[w]ith an as-applied

conflict preemption challenge, the application of the law must conflict with federal law’s

comprehensive immigration scheme or with the federal government’s discretion over immigration-

related prosecutions.” 2026 WL 290378, at *9. As in Roberts, the evidence presented at Evans’s

trial does not show that his prosecution interfered with federal law or federal discretion over

immigration-related prosecutions. Id. From the evidence presented at trial, after Trooper Leanos

arrested Evans, the passengers, who identified themselves with Honduran identification cards,

were turned over to Border Patrol Agents. Further, nothing in the record suggests that federal

prosecutors wanted to pursue federal charges against Evans. On this record, we hold that Evans’s

prosecution under section 20.05(a)(1)(A) was not as-applied conflict preempted. See Id.

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MOTION TO SUPPRESS

A. Applicable Law

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees protection against

unreasonable searches and seizures, “and its protections extend to brief investigatory stops of

persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273

(2002) (citations omitted). See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Under the Fourth Amendment, an

investigative detention must be justified by reasonable suspicion. Derichsweiler v. State, 348

S.W.3d 906, 914–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). “Reasonable suspicion exists where the officer has

specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would

lead him to reasonably conclude that a particular person is, has been, or soon will be engaged in

criminal activity.” Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We look at the

totality of the circumstances to determine whether the detaining officer has a “particularized and

objective basis” for suspecting legal wrongdoing. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 276–77 (finding an

arresting officer “was entitled to make an assessment of the situation in light of his specialized

training and familiarity with the customs of the area’s inhabitants.”). When a detaining officer acts

upon nothing other than a request of another officer to apprehend, the question becomes whether

the requesting officer had reasonable suspicion or probable cause. State v. Jennings, 958 S.W.2d

930, 933 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1997, no pet.) (citing Rance v. State, 815 S.W.2d 622, 635 n.2

(Tex. Crim. App. 1991). However, “the cumulative information known to the cooperating officers

at the time of the stop is to be considered in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists.”

Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914 (quoting Hoag v. State, 728 S.W.2d 375, 380 (Tex. Crim. App.

1987)).

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B. Evidence Presented at the Hearing

At the suppression hearing, the State called arresting officer Trooper Leanos. Trooper

Leanos testified that Agent Ruiz called him and told him he had just observed a vehicle “loading

up” and that the people that got into the vehicle were being “smuggled” and “concealed.” Trooper

Leanos testified that Agent Ruiz told him the vehicle loaded up in an area known for human

smuggling, a fact that Trooper Leanos had independent knowledge of based on his involvement in

Operation Lone Star. Agent Ruiz provided Trooper Leanos with a description of the make, model,

color, and license plate number of the vehicle. Trooper Leanos testified that when he located the

vehicle, the tinted windows prevented him from seeing inside or determining how many

passengers were in the vehicle. Agent Ruiz did not testify at the hearing.

C. Analysis

Evans argues that we must rule in his favor because (1) four people getting into a car is, on

its own, not suspicious or an indication of criminal activity, and (2) being in a “high crime” area

alone may not serve as the basis for a stop. Evans contends that the Court of Criminal Appeals’

ruling in Hernandez v. State, No. PD-0176-25, 2025 WL 3693534 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 19,

2025), supports his argument. We disagree.

In Hernandez, a 911 caller reported a suspicious four-door Chevrolet Silverado driving at

a slow speed in a rural area known for human smuggling. 2025 WL 3693534, at *1. Thirty minutes

later, the responding officer approached the only vehicle in the area, which did not match the

vehicle description or location provided by the 911 caller, and initiated a stop. Id. The driver

initially refused to stop, and when he did stop, he refused to submit to the officer’s requests. Id.

The driver was convicted of evading arrest. Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the

conviction, holding there was insufficient evidence to establish the officer’s detention was

supported by reasonable suspicion. Id. at *8. The court emphasized that there was no evidence that

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appellant was, had been, or soon would be engaged in criminal activity because there was “nothing

unusual, suspicious, or criminal” about the driver’s behavior before the stop. Id. at *7. Further, the

court reasoned that absent an indication that human smuggling was at play, a “suspicious vehicle”

in an area known for human smuggling was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Id.

The facts in this case are more comparable to those known to the officer in Navarette v.

California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014). In Navarette, a 911 caller reported a silver Ford F-150 truck

swerved and ran her off the road. Id. at 395. She provided the truck’s license plate number and

direction of travel. Id. An officer identified the truck with the exact same license plate near the

area reported and conducted a stop. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court found that the officer had

reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop based on the facts of the case and emphasized that the

911 caller personally observed the defendant commit a dangerous traffic violation. Id. at 403.

Here, Trooper Leanos responded to a call from Agent Ruiz who personally observed four

individuals get into Evans’s car before it “sped off.” Based off his observations, experience, and

knowledge of the area in question, Agent Ruiz drew a reasonable inference that criminal activity

was afoot. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (finding an officer may “draw on their own experienced

and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information

available to them that might elude an untrained person.”). Unlike in Hernandez where the 911

caller merely reported a “suspicious” driver, Agent Ruiz specifically told Trooper Leanos that he

believed the individuals were being “smuggled” and “concealed.” See Hernandez, 2025 WL

3693534, at *7. Like in Navarette, and also unlike Hernandez, Trooper Leanos pulled over a

vehicle that precisely matched the make, model, color, and license plate number described by

Agent Ruiz. Further, upon conducting the stop, Trooper Leanos provided additional specific,

articulable facts to support Agent Ruiz’s inference that the passengers were being concealed. See

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Nacu v. State, 373 S.W.3d 691, 696 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.) (holding that

reasonable suspicion existed where specific and articulable facts provided by the detaining officer

supported the witness’s statements). See also Minor v. State, No. 07-23-00397-CR, 2025 WL

211324, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 15, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (affirming smuggling of persons conviction where evidence of concealment included,

among other factors, heavily tinted windows). Plainly put, not only was there sufficient evidence

to suggest that Evans was engaged in some sort of suspicious activity, but also that the suspicious

activity was directly tied to human smuggling.

Viewing the evidence supported by the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s

denial of Evans’s motion, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances provides an objective,

justifiable basis for the stop. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying Evans’s motion to suppress. We overrule Evans’s fourth issue.

CLERICAL ERROR IN THE WRITTEN JUDGMENT

The trial court’s judgment identified the “Statute for Offense” as “Sec. 20.05(a)(1)(C)

Penal Code.” Evans, however, was charged and convicted under Texas Penal Code section

20.05(a)(1)(A). We have the authority to modify incorrect judgments when the necessary

information is available. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b). See Minor, 2025 WL 211324, at *4. Accordingly,

we modify the judgment of conviction to state that the “Statute for Offense” is “20.05(a)(1)(A)

Penal Code.”

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified.

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH

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