In the Interest of I.R.D. and C.R.D., Children v. the State of Texas

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-25-00588-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF I.R.D. and C.R.D., Children

From the 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2024-PA-00378
Honorable Raul Perales, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: H. Todd McCray, Justice

Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice
Lori Massey Brissette, Justice
H. Todd McCray, Justice

Delivered and Filed: March 4, 2026

AFFIRMED

Mother and Father appeal the trial court’s order terminating their parental rights to their

two children, I.R.D. and C.R.D. 1 Mother and Father challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of

the evidence supporting the trial court’s best interest determinations under section 161.001(b)(2)

of the Texas Family Code. Because we conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the trial

court’s best interest finding, we affirm the judgment of termination.

1
To protect the privacy of the minor children, we refer to them by initials. TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(d). TEX. R.
APP. P. 9.8(b)(c).
04-25-00588-CV

BACKGROUND

The Department of Family Protective Services initially became involved in the underlying

case in March 2023 when it received a referral regarding Mother testing positive for illegal drugs

when she gave birth to C.R.D. Mother had a history with the Department involving the termination

of her rights to two of her older children due to substance abuse.

When the case was opened, the children were living with Mother and Father at the home

of their paternal grandmother. In October 2023, an incident occurred in which Father and Mother

assaulted the grandmother, resulting in visible injuries to her head and face. Law enforcement was

not involved, but after the assault occurred, the grandmother no longer wanted Father or Mother

in her home.

In December 2023, both parents were charged with possession of methamphetamine. As a

result, family-based safety services were offered to Mother and Father including an assessment for

substance abuse treatment. Mother agreed to the assessment, which led to a recommendation that

she complete eight weeks of outpatient services. Although Mother did participate in portions of

the services, her participation was inconsistent as she failed to attend individual and group sessions

as scheduled. She also either refused to submit to drug tests or missed the scheduled appointments.

Father refused to engage in any of the family safety services offered to him.

As a result of these actions, the Department was concerned that Mother and Father were

still using substances. The Department was further concerned that they continued to engage in

behavior that was not safe for the children, that they continued to maintain a relationship with each

other despite a history of domestic violence, and that they continued to put the children in harm’s

way by not providing their basic needs. The Department was also troubled by the fact that violence

had occurred between household members which had placed the wellbeing of the children at risk.

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Based on these concerns, the children were removed from the home and placed with their

maternal grandmother. Both parents were provided with a joint family service plan. Among other

things, the service plan included a requirement that Mother and Father participate in Family Drug

Court. However, both parents were expelled from the program for lack of compliance.

In August 2025, the trial court conducted a bench trial at which six witnesses testified:

Department caseworkers Amber Sixtos, Jennifer McMurray, and Krystal Salazar, child advocate

Helen McMahon, Mother, and the paternal grandmother.

Following trial, the court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to section

161.001(b)(E) and (P) of the Texas Family Code. 2 The court terminated Father’s rights pursuant

to section 161.001(b)(E), (N), and (P) of the Texas Family Code. 3 The court further found that

termination of both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest

pursuant to section 161.001(b)(2) of the Texas Family Code.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

To terminate parental rights pursuant to Family Code 161.001, the Department has the

burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence: (1) one of the predicate grounds in subsection

161.001(b)(1); and (2) that termination is in the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b).

2
The court found that Mother:
(1) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which
endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the children. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(E).
(2) used a controlled substance in a manner that endangered the health or safety of the children, and (1) failed
to complete a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program; or (2) after completion of a court-ordered
substance abuse treatment program continued to abuse a controlled substance. TEX. FAM. CODE §
161.001(b)(1)(P).
3
The court found that Father:
(1) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which
endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the children. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(E).
(2) constructively abandoned the children. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(N).
(3) used a controlled substance in a manner that endangered the health or safety of the children, and (1) failed
to complete a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program; or (2) after completion of a court-ordered
substance abuse treatment program continued to abuse a controlled substance. TEX. FAM. CODE §
161.001(b)(1)(P).

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04-25-00588-CV

Clear and convincing evidence requires “proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a

firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. § 101.007.

