Zadarron Leon Reedy v. the State of Texas

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed November 14, 2024

In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-23-00130-CR

ZADARRON LEON REEDY, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 1
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F21-15511-H

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Pedersen, III, Smith, and Garcia
Opinion by Justice Garcia

Appellant Zadarron Leon Reedy appeals his conviction for capital murder.

We overrule his three appellate issues and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND
In August 2021, appellant was indicted for capital murder. The indictment

accused him of killing Thomas Scott in the course of committing and attempting to

commit the offense of robbery against Scott. The indictment alleged that appellant

was 15 years old at the time of the slaying and 17 at the time of the indictment.
Appellant was tried as an adult, and the jury found appellant guilty of capital

murder. This resulted in a sentence of life imprisonment with parole eligibility.

Appellant timely appealed.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED
Appellant presents three issues on appeal. He argues (1) the evidence is legally

insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial judge erred by denying appellant’s

request for a lesser included charge of felony murder, and (3) the trial judge erred

by denying appellant’s motion to suppress his custodial statement.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Issue One: Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient as to two elements

of the charged offense of capital murder. Specifically, appellant argues that the

evidence is legally insufficient to prove (1) that he shot Scott in course of committing

robbery as opposed to theft or unauthorized use of a motor vehicle or (2) that he

intended to cause Scott’s death.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction if any rational juror could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

McPherson v. State, 677 S.W.3d 663, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). We consider the

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and we may not reweigh the

evidence, substitute our judgment for the jury’s, or act as a thirteenth juror. Id. This

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standard gives full play to the jury’s responsibility to resolve conflicts in the

testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to

ultimate facts. Id.

A person commits capital murder if he intentionally commits murder in the

course of committing or attempting to commit robbery or certain other crimes. TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(2). A person commits robbery if, in the course of

committing theft, and with the intent to obtain or maintain control of someone else’s

property, he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.

Id. § 29.02(a)(1). “In the course of committing theft” means conduct that occurs in

an attempt to commit, during the commission, or in immediate flight after the

attempt to commit or commission of theft. Id. § 29.01(1). A person commits theft if

he unlawfully appropriates property with the intent to deprive the owner of it. Id.

§ 31.03(a).

2. Review of the Evidence
Police officer Corey Wheeler testified that he was on patrol the night of June

20, 2020, when he responded a call about a shooting near the intersection of Ann

Arbor and Marsalis.1 He went to a Sam’s 99 Cent Store near that intersection and

found a dead body lying in the parking lot. Wheeler examined the body and found

what appeared to be an entry wound on the person’s left side and an exit wound

1
A 911 operator testified that this intersection is in Dallas and in Dallas County.

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“behind the back side of his right shoulder blade area.” Other evidence identified the

decedent as forty-three-year-old Thomas Scott.

Wheeler went inside the store and watched a video that had been taken by a

security camera. That video was admitted into evidence as State’s Exhibit 3. The

video is four minutes and sixteen seconds long, and the date/time stamp indicates

that it begins on June 20, 2020, at 11:52:15 p.m. It shows the parking lot in front of

the store, with Scott’s car parked next to the street at the top left of the video. This

is a screen capture of the beginning of the video, with the license plate on the front

of the silver car near the center of the screenshot redacted:

At roughly 11:53:29, Scott emerged from his car and then walked to the left,

eventually leaving the camera’s field of vision. Wheeler testified that an abandoned

car wash was located in the area where Scott went. At about 11:55:58, a group of

four people entered the camera’s field of vision from the left. One of them went to

the driver’s side of Scott’s car and got in. The car’s headlights came on at roughly

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11:56:07. At roughly 11:56:10, Scott appeared on the left side of the camera’s field

of vision, and he ran to his car as it began to drive away to the right. Scott reached

the passenger side of the car at roughly 11:56:12 and immediately fell to the ground

as the car continued to move away. The car then stopped just short of the road, and

three people ran to the car and got in. Then the car pulled out into the street and

drove away to the right.

A medical examiner testified that Scott died from a single gunshot wound that

perforated his heart. She further testified that he had only seconds to live once he

was shot.

