Kelli DeWispelare v. Jamie DeWispelare

Affirmed and Opinion Filed September 23, 2024

In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-24-00176-CV

KELLI DEWISPELARE, Appellant
V.
JAMIE DEWISPELARE, Appellee

On Appeal from the 116th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-23-14602

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Molberg, Breedlove, and Kennedy
Opinion by Justice Breedlove
Kelli DeWispelare appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to dismiss

Jamie DiWispelare’s claims under the Texas Citizens Participation Act. TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001–.011 (TCPA). Concluding that Jamie1 offered

clear and specific evidence on each element of his claims and Kelli did not establish

she was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on her affirmative defenses, we

affirm the trial court’s order.

1
The parties use their first names in their briefing; we will do the same.
BACKGROUND

For purposes of the TCPA, the basis of a legal action is determined by the

plaintiff’s allegations. See Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. 2017).

Accordingly, our factual background for this opinion is taken from Jamie’s pleadings

and the affidavit he filed in connection with the motion to dismiss.

Jamie describes the parties as “estranged husband and wife going through a

contentious divorce in Florida.” Jamie now lives and works in Texas. Jamie alleges

that “[i]n or around November 2022,” Kelli mailed a manila envelope to his Dallas

employer “containing nine police reports full of false allegations she had made

against [Jamie], ranging from alleged physical and verbal abuse to destruction of

property, murder threats, and even a very specific over-the-top claim that [Jamie]

struck [her] in the head and tied her up for hours.” Jamie asserts that “[a]ll of these

allegations are categorically false.”

The parties refer to the envelope and its contents as “the Mailing.” The reports

in the Mailing are dated between May 14, 2022, and July 19, 2022. All are entitled

“St. Johns County Sheriff’s Office Call History Record” with the exception of a

docket sheet from a “Family—Other Family lawsuit” filed by Kelli against Jamie in

“St. Johns County Courts” on July 15, 2022. The “Call History Records” all reflect

calls by Kelli to the sheriff’s office complaining about Jamie.

Jamie filed this lawsuit on September 8, 2023. He alleged causes of action for

“defamation/libel per se,” and “defamation/libel.”

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Kelli filed an answer and a TCPA motion to dismiss. In her supporting

affidavit, Kelli denied preparing or sending the Mailing “to anyone, including

[Jamie’s] employer.” She stated she had “no knowledge of how, when, or who

prepared or sent the [Mailing] or why it was prepared or sent.” She sought dismissal

of the lawsuit on the ground that her reports to the police were an exercise of her

right of free speech and her right to petition. She argued that her reports to law

enforcement were matters of public concern “because they relate to crime and safety

in the community.” She also argued that her right to file a police report, “even if

allegedly false,” “is a protected right to petition the government,” and that police

reports are communications pertaining to judicial proceedings. Kelli also argued that

Jamie’s claims were barred by limitations and by “the absolute privilege applicable

to judicial documents and proceedings.”

After a hearing, the trial court denied Kelli’s motion to dismiss. This appeal

followed.

APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The TCPA protects citizens from retaliatory lawsuits that seek to silence or

intimidate them for exercising their rights in connection with matters of public

concern. In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 586 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding). See

generally TCPA §§ 27.001–.011. The stated purpose of the statute is “to encourage

and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate

freely, and otherwise participate in government to the maximum extent permitted by

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law and, at the same time, protect the rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits

for demonstrable injury.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.002; see also

ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Coleman, 512 S.W.3d 895, 898 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam)

(discussing TCPA’s purpose).

To accomplish this purpose, the statute provides a procedure to expedite

dismissing claims brought to intimidate or to silence a defendant’s exercise of a

protected right. Coleman, 512 S.W.3d at 898; see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

§§ 27.003(a), 27.005(b); Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 679–80 (Tex. 2018).

The movant bears the initial burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence

that the legal action is based on or is in response to the movant’s exercise of the right

of free speech, the right of association, or the right to petition. TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE § 27.005(b); see also S&S Emergency Training Sols., Inc. v. Elliott, 564

S.W.3d 843, 847 (Tex. 2018). A movant may seek dismissal even if she denies

making the communication. Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 463 (Tex. 2017).