This heightened standard of proof necessarily extends to appellate review in parental termination

cases. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 630-31 (Tex. 2018); In re G.M.M., 721 S.W.3d 679, 683 (Tex.

App. –San Antonio 2025, no pet.).

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply well established standards of

review. See In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (conducting a factual

sufficiency review); In re J.P.B. 180 S.W. 3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) (conducting a

legal sufficiency review). In doing so, we recognize that the trial court is the sole judge of the

credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269,

276 (Tex. 2024); In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021).

In this case, Mother and Father do not contest the trial court’s findings regarding predicate

grounds. Instead, they focus their challenge on the best interest findings of the trial court, arguing

that the evidence is both legally and factually insufficient to support a finding that termination of

their parental rights is in the children’s best interest. We therefore treat the unchallenged predicate

grounds as binding and limit our review to the best interest determination. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d

624, 631 (Tex. 2018); In re K.G.S., No. 04-25-00254-CV, 2025 WL 2408553, at *2 (Tex. App.–

San Antonio Aug. 20, 2025, pet. denied) (mem op.).

BEST INTEREST

When considering the best interests of a child in the context of involuntary parental

termination, we recognize the existence of a strong presumption that favors preserving the parent-

child relationship. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006). At the same time, the Texas

Family Code presumes that prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is

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in the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(a). The Department must rebut the first

presumption and satisfy the second with clear and convincing evidence. In re E.J.M., 673 S.W.3d

310, 332 (Tex. App. –San Antonio 2023, no pet.)

To determine whether a parent is willing and able to provide the child with a safe

environment, we consider the non-exclusive list of statutory factors set forth in the Texas Family

Code. 4 TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b). The Texas Supreme Court has also provided a similar

framework 5 to consider in determining a child’s best interest. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367,

371-72 (Tex. 1976). Neither the statutory factors nor the Holley factors are exhaustive, and

“(e)vidence of a single factor may be sufficient for a factfinder to form a reasonable belief or

conviction that termination is in the child’s best interest.” In re J.B.-F., No. 04-18-00181-CV, 2018

WL 3551208, at *3 (Tex. App.–San Antonio July 25, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

In evaluating a child’s best interest, courts may consider circumstantial evidence,

subjective factors, and the totality of the evidence along with direct evidence. In re B.R., 456 S.W.

3d 612, 615 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2015, no pet.); In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.–

4
These factors include: (1) the child’s age and physical and mental vulnerabilities; (2) the frequency and nature of
out-of-home placements; (3) the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the child; (4) whether the
child has been the victim of repeated harm after the initial report and intervention by the department; (5) whether the
child is fearful of living in or returning to the child’s home; (6) the results of psychiatric, psychological, or
developmental evaluations of the child [or] the child’s parents; (7) whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive
conduct by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home; (8) whether there is a history of substance
abuse by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home; (9) whether the perpetrator of the harm to
the child is identified; (10) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling
services and to cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate agency’s close supervision; (11) the willingness and ability
of the child’s family to effect positive environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time; (12)
whether the child’s family demonstrates adequate parenting skills... ; and (13) whether an adequate social support
system ... is available to the child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b).
5
These factors include: (1) the child’s desires; (2) the child’s present and future emotional and physical needs; (3) any
present or future emotional and physical danger to the child; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking
custody; (5) the programs available to assist the individuals seeking custody to promote the child’s best interest; (6)
the plans for the child by the individuals or agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed
placement; (8) the parent’s acts or omissions which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is improper;
and (9) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72; see also In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d
239, 249 n.9 (Tex. 2013).

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San Antonio, 2013, pet. denied). A trier of fact may also measure a parent’s future ability to meet

a child’s needs by the parent’s past conduct. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002); In re E.D.,

419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2013, pet. denied).

Evidence that proves a statutory ground for termination is likewise probative on the issue

of best interest. Id. Accordingly, the trial court’s findings under subsection (E) and (P) as to Mother

and (E), (N) and (P) as to Father may serve as evidentiary support for the court’s best-interest

finding. See id.

