Capital Fund I, LLC v. J.G.S.A. Homes, LLC

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-25-00054-CV

CAPITAL FUND I, LLC,
Appellant

v.

J.G.S.A. HOMES, LLC,
Appellee

From the 225th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2024CI24960
Honorable Angelica I. Jimenez, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Lori Massey Brissette, Justice

Sitting: Lori Massey Brissette, Justice
Adrian A. Spears II, Justice
Velia J. Meza, Justice

Delivered and Filed: April 15, 2026

DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

In this case, we consider whether a severance order transforms a partial default judgment

on a subset of claims into a final judgment if the partial default judgment and the underlying claims

are severed into a new cause alongside pending, non-defaulted claims. We conclude that it does

not and dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
04-25-00054-CV

BACKGROUND

In 2024, J.G.S.A. Homes, LLC sold two San Antonio properties to Falcon Acquisition

Group, Inc. with the assistance of Nick Swanson and Esteban M. Ramirez. To facilitate the

purchase of the properties, Falcon obtained loans from Capital Fund I, LLC. When Falcon

allegedly failed to satisfy its obligations in connection with the purchase, J.G.S.A. sued Swanson,

Ramirez, and Falcon, along with Capital Fund, asserting numerous claims.

But Capital Fund failed to timely answer. 1 J.G.S.A. then moved for a default judgment

against Capital Fund and others and the trial court granted its motion. J.G.S.A. then moved to sever

its case against Capital Fund into a new cause, which the trial court granted. 2

Capital Fund appealed. After the parties filed their primary briefs, Capital Fund—the

appellant—filed a reply brief arguing this court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 3 It separately

filed a motion to dismiss its own appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. With the parties having

had the opportunity to fully brief the jurisdictional issue, we now consider same.

CAPITAL FUND’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Capital Fund moves to dismiss this appeal because (1) the default judgment was

interlocutory on its face and (2) the severance order did not render it a final judgment because it

severed into a new action both J.G.S.A.’s still-pending claims against Capital Fund as well as its

claims against Capital Fund determined on default. We agree.

1
During a hearing on its motion to set aside the default and for a new trial, Capital Fund explained through counsel it
it had attempted to secure its defense of the matter through a title company based on a title claim, but the title company
belatedly declined to defend it.
2
A month after the trial court granted the severance order, Capital Fund moved to set aside the default judgment and
for a new trial, which the trial court denied.
3
Capital Fund’s briefs were filed by its new counsel Jackson Walker LLP, which only appeared on behalf of Capital
Fund in February 2025—the month after the notice of appeal was filed.

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04-25-00054-CV

J.G.S.A. sued Capital Fund for statutory fraud, fraud by nondisclosure, conversion, and

“vicarious liability.” J.G.S.A. sought as relief against Capital Fund its actual damages, exemplary

damages, recission of the contracts at issue, declaratory relief, attorney’s fees, costs, and interest.

After Capital Fund failed to appear, J.G.S.A. moved for a default judgment against it, seeking to

address only J.G.S.A.’s claims for fraud by nondisclosure and vicarious liability. It requested

declaratory relief, actual damages, exemplary damages, prejudgment interest, attorney’s fees, and

costs. It is undisputed J.G.S.A. did not move for default judgment as to its claims for statutory

fraud or conversion.

The trial court granted the default judgment. The “Final Default Judgment Against Capital

Fund I, LLC” provides it is “interlocutory and does not dispose of all claims and all parties.” 4

J.G.S.A. then moved to sever its case against Capital Fund into a separate suit from the other

parties, explaining it was seeking a “final judgment” and the case would “contain both of

[J.G.S.A.’s] pleadings, documents on file that relate to the litigation of claims against Capital Fund,

and the motion for default judgment against Capital Fund and corresponding Judgment” which the

trial court granted. The trial court granted the severance order, explaining “[i]t would be just to

grant Plaintiff’s request to sever the portion of the case relating to Capital Fund from the rest of

this case,” ordering J.G.S.A.’s “claims against Capital Fund . . . and the portion of this case

relating to it are hereby severed from this case” (emphasis added).

The Texas Supreme Court has explained, “the severance of an interlocutory judgment into

a separate cause makes it final” if “the severed action . . . consists only of claims that have been

4
The trial court awarded J.G.S.A. actual damages in the amount of $904,800.00, exemplary damages in the amount
of $904,800.00, prejudgment interest in the amount of $10,113.60, attorney’s fees of $34,785.50, and costs of $27.00.
The trial court further declared all agreements entered into by Capital Fund in connection with the sale of the property
void ab initio as well as that all documents recorded in Bexar County Real Property Records recorded on behalf of
Capital Fund in connection with the transactions were of no legal effect. The court also awarded J.G.S.A. appellate
attorney’s fees if Capital Fund unsuccessfully appealed the judgment.