If the movant makes this initial showing, the burden shifts to the nonmovant

to establish by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential

element of its claims. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(c); see also Elliott,

564 S.W.3d at 847. “Prima facie case” refers to evidence sufficient as a matter of

law to establish a given fact if it is not rebutted or contradicted. Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d

at 590. This standard requires the nonmovant to bring forth “the ‘minimum quantum

of evidence necessary to support a rational inference that the allegation of fact is

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true.’” Id. (quoting In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 136 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Tex.

2004) (per curiam)). “Prima facie evidence is evidence that will suffice as proof of

a fact in issue; in other words, a prima facie case is one that will entitle a party to

recover if no evidence to the contrary is offered by the opposite party.” Mishkoff v.

Garrett, No. 05-22-01063-CV, 2024 WL 770142, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 26,

2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (internal quotation omitted).

Finally, the court must dismiss the legal action if the movant “establishes an

affirmative defense or other grounds on which the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.005(d).

We review de novo the trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss under the

TCPA. Adams v. Starside Custom Builders, LLC, 547 S.W.3d 890, 894 (Tex. 2018);

Dyer v. Medoc Health Servs., LLC, 573 S.W.3d 418, 424 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019,

pet. denied). “In conducting this review, we consider, in the light most favorable to

the non-movant, the pleadings and any supporting and opposing affidavits stating

the facts on which the claim or defense is based.” Dyer, 573 S.W.3d at 424 (internal

quotation omitted); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.006(a). However,

the plaintiff’s petition is generally “the best and all-sufficient evidence of the nature

of the action.” Hersh, 526 S.W.3d at 467 (internal quotations omitted).

DISCUSSION

Kelli raises five issues. First, she argues generally that the trial court erred by

denying her motion to dismiss. Second, she contends she met her burden to establish

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that Jamie’s suit is based on her right of free speech on a matter of public concern.

Third, she argues that Jamie failed to establish, by clear and specific evidence, a

prima facie case on each element of his claims. Fourth, she argues in the alternative

that Jamie’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Fifth, she contends in the

alternative that Jamie’s claims are barred by the judicial proceedings privilege.

For purposes of this appeal, Jamie does not dispute that his suit “is based on

or in response to” Kelli’s exercise of her rights of free speech. See TCPA

§ 27.005(b)(1)(A), (B).2 As a result, Jamie bore the burden to establish, by clear and

specific evidence, a prima facie case for each essential element of his claim. See

TCPA § 27.005(c); see also Elliott, 564 S.W.3d at 847. Establishing a prima facie

case is not a high hurdle. USA Lending Grp., Inc. v. Winstead, PC, 669 S.W.3d 195,

198, 205 (Tex. 2023).

1. Jamie’s prima facie case

“The elements of a prima facie case for defamation are: (1) the defendant

published a false statement; (2) that defamed the plaintiff; (3) with the requisite

degree of fault regarding the truth of the statement (negligence if the plaintiff is a

2
Here, given our conclusions below that Jamie has met his burden in step two of the analysis and Kelli
has not met her burden in step three, analysis of step one is not necessary to our disposition of the appeal,
and we need not consider that step further. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1; Belcher v. King, No. 03-19-00222-CV,
2020 WL 4726593, at *9 (Tex. App.—Austin July 30, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (after concluding that
nonmovants produced sufficient evidence of their defamation counterclaim, court of appeals assumed
TCPA applied and pretermitted consideration of appellants’ issue challenging the TCPA’s application).
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private individual); and (4) damages, unless the statement constitutes defamation per

se.” Bedford v. Spassoff, 520 S.W.3d 901, 904 (Tex. 2017).