A. Substance Abuse

One of the factors to consider in determining whether the child’s parents are willing and

able to provide the child with a safe environment is “whether there is a history of substance abuse

by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home[.]” See TEX. FAM. CODE §

263.307(b)(8) (stating a parent’s history of substance abuse is a factor considered by the trial court

in determining the children’s best interests); In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009) (noting

“endangering conduct is not limited to actions directed toward the child.”). Substance abuse is

relevant to a best interest analysis because illegal drug use creates the possibility that the parent

will be impaired or imprisoned and thus incapable of parenting. In re A.A.M., 464 S.W.3d 421,

426 (Tex. App. –Houston 2015, no pet).

The court heard testimony that Mother had a history with the Department in which her

parental rights to her older children were terminated due to her drug use. Although Mother denied

using drugs at the time of C.R.D.’s birth, the trial court heard testimony that she tested positive for

multiple substances when C.R.D. was born. Mother also admitted that she was arrested for

possession of methamphetamines while this case was pending. The court heard further testimony

that Mother tested positive for illegal substances while this case was pending.

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The Department also expressed concern regarding Mother’s drug testing compliance. For

example, caseworker Krystal Salazar testified that the trial court ordered Mother to submit to a

hair follicle test within 48 hours in July 2025. Mother understood that failure to test as ordered

would result in the test being presumed positive, yet she did not comply. Although she testified

that she obtained a hair-follicle test from a private company, she offered no results or other

documentation. Under these circumstances, the trial court could reasonably infer that Mother’s

failure to appear for testing reflected continued drug use. See In re A.M.I., 04-19-00422-CV, 2019

WL 6719028, at *4 (Tex. App. –San Antonio Dec. 11, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re T.N.J.J.,

No. 04-19-00288-CV, 2019 WL 6333470 at *5 (Tex. App. –San Antonio Nov. 27, 2019, not pet.)

(mem. op).

In addition to the evidence concerning continued drug use, the Department presented

evidence regarding Mother’s non-compliance with drug treatment. Although Mother attended

some substance abuse sessions, her overall compliance with the service plan was inconsistent.

While she participated in the Family Drug Court from May 2024 until March 2025, she was

expelled from the program after testing positive for drugs in February 2025. During the program,

Mother completed outpatient substance abuse counseling with New Choices, but she completed

no other services. Following her expulsion, Mother was unsuccessfully discharged from additional

outpatient substance abuse services due to inconsistent attendance. Although Mother testified that

she had completed substance abuse treatment, when weighed against the contradicting testimony,

the trial court was not required to credit that testimony. See R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 276; J.F.-G.,

627 S.W.3d at 317.

The evidence supports a conclusion that Mother’s history of substance abuse, repeated

positive tests, and failure to engage in treatment indicate a high likelihood of continued drug abuse,

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creating an impermissible risk of physical and emotional danger to the children and impairing

Mother’s ability to meet their needs.

The court also heard evidence regarding Father’s substance abuse and refusal to engage in

services. When the Department initially visited the home, Father was argumentative and was asked

to leave to avoid escalating the situation. He continued to remain uncooperative and, as the case

progressed, Father was arrested for possession of methamphetamines, felony credit card abuse and

DWI.

Although Father initially participated in the Family Drug Court and completed a

psychological assessment, he refused to complete additional services. He was offered substance

abuse counseling and domestic violence classes but did not engage beyond the initial assessment.

Salazar testified that, according to Mother, Father was “still an active user.” 6 Although Father

submitted to several drug tests during the program, he was expelled from the Family Drug Court

program for nonparticipation. After his expulsion, Father ceased to engage in Department-ordered

services and could not be located for eleven months. Although Father submitted one drug test once

he was located, the evidence is undisputed that Father did not begin, much less complete, substance

abuse treatment or comply with ongoing drug testing.

From this evidence, the trial court could reasonably infer that Father continued to use drugs

during the pendency of this case. See R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 280-81; J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 317.

The trial court was entitled to disbelieve any claim of sobriety and to infer that Father’s prolonged

refusal to test or engage in services reflected ongoing and unresolved drug use. See id. Based on

this inference, the evidence supports the court’s determination that Father’s continued abuse of

6
Mother’s statement was unobjected to hearsay that became evidence for all purposes. See In re R.H.W. III, 542
S.W.3d 724, 734 (Tex. App. –-Houston, 2018, no pet.) (finding “[u]nobjected to hearsay is, as a matter of law,
probative evidence under Texas Rule of Evidence 802”); In re R.H., No. 02-20-00396-CV, 2021 WL 2006038, at *12
(Tex. App. –Fort Worth May 20, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting trial court can consider unobjected to hearsay).