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04-25-00054-CV

fully and finally resolved.” Sealy Emergency Room, L.L.C. v. Free Standing Emergency Room

Managers of Am., L.L.C., 685 S.W.3d 816, 820, 822 (Tex. 2024). 5 But that did not happen here.

Rather than seek a severance order severing out the claims resolved by the default “judgment”

from the remaining, pending claims against Capital Fund, J.G.S.A. sought—and received—a

severance order severing its entire case against Capital Fund—both pending and defaulted

claims—into a new cause. This did nothing more than sever the case against Capital Fund from

the claims against other parties and left the default judgment against Capital Fund as an

interlocutory order. 6 See In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, 689 S.W.3d 916, 918, 923 (Tex. 2024)

(per curiam) (orig. proceeding) (providing default judgments that “includes language that

affirmatively undermines or contradicts finality” are “not final even if a review of the record would

reveal that it actually disposed of all parties and all claims”); see also Reiss v. Reiss, 118 S.W.3d

439, 441–42 (Tex. 2003) (providing courts must construe trial court orders based on their

unambiguous language); Wilde v. Murchie, 949 S.W.2d 331, 332 (Tex. 1997) (same). We therefore

have no final judgment and no jurisdiction.

J.G.S.A. contends that while the default judgment was interlocutory, based on the one-

satisfaction rule, the default judgment resolved J.G.S.A.’s entire case against Capital Fund such

that further prosecution of its other allegations, claims, and requests for relief against Capital Fund

was barred by operation of law, citing Gulf View Private Inv., Inc. v. GC Sys., A.S. 716 S.W.3d

830 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2024, pet. denied). But the one-satisfaction rule has no bearing on

5
See also Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001) (providing judgment is final for purposes of
appeal if it disposes of all pending parties and claims in record); In re Krieg, 720 S.W.3d 758, 766 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2025, orig. proceeding) (providing severance order may operate as final judgment when trial court has, by
proper order or judgment, already disposed of severed parties and claims asserted by and between them (citing Sealy
Emergency Room)); Lusk v. Osorio, No. 14-17-01011-CV, 2019 WL 3943195, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
Aug. 20, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (providing trial court did not render final judgment in severed cause until court
finally disposed of all pending claims among appellant and appellees in subsequent judgment).
6
The record shows J.G.S.A. has not nonsuited its remaining claims.

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04-25-00054-CV

our jurisdiction. As we explained in Gulf View, the one satisfaction rule is concerned with the

recovery of damages, not claims, and the “fundamental consideration in applying the one-

satisfaction rule is whether the plaintiff has suffered a single, indivisible injury—not the causes of

action the plaintiff asserts.” Id. at 871 (emphasis added). 7

Finally, J.G.S.A. argues that, instead of dismissing for lack of jurisdiction, we should

remand to the trial court for clarification, citing Bella Palma, LLC v. Young, 601 S.W.3d 799 (Tex.

2020) (per curiam). But Bella Palma is distinguishable in that the court found the judgment subject

to clarification. See id. at 800–01. Here, despite any clarification that could be made regarding the

trial court’s intent, we have a default judgment that plainly states it is interlocutory and a severance

order that plainly severs all pending and defaulted claims into a new cause. See Lakeside Resort,

689 S.W.3d at 922–24; Sealy Emergency Room, L.L.C. v. Free Standing Emergency Room

Managers of Am., L.L.C., 685 S.W.3d at 820, 822; Reiss, 118 S.W.3d at 441–42.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we have no final, appealable judgment in this case, and we must dismiss this

case for lack of jurisdiction. 8

Lori Massey Brissette, Justice

7
J.G.S.A. points out Capital Fund had ample time to raise the issue, but it did not. Even so, jurisdiction can be raised
at any time and may not be conferred by waiver or estoppel. See, e.g., Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. NTU, LLC v. Wilbarger
Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 691 S.W.3d 890, 907 (Tex. 2024); Frausto v. RC Indus. LLC, 605 S.W.3d 54, 57 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2020, no pet.) (same).
8
Capital Fund also requests we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. But the severed case remains
pending in the trial court, and we otherwise have no jurisdiction to remand a case to the trial court that we lack
jurisdiction over in the first instance. Accordingly, we deny Capital Fund’s requested relief. See Bonsmara Nat. Beef
Co., LLC v. Hart of Tex. Cattle Feeders, LLC, 603 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Tex. 2020) (“When a trial court renders a final
judgment, the court’s interlocutory orders merge into the judgment and may be challenged by appealing that
judgment.”).

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