In Bedford, the supreme court explained that “more than mere notice pleading

is required to establish a plaintiff’s prima facie case.” Id. “Clear and specific

evidence means that the ‘plaintiff must provide enough detail to show the factual

basis for [his] claim.’” Id. (quoting Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 591). “‘In a defamation

case that implicates the [Act], pleadings and evidence that establishes the facts of

when, where, and what was said, the defamatory nature of the statements, and how

they damaged the plaintiff should be sufficient to resist’ a motion to dismiss under

the Act.” Id. (quoting Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 591). “When considering the motion to

dismiss, the court considers both the pleadings and any supporting and opposing

affidavits.” Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.006(a)). Jamie

argues that he proffered evidence establishing a prima facie case of defamation.

False statement. The entire Mailing is attached to Jamie’s sworn declaration

supporting his response to Kelli’s motion to dismiss. In his declaration, Jamie

testified that in the Mailing’s police reports, Kelli “made countless false and

damaging statements about me, including accusing me of multiple criminal acts.”

Jamie addressed each statement in each report, including Kelli’s statements that he

was “harassing her by phone calls,” making verbal threats, making suicide threats,

and threatening to “come back to her house.” He denied Kelli’s accusations that he

“showed up at the house . . . and then left,” “placed cameras in the home to watch

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her,” drained a bank account, subjected her to “physical, emotional, and financial

abuse,” and had become “even more violent and unpredictable towards her and the

kids.” We conclude that Jamie proffered clear and specific evidence of “the facts of

when, where, and what was said” in the Mailing, and he testified that “what was

said” was false. See Bedford, 520 S.W.3d at 904.

Kelli does not dispute making the statements to the police. She does argue,

however, that there is “no proof of [her] involvement” in sending the Mailing, and

no “evidence that anybody read its contents.” Contrary to these contentions, Jamie

testified that his employer’s director of human resources “contacted me and showed

me a [manila] envelope [the employer] had recently received in the mail,

unsolicited,” containing copies of the docket sheet and police reports. He also

testified that he is familiar with Kelli’s handwriting, and the handwriting on the

Mailing envelope appears to be hers. He testified that Kelli “knew my new

employer’s address because I told her verbally and as part of our divorce

proceedings.” He also stated he “thought long and hard about who but [Kelli] could

have had the motive, means, and opportunity to send the [Mailing]. I can think of no

one else who would have access to its contents, know of my current employer, and

have any reason to send the docket and police reports to anyone.” We conclude Jamie

offered clear and specific evidence to show the factual basis for his claim that Kelli

sent the Mailing. See Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590 (nonmovant must bring forth the

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minimum quantum of evidence necessary to support a rational inference that the

allegation of fact is true).

Defamatory. “A statement is defamatory if the words tend to injure a person’s

reputation, exposing them to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or financial injury, or

if it tends to impeach the person’s honesty, integrity, or virtue.” MVS Int’l Corp. v.

Int’l Advert. Sols., LLC, 545 S.W.3d 180, 202 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.)

(citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.001, “Elements of Libel”). “To

qualify as defamation, a statement should be derogatory, degrading, somewhat

shocking, and contain elements of disgrace.” Id. Kelli’s statements to the police,

reflected in the police reports in the Mailing, include her allegations that Jamie

repeatedly harassed, threatened, and abused her. She also accused Jamie of physical

assault. As we discuss below, accusing someone of a crime is an example of

defamation per se, a statement that is “so obviously harmful” that general damages

are presumed. Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 593. We conclude that Jamie offered clear and

specific evidence that Kelli’s statements in the Mailing were defamatory. See TCPA

§ 27.005(c).

Degree of fault. “A private individual need only prove negligence” as the

degree of fault to support a defamation claim. Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 593. In the

context of a defamation claim, we consider whether a defendant acted with

negligence regarding the truth of the statements. See WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore,

978 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. 1998) (standard for plaintiffs who are private

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individuals). Only Kelli and Jamie have knowledge of what actually happened, or

did not happen, between them. At this stage, Jamie’s burden was to offer sufficient

evidence to entitle him to recover if Kelli offered no evidence to the contrary. See

Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590. We conclude he did so here.