Scott’s vehicle was recovered about 24 hours later. A single shell casing was

found in the back seat.

Appellant was arrested after a police investigation. Judge Nancy Kennedy2

read appellant his rights because he was a juvenile. Then Detective Scott Sayers

interviewed appellant. The interview, including Judge Kennedy’s reading of

appellant’s rights, was video recorded, and the recording was admitted into evidence

over appellant’s objection as State’s Exhibit 33. The video’s audio quality is poor,

and during trial the State asked Sayers what appellant said in his interview when he

and Sayers were talking about Scott’s running up to the side of the vehicle. Sayers

testified, “He said he viewed the complainant as a threat.”

2
Judge Kennedy was subsequently elected to this Court in 2022.

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3. Application of the Law to the Facts
Appellant’s first argument is that there is insufficient evidence to show that

he committed the offense of robbery. He contends that the evidence shows that he

committed only the offense of theft or unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and that

the offense, whichever offense it was, was already completed before Scott’s death.

Therefore, he argues, the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that he was

guilty of capital murder, i.e., that he killed Scott in the course of committing or

attempting to commit robbery.

We reject appellant’s argument. As relevant to this case, the elements of

robbery include injurious conduct committed in the course of committing theft.

PENAL § 29.02(a)(1). “In the course of committing theft” means conduct that occurs

in an attempt to commit, during the commission, or in immediate flight after the

attempt or commission of theft. Id. § 29.01(1). The surveillance video shows that

Scott’s car had traveled only about one car’s length before Scott reached the

passenger-side window and was fatally shot. The jury could reasonably conclude

beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant shot Scott while appellant was committing

or in immediate flight after committing the offense of theft—i.e., in the course of

committing theft—and thus committed robbery. See Chamberlin v. State, 704

S.W.2d 801, 803 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, no pet.) (“[V]iolence accompanying an

escape immediately subsequent to a completed theft can constitute robbery [under

§ 29.02].”). Thus, the jury could reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that

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appellant killed Scott in the course of committing robbery, as required for the offense

of capital murder. See PENAL § 19.03(a)(2).

Appellant’s other argument under issue one is that there is insufficient

evidence that he intended to cause Scott’s death, which is an element of capital

murder in this case. See id. § 19.03(a)(2). In support, he argues that the evidence

shows that his entire interaction with Scott took place within seconds and that he

fired only one shot. He also cites testimony by Detective Sayers that, under the

circumstances, appellant would not have known who was running up to the car as

appellant was starting to drive away.

We reject appellant’s argument. The jury may infer intent from a defendant’s

acts, his words, his conduct, the method used to commit the crime, and the nature of

the wounds inflicted. Pence v. State, No. 05-22-00637-CR, 2023 WL 5089276, at

*4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 9, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication). Moreover, a jury may infer specific intent to kill from use of a deadly

weapon in a deadly manner unless it is reasonably apparent that death or serious

injury could not result from the weapon’s use. Palomo v. State, No. 05-16-01459-

CR, 2018 WL 636105, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 31, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem.

op., not designated for publication). If a deadly weapon is fired at close range and

death results, the law presumes an intent to kill. Id. A firearm is a deadly weapon.

PENAL § 1.07(a)(17).

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The jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence that appellant shot a

gun at Scott at close range, striking him in the chest and killing him within seconds.

Moreover, Sayers testified that appellant told him during his interview that appellant

viewed Scott as a threat. Based on the evidence and the authorities cited above, we

conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that appellant

possessed the requisite intent to murder Scott.

We overrule appellant’s first issue.

B. Issue Two: Jury-Charge Error
In his second issue, appellant argues that the trial judge erred by denying his

request to submit a lesser included offense—felony murder—to the jury.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review a trial judge’s refusal to submit a lesser included offense

instruction for abuse of discretion. Chavez v. State, 666 S.W.3d 772, 776 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2023).