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drugs, like Mother’s, posed an impermissible risk of physical and emotional danger to the children

and impaired his ability to provide a safe and stable environment. See In re K.G.S., No. 04-25-

00254-CV, 2025 WL 2408553, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 20, 2025, pet. denied) (mem.

op.) (“[b]ecause drug use can destabilize the home and expose children to physical and emotional

harm if not resolved, evidence of drug use weighs in favor of termination”).

Mother’s and Father’s drug use, refusal to submit to drug testing, and failure to participate in

drug treatment during the pendency of this case weigh heavily in favor of the trial court’s best

interest finding in light of multiple Holley factors, including the emotional and physical danger to

the children, parental abilities, the stability of the home, and the propriety of the existing parent-

child relationship. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72.

B. Domestic Violence

Another factor to consider in determining whether parents are willing and able to provide

their children a safe environment is “whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by

the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home[.]” See TEX. FAM. CODE §

263.307(b)(7); J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345 (noting endangering conduct is not limited to actions

directed toward the child); In re E.J.C.T., No. 04-24-00663-CV, 2025 WL 871627, at *3 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio Mar. 19, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op) (concluding evidence of the parent’s history

of domestic violence supports the trial court’s best interest finding).

In this case, the court heard evidence that Father and Mother physically assaulted the

paternal grandmother while the children were present in the home. Although law enforcement was

not called, Caseworker Amber Sixtos testified that she observed significant injuries to the

grandmother’s head and face. Grandmother explained that she did not involve law enforcement

because she feared the impact on the children. After the assault, the grandmother consulted an

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attorney and attempted to contact the justice of the peace to pursue an eviction because she no

longer wanted Father or Mother in the home.

The trial court also heard testimony that the maternal grandmother, who is the current

caregiver, has received threatening phone calls and text messages from Father. Father admitted

sending the messages, but he denied that they were threatening. Salazar testified that law

enforcement was notified because of safety concerns for the maternal grandmother. Salazar also

declined to discuss potential permanent placements for the children in open court out of concern

for the safety of those individuals.

Further, neither Father nor Mother fully engaged in the domestic violence classes that were

part of their service plan through the Family Drug Court program. During trial, the court heard

testimony that Mother had completed a violence intervention program but she failed to submit a

certificate of completion to the Department. Based upon this evidence, the trial court could have

reasonably concluded that the children were exposed to domestic violence and ongoing criminal

conduct that placed them at risk of physical and emotional harm. See J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345;

In re A.H., No. 04-15-00416-CV, 2015 WL 7565569, at *7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 25,

2015, no pet.) (emphasizing that a parent’s violent conduct can produce an environment that

endangers a child’s well-being).

This conclusion weighs in favor of the trial court’s best interest finding when considered

under multiple Holley factors, including the children’s emotional and physical needs, the risk of

emotional and physical danger to the children, parental abilities, and the stability of the home. See

Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72.

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CONCLUSION

Having reviewed the record 7 in light of the Holley and statutory factors and having

considered all the evidence under the appropriate standards of review, we conclude the trial court

could have reasonably formed a firm conviction or belief that termination of Mother’s and Father’s

parental rights was in I.R.D.’s and C.R.D.’s. best interest. Likewise, the evidence weighing against

termination is not so significant to conclude that the trial court’s decision was unreasonable. We

therefore hold the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best

interest findings and overrule Mother’s and Father’s sole point of error. The order of termination

is affirmed.

H. Todd McCray, Justice

7
We note that the same evidence that supported the trial court’s findings under subsection (E), (N), and (P) also
support the trial court’s best-interest finding. See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; see also In re A.B.S., No. 04-19-00651-CV,
2020 WL 806950, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 19, 2020, no pet.) (explaining that in determining whether
termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interest of a child, a factfinder may judge a parent’s future
conduct by her past conduct).

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