Damages. A plaintiff must show that a defamatory statement proximately

caused damages unless the statement is defamatory per se. Bedford, 520 S.W.3d at

904. “Defamation per se refers to statements that are so obviously harmful that

general damages, such as mental anguish and loss of reputation, are presumed.”

Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 596. Whether a statement qualifies as defamation per se is

generally a legal question. Id. The supreme court has held that accusing someone of

a crime is defamatory per se. Id. Here, for purposes of this TCPA motion, Kelli’s

statements can be understood as accusing Jamie of the crime of assault, among other

offenses. Thus, Jamie was not required to show proof of damages. See id.

We conclude that Jamie offered clear and specific evidence of each element

of his claim for defamation. TCPA § 27.005(c); see Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 592. We

overrule Kelli’s third issue.

2. Kelli’s affirmative defenses

In her fourth and fifth issues, Kelli contends she established two affirmative

defenses as a matter of law: (1) that Jamie’s claims are barred by limitations, and

(2) that Jamie’s claims are barred by the judicial proceedings privilege. “A TCPA

movant relying upon an affirmative defense for dismissal must conclusively

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establish that defense and, if any exceptions to the defense are pleaded by the

nonmovant, the movant must also negate the pleaded exceptions.” Gautreaux v.

May, No. 05-22-00616-CV, 2023 WL 5740179, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 6,

2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (internal quotation omitted).

Limitations. Jamie’s claims for defamation have a one-year statute of

limitations. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.002(a). “[C]laims for

defamation . . . generally accrue when the allegedly defamatory matter is published

or circulated.” Glassdoor, Inc. v. Andra Grp., LP, 575 S.W.3d 523, 528 (Tex. 2019).

Kelli argues that the police reports were “published no later than July 26, 2022”—

the date of her last complaint to police—and Jamie did not file his suit until

September 8, 2023, more than one year later. Jamie responds that his suit is premised

on his claim that Kelli sent the Mailing to his employer in November 2022.

Kelli cites Glassdoor, 575 S.W.3d at 528, in support of her argument that

Jamie’s claims are barred by limitations. In Glassdoor, the court explained that

“Texas courts apply the ‘single publication rule’ in cases of alleged libel in mass

print media.” Id. “Under that rule, a cause of action accrues ‘on the last day of the

mass distribution of the printed matter containing the defamatory statement,’ which

is when ‘the publisher of the statement has made the libelous matter available to his

intended audience.’” Id. (quoting Stephan v. Baylor Med. Ctr. at Garland, 20 S.W.3d

880, 889 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, no pet.)). In Glassdoor, the court held that “the

single publication rule applies to information made publicly available on the

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internet.” Id. Kelli argues that the police reports were “published no later than July

26, 2022,” the latest date on any of the police reports included in the Mailing. Jamie

alleges, however, that the Mailing was sent to his employer in November 2022.3

Although Glassdoor extended the single publication rule from mass media

publications to publicly available information on the internet, the court said nothing

about separate publication of a police report by a single, individually-addressed,

non-electronic mailing to a specific recipient, months after the report was made. Cf.

id. (cause of action accrues on last day of “mass distribution”). Kelli cites no case

extending Glassdoor in similar circumstances, and we have found none. Instead, we

conclude that the Mailing was a separate publication of Kelli’s statements in the

police reports. “Each distinct publication of a defamatory statement inflicts an

independent injury from which a defamation cause of action may arise.” Akin v.

Santa Clara Land Co., 34 S.W.3d 334, 340 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet.

denied) (citing Marshall Field Stores, Inc. v. Gardiner, 859 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ dism’d w.o.j.), and Fisher v. Beach, 671

S.W.2d 63, 67 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, no writ)). “Texas law treats each alleged

defamatory publication as a single transaction with an independent injury.” Tex.

Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc., 219 S.W.3d 563, 587

(Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied) (citing Akin) (involving different instances

3
Kelli does not suggest any different date for the Mailing; instead, she questions whether the Mailing
was sent at all. As we have explained, however, Jamie offered evidence that his employer received the
Mailing in the mail in “mid-November 2022,” and Kelli did not offer any evidence to the contrary.
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of alleged defamation that were communicated to different audiences); see also

Fisher, 671 S.W.2d at 67 (“each republication of an allegedly defamatory

communication inflicts an independent injury from which a slander cause of action

may arise”).