Whether a defendant is entitled to a lesser-included-offense instruction turns

on a two-part test. Id. First, we compare the statutory elements of the alleged lesser

included offense with the statutory elements of the greater offense and any

descriptive averments in the indictment. Id. If proof of the lesser offense is included

within proof of the greater offense, the first step of the test is satisfied. Id.

Second, there must be evidence from which a rational jury could find the

defendant guilty of only the lesser offense. Id. This requirement is met if there is

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affirmative evidence of a factual dispute that raises the lesser offense and rebuts or

negates other evidence establishing the greater offense. Id. It does not matter whether

the dispute is based on direct or circumstantial evidence so long as a rational jury

could interpret the record in a way in which it could find the defendant guilty of only

the lesser included offense. Id. Even a scintilla of evidence is sufficient to raise such

a dispute, but it must be directly germane to the lesser included offense and present

that offense as a valid, rational alternative to the greater offense. Id. at 777. If the

defendant either presents evidence that he or she committed no offense at all or

presents no evidence, and no evidence otherwise raises the issue, a lesser-included-

offense charge is not required. Id.

There must be some evidence directly germane to the lesser included offense

for the jury to consider before a lesser-included-offense instruction is warranted; the

possibility that the jury might disbelieve crucial evidence pertaining to the greater

offense is not enough. Ransier v. State, 670 S.W.3d 646, 650 (Tex. Crim. App.

2023). Unless the evidence presented is subject to different interpretations consistent

with either the greater or the lesser included offense, evidence directly germane to a

lesser included offense exists only if there is affirmative evidence that both raises

the lesser included offense and rebuts or negates an element of the greater offense.

Id.

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2. Application of the Law to the Facts
The State concedes that the first step of the lesser-included-offense test is

satisfied, and we will assume without deciding that it is. The question presented is

whether the evidence adduced at trial satisfied the second step of the test.

Appellant argues that the evidence raised the lesser included offense of felony

murder by tending to show either (i) he did not intend to kill Scott or (ii) he did not

commit the offense of robbery. He relies specifically on the following evidence:

• statements appellant made in his interview with Detective Sayers
that he viewed Scott as a threat and that he did not know that
Scott had died;
• Sayers’s testimony that, under the circumstances, appellant
would not have known who was running up to the car as
appellant was starting to drive away; and

• the surveillance video of the crime.
Appellant also cites a note that the jury sent to the judge during deliberations, but

that is not evidence that could potentially satisfy the second part of the lesser-

included-offense test.

We reject appellant’s arguments. The evidence that appellant viewed Scott as

a threat at the time he shot Scott does not logically tend to show that appellant lacked

the intent to kill Scott when he shot him. Nor does the evidence that appellant did

not know whether Scott had died or that appellant may not have known who Scott

was tend to negate the element of intent to kill. Finally, the surveillance video depicts

nothing that would tend to show that appellant lacked the intent to kill. Accordingly,

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there is no evidence bearing on the element of intent that supports a lesser-included-

offense instruction for felony murder.

We also conclude that no evidence supports a conclusion that appellant was

not guilty of robbery but was guilty of theft of a vehicle or unauthorized use of a

motor vehicle. The surveillance video shows that appellant shot Scott within a

second or two after appellant began to drive away in Scott’s car and had traveled

only about a car’s length in distance. The video does not reasonably support a

conclusion that appellant did not commit robbery, i.e., that appellant did not shoot

Scott while committing or in immediate flight after committing the offense of theft.

We overrule appellant’s second issue on appeal.

C. Issue Three: Denial of Motion to Suppress
In his third and final issue, appellant argues that the trial judge erred by

denying his request to suppress a custodial statement—specifically, a video

recording of his interview with Detective Sayers on June 23, 2020, after appellant

was taken into custody.

1. Standard of Review
We review a ruling on a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion under a

bifurcated standard of review. State v. Torres, 666 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2023). We give almost total deference to the trial judge’s determination of

historical facts and the trial judge’s rulings on mixed questions of law and fact,

especially when those determinations are based on an assessment of credibility and

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demeanor. Id. We review de novo pure questions of law and rulings on mixed

questions of law and fact that do not turn on an assessment of credibility and

demeanor. Id. at 740–41.