Kelli further argues that there was no “republication” of the documents in the

Mailing that would trigger a new accrual date for Jamie’s claims. She contends that

“republication” does not apply to publicly available information, and police reports

are public records. Kelli cites Young v. CompUSA, Inc., No. 3:03-CV-0268-P, 2004

WL 992577, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2004) (Order), an employment discrimination

case, in support of her argument.

In Young, the plaintiff’s defamation claim arose from a police report filed by

the employer’s human resources representative alleging that the plaintiff had

assaulted him and had stolen from their employer. Id. The plaintiff argued that the

police report was continuously “republished” by remaining online in the district

attorney’s files until the charges were dismissed. Id. Among other authority, the

plaintiff relied on case law holding that each transmission of a confidential credit

report was a new and separate injury. Id. Rejecting this argument, the court first

noted that the plaintiff “failed to offer any competent summary judgment evidence

to prove that the false statements were republished.” Id. The court went on to note

that police reports “are generally public information” and credit reports are not, and

concluded that “[i]n the absence of any evidence of transmission of confidential or

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restricted information to a new audience, republication of the defamatory material

will not operate to extend the statute of limitations.” Id.

Here, in contrast, Jamie offered proof of the statements’ “republication” in the

Mailing. He does not argue, as the plaintiff did in Young, that there was continuous

republication by the reports’ continued presence in the police records. Cf. id.

The parties also cite Yadav v. Frost Bank, No. SA-20-CV-00005-FB-ESC,

2020 WL 7385842, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2020) (Report and Recommendation

of U.S. Magistrate Judge), aff’d, 851 Fed. App’x 509 (5th Cir. 2021) (mem. op., per

curiam), in support of their arguments regarding whether limitations has run on

Jamie’s claims. In Yadav, Vinay Yadav sued Frost Bank for defamation based on

allegations that the Bank published false statements about him in a police report. Id.

at *6. Noting the one-year statute of limitations under Texas law, the court explained

that because “[t]he allegedly false statements by Defendant were published as a

matter of public record in a police report filed on November 19, 2018,” Yadav was

“deemed to know of the statements” on that date. Id. He did not file suit until

December 3, 2019, more than one year later. Id. Yadav argued that the report was

“republicized” three times on later dates, extending limitations on his claims, but the

court explained that these “republications” were privileged filings—exhibits to the

Bank’s motion to dismiss filed in the lawsuit—that could not constitute the basis for

defamation claims. Id.

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Here, in contrast, the police reports were sent to Jamie’s employer. And as the

court in Yadav recognized, “[e]ach time a defamatory statement is brought to the

attention of a third party, a new publication has occurred.” Id. (citing Renfro Drug

Co. v. Lawson, 160 S.W.2d 246, 251 (Tex. 1942)). “Thus, the republication of a

defamatory statement can still fall within the limitations period even though the

original publication is time-barred.” Id. Unlike in Yadav, Jamie’s suit is premised on

the Mailing, not on the initial police report filings.

As we have discussed, Jamie offered evidence to support his contention that

he filed this lawsuit less than one year after Kelli sent the Mailing to his employer.

Therefore, we conclude that Kelli has not conclusively established her limitations

defense. See Gautreaux, 2023 WL 5740179, at *8. We overrule Kelli’s fourth issue.

Judicial proceedings privilege. In her fifth issue, Kelli contends that Jamie’s

claims are “barred by the absolute privilege applicable to judicial documents and

proceedings.” She contends that the nine items in the Mailing “were prepared in

connection with, or anticipation of, civil or criminal legal proceedings.”