2. Relevant Facts
On June 23, 2020, while he was in custody, appellant participated in a video-

recorded interview with Detective Sayers. The video, State’s Exhibit 33, shows that

Judge Nancy Kennedy first read him his rights in the presence of two witnesses.

Appellant then stated that he wanted to talk. Detective Sayers then entered the room

and conversed with appellant for about 23 minutes.

On June 26, 2020, Judge Kennedy signed findings of fact and conclusions of

law. She recited that she had reviewed the video recording, and she found that

appellant was given “all warnings of rights specified by law before making any

statement.” She further found that appellant “knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily waived these rights prior to and during the making of his statement and

that [appellant] fully understands the nature and contents of the statement.” Finally,

she found that appellant made the recorded statement of his own free will and that

“he was not promised any benefit tangible or intangible and was not coerced or

forced in any manner to give this statement.”

Appellant contends that he made a motion to suppress asserting that the

recorded statement was taken in violation of Family Code § 51.095 and that he did

not knowingly, intelligently, freely, and voluntarily waive his rights under that

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section. But we do not find a motion to suppress the recorded statement in the

appellate record. Appellant appears to be referring to the following item in his

“Omnibus Pretrial Motion” filed on January 17, 2023:

On January 24, 2023, the presiding trial judge held a hearing about the

admissibility of the recorded statement. The evidence introduced at the hearing

consisted of: (1) a stipulation of evidence that identified Judge Kennedy as the

magistrate who warned appellant of his rights and Detective Sayers as the person

who conducted the interview; (2) the video recording itself; (3) Judge Kennedy’s

June 26, 2020 findings and conclusions; and (4) the written warning that Judge

Kennedy gave appellant, signed by two witnesses. Appellant’s counsel conceded

that Judge Kennedy complied with “the statute” and limited his argument to

disputing Judge Kennedy’s finding that appellant “truly understood what was going

on and freely and voluntarily waived his rights not to talk to the police.” Counsel

made only two specific complaints about how the interview was conducted:

(i) Detective Sayers entered the room before Judge Kennedy was finished and

(ii) the interview “wasn’t an interrogation” but rather was in response to a question
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appellant had about his “predicament.” Beyond that, counsel simply asked the

presiding trial judge to watch the recording of the interview and “judge for herself”

whether appellant freely and voluntarily made the statement with a true

understanding of his rights and what was going on. After hearing argument from the

State, the presiding judge took the matter under advisement.

We see no written order on appellant’s request to suppress the recorded

statement in the appellate record. There was a hearing on January 30, 2023, at which

appellant was admonished. During that hearing, an attorney mentioned that the

presiding judge had sent out an email about the motion to suppress, but the attorney

did not say what the email said. Then, during trial the State offered the video

recording into evidence, and appellant’s attorney said, “[W]e have the same

objection as previously stated to the Court.” The trial judge overruled the objection

and admitted the recording into evidence.

3. Applicable Law
Because appellant was a juvenile when he was arrested, the Family Code

controls issues involving his substantive rights. See Roquemore v. State, 60 S.W.3d

862, 866 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Family Code § 51.095 prescribes requirements for

making a child’s statement admissible in future proceedings. See TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN. § 51.095; see also id. § 51.02(2)(A) (defining “child” as a person who is at

least ten years old but younger than 17). One requirement applicable to the statement

involved in this case is that the child must have “knowingly, intelligently, and

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voluntarily” waived his or her rights, including the right to remain silent. See id.

§ 51.095(a)(5)(A). There is little caselaw interpreting this provision, but it is

substantially the same as a provision in Article 38.22 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 3(a)(2); see also McIntyre

v. State, 619 S.W.3d 311, 323 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, pet. ref’d) (noting that

the two provisions are substantially the same). Section 51.095(a)(5)(A) also

resembles Article 38.21, which provides, “A statement of an accused may be used

in evidence against him if it appears that the same was freely and voluntarily made

without compulsion or persuasion, under the rules hereafter prescribed.” CODE

CRIM. PROC. art. 38.21. Because the statutes are similar, we consider precedents

interpreting Article 38.21 and Article 38.22 to be instructive in applying the

“knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily” standard found in § 51.095(a)(5)(A).

Once appellant challenged the voluntariness of his recorded statement, the

State bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the

statement was voluntary. See Vasquez v. State, 411 S.W.3d 918, 920 n.11 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2013) (applying Article 38.22). A claim of involuntariness can be based

on factors such as the following:

• overreaching by law enforcement;

• duress brought on by hallucinations, illness, medications, or a
private threat;
• the defendant’s lack of mental capacity to understand his or her
rights; or

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• a temporary mental condition that prevented the defendant from
understanding what he or she was confessing to.

See Sandoval v. State, 665 S.W.3d 496, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (applying

Article 38.22), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1166 (2024). On the other hand, “youth,

intoxication, mental retardation, and other disabilities are usually not enough, by

themselves, to render a statement inadmissible.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

footnote omitted).

A promise made to a defendant can render a confession invalid if the promise

is positive, made or sanctioned by someone in authority, and of such an influential

nature that it would cause a defendant to speak untruthfully. Martinez v. State, 127

S.W.3d 792, 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (applying Article 38.21). But general,

unspecific offers to help and general statements that a confession can sometimes

result in leniency will not render a confession involuntary or invalid. Jones v. State,

No. 05-19-00503-CR, 2020 WL 5887019, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 5, 2020,

no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (applying Article 38.21). And a

prediction about future events is not a promise. Id.; see also Bernal v. State, No. 05-

23-00027-CR, 2024 WL 3633394, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 2, 2024, no pet.

h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (applying Article 38.21 and holding

that “clichés and comforting expressions” like “I promise, everything’s going to be

ok” are not promises that can make a confession involuntary).

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4. Application of the Law to the Facts
Appellant argues that the following factors show that his recorded statement

was not knowingly, freely, and voluntarily made:

• Judge Kennedy read the warnings to appellant very quickly and
did not perform detailed questioning to verify that he understood
his rights;

• Detective Sayers said things calculated to make appellant believe
that giving his side of the story would help him in his criminal
case; and

• the State adduced no evidence that appellant was familiar with
criminal proceedings, possessed normal intelligence, or could
read or write.
We conclude that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion by admitting

appellant’s recorded statement. Judge Kennedy read appellant his rights at a normal

speed and even paused once to make sure that appellant was listening to her. When

she subsequently asked appellant if he wanted to make a statement, he said he wanted

to talk, and she confirmed his decision by asking him, “You do want to talk?” He

answered, “Mm-hm.” She spent about six minutes in the room with appellant and

conversed with him during that time, and she found that appellant knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights. The presiding judge was entitled to

credit Judge Kennedy’s opinion.

Appellant’s interview with Detective Sayers was not long, lasting about 23

minutes. Appellant was able to converse intelligently with Sayers, showing, for

example, that he knew the meaning of the word “remorseful.”

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Appellant argues that Sayers offered improper inducements in order to

persuade appellant to speak.3 Specifically, he complains that Sayers said (i) that

when appellant’s case went to trial, people would want to know why appellant shot

Scott; (ii) that everything matters in a capital case; and (iii) that telling why he shot

Scott would make a difference in appellant’s capital-murder trial. But none of these

statements rises to the level of a positive promise; rather, they all amount to the kind

of clichés and comforting expressions that are insufficient to support a claim of

involuntariness. See Bernal, 2024 WL 3633394, at *5; see also Jones, 2020 WL

5887019, at *8.

We overrule appellant’s third issue on appeal.

IV. DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/Dennise Garcia//
230130f.u05 DENNISE GARCIA
Do Not Publish JUSTICE
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

3
The State argues that appellant forfeited his improper-inducement argument by failing to assert it in
the trial court. We assume without deciding that appellant did not forfeit the argument.
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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT

ZADARRON LEON REEDY, On Appeal from the Criminal District
Appellant Court No. 1, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F21-15511-H.
No. 05-23-00130-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Garcia.
Justices Pedersen, III and Smith
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 14th day of November, 2024.

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