“The judicial-proceedings privilege is straightforward: Communications in

the due course of a judicial proceeding will not serve as the basis for a civil action

for libel or slander.” Landry’s, Inc. v. Animal Legal Defense Fund, 631 S.W.3d 40,

46 (Tex. 2021) (internal quotation omitted). The court in Landry’s, Inc. explained:

The judicial-proceedings privilege is an absolute privilege that covers
“any statement made by the judge, jurors, counsel, parties or witnesses,
and attaches to all aspects of the proceedings, including statements

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made in open court, pre-trial hearings, depositions, affidavits and any
of the pleadings or other papers in the case.” James [v. Brown], 637
S.W.2d [914] at 916–17 [(Tex. 1982)]. The privilege facilitates the
proper administration of justice by promoting “full and free disclosure
of information . . . by participants in judicial proceedings.” Shell Oil
Co. v. Writt, 464 S.W.3d 650, 654 (Tex. 2015); see also Bird v. W.C.W.,
868 S.W.2d 767, 772 (Tex. 1994) (“[T]he administration of justice
requires full and free disclosure from witnesses unhampered by fear of
retaliatory lawsuits.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Id. “Whether an allegedly defamatory communication is related to a judicial

proceeding is a question of law, and we resolve all doubt in favor of the privilege.”

Mishkoff v. Garrett, No. 05-22-01063-CV, 2024 WL 770142, at *4 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Feb. 26, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

Jamie responds that (1) his claims are based on statements made to his

employer, not statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding, (2) his claims

are based on the publication of false statements to his employer in Dallas in

November 2022, not on Kelli’s false statements to police in the summer of 2022,

and (3) the judicial proceedings privilege is absolute, while statements to police are

only “qualifiedly privileged.”

In Landry’s, Inc., the owner of a Houston aquarium sued an animal rights

organization (ALDF) for defamation after ALDF made statements on social media

and in a press release critical of the conditions in the aquarium’s tiger habitat.

Landry’s, Inc., 631 S.W.3d at 44–45. The supreme court considered whether these

pre-suit statements by ALDF’s attorney were protected by the judicial proceedings

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privilege. Id. at 46–47. The supreme court noted disagreement among the courts of

appeals regarding the scope of the judicial proceedings privilege, and concluded:

The reasoning of one court of appeals nearly a century ago remains
compelling today:

The privilege accorded a litigant which exempts him from
liability for damages caused by false charges made in his
pleadings, or in the court in the course of a judicial proceeding,
cannot be enlarged into a license to go about in the community
and make false and slanderous charges against his court
adversary and escape liability for damages caused by such
charges on the ground that he had made similar charges in his
court pleadings.
De Mankowski v. Ship Channel Dev. Co., 300 S.W. 188, 122 (Tex.
App.—Galveston 1927, no writ).
Landry’s, Inc., 631 S.W.3d at 48. The court concluded that dissemination to the

media of a notice letter, an accompanying press release, and other publicity

statements made on social media were not protected by the judicial proceedings

privilege. Id. at 50.

The Mailing consists of Kelli’s reports to the police. Nevertheless, Jamie’s

complaint in this lawsuit is not that Kelli made reports to the police. Instead, he

complains of Kelli’s dissemination of the reports to his employer. As in Landry’s,

Inc., Kelli cannot “escape liability for damages caused” by the statements in the

Mailing on the ground that she had made the same charges in her reports to the

police. See id. at 48. We conclude that Jamie’s claims are not barred by the judicial

proceedings privilege. We overrule Kelli’s fifth issue.

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CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s February 1, 2024 “Order Denying Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss.”

240176f.p05
/Maricela Breedlove/
MARICELA BREEDLOVE
JUSTICE

–18–
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT

KELLI DEWISPELARE, Appellant On Appeal from the 116th Judicial
District Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-24-00176-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. DC-23-14602.
Opinion delivered by Justice
JAMIE DEWISPELARE, Appellee Breedlove. Justices Molberg and
Kennedy participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s February
1, 2024 “Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss” is AFFIRMED.

It is ORDERED that appellee Jamie DeWispelare recover his costs of this
appeal from appellant Kelli DeWispelare.

Judgment entered this 23rd day of September, 2024